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This project attempts to respond to Charles Taylor’s invitation, made in A Secular Age, 
for “new and unprecedented itineraries” capable of guiding seekers toward an encounter 
with God. Today, many Westerners find belief in God difficult if not impossible. This 
essay begins with an overview of Taylor’s secularization narrative and explores the 
causes and pressures that have made belief in the Transcendent problematic. To respond 
to Taylor’s summons for new itineraries, I turn in Chapters 2-4 to the work of 
philosopher William Desmond. After introducing readers to Desmond and locating him 
on a landscape dominated by phenomenologists, I introduce Desmond’s metaphysical 
philosophy and argue that this his thought can be approached as a form of spiritual 
exercise capable of reawakening a sense of the Transcendent. In Chapters 3 and 4 I 
engage the work of Pierre Hadot to show how Desmond’s philosophy can work to 
transform the way one perceives the world. Read within this framework, I believe 
Desmond’s metaxological metaphysics provides a series of spiritual exercises needed in 
an increasingly secular age. Read within the framework, metaxology becomes less a 
philosophy about which one must be informed than a philosophy capable of forming 
readers to perceive reality anew. In Chapter 5, I draw out some of the theological 
implications for this interpretation of Desmond’s work. In the conclusion, I survey the 
project and indicate what I consider to be the theological achievement of Desmond’s 
project and indicate opportunities for future engagement between metaxology and 
theology. 
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Introduction 
 
It is essential that the vision of reality which poetry offers be transformative, more than 
just a printout of the given circumstances of its time and place. The poet who would be 
most the poet has to attempt an act of writing that outstrips the conditions even as it 
observes them. The truly creative writer, by interposing his or her perception and 
expression, will transfigure the conditions and effect what I have been calling “the 
redress of poetry.” The world is different after it has been read by a Shakespeare or an 
Emily Dickinson or a Samuel Beckett because it has been augmented by their reading of 
it. 
-Seamus Heaney, The Redress of Poetry 
 
 
We have shortage of images capable of describing the spiritual environment of 
our age. From John of the Cross, one might retrieve the “dark night of the soul.” With 
Louis Dupré we might see ourselves as abiding in the “desert of modern atheism,”1with 
Karl Rahner as weathering faith’s wintry season,2 or with William Desmond as enduring 
the “night of atheism.”3  Each metaphor attempts to express a shift in the possibility of 
religious belief. As Charles Taylor poses the question, “Why was it virtually impossible 
not to believe in God in, say, 1500 in our Western society while in 2000 many of us find 
this not only easy, but even inescapable?”4 How has it come to pass that paths once 
reliably trod by our spiritual ancestors appear, today, increasingly incapable of conveying 
us toward the sacred or leading us to linger upon the question of God? 
 Across the plane of unbelief, a theologically trained ear cannot help but hear 
echoes of Rahner’s prophecy: “the devout Christian of the future will either be a ‘mystic,’ 
one who has experienced ‘something,’ or he will cease to be anything at all.”5 A 
theologian whose life spanned the long and bloody twentieth century, Rahner never 
                                               
1 Louis Dupré, Religious Mystery and Rational Reflection (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 139.  
2 Karl Rahner, Faith in a Wintry Season trans. Harvey Egan (New York: Crossroad, 1990). 
3 William Desmond, God and the Between (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 338.  
4 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 25.  
5 Karl Rahner, “Christian Living Formerly and Today,” in Theological Investigations VII, trans.  
David Bourke (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), 15.  
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surrendered his confidence that God could be encountered in one’s life. His optimism 
about the possibility of experiencing the divine, however, was tempered by his 
recognition that naïve or taken-for-granted belief had become impotent to mediate such 
an encounter. “All the societal supports of religion are collapsing and dying out in this 
secularized and pluralistic society,” he observed, and if one is to have an authentic 
Christian spirituality it will only be “through an ultimate, immediate encounter of the 
individual with God.”6 In something of a Rahnerian spirit, Taylor muses:  
inevitably and rightly Christian life today will look for and discover new ways of 
moving beyond the present orders to God. One could say that we look for new 
and unprecedented itineraries. Understanding our time in Christian terms is party 
to discern these new paths, opened by pioneers who have discovered a way 
through the particular labyrinthine landscape we live in, its thickets and trackless 
wastes, to God.7  
 
If the desert sands of secularism have eroded ancient paths, or if atheism’s dark night 
appears to have eclipsed the light of faith, believers face a choice. Either choose to 
abandon the pilgrimage and become a permanent resident in the spiritual desert or find 
the courage to venture out again and chart new and innovative itineraries to the sacred.  
 This essay records an effort to show how William Desmond’s metaxological 
metaphysics offers a compelling response to Taylor’s call for “new paths.” The reader’s 
eyebrows raise: “Metaphysics? In this day and age? Have we not finished with that?” I 
know, I know: many today think the code has been called on metaphysics. To wit: long 
before Heidegger announced its overcoming, David Hume concluded his Enquiry  
If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for 
instance, let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or 
number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of 
                                               
6 Paul Imhof and Hubert Biallowons, eds., Karl Rahner in Dialogue: Conversations and Interviews, 1965- 
1982, trans. Harvey D. Egan (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 1986), 176.  
7 Taylor, A Secular Age, 755.  
 3 
fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing 
but sophistry and illusion.8   
 
If I risk singing my hand by reaching into the flames to rescue Desmond’s texts, it is 
because I believe his works are needed by philosophers and theologians. It will be the 
task of this essay to argue for the viability Desmond’s thought and to demonstrate how, 
properly interpreted, metaxology can transfigure the way we behold the world around us. 
Metaxology offers something akin to Heaney’s “redress of poetry,” a transformed vision 
whereby giving us to behold not a different reality but reality differently.  
 As will become clearer, metaxology is not a philosophical “system” one reads and 
masters. Nor is it a grid or a Procrustean bed of concepts. Metaxology is better likened to 
an undertaking or, in the wake of Taylor’s call, perhaps a “passionate itinerary.” The 
word “passion” finds its origin in the Latin patere meaning “to suffer” or “to undergo.” 
Taken in this sense, Desmond leads us to the shore of Arnold’s Dover Beach where  
The Sea of Faith  
Was once, too, at the full, and round earth’s shore  
Lay like the folds of a bright girdle furled.  
But now I only hear  
Its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar,  
Retreating, to the breath  
Of the night-wind, down the vast edges drear  
And naked shingles of the world.  
 
Ah, love, let us be true 
To one another! for the world, which seems  
To lie before us like a land of dreams 
So various, so beautiful, so new, 
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light 
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain; 
And we are here as on a darkling plain 
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight, 
Where ignorant armies clash by night.9  
                                               
8 David Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Eric Steinberg (Indianapolis: Hackett,  
1993), 114.  
9 Matthew Arnold, Dover Beach and Other Poems (New York: Dover, 1994), 86-87.  
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Desmond offers us a way of standing firm on the shore and discerning within the 
“melancholy, long, withdrawing roar” not the end of belief but a silent prelude to a re-
awakened sense of the Transcendent. He gives a way of dwelling on the “darkling plain” 
not in a forlorn spirit of resignation but in receptive openness to or vigilant listening for 
the advent of the Holy One. This is not metaphysics as an abstract system of idle 
speculation but metaphysics as an askesis, a spiritual practice, and a way of life. For those 
today who belief in the Transcendent difficult, vexing, or exercising, to them I suggest 
reading Desmond’s philosophy as a form of spiritual exercise or as a practice capable of 
renewing one’s sense of the Transcendent.  
Nearly two years before beginning this project, Dominic Doyle shared a bit of 
advice given to him by Michael Buckley. The gist of the counsel: “A dissertation is only 
as good as the question it seeks to answer.” To provide an overview of my project, allow 
me to put forward the question with which I have struggled, the resources I believe we 
need to answer the question, and then what happens when we answer the question. Or: 
What is the problem, Who can fix it, and Why does it matter?  
 At the risk of hyperbole, I would say page 755 of A Secular Age changed my life. 
On this page, as quoted above, Taylor issues a summons for new itineraries to the sacred. 
To my mind, as I elaborate in Chapter One, this is Taylor’s Narnian moment. If you 
recall The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe, at the end of the book the children discover 
that the wardrobe no longer conveys them to Narnia. The closure of this route does not, 
of course, mean Narnia has ceased to exist; it means, rather, that the children must remain 
attentive to the appearance of new routes. To his credit, Taylor offers several exemplars 
of figures who have attempted to uncover such routes: Charles Peguy, Ivan Illich, and 
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Gerard Manley Hopkins. But Taylor’s summons got me thinking: do we really need new 
routes or might we need to repristinate some of the old ones? Although our first response 
to Taylor’s summons may be to set out to extend the borders of his map, I am of a mind 
that there are other approaches. What if, instead of looking for new routes to the sacred, 
we look at old routes anew? Rather than a pilgrimage into distant lands, why don’t we 
undertake an archaeological expedition and dig vertical shafts to allow us to excavate the 
ground beneath the old routes to see if we might not discover hitherto concealed depths 
that give us to perceive map of our age in a new, transformed, and transformative way?  
 I ask this because I accept as a truism that a map should never be mistaken for the 
territory: even the most vivid depiction of a terrain cannot replace having to negotiate it 
for oneself. Talk about something – whether it be our secular age, or a workout program, 
or literature – cannot substitute for engaging the issue for oneself. Taylor’s call for new 
itineraries struck me as requiring not so much a new way of thinking as a new way of 
being mindful. The central question, the what animating my reading and writing, arises 
from page 755: even if we must labor beneath the hoary light of an eclipsed 
Transcendence, can we find a thinker capable of guiding our search for new itineraries to 
God? In the figure of William Desmond, I contend, we find one such guide.  
 If Chapter One surveys the map and territory of our age, Chapters Two through 
Four suggest how Desmond’s metaxological metaphysics allows us to dwell within the 
territory Taylor so vibrantly explores. The core of this essay, these chapters unfold in 
three moments. First, in Chapter Two, I introduce readers to Desmond. After a brief 
biographical sketch, I enter into a conversation with a series of thinkers – Martin 
Heidegger, John Caputo, Richard Kearney, and Merold Westphal – about the viability of 
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a theological engagement with metaphysics and, somewhat playfully, suggest a set of 
“Five Commandments” metaphysics must obey. The bulk of this chapter provides a 
general overview to the systematic nature of Desmond’s thought and shows how he and 
Taylor, while not engaged in identical projects, can complement one another.  
 While Chapter Two offers a broad overview of and introduction to metaxology, it 
falls to Chapters Three and Four to show how metaxology works. My argument: 
Desmond’s philosophy is best approached as a form of spiritual exercise aimed not so 
much at informing readers as forming them to perceive reality anew. The reader will 
rightly detect the presence of Pierre Hadot beneath this claim. In Chapter Three, I use 
Hadot’s work to frame Desmond’s project. Approaching metaxology as a form of 
spiritual exercise, I believe, can aide the willing reader in cultivating attitude in which the 
question of the Transcendent may be resurrected. I admit immediately: to my knowledge, 
Desmond does not regard his own work in this way. Indeed, nearly thirty years ago he 
wrote, “The philosopher undergoes the discipline, not of spiritual exercise, but of mindful 
thought.”10 Even if this counts as a protest against my interpretation – which I doubt – I 
am resolute in my conviction that Desmond’s philosophy is best approached as 
something that must be practiced, undertaken and undergone, as a type of spiritual 
exercise. This chapter concludes with reading what Desmond calls the “Return to Zero” 
as a type of exercise capable of cultivating a renewed sense of metaphysical mindfulness.  
 In Chapter Four, I offer a series of four exercises drawn from Desmond’s God 
and the Between. Rather than straightforward directions to or proofs of God, he offers a 
series of “indirections.” These indirections transform how we understand and behold the 
territory of our age. Rather than offering us a new map, these indirections lead us into the 
                                               
10 William Desmond, Philosophy and Its Others (Albany: SUNY, 1990), 41.  
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very heart of existence itself. They are reflexive exercises aimed at transforming the way 
we behold the whole of reality. In these exercises we begin to see how metaxology and 
theology are not antagonistic and how metaxology can overlap with, and contribute to, 
theological reflection.  
In Chapter Five, I indicate the effect these exercises can have on the one 
undertaking them. This chapter is by far the most speculative and tentative, intended 
more to issue a series of promissory notes in need of redemption at a later date. By 
transposing it into an explicitly theological register, I show how metaxology is a fecund 
resource for theologians. To be sure, one can approach metaxology as a form of natural 
theology. Yet within theology itself metaxology provides a remarkably fecund resource 
allowing us to rethink issues pertinent to fundamental theology (revelation and grace), 
theological method and theological anthropology. I hesitate to be too explicit here in the 
introduction: if the net gain of this project were able to be stated succinctly at the 
beginning, then there would be little need to write, or read, hundreds of pages to get to it. 
The nuggets brought forth in this chapter need to be refined and purified and tested 
further. But there are nuggets to be found – of this I am convinced – and if Desmond’s 
metaphysics helps to guide us toward a rich lode of theological insight, I am willing to 
risk unearthing a lot of “fool’s gold” if this endeavor eventuates in the discovery of a rich 
vein of insight we might begin to mine.   
 I conclude this essay with a brief recapitulation of the itinerary we have traversed, 
a journey leading us from Taylor’s Quebec to Desmond’s Cork. We find our way to a 
pub where Taylor and Desmond can, at the day’s gloaming, raise a pint and give a toast 
to the Transcendent. If we find Desmond a reliable guide through our secular age, we 
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should here praise his efforts and assess where improvements might yet be needed. For if 
he can show how the eclipse of the Transcendent, or the dark night of atheism, is not a 
fait accompli but only a transitory phase, then our journey is far from over. Only at the 
end of one day’s expedition can we decide how best to proceed the next day, who we 
might enlist to join us, how we might begin to share the news of any discoveries. There is 
no definitive “The End” but only a pause, a wink, a celebratory swig, and a resolution to 
continue digging as we await the dawn of a new day.  
Let me now say something of method, scope, and limitation. Richard Kearney 
recounts how Paul Ricouer began his 1977 seminar by asking d’oú parlez-vous? or 
“where do you speak from?”11 I speak from the stance of an Irish-American, a Jesuit 
priest, an Irish musician and theologian. My sense of the Church and faith comes as much 
from being raised a Catholic as it does from talking about religion and faith at the end of 
the bar. I speak most, though, from my experience having taught high school boys in 
Detroit. Perhaps my best homiletic lessons were learned teaching 9th – 12th graders: if you 
can make something interesting to sleep-deprived, hormonally charged adolescents, you 
can make anything interesting. I write this as I tried to teach: I am no Moses come down 
from the Mount, so I proceed tentatively and allusively, more inductively and intuitively 
than deductively. Or, said with Pascalian flare, I aim to write with esprit de finesse more 
than esprit de géometrie.  
 This plays out in two ways. First, I admit to being an allusive – though hopefully 
not elusive – writer. I always have found it helpful to offer concrete examples and to 
draw connections between ideas. You will find this in my many advertences to narrative, 
poetry, and music. I do not do it to show off erudition – there is not much to show – but 
                                               
11 Richard Kearney, Anatheism (New York: Columbia, 2010), xi.  
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to help “build bridges” and make connections between Desmond and other thinkers and 
modes of reflection. Desmond is not yet well-known and it seems needful to show, in an 
era skeptical of metaphysics, how engaging his thought can be enriching and illuminating 
in a host of areas. My goal throughout is to show how beholding the world with 
metaxological eyes allows for the revelation of too-easily concealed depths and riches. 
There is more to reality, as I hope to show, than meets the secular eye. Second, I am 
reluctant to carry on side conversations in footnotes. As was beaten into my head by my 
first advisor, Joan Nuth: if it is not worth including in the text, it is not worth including. 
Consequently, I try to reserve footnotes for citations and I resist, to the best of my ability, 
from carrying on with sub-conversations. I am not always successful in this, but I do try. 
If this exploration proves successful, there will be time and space enough for those 
conversations to be had. If this is a flop, well…at least I am not wasting the reader’s time.  
 Now a word about the project’s scope. First, it is not my intent to offer a digest of 
the whole of Desmond’s thinking. I do not engage much with his work on Hegel, on 
aesthetics, or on ethics. His writings on these topics are interesting in their own right, but 
they do not seem as vital for answering Taylor’s solicitation for new itineraries. 
Furthermore, while there have been developments in Desmond’s philosophy over the 
course of his career, his metaphysics has remained consistently coordinated by what he 
regards as the “fourfold sense of being.” No doubt, one might dedicate an entire study to 
examining the developments in how this fourfold is understood. This is not that study. 
After a long career as an author and teacher, it would be shocking were his thought to 
have failed to develop. These developments, though, tend to have a “deepening” effect: 
concepts introduced earlier in his career do not disappear or change so much as deepen 
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and mature. As a result, my reading and interpretation of his philosophy takes for granted 
a certain integrity to his metaphysical reflections.  
 Finally, an observation. Graduate students are reminded over and again that the 
dissertation is not their life’s work – thank God! – and that it is an exercise mean to get 
them into the guild of scholars. In a way, this essay is an exercise on exercise. Rest 
assured: our journey is not into a funhouse’s “Hall of Mirrors” where we get lost in 
reflections on reflections on reflections. If we imaginatively return to Dover Beach, this 
essay is an extended meditation whereby we stand on the shore of the Sea of Faith, scan 
its surface, and allow the reality of our age to be present fully to us. If we stand with 
Desmond, we will find we have no reason to quake or quail: the surrounding darkness 
need not be seen, or experienced, as extinguishing the Transcendent. His reflections 
uncover within the very being of creation, and within our abyssal selves, secret sources of 
strengthening. He gives us resources to stand firm beneath the dark night, to endure the 
shattering of nihilism, and to open our eyes to see amidst the dust and rubble the hints 
and glimmers of a new dawn. By morning’s light, the Sea is transformed: no longer does 
it rush away from the shore but comes back again with a surge.  
 Such, at least, is what I want to argue as we embark upon this exploration. We set 
out with Taylor and let him show us the shape and contours of the shore’s map. When we 
meet Desmond, we will allow him to convince us to take off our shoes and wander the 
shoreline where, perhaps, we will experience as though for the first time the rush of the 
Sea of Faith’s waters and feel it pool and swirl around our ankles. I do not want only to 
describe spiritual exercises for my reader. I want to show, instead, how William 
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Desmond’s philosophy can be read as a type of askesis one must undertake for oneself. In 
this I am reminded of Paul Elie’s observation about pilgrimage: 
A pilgrimage is a journey undertaken in the light of a story. A great event has 
happened; the pilgrim hears the reports and goes in search of the evidence, 
aspiring to be an eyewitness. The pilgrim seeks not only to confirm the experience 
of others firsthand but to be changed by the experience. Pilgrims often make the 
journey in company, but each must be changed individually they must see for 
themselves, each with his or her own eyes. And as they return to ordinary life the 
pilgrims must tell others what they saw, recasting the story in their own terms.12  
 
As an essay, this work certainly adheres to scholarly convention and it will, I hope, 
inform the reader. But I hope it works on a deeper and more affective level to invite the 
reader, as Augustine heard so many years ago: tolle lege, take up and read. Grandma 
Kilbane never tired of reminding us that “the proof of the pudding is in the tasting.” I 
reckon it might take a bit of coaxing to get some readers to sample this metaphysically-
infused pudding. Even if you do not abandon all other fare and take up a strictly 
metaxological diet, I should like to think you will find how well Desmond’s metaphysics 
can accompany, and flavor, lots of ways of thinking. Come along, then, if not for the 
pudding then to see some new sights and meet a thinker you might well never have heard 
of before.  I hope we can have a laugh along the way, share some verse, and try to discern 
together, as we spend time on the shore of Dover Beach, how our era has come to 
experience the eclipse of transcendence and whether Desmond might be capable of 
offering a new itinerary to the sacred needed in an increasingly secular age. Perhaps we 
will find that what to many eyes and hearts is the permanent eclipse of the Transcendent 
can become but a dark prelude to reborn faith.  
 
 
 
                                               
12 Paul Elie, The Life You Save Might Be Your Own (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), x.  
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Chapter 1 
 
BEATING THE BOUNDS OF A SECULAR AGE  
 
 One way to put the question that I want to answer here is this one: why was it 
 virtually impossible not to believe in God in, say, 1500 in our Western society, 
 while in 2000 many of us find this not only easy, but even inescapable? 
-Charles Taylor, A Secular Age 
 
 
 “There is a generalized sense in our culture,” Charles Taylor observes, “that with 
the eclipse of the transcendent, something may have been lost.”13 He continues: 
I put it in the optative mood, because people react very differently to this; some 
endorse this idea of loss, and seek to define what it is. Others want to downplay it, 
and paint it as an optional reaction, something we are in for only as long as we 
allow ourselves to wallow in nostalgia. Still others, again, while standing as 
firmly on the side of disenchantment as the critics of nostalgia, nevertheless 
accept that this sense of loss is inevitable; it is the price we pay for modernity and 
rationality, but we must courageously accept this bargain, and lucidly opt for what 
we have inevitably become.14 
 
That there has been a change in the West’s attitude toward questions of the Transcendent 
is hardly debatable. Seminars entitled “Theology in a Secular Age,” declining rates of 
religious involvement,15 and countless YouTube channels, radio interviews, essays, 
journal articles and monographs leave little doubt: our sense of contact with something 
“beyond ourselves” has attenuated.16 What is not entirely clear, though, is what this 
“loss” means. Some regard the “eclipse of the transcendent” as an achievement: “God is 
dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him.”17 Others, Louis Dupré notes, refuse to 
be called atheist because “atheism is still ‘an inverted act of faith.’ The humanist must 
                                               
13 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2007), 307.  
14 Ibid., 307.  
15 Pew Research Center, “U.S. Public Becoming Less Religious,” (DC: 2015), 
 http://www.pewforum.org/2015/11/03/u-s-public-becoming-less-religious/ August 3, 2017.  
16 Representative of such works would be Louis Dupré’s Passage to Modernity, Michael Allen Gillespie’s 
 The Theological Origins of Modernity, Hans Blumenberg’s The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, 
 Mark Lilla’s The Stillborn God, and Brad Gregory’s The Unintended Reformation  
17 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), 180. 
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start not with the denial of God, but with the affirmation of the human, the sole source of 
meaning.”18 Yet others, like Paul Crowley, perceive an opportunity to develop “a 
theology that unifies the fides quae with the fides qua in a deeper understanding 
(mystagogic task), thereby enabling Christian theology to function within and address a 
people of the church and of the world who are steeped in a secular milieu (the missionary 
task).”19 The “eclipse of the transcendent” admits of a wide variety of interpretations; it 
has “its boosters as well as its knockers”20 and allows for a range of positions in between. 
In Charles Taylor’s work, we find a penetrating interpretation and analysis of the 
space between modernity’s “boosters” and “knockers” wherein we can recognize both 
what “is admirable and much that is debased and frightening.”21 As we will see, this 
sense of between is as central for Taylor as it is for William Desmond, whose 
metaxological metaphysics (a logos of the metaxu or “between”) I explore in subsequent 
chapters. Both thinkers contest claims that the “eclipse of the transcendent” is a settled 
matter, a fait accompli. Instead, each guides his reader beneath the eclipse where one can 
feel the stress and strain of what Taylor calls the “Jamesian open space” where “the 
winds blow, where one can feel the pull in both directions”22 toward both belief and 
unbelief. In their writings, both thinkers permit readers to experience what is lost, or 
gained, when the transcendent horizon is wiped out. They charge readers with discerning 
whether the eclipse is total or transitory, whether it records a permanent loss of the sacred 
or opens onto a purgative process to be undergone as a prelude to a new dawn.  
                                               
18 Louis Dupré, Religious Mystery and Rational Reflection (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 133.  
19 Paul Crowley, “Mystagogy and Mission: The Challenge of Nonbelief and the Task of Theology,”  
 Theological Studies 76 (1), 2015: 7—28 at 12.  
20 Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 11.  
21 Ibid.  
22Taylor, A Secular Age, 592.   
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  If the “eclipse of the transcendent” is a feature of our secular age, we should get 
clear on what the word “secular” describes. Taylor identifies three meanings:  
• Secular1 – the emptying of God, or an ultimate reality, from public and 
social spheres; religion has its own “sphere” in which it operates.  
• Secular2 – enshrined in “subtraction stories,” this describes the “falling 
off of religious beliefs and practices.”  
• Secular3 – focuses on the “conditions of belief.” Belief in God has ceased 
to be axiomatic or presumed; belief and unbelief are contested options.23 
 
In A Secular Age, he is occupied chiefly with tracing the development and contours of 
Secular3. What distinguishes Secular3 from previous ages is “the eclipse of all goals 
beyond human flourishing becomes conceivable; or better, it falls within the range of an 
imaginable life for masses of people.”24 Ours is an age in which we need not refer our 
actions, or direct our lives, toward anything beyond the terrestrial order. In fact, we daily 
encounter myriad beliefs varying in commitment and intensity: fervent Muslims, 
milquetoast Christians, upright atheists, duplicitous agnostics. The title of Greg Epstein’s 
book sees as possible what once, earlier in the Latin West, would have been unthinkable: 
one can be Good Without God.25 The “eclipse of the transcendent” does not, of course, 
necessarily mean our age has been plunged into depravity or nihilism; rather, it means 
appeal to or belief in the transcendent – an impersonal Good, a personal God – has 
become one option among many: belief, unbelief, agnosticism, hostility to transcendence, 
etc.. Taylor’s map of the “the spiritual shape of the present age”26 can be read as an effort 
to rethink the nature of what Max Weber called “disenchantment.” Whereas Weber saw 
the rise of science and technology as pushing religious belief out of the picture, Taylor 
tells a different story, a counter-narrative, of why belief has become challenging.  
                                               
23 Ibid., 2-3. Cf. Ruth Abbey’s “Theorizing Secularity 3” in Aspiring to Fullness in a Secular Age, 
24 Ibid., 20.  
25 Greg Epstein, Good Without God (New York: Harper Collins, 2010) 
26 Taylor, A Secular Age, 539.  
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Taylor admits: A Secular Age “lays out, unashamedly, a master narrative”27 of 
how belief in the transcendent became increasingly difficult. We risk missing the force of 
his account if we approach the text only as a retrospective chronicle of events. What 
makes his story so compelling is that it is at once informative and performative: his text 
implicates the reader so that in reading the text one finds oneself “being read” by it. A 
Secular Age does not tell a story but, rather, reveals our story as it is read. By implicating 
the reader in its telling,28 the reader is given to feel how, with eclipse of the transcendent,  
 our actions, goals, achievements, and the like, have a lack of weight, gravity, 
 thickness, substance. There is a deeper resonance which they lack, which we feel 
 should  be there.29     
 
James K.A. Smith corroborates this, observing that Taylor’s goal “isn’t demonstration or 
proof; the point isn’t to offer a syllogism that secures analytical truth. Instead, the appeal 
is to a ‘sense,’ a feel for things.”30  
 Taylor invites us to dwell within the story and to feel from within what he calls 
the “malaises of immanence.”31 Without gainsaying modernity’s gains, he is keen to 
induce a sense of what has been lost on account of the eclipse. These include  
 (1) The sense of the fragility of meaning, the search for an over-arching 
 significance; (2) the felt flatness of our attempts to solemnize the crucial moments 
 of passage in our lives; (3) the utter flatness, emptiness of the ordinary.32  
 
In a way, he wants us to sing with Peggy Lee’s and ask: “Is that all there is?”33 Beneath 
the eclipse’s waning light, can we hope for anything other than what we see before us? 
                                               
27 Charles Taylor, “Afterword: Apologia pro Libro suo,” in Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age, ed. 
 Michael  Warner, Jonathan VanAntwerpen, and Craig Calhoun (Cambridge: Harvard University 
 Press, 2010), 301. 
28 “Self-implication” here is taken from Sandra Schneiders and will be developed later in the project.   
29 Taylor, A Secular Age, 307.  
30 James K. A. Smith, How (Not) to Be Secular (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014), 132.  
31 Taylor, A Secular Age, 309.  
32 Ibid., 309.  
33 Ibid., 311.  
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 I am convinced the answer to Peggy Lee’s question is a resounding no: we need 
not resign ourselves the “fragility of meaning” or the “emptiness of the ordinary.” Indeed, 
my project seeks to demonstrate how William Desmond’s metaphysics, approached as a 
form of “spiritual exercise,” can re-awaken in our age not only the question of the 
Transcendent but also cultivate a practice of philosophical mindfulness capable of 
rendering us increasingly attentive to the Transcendent. I admit: this is a tall order, not 
least because our age has grown suspicious of metaphysics and Desmond remains an 
unrepentant metaphysician.  
To make my case that Desmond deserves to be taken up and read by theologians, 
I have made a strategic decision to begin my investigation with a chapter on Taylor. I do 
this, first, because Taylor offers us a richly informative and highly influential narrative of 
the forces and pressures resulting in modernity’s eclipse of the transcendent. He gives us, 
in other words, an historical account or map of how and why questions of “the 
Transcendent” became increasingly “exercising” or problematic. A second reason is the 
style of argument Taylor uses throughout A Secular Age endows the text with its 
performative character. The text works by inducing readers to experience the pressures 
and movements it narrates: we set out to read A Secular Age and find ourselves 
implicated by and drawn into its story. My goal: if I can show how this text “works,” I 
will have a reference point and model for my subsequent investigation of Desmond’s 
thought. Finally, and quite simply, Taylor is better known than Desmond. Still, it is my 
belief that Taylor poses a question – How did the Transcendent become exercising or 
problematic? – to which Desmond offers an answer. As I hope to demonstrate, when 
Taylor calls for new routes leading seekers to an encounter with God, Desmond responds 
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with a practice of metaphysics which, undertaken as a form of spiritual exercise, opens up 
an innovative itinerary reawakening us to a sense of the sacred needed in a secular age.  
 This chapter unfolds in three parts. Part One offers a “key” to interpreting and 
experiencing the force of Taylor’s narrative. How he argues is as important as what he 
argues. By examining his argumentative strategy, we get a sense of how A Secular Age 
works as a performative text to reorient our perception of history and of ourselves. Part 
Two uses metaphors drawn from “Iris Murdoch and Moral Philosophy”34 to guide us 
through key moments of A Secular Age. Rest assured: this is not an exhaustive summary 
of his project.35 Nevertheless, I think I can provide a sense of the transitions and 
developments which have made appeals to the transcendent increasingly otiose. In Part 
Three, I evaluate how Taylor has “beaten the bounds” of our age and commend him for 
providing us a viable map for navigating our age, a map capable of being deepened and 
enriched through an engagement with Desmond’s metaphysics.  
 
1.1 Taylor’s Argumentative Strategy: “Reasoning Through Transitions” 
 I believe the hermeneutical “key” to unlocking Taylor’s method to be found in 
“Explanation and Practical Reason.”36 Termed “reasoning through transitions,” this style 
of argument is employed throughout his works, not least in A Secular Age and Sources of 
the Self. Taylor, however, seldom adverts attention to its use. It is hardly surprising that 
readers are frustrated by his wending prose and a seeming unwillingness to advance a 
                                               
34 Charles Taylor, “Iris Murdoch and Moral Philosophy,” in Dilemmas and Connections (Cambridge: 
 Belknap Press, 2011) 
35 For overviews, consult Ruth Abbey’s Charles Taylor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); 
 Nicholas Smith, Charles Taylor: Meaning, Morals, and Modernity (Malden: Blackwell 
 Publishers, 2002). For two volumes that engage A Secular Age consider Aspiring to Fullness in a 
 Secular Age as well as Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age.  
36 Charles Taylor, “Explanation and Practical Reason,” in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge: Harvard 
 University Press, 1995), 34-60. will need to make recourse to other essays to bring clarity to 
 Taylor’s overall goal in “Explanation and Practical Reason.”  
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clear thesis from beginning to end.37 Truth be told, Taylor does need a good editor. Still, 
a charitable way of approaching his work is to regard its perlocutionary effect: the text’s 
zig-zag narration disorients the reader and induces cognitive dissonance. The way he 
unravels his tale works to unsettle readers by implicating them in its telling and forcing 
them to reflect on whether, and how well, they find themselves reflected in its telling.38  
 I think this strategy becomes apparent in his effort to challenge and undermine a 
picture of the human subject Taylor regards untenable and deleterious.39 His recent 
Retrieving Realism begins with Wittgenstein’s aphorism “A picture held us captive (Ein 
Bild hielt uns gefangen).” 40 The “picture” he challenges, Peter Gordon observes, is of the 
self as “‘punctual,’ that is, atomistic, individualistic, and only contingently bound to its 
cultural or historical surroundings.”41 Yet it is just this picture that has become our de 
facto understanding of the self. And herein we face a vexing problem: just how do you 
get people to “see” or grasp that what we conventionally assume to be the meaning the 
self is, actually, not only open to but in need of other, better, interpretations? How, in 
other words, do you get someone to recognize one’s framework when one is generally 
oblivious to or unware of being enframed?   
                                               
37 See Jon Butler’s “Disquieted History in A Secular Age” in Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age. On 
 page 197 he writes that A Secular Age could have been “half its size, even a third, because fewer 
 pages would almost inevitably have forced more focused arguments and clearer expositions.” 
38 This is not counted a gain by all readers. Although Taylor limits his scope to “Latin Christendom,” some  
critics have resisted his mega-narrative as insufficiently attentive to subaltern narratives. Saba 
Mahmood notes that “Latin Christendom” is hardly homogenous. Rather than “a” story, attention 
needs to be given to many stories. Because he neglects to account for subaltern narratives, 
Taylor’s efforts might themselves be seen as enclosing or constraining others by imposing a story 
not their own upon them. See Saba Mahmood, “Can Secularism Be Otherwise?” in Varieties of 
Secularism in a Secular Age, 282-299.  
39 Charles Taylor, “Overcoming Epistemology,” in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge: Harvard,
 1995), 1-19; Charles Taylor, “Engaged Agency and Background in Heidegger,”  in The  
Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed. Charles Guignon (New York: Cambridge, 1993), 317-
36; Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Taylor, Retrieving Realism (Cambridge: Harvard, 2015). 
40 Dreyfus and Taylor, Retrieving Realism, 1.  
41 Peter Gordon, “The Place of the Sacred in the Absence of God: Charles Taylor’s “A Secular Age”, 
 Journal of the History of Ideas 69, no. 4 (2008): 647—653 at 650.  
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1.1.1  Apodictic Reasoning 
 To get his reader to look at the frameworks they customarily look through, Taylor 
needs to show how our lives could be framed otherwise. He needs, that is, to show how 
other frameworks can make better sense of our lives and experiences. By employing a 
form of practical reasoning, described as “reasoning in transition,” he tries   
 to establish, not that some position is correct absolutely, but rather that some 
 position is superior to some other. It is concerned, covertly or openly, implicitly 
 or explicitly, with comparative propositions. We show one of these comparative 
 claims to be well founded when we can show that the move from A to B 
 constitutes gains epistemically. This is something we do when we show, for 
 instance, that we get from A to B by identifying and resolving a contradiction in 
 A or a confusion which A relied on, or by acknowledging the importance of some 
 factor which A screened out, or something of the sort. The argument fixes on the 
 nature of the transition from A to B. The nerve of the rational proof consists in 
 showing that this transition is an error-reducing one. The argument turns on rival 
 interpretations of possible transitions from A to B, or B to A.42     
 
Implicit is a contrast between two models of practical reasoning identified as “ad 
hominem” and “apodictic.”43 Ad hominem reasoning is rooted in biographical narrative 
and reflects how “we have lived a transition which we understand as error-reducing and 
hence as an epistemic gain.”44 It goes “to the person” to enter into dialogue. This is 
contrasted with the “bad model” of apodictic reasoning which seeks to ascertain some 
“criteria” capable of neutrally deciding the contested issue.45 To appreciate the distinction 
between these approaches, let us consider the promise and limits of apodictic reasoning.   
  Inspiration for apodictic reasoning is found in the “naturalist temper of modern 
thought.”46 This has been a longstanding concern for Taylor, dating back to his early and 
                                               
42 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 72.  
43 Taylor, “Explanation and Practical Reason,” 36. Stephen Long similarly recognizes the importance of ad 
 hominem reasoning in Taylor’s A Secular Age. See Stephen Long, “How to Read Charles Taylor: 
 The Theological Significance of A Secular Age,” in Pro Ecclesia 18 (Winter 2009): 93—107.  
44 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 72.  
45 Ibid., 73.  
46 Ibid., 39.  
 20 
polemical engagement with behaviorism.47 The task of behaviorism, as Nicholas Smith 
notes, is “to give a mechanistic account of behavior at the ‘molar’ level, that is, at the 
level of the gross movements of an organism and the organism’s environment.”48 
Behaviorism is modeled on scientific methods developed during the scientific 
revolution.49 Behaviorist psychologists, for instance, try to explain human behavior as 
they would explain the behavior of any other animal without any appeal or recourse to 
thoughts or feelings, intentions or motivations. One model, described by Smith as 
Stimulus-Response, 50 tries to “map” the connections between any given stimulus and the 
response it elicits. The belief: given enough time, one could eventually predict, for human 
and non-human animals, all future actions and behaviors.   
 Taylor regards this sort of atomistic or disengaged depiction of the human agent 
as grossly misrepresentative: there is no neutral “view from nowhere” or Archimedean 
point. As Ruth Abbey observes, apodictic reasoning is hampered by a category error 
whereby human reasoning is construed as   
 proceeding from its independent starting ground and employing neutral 
 procedures, it presses on to conclusions that are final and certain. But once again, 
 he sees it as a category error to use or expect this sort of reasoning in 
 normative debates. While this mode of reasoning might work in some parts of the 
 natural sciences, it cannot be transplanted into areas where the disputes are 
 primarily ethical in nature.51   
 
Apodictic reasoning errs in taking as its canon a model of reasoning arising in the 17th 
century. This model presumes that reason “should be as disengaged as possible from our 
implicit commitments and understandings, as it is in natural science, and as it must be if 
                                               
47 Charles Taylor, The Explanation of Behavior (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964) 
48 Nicholas Smith, Charles Taylor: Meaning, Morals, and Modernity (Malden: Blackwell, 2002), 42.  
49 Charles Taylor, “Peaceful Coexistence in Psychology,” in Human Agency and Language: Philosophical 
 Papers 1 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 117.  
50 Smith, 42.  
51 Ruth Abbey, Charles Taylor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 166-7.  
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we are not to be victims of the status quo with all its imperfections and injustices.”52 By 
no means does Taylor deny the importance or gains of the natural sciences; he objects, 
rather, to the belief that this form of reasoning provides the sole standard for all inquiry.  
 The shortcomings of apodictic reasoning become apparent if we consider the 
argument of his “What is Human Agency?” Here Taylor asks: What is it that we attribute 
to ourselves as human agents which we would not attribute to animals?”53 He approves 
Harry Frankfurt’s distinction between first- and second-order desires, meaning humans 
are not alone in having desires and motives, or in making choices.  They share 
these things with members of certain other species, some of which  even appear to 
engage in deliberation and to make decisions based on prior thought. It seems to 
be peculiarly characteristic of humans, however, that they are able to form what I 
shall call “second-order desires” or “desires of the second order.”54   
 
So, for instance, the family dog may strongly desire to eat the steak on the table but 
checks this desire, contenting itself with kibble, lest it get a whack on the nose; a little 
girl wants to fling a Brussels sprout at her brother but checks her desire and eats it, lest 
she be denied dessert. Both have desires, but there is a stark difference between them. 
With Frankfurt, what Taylor believes is “distinctively human is the power to evaluate our 
desires, to regard some as desirable and others as undesirable.”55 The girl reflects and 
realizes that flinging food is not nice and that she should not waste food or hurt her 
brother. Dogs cannot reflect in this manner: they may be conditioned, they may 
remember effects of prior experiences, but they can neither articulate nor evaluate their 
desires.   
                                               
52 Taylor, “Explanation and Practical Reason,” 59.  
53 Charles Taylor, “What is Human Agency?” in Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1 
 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 15.  
54 Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Journal of Philosophy 67 no. 1, 
 (1971): 5—20 at 6.  
55 Taylor, “What is Human Agency,” 16.  
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 Taylor then goes on to draw a further distinction within second-order desire. In 
day-to-day life, we are confronted with a host of options requiring us to order a variety of 
desires. Yet these desires are not evaluated in the same manner, leading Taylor to 
distinguish “weak evaluation” from “strong evaluation.” Take his example of choosing 
between a vacation in the north or the south. Each is uniquely attractive: a more rugged 
northern vacation appeals to one’s sense of adventure, a more tropical southern vacation 
promises relaxation. One recognizes a qualitative difference between the options but, 
ultimately, opts for the northern holiday simply because one feels like it.56  For Taylor, 
“weak evaluation” involves a comparison between objects (two vacations) and choosing 
the one that promises to bring about the greatest satisfaction to the choosing agent. It is a 
choice made for no other reason than one “feels” like a northern holiday.  
 “Strong” evaluation, by contrast, takes account of the “quality of our motivation” 
and is concerned with “the qualitative worth of different desires.”57 This type of 
evaluation records a linguistic shift away from expressing merely personal preferences 
toward an attempt to articulate how and why one judges one desire more estimable than 
another. The strong evaluator experiences an expansion and an enrichment of her 
language; she develops “a vocabulary of worth” in which she is able “to express the 
superiority of one alternative, the language of higher and lower, noble and base, 
courageous and cowardly, integrated and fragmented, and so on.”58 A strong evaluator’s 
growth in articulacy serves to cultivate ever-greater internal depths within the agent: 
 now we are reflecting about our desires in terms of the kind of being we are in 
 having  them or carrying them out. Whereas a reflection about what we feel like 
 more, which as all a simple weigher can do in assessing motivations, keeps us as 
                                               
56 Ibid., 17. Emphasis added. 
57 Ibid., 16.  
58 Ibid., 24.  
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 it were at the periphery; a reflection on the kind of beings we are takes us to the 
 center of our existence as agents. Strong evaluation is not just a condition of 
 articulacy about preferences, but also about the quality of the kind of beings we 
 are or want to be. It is in this sense deeper.59  
 
Weak evaluators distinguish between what one wants yet, on this level, not much 
reflection is demanded; by contrast, the strong evaluator must take a stand, commit 
oneself, and if needed give a rationale for one’s choice. Growth in articulacy, our ability 
to dialogue with others about what we have chosen and to give an account for why we did 
so, is not epiphenomenal to what it means to be human. On the contrary, it is constitutive 
of personhood: “our capacity for strong evaluation is an essential feature of a person.”60 
 Our capacity to grow as “strong” evaluators proves a surd to “the recurring 
ambition of our rationalist civilization to turn practical reflection as much as possible into 
calculation, an ambition whose major expression has been the doctrine of 
utilitarianism.”61 If strict utilitarianism seeks to restrict one’s range of options, growth in 
strong evaluation actually leads to a proliferation of choices. Faced with a host of options, 
the strong evaluator must take a stand on who one is and who one desires to be:  
The simple weigher may hesitate, as before the éclair and mille feuilles, and his 
momentary preference may go back and forth. But we would not say that he 
envisages his situation of choice now one way, now another. With strong 
evaluation, however, there can be and often is a plurality of ways of envisaging 
my predicament, and the choice may not be just between what is clearly the 
higher and the lower, but between two incommensurable ways of looking at this 
choice.62    
 
Think of it as a distinction between Spock and Kirk. In Stark Trek: Into Darkness, 
Spock’s logic that “the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few” renders him 
                                               
59 Ibid., 26. This is akin to Ricoeur’s distinction between the idem- and ipse-identity. The idem-self is the  
perduring who announcing itself through what one is. These overlap, of course, but who one is – 
one’s identity – is irreducible to any single what or amalgam of whats. See Paul Ricoeur, Oneself 
as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 120-1. 
60 Ibid., 43.  
61 Ibid., 17.  
62 Ibid., 26.  
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willing to sacrifice his own life rather than violate the Prime Directive.63 Kirk brazenly 
contravenes Spock’s choice, risking his life and exposure by rescuing Spock from 
imminent death. On the surface, it seems we are faced with two protagonists committed 
to incommensurable goods: Spock’s “needs of the many” and Kirk’s “friendship.” Is 
there, though, parity between their positions? No one seems willing, Taylor observes, 
to challenge the view that, other things being equal, it is better that men’s desires 
be fulfilled than that they be frustrated, that they be  happy rather than miserable. 
Counter-utilitarians challenge rather whether the entire range of ethical issues can 
be put in these terms, whether there are not other goals which can conflict with 
happiness, whose claims have to be adjudicated together with utility.64  
 
If Spock’s apodictic reasoning reflects a commitment to utilitarian principles, we must 
ask, first, just what are the “needs” of the many? How is the “good” of defined and 
enacted? Are these principles self-evident or are they based on unexamined premises? In 
short: to what canon does Spock appeal? The limits of Spock’s reasoning become 
apparent when contrasted with Kirk, whose in extremis actions gives a sense not only of 
his character as a strong evaluator but also provides the negative contrast with Spock who 
now appears “insensitive or brutish or morally perverse.”65 We admire Kirk not for being 
reckless – which he is – but because in taking account of the goods of loyalty, courage, 
and fidelity, he shows the exiguousness of Spock’s reasoning.  
 What limits apodictic reasoning in all its varieties – behaviorism, naturalism, 
utilitarianism, etc. – is that its reach exceeds its grasp. It may be appropriate in certain 
settings but, when applied to nettlesome human conflicts, it preserves its explanatory 
                                               
63 The gist: there is a prohibition on using technology to influence or alter the course of another 
 civilization. In the film, Spock regards it a violation of the Prime Directive to be seen by the 
 aboriginal population of the planet they are trying to save. The “good” of the people, as encoded 
 in the directive, trumps the “good” of his life.  
64 Charles Taylor, “The Diversity of Goods,” in Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 
 2 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 241.  
65 Taylor, “Explanation and Practical Reason,” 37.  
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force only by distorting what it means to be human. Spock’s cool and disengaged logic 
chills us because, compared to Kirk, he appears inhumane. We regard Kirk all the better 
because Spock proves a foil: his inhumanity reveals Kirk’s humanity. Roddenberry wrote 
better than he knew: even in the final frontier of space, where traveling at light speed is 
commonplace, the depths of humanity have not been filled in or exhaustively explored.  
 Apodictic reasoning is appealing because it seems heir to a model of reasoning 
remarkable in its explanatory power. When subjected to scrutiny, though, the Procrustean 
bed of disengaged logic cannot accommodate the width and depth of human selfhood. It 
cannot fulfill its promise to resolve all dilemmas because it cannot account for the 
reality’s inexpungable complexity. Nevertheless, buttressed by the prestige of the natural 
sciences, it has been imbued with an aura of indisputability. In the work of Sam Harris66 
and Daniel Dennett,67 there continues to be an outright “hostility to the notion of strong 
evaluation” and an insistence that reason “be as disengaged as possible from our implicit 
commitments and understandings.”68 It would seem we are left in a quandary: if apodictic 
reasoning cannot resolve all disputes, are we to be pushed toward “a half-despairing, 
half-complacent embracing of an equivocal ethical subjectivism”?69  
 
1.1.2  Ad Hominem Reasoning  
  
 Whereas apodictic reasoning relies upon a belief that interlocutors can be brought 
to recognize a single neutral criterion to resolve disputes, ad hominem reasoning assumes 
otherwise. Note: by ad hominem Taylor is not indicating the logical fallacy that attacks 
                                               
66 Sam Harris, The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values (New York: Free Press, 
 2011). 
67 Daniel Dennett, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon (New York: Penguin, 2006). 
68 Ibid., 59.  
69 Ibid., 41.  
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one’s opponent rather than her argument. By ad hominem he means an argument that 
goes “to the person” and assume the interlocutor’s point of view. Essentially, ad 
hominem argument begins from another’s standpoint and, by means of dialogue, shows 
how adopting another position might prove beneficial. Rather than trying to find neutral 
ground or territory, it seeks to engage the subjectivity of one’s interlocutor. This requires   
 showing that there is what Ernst Tugendhat calls a “way of experience” which 
 leads from one’s interlocutor’s position to one’s own via some error-reducing 
 moves, such as the clearing up of a confusion, the resolving of a contradiction, or 
 the frank acknowledgement of what really does impinge.70   
 
Unlike apodictic reasoning which strives to achieve absolute certainty without appealing 
to human experience, an ad hominem approach moves progressively through a series of 
biographical transitions toward formulating a provisional “best account” or way of seeing 
able to make better sense of one’s experience and remains open to further modification.71  
 How would this type of argument resolve disagreements, especially when the 
parties cannot agree a neutral criterion? For Taylor, in the absence of “externally defined 
criteria,”72 we have no choice but to engage in dialogue.73 Each party must begin by 
assuming, “my opponent already shares at least some of the fundamental positions 
toward good and right which guide me.”74 For example, take X and Y as representing two 
competing positions. According to an apodictic mode of reasoning, an argument succeeds 
by showing that “X is false and Y true, or X has probability n and Y has 2n.”75 But 
assume there is no neutrally agreed upon premise both X and Y share. Are we doomed to 
                                               
70 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 505.  
71 Taylor, “Explanation and Practical Reason,” 54.  
72 Ibid., 42.  
73 Certain, apodictic, judgments can indeed appeal to external criteria: strike zones, tax codes, speed limits, 
 exchange rates. These appeal to an objective standard. The question is whether all disagreements – 
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skepticism or “agreeing to disagree”? No, not if we engage in a process of ad hominem 
reasoning with an openness to making some sort of modification to one’s own position.76 
Taylor offers three examples to show how “reasoning in transition” can work: 
(a) Y can be shown to make better sense of difficulties internal to X than X can.77 
(b) Y can be shown to present a development that cannot be explained in X’s 
terms.78 
(c) Transition from X to Y is shown to be error-reducing through the removal of 
“a contradiction, or overcoming of a confusion, or the recognition of a hitherto 
ignored relevant factor.”79  
 
Ad hominem argument differs from apodictic reasoning by refusing to appeal to an 
external or supposedly neutral criterion.  Reasoning in transition proceeds by initiating a 
dialogue through which an agent in position X might recognize the benefits and 
advantages of position Y (or vice versa). It is potentially therapeutic inasmuch as the 
agent in position X, through this dialogue, comes to see how position Y is in fact more 
desirable or error-reducing. The trajectory of the argument is toward making “better 
sense” of one’s life or bringing greater coherence to one’s experiences.  Rather than a 
zero-sum game of winner/loser, these arguments aim to facilitate growth in self-
understanding. In option (c), for instance, the agent begins from position X and attempts 
to imagine her life as if she had transitioned to position Y by imaginatively weighing how 
this transition ameliorates otherwise intractable aporiae, makes better sense of her life, or 
promises to be somehow error-reducing and advantageous.  
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 It should be pointed out that, of their nature, ad hominem arguments are 
irrefragably open-ended. They are ongoing and ambiguous, not “cut-and-dry,” because  
 the claim is not that Y is correct simplicter but just that whatever is “ultimately 
 true,” Y is better than X. It is, one might say, less false…Its message is: whatever 
 else turns out to be true, you can improve your epistemic position by moving from 
 X to Y; this step is a gain.80  
 
Further developments are likely to occur and, as Alasdair MacIntyre contends, “our 
beliefs about what the marks of ‘a best account so far’ are will themselves change in what 
are at present unpredictable ways.”81 These arguments possess a limitless “growing edge” 
and are open to and expectant of further innovation and change. 
 The third argument (c) derives its force, not by assuming Y to be obviously 
superior, but by engaging the interlocutor in a dialogue aimed at shifting the other’s 
vantage point to see the advantages of Y over X. In so doing, it opens up a space of 
hypothetical conjecture in which both think along with one another and re-imagine how 
life would look were one to change position. This is a departure from arguments (a) and 
(b) which are contrastive, meaning they compare two positions in order to show that a 
transition to Y marks a definitive, clear-cut, improvement over X. Jason Blakely views 
much of A Secular Age as engaging in (a), “an attempt to give a better theory of what 
secularism in fact means in light of the anomalies plaguing traditional secularization 
theories.”82 Elements of (b) are also present as Taylor tacks back-and-forth through his 
story in an effort to show what was gained in each transition and, also, what was lost.  
 What sets (c) apart is that it proceeds “not through comparison to a rival theory 
but by direct appeal to a specific individual’s lived experiences, intuitions, or sense of 
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what is true.”83 Through dialogue, we become aware of certain inconsistencies and 
contradictions present in our lives. What one had once regarded the stability of position 
X, through the course of sustained interaction, begins to appear fragile and less able to 
support one’s life. One begins to transition from X toward Y because it is there one 
senses the possibility of a better form of life. We are given to imagine ourselves 
otherwise and, coming to see this as a better way, we reform our lives accordingly.  
  Colin Jager rightly identifies how Taylor’s narrative implicates the reader in its 
telling and can induce the transformation of one’s life. He describes A Secular Age as a 
story to be “told, experienced, undergone, in order for its force to be felt.”84 Taylor, he 
contends, uses “philosophic song” as a “mode of critical thought because it forces it 
readers to undergo the very thing it is describing.”85 To develop further the scope of the 
“philosophic song,” I would say Taylor not only sings to his readers but also tries to sing 
with them. He challenges us to surrender modernity’s hymnal and to take up and sing 
from a new musical score. Taylor’s wager, it seems to me, is that readers will find his 
composition more capacious, accommodating, and truer to human experience. Taylor 
wants to show how his choral arrangement better reflects the depth and breadth of human 
experience and allows us to the hit “transcendent notes” modernity’s songs cannot reach.  
 Let me conclude with a distinction between apodictic and ad hominem arguments, 
a distinction I think proves illuminating of Taylor’s work and will also be used in the next 
chapter as we explore Desmond’s thought. To my eye, the goal of apodictic reasoning – 
whether in moral argument or, as we will see, in modernity’s subtraction narratives – is to 
incapacitate one’s opponent. You either show a fundamental premise to be false, or the 
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other’s reasoning to be riddled with errors, and you dismiss his or her position as foolish, 
misguided, or woefully ignorant. The goal: to win at any cost. Ad hominem approaches 
intend, by contrast, capacitate one’s interlocutor through dialogue. The goal is not to 
score points, or achieve a takedown, but rather to facilitate a new way of thinking. It is a 
biographical argument, one that offers a new form of life, that initiates an ongoing 
process of growth in articulacy as one approaches asymptotically the goal of human 
flourishing. The style of argument mirrors its anthropological presuppositions; our choice 
of argumentative strategy, or narrative style, reveals much about how we understand what 
it means to be human. I will refer to and develop this distinction throughout this essay. 
 
1.1.3  A Post-Modern Socrates?    
 Taylor’s argumentative strategy, in a sense, is nothing new. Its roots can be traced 
back at least to Socrates whose elenctic method enabled him both physically and 
philosophically to accompany interlocutors along the way (meta = along, hodos= way) of 
discovery. Socrates did not impose or appeal to neutral criteria but walked and conversed 
with his partner. Nor does the road ever terminate, and it is fitting for so many Socratic 
dialogues to end without firm resolution, because there is always more to say, always 
more roads to traverse. Desiring to preserve something of the “order of discovery” made 
possible by Socrates, Taylor recognizes the deleterious consequences of the apodictic 
mode of argument that bracket out or disqualify appeals to biography and experience.  
 The consequence of being implicated by Taylor’s text, of setting out to walk 
along the road with him, is that the textual performance opens up new vistas and 
horizons. One finds, having surveyed and evaluated the story he shares, that one’s very 
way of seeing and judging has been affected. One is formed through the text and  
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  one’s range of rational argument is greatly extended…once we see that not all 
 disputes are between fully explicit positions…I would argue that a great deal of 
 moral argument involves the articulation of the implicit, and this extends the 
 range of ad hominem far beyond the easy cases where the opponent offers us 
 purchase in one explicit premise.86  
 
This “philosophic song” is neither a paean nor a panegyric, sung neither in praise nor 
lament nor nostalgia. Its performance invites readers to take part, to become newly 
“attuned,” and to learn to sing in a key open to transcendent variations. The song he 
invites us into, along with the song Desmond’s philosophy makes possible, proves 
nothing less than an exercise in and of our humanity: we only become ourselves by 
dialoguing, or singing, with others.87 We turn now to Taylor’s account of how we fell out 
of tune with the transcendent and consider how the map he draws might offer a return 
route to the Transcendent. The question: does Taylor offer a contemporary retrieval of 
Augustine who discerned in Book X of the Confessions how the whole of the created 
order offered choral testimony to the One who “made us (Ps. 99:3)?”88  
 
1.2 Transitioning to a Secular Age  
  In the final chapter of A Secular Age, Taylor considers several figures who broke 
free from the “immanent frame” by undergoing a conversion.89 He focuses especially on 
Ivan Illich, Gerard Manley Hopkins, and Charles Péguy. Taylor takes these figures as 
exemplars who sought, each in his own life, a greater sense of fulfillment or flourishing 
than he found available to him. Each one, in turn, broke out and charted with his life a 
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new pathway to an encounter with the sacred and found, consequently, a new way of 
being. For Taylor, the process of conversion is not meant to return to 
an earlier formula, inspiring as many of these will undoubtedly be; there will 
always be an element of imitation of earlier models, but inevitably and rightly 
Christian life today will look for and discover new ways of moving beyond the 
present orders to God. One could say that we look for new and unprecedented 
itineraries. Understanding our time in Christian terms is partly to discern these 
new paths, opened by pioneers who have discovered a way through the particular 
labyrinthine landscape we live in, its thickets and trackless wastes, to God.90 
 
To my mind, this is the book’s most powerful and exciting claim. Taylor’s solicitation is 
not for a repetition of old ways but, rather, for a renewal that takes the shape of forging 
new itineraries. To the dismay of Nietzsche’s madman, Taylor has heard the news of 
God’s death but does not believe it. Our ancestors’ routes may no longer be reliable, but 
we are not bereft of options. We may, and some of us must, strike out again.  
 I want to turn, in light of this call for “new itineraries,” to consider why, in the 
first place, a “return” is necessary. Taylor’s question may again be posed: Why was it 
virtually impossible not to believe in God in, say, 1500 in our Western society, while in 
2000 many of us find this not only easy, but even inescapable?91 Many, though not all, 
Westerners have come to feel the tension of Secular3. On the same shelf at Barnes & 
Noble one finds copies of Karen Armstrong’s The Case for God alongside A.C. 
Grayling’s The God Argument: The Case Against Religion and for Humanism. Yet, as 
Taylor observes, our age permits of a host – a nova – of un/belief options. If we are to 
make sense of Taylor’s call to discern future paths, it is necessary to understand why it is 
necessary to do so in the first place. We need to occupy the space between un/belief’s 
boosters and knockers get a sense of how the “eclipse of the transcendent” came to pass.  
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 To guide us through Taylor’s mapping of Secular3, I use three metaphors drawn 
from “Iris Murdoch and Moral Philosophy”: the “moral corral,” the “ethical field,” and 
the “forest of the unconditional.” I focus in particular on the transition between the 
metaphors as especially illuminating of key historical developments. Indeed, by 
developing these metaphors I think I can show how Taylor’s text performs by implicating 
the reader and giving a sense or “feel” for each transition.  
  I structure each subsection similarly, beginning by identifying the metaphor and 
offering a suggestion about what it communicates. Next, I consider how the metaphor 
serves to encapsulate key historical transitions. Finally, I suggest how the metaphor 
functions descriptively and performatively. In this, I am inspired by Desmond: playing on 
the bivalent meaning of the Greek meta meaning “in the midst” and “beyond,” I explore 
how each metaphor (meta + pherein “to transfer”) makes sense of the transitions by 
guiding us “in the midst” of history and how the metaphor can “carry us beyond” its own 
limits.92 If my argument about the performative character of Taylor’s work proves 
successful, we will see how the power of metaphor opens up vistas beyond the immanent 
order openings capable of serving as routes for our return to the Transcendent.  
 
1.2.1  The Moral Corral  
  By the metaphor of “moral corral” Taylor means to indicate how Anglo-Saxon 
philosophy has artificially truncated the scope of its inquiry into morality. With Iris 
Murdoch, Taylor faults this tradition for focusing on “questions of what we ought to do,” 
while failing to address, “questions about what it is good to be or what it is good to 
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love.”93 This narrowed scope, focused upon questions of the “right” over the “good,” 
resulted from attempts (1) “to work out exactly what the considerations are which tell us 
which action is right” and (2) to demonstrate that these “are the right considerations, 
against other rival candidates.”94 Until the mid-twentieth century, the two systems of 
normative ethics responsive to this were utilitarianism and deontology. Their answer to 
(1) taking right to be either maximizing benevolence or adhering to duty/justice was 
developed into deliberative procedures as a response to (2). What made these so alluring 
was “in each case, the answer to the first has the intellectually satisfying property of 
being a single criterion. Morality can be derived from one source.”95 The shadow of 
apodictic reasoning falls long on such moral reasoning.  
 Just a corral restrains animals, taking them from their natural environment and 
penning them in within its fences, so too does the “moral corral” communicate a sense of 
an agent having been “penned in” and deprived of a more natural environment. Compare 
the image of a “corral” with Taylor’s description of a pre-modern sense of the human as 
embedded within and in congress with the cosmic order or Great Chain of Being. Theory 
was not, as in modern philosophy, a disengaged description; it was a practical and 
contemplative activity. Indeed, theory was “one of the highest activities of man, one 
which bring him close to the divine.”96Theory is less a calculation than a contemplative 
stance, a way of seeing whereby one recognizes how 
The complete good of human life as rational doesn’t simply consist in ethical 
excellence; it also includes the excellence of science. And the fulfillment of these 
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96 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 125.  
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requires a grasp of the cosmic order. Attending to both orders is thus constitutive 
of the human good.97 
 
The “corral” metaphor is richly allusive. On the one hand, it stirs a mindfulness of the 
kind of creatures who typically inhabit these structures, leading us to wonder whether 
humans and livestock are equipollent. On the other hand, the structure of a corral reminds 
us not only that it is an intentional construction but, also, that it serves as much to keep 
things within itself as it is does to keep things out. Clearly, this is not a value-neutral 
metaphor and is meant to be provocative: Taylor wants us to get a sense of its contours 
and to evaluate how well it accounts for our lives.  
   
1.2.1.1  The Moral Corral: Encapsulated History 
 
 A first enticement into the moral corral came from what appeared, especially in 
utilitarian reasoning, as a debt to the West’s Christian heritage: 
 If one objects to a utilitarian that one might legitimately put, say, one’s own 
 integrity before the obligation to do the act which has the highest utility 
 consequences, one invites the retort that one is self-indulgent and not really 
 single-mindedly committed to human happiness, as one ought to be.98  
 
Reasoning in accord with utilitarianism’s canon of benevolence means we are expected to 
be the Good Samaritan; looking out for the good of others is the norm and expectation. 
Such codification, Ivan Illich inveighs, actually marks the corruption of Jesus’ parable: 
what Jesus summoned his listeners to was not a perfection achieved by adhering to a 
norm; perfection, he insisted, is found only in and through relationship. Utilitarian ethics 
“fixes” in code form what had been Christianity’s radical innovation. Whereas the 
parable opens the possibility that in and through the body of another we can hear a call 
“to be a neighbor,” utilitarianism fixes the call of charity into a code. “Charity” no longer 
                                               
97 Ibid.  
98 Ibid., 5. Emphasis added.  
 36 
empowers an action; instead, it becomes an adjective affixed to bureaucratic agencies 
whose job it is to take care of those I leave unattended.99 Charity no longer quickens the 
virtues, no longer converts the heart or elicits a response to someone’s need. What 
utilitarianism held out as a promise of continuity with the Christian past becomes its 
perversion: Perversio optimi quae est pessima, the perversion of the best is the worst. 
Utilitarianism persuades by dissembling charity. Instead of entering a network of agape 
that overturns old conventions, we have opted to codify “charity” and domesticate it.100  
 In a drive to universalize benevolence, utilitarian reasoning narrowed its vision to 
focus on fulfilling requirements stipulated by a code and lost sight of the Good Samaritan 
for whom charity was an empowering and, by the measure of its day, anarchic call. By 
narrowing the focus of moral reflection to questions of what it is “right to do,” it lost 
sight of a deeper concern with “what it is good to be.” It is not surprising that this form of 
reasoning ascends in popularity with the advances of the scientific revolution. The desire 
for universally applicable procedures prompted a search for the criterion on which to 
ground moral reasoning. If we take the desire for a universalized “maximal benevolence” 
it seems that we could develop a procedure capable of achieving this goal. The drawback, 
as we saw earlier with Spock and Kirk, is a single criterion is incapable of meeting the 
needs of human fulfillment. Only by stripping away what appears fuzzy – emotions, 
desires, appeals to a sense of calling – could the calculus work. Adding in the fuzzy 
“variables,” which vary according to each agent, the calculus breaks down.101  
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 Now, Taylor’s claim is not that at some point thinkers collectively sat down and 
decided, “let’s cut out all appeals to the transcendent when reasoning.” It is more the case 
that within the last few centuries such appeals to the transcendent became obsolete as 
appeals to anything “higher” became increasingly unnecessary. We get a sense of this in 
his explication of the “affirmation of ordinary life.” Gaining momentum during the 
Reformation, this affirmation “dethroned the supposedly higher activities of 
contemplation and the civic life and put the center of gravity of goodness in ordinary 
living, production, and the family.”102 For the Reformers the “sanctification of ordinary 
life” meant, first, ordinary life became the “site for the highest forms of Christian life” 
and, second, entailed “an anti-elitist thrust.”103 A point held in common to all Reformers  
was their rejection of mediation. The mediaeval church as they understood it, a 
corporate body in which some, more dedicated, members could win merit and 
salvation for others who were less so, was anathema to them. There could be no 
such thing as more devoted or less devoted Christians: the personal commitment 
must be total or it was worthless.104 
 
A homology exists between this rejection and the commitment to practical benevolence: 
both try to universalize what had been, previously, a summons discerned in the life of 
individual Christians. By universalizing the call to holiness and affirming ordinary life, 
one does away with the need for an ecclesial hierarchy or a set-apart group of 
contemplatives to pray for, intercede on behalf of, or mediate an encounter with the 
divine. God’s accessibility to all walks of life effaces any hierarchy of holiness and 
inculcates a sense of egalitarianism among believers: ditch diggers and sheep shearers, 
women and men, merchants and pastors.  None better, none worse, all called by God in 
equal measure.   
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 For Taylor, the transitions toward “practical benevolence” and the “affirmation of 
ordinary life” are parts of a larger cultural revolution. What we need to see is how our 
sense of contact with the Transcendent is separated from the quotidian. Charity is a code 
of conduct, not God’s gracious and empowering overture to Christians to “prolong the 
Incarnation.”105 The Reformers disallow any “higher” calling to the monastery or 
priesthood because all are equally called to holiness. There is a diminished sense of any 
divine insistence calling women and men to a new form of life. It is not so much that God 
is being deliberately jettisoned from the quotidian round. The opposite is the case: God 
becomes so drawn into the world as to lead to the domestication of the divine. As a 
consequence, the image of God morphs from the Transcendent One met at privileged 
moments in the liturgy or during the liturgical year into a God of the everyday. The irony 
of the Reformers’ accomplishment of democratizing access to God is, by shearing God of 
transcendence and making the Divine immanently accessible, they expedited the slide 
from robust theism to a weakened deism and, eventually, to exclusive humanism.  
 To get at the burgeoning “exclusive humanism” we need to take account of four 
“anthropocentric shifts” severing us from our sense of, or our need to appeal to, the 
Transcendent. No one of these was sufficient to foreclose an appeal to self-transcendence 
or the Transcendent, but combined they exacerbated a sense of alienation from our place 
within Great Chain of Being. In the 17th and 18th centuries, Taylor cites four “eclipses”  
1. The Eclipse of Further Purpose – we owe to God’s providence only the 
achievement of our own good. We do not need to refer our lives to a 
Transcendent God or appeal to transcendence – anything beyond ourselves – to 
achieve flourishing. Focus given exclusively to inner-world telos  
2. The Eclipse of Grace – God’s plan is manifest for those willing to see it. We 
need nothing extra in order to grasp God’s providential ordering of creation.  
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3. The Eclipse of Mystery –created order evacuated of mystery because (1) our 
good is inner-worldly and (2) we can, using reason, understand God’s purposes.  
4. The Eclipse of Our End – we lose the sense that God has a final transformation in 
store for us; the idea of “theiosis” or divinization or becoming a partaker in the 
divine life evanesces.106  
 
Over time this four-fold eclipse led to an increased fixation upon the importance of daily 
life. Nevertheless, although we lost a sense of our lives as illuminated or guided by God, 
we did not dwell long in darkness: we fixed greater attention to the light we humans can 
create. This was accompanied by a change in our spiritual lives: what had once been 
kairotic time measured by liturgical seasons and observances was drained of the divine 
and became secular time. We lost a sense of eschatological tension, of God’s action in 
and through the world, and there began to take shape a new spiritual outlook that believed 
“our first concern ought to be to increase life, relieve suffering, foster prosperity.”107 The 
“eclipses” were not, of course all bad: it is estimable that we became increasingly 
attentive to new demands. But lost in transition, as Taylor recounts, is any appeal to 
Transcendence. We can pursue good, and be good, without appealing to grace or to God.  
 Albeit traced with rough lines, what I am trying to bring into relief is a remarkable 
transformation within what Taylor calls the “social imaginary.” He describes the social 
imaginary as the   
largely unstructured and inarticulate understanding of our whole situation,  within 
which particular features of our world show up for us in the sense they have. It 
can never be adequately expressed in the form of explicit doctrines because of its 
unlimited and indefinite nature.”108  
 
We live and act against this background without ever giving much thought to it. It is 
conveyed in narratives, enshrined in monuments and institutions, and observed in the way 
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our calendars are structured around civic holidays and observances. The social imaginary 
provides the shared know-how when it comes to cultural expectations, social interactions, 
inter-personal dynamics, and humor: the way sarcasm works, or the give-and-take of a 
joke, depends on a vast and intricate background that makes such exchanges possible. In 
effect, the social imaginary is “that common understanding which makes possible 
common practices, and a widely shared sense of legitimacy.”109  
 With the gift of hindsight, Taylor shows how contingent developments within 
history affected, and continue to shape, our current understanding of what it means to be 
human. In an earlier age, we had a sense of porosity or openness to the divine; space and 
time were configured in such a way that the divine presence was always immediate. 
Given various transitions and developments, however, we grew increasingly “buffered” 
to the divine. Increasingly unmoored from our collective imagination, the Transcendent 
eventually drifted away and, in its waning light, we ceased looking toward it for our 
fulfillment. Instead of pining for an eschatological horizon, we put trust in our abilities 
and began to focus more on “how we deal with others, in justice and benevolence.”110 As 
he observes, the exaltation of “justice-benevolence over issues of fulfillment and the 
good life” can be seen as contributing to an advance: we grow in a sense of justice 
applied blindly and due process; we develop a sense of universal human rights and 
dignity. What we gained in universal applicability – a single canon to bind them all – 
casts a shadow on appeals to biography or subjectivity. As apodictic reasoning grew in 
dominance, such appeals began to atrophy and, eventually, wither away.  
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 As a further enticement into the corral we must also consider the way 
epistemological developments affected our sense of human agency. For Taylor, one of 
Descartes’ signal contributions was to develop a sense of disengaged reason. For 
Descartes, this meant “self-monitoring reason, reasoning which can turn on its own 
proceedings and examine them for accuracy and reliability.”111 This ideal of accuracy and 
reliability is enshrined in his les ideés claires et distinctes.112 Anyone who has read his 
Meditations knows Descartes denies that sense impressions are capable of conveying 
certain and indubitable knowledge; there is always a threat that one may be misled. So, if 
contact with the world cannot be the bearer of knowledge, how can one be certain of 
anything? His solution involves an inward turn. “Of course, the theme that the sage has to 
turn away from merely current opinion, and make a more rigorous examination that leads 
him to science, is a very old one, going back at least to Socrates and Plato.”113 What sets 
Descartes apart from this older tradition is “is the reflexive nature of his turn. The seeker 
after science is not directed away from shifting and uncertain opinion toward the order of 
the unchanging, as with Plato, but rather within, to the contents of his own mind.114 After 
Descartes, one no longer needs to appeal to the cosmos or an external authority to secure 
knowledge. One needs only to turn away from the fleeting impressions of the flesh, to 
focus inwardly, and to ascertain for oneself what is, and is not, certain. Here we see the 
nascent formation of an ideal “disengaged perspective.” Trust is placed in a neutral 
procedural method promising to arrive at truth. For disengaged reason, the cogito stands 
aloof from the vicissitudes of daily life; one need only follow procedural reasoning to 
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achieve the certainty of knowledge. The Cartesian subject becomes the ruler and 
measurer of all reality. God is not, of course, jettisoned from the picture but is invoked 
more as a divine insurance policy of the veracity of the cogito’s reflections than as the 
Creator and sustainer of all creation.   
 Methodologically, Descartes catalyzed a shift away from the older, Aristotelian, 
model toward what became the ideal of disengaged reason. This this model of disengaged 
reason, however, can hardly be counted an unalloyed gain: 
In fact, we can say that the founding move of the modern dualist sorting, and of 
 the mechanization of the world picture, was this Cartesian kind of disengagement, 
 which disinvests the world of objects around us of any meaning, be it the ordinary 
 everyday meanings that things have for us as embodied agents – being available 
 or out of reach, pressing on us or open, attractive or repulsive, inviting or 
 forbidden – or be it the intrinsic purposes defined by Ideas.115  
 
Disengagement is an affected pose, a deliberate way of beholding, bracketing out the 
ordinary appearance of things. Because assumed, it falsely suggests its neutrality and 
objectivity. Dreyfus and Taylor identify two “deeper levels” of motivation one rooted in 
power, the other in pride, beneath this purported neutral stance:  
 At a deeper level, the stance of disengagement has also benefited from a powerful 
 ethical charge. It is strongly valued insofar as it is seen as inseparable from 
 freedom, responsibility, and the self-transparency which we gain by reflection on 
 our own thinking…But once we come to see the world as mechanism, a domain 
 of efficient causation, but without inherent purpose, then we are free to treat it as 
 a neutral field where our main concern is how to affect our own purposes. 
 Instrumental reason becomes the only appropriate category, and knowledge can 
 be seen as the basis of power.  
 
 Disengagement is not only a source of power; it is also the instrument of 
 disenchantment. The world ceases to be the locus of spirits and magic 
 forces…There is a sense of invulnerability, in relation to the immemorial sense of 
 being at the mercy of spirits and forces – but also the intuition that this 
 invulnerability was hard won. It required effort, and also courage, to face down 
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 the primordial fears, and abandon the sense of comfort in our niche that a 
 meaningful cosmos offers. And this generates a feeling of pride.116  
 
Here, Dreyfus and Taylor cast a critical eye at the claim of “value-neutrality.” Indeed, 
they detect beneath its surface claim deep and ulterior motives. To be sure, they are not 
decrying Descartes’ project as misguided or errant. What they are pointing to, though, are 
the motivational dynamics at play in the stance of the disengaged knower. Knowledge, 
power, and pride: the disengaged stance is less a natural pose, a disinterested “seeing 
things as they are,” than it is an achievement with dire ramifications. 
 One of these ramifications is a hypertrophied “procedure envy” modeled too-
closely on the supposedly disengaged or neutral scientific inquiry. The achievement of 
scientific reasoning became the index of all reasoning and provided not only the standard 
by which reason was measure but, also, the procedure of reasoning. Our trust need not be 
in the fallibility of a world in flux but in the power of our reason to apply an operational 
procedure leading toward knowledge. Single-term moralities, symptomatic of “procedure 
envy,” prove irresistible to moral philosophers:  
At last the fuzzy intuitions of common sense can be reduced to clarity. What is 
 more, all incommensurabilities, and hence, difficult decisions, can be ironed out. 
 Utilitarianism both satisfies demand for rigor and homogeneity and fits well with 
 the disengaged stance of instrumental reason.…But Kantianism also gets a charge 
 from being rigorous and homogenous.117   
 
If one could just ascertain the central term – either benevolence or duty – and articulate 
the procedure to follow, one could then debate the superiority of one model over the 
other. Consequently, moral reasoning became increasingly concerned with foundations, 
canons and codes, and fell increasingly out of touch with humanity’s depths.  
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 The convergence of moral and epistemological temperaments helped to shift our 
understanding of the world and our role within it. Taylor identifies three traits marking 
the emergent modern subject:  
The first is the picture of the subject as ideally disengaged, that is, as free and 
rational to the extent that he has fully distinguished himself from the natural and 
social worlds, so that his identity is no longer to be defined in terms of what is 
outside him in these worlds. The second, which flows from this, is a punctual 
view of the self, ideally ready as free and rational to treat these worlds – and even 
some of the features of his own character – instrumentally, as subject to change 
and reorganizing in order the better to secure the welfare of himself and others. 
The third is the social consequence of the first two: atomistic construal of society 
as constituted by, or ultimately to be explained in terms of, individual purposes.118  
 
These are traits associated with the modern subject: disengaged, rationally in control, and 
directing one’s intentionality without interference.119 As a description it resonates with 
the image of “buffered self” seen as “invulnerable, as master of the meanings of things 
for it.”120 Or, as Murdoch notes, for the modern subject “morality is a matter of thinking 
clearly and then proceeding to outward dealings with other men.”121  
 We have, however, reason to be skeptical of this agent. As suggested, 
“disengaged” is hardly synonymous with “disinterested” or neutral.  It is an affected 
stance; simply scratch beneath the surface to find that “neutral ground” actually conceals 
less-than-disinterested motivations. The modern subject chants “neutrality, objectivity, 
valueless inquiry,” but is this a proclamation or an incantation? Is it possible for the 
process of “disenchantment” to have actually worked its own enchantment? Could it be 
that the freedom promised by disenchantment has actually delivered the modern agent 
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into a too-restrictive cell? Perhaps it is the case that modernity’s heroic figure is, at the 
end of it all, remains little more than a member of a vast herd.     
 
1.2.1.2  The Moral Corral: Function 
 So, how does the metaphor of the “moral corral” work to (1) carry us “amidst” 
history and (2) can it ferry us, or at least point us, beyond itself to something more?  
 The work of the metaphor, in response to (1), is to encapsulate one way of living 
within what Taylor calls “the immanent frame.”122 Of this he writes: 
 the buffered identity of the disciplined individual moves in a constructed social 
 space, where instrumental rationality is a key value, and time is pervasively 
 secular. All of this makes up what I want to call the “immanent frame.” There 
 remains to add just one background idea: that this frame constitutes a “natural” 
 order, to be contrasted to a supernatural one, an “immanent” world, over against a 
 possible “transcendent” one.123  
 
A frame, like a corral, is at once inclusive and exclusive. It holds things in, creates the 
space in which they are held, and serves as a barrier. There is a way of doing business, or 
living life, “within” the corral that seems natural. Heidegger captures this with his 
understanding of the “referential totality”124 against which our lives and actions make 
sense. What is easy to lose sight of, and what Taylor is keen on highlighting, is that the 
corral has been constructed. By telling about how the concerns of morality became 
artificially foreshortened, Taylor makes it possible to re-assess the story and to see 
whether a better narrative might be told. By narrating how various forces converged and 
led to a limited understanding of human agency, or with the suggestive metaphor of the 
corral, it is possible for us to become mindful of what is missing. In tracing out a 
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genealogical account that describes how questions of “what it is good to be” were 
increasingly bracketed, we ask ourselves, “Ah, but can we cut these out? Are they not 
necessary?”125 Rather than an inescapable fate, we begin to see how the moral corral is, 
in fact, an achievement.126 We managed, that is, to buffer ourselves from cosmic forces, 
to imagine the self as atomic and punctual, and we settled for these narrower confines 
because they seemed capable of accommodating our needs. We were not pushed into the 
corral, we were lulled into its depths; not every achievement is an unalloyed gain. 
 The coral metaphor conveys a sense of dwelling within a “Closed World Structure 
(CWS).”127 If the West’s social imaginary is “the immanent frame,” then the CWS is a 
“spin” or interpretation that is “clouded or cramped by a powerful picture which prevents 
one seeing important aspects of reality.”128 The narrowness and restrictiveness of the 
corral gives us a feel for of the CWS. Yet, and this is crucial, this is but one way of 
interpreting what it means to be a self; it is not the only way. In the very act of telling a 
story, of interpreting the history leading to the development of the “immanent frame” and 
the CWS, Taylor shows that the corral, or CWS, is not a settled matter. Because he can 
offer an interpretation or alternative narrative to “subtraction stories,” he puts into play 
the possibility that there may be better accounts available.  
 Herein we see an answer to (2). By showing us what has been gained and what 
has been lost through the transitions encapsulated by the corral metaphor, Taylor invites 
us to weigh whether the corral sufficiently accounts for the needs of human beings. The 
metaphor works not only retrospectively to describe transitions but also, and more 
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importantly, to carry us “beyond” itself by showing the corral’s inability to account 
sufficiently for human life. If we find the corral inhospitable to a thicker description of 
human agency incapable of accommodating our constitutive natures as strong evaluators, 
we need to move beyond its confines to an environment where this is possible. The 
metaphor is neither neutral nor static. It is not neutral because it does not envision the 
corral as fitting for human agents. It is not static because, by awakening us to the 
restricted confines of the corral, it provides an impetus for us to move beyond the corral’s 
fence and to find our place upon a wider and more welcoming terrain.  
 
1.2.2  The Ethical Field 
 
 Through the metaphor of “ethical field,” Taylor offers a broader “take” on what it 
means to be a modern subject. Human reasoning, he has argued, is not sufficiently 
understood within the confines of the corral; its full potency, so restricted, cannot be 
realized. We need wider expanses and broader vistas if we are to flourish. Again, this is 
not a value-neutral metaphor: we were “trapped in the corral of morality” and have been 
“liberated” to enter the wider field.129 And it is just this I want to stress: there is liberation 
in coming to recognize the insufficiency of one narrative (corral) and the gain to be had 
in transitioning to another (field).  
 From a stance within the ethical field, we see more clearly the limitations of the 
corral, that it possesses an overly “narrow view of what morality is as a dimension of 
human life.”130 From the field we appreciate better the limitations of what Taylor calls 
“subtraction stories” as having played a role in luring us into, and keeping us penned in, 
the corral. James Smith describes subtraction stories as those  
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 tales of enlightenment and progress and maturation that see the emergence of 
 modernity and “the secular” as shucking the detritus of belief and superstition. 
 Once upon a time, as these subtraction stories rehearse it, we believed in sprites 
 and fairies and gods and demons. But as we became rational, and especially as we 
 marshaled naturalist explanations for what we used to attribute to spirits and 
 forces, the world became progressively disenchanted. Religion and belief 
 withered with scientific exorcism of superstition.131 
 
A subtraction story of the CWS’s evolution would portray it not only as an inevitability 
of modernity’s advance but also, and more importantly, as an indisputable gain. On such 
a telling, there is “no epistemic loss involved in the transition; we have just shucked off 
some false beliefs, some fears of imagined objects.”132 
  Taylor disputes this story. In fact, by means of counter narrative, he shows how 
modernity’s subtraction story could have been different and can be narrated otherwise. In 
effect, A Secular Age works to disrupt common “subtraction stories” that purport to 
recount neutrally the natural progress of history. Subtraction narratives of modernity, 
those claiming that the eclipse of transcendence was inevitable, are frequently “haloed” 
by an aura of disengaged scientific inquiry. They claim to tell a factual story, chronicling 
from a distance those events that led to the eclipse of transcendence. But can they really 
claim neutrality? Taylor sees, with Ricoeur, how in emplotting a narrative one cannot 
sever the telling of the story from ethics and politics. A story’s narration does not 
neutrally tell “one thing after another” (meta) because, in crafting a plot, one invariably 
makes decisions about what to include and what to exclude. When we tell stories we 
draw connections between events that try to show causality, “one thing because of 
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another” (dia).133 How we tell the story, how we connect events and portray their 
unfolding, is every bit as important as the events themselves.   
What Taylor is getting at is that subtraction stories often masquerade as objective 
“telling the facts” but this conceals its ethical and political aims. He dissents from, and 
wants to expose as far from neutral, the “coming of age” stories that depict our loss of a 
sense of transcendence as an unalloyed good or gain. He writes 
 I am arguing that it is only within some understanding of agency, in which 
 disengaged scientific enquiry is woven into a story of courageous adulthood, to be 
 attained through a renunciation of the more “childish” comforts of meaning and 
 beatitude, that the death of God story appears obvious.134  
 
Secularization narratives are as much a moral story as they are accounts of scientific 
progress, historical contingencies, or philosophical insights. By offering an alternative 
account, a re-figuration of the events within a new narrative, Taylor exposes the 
subtraction narratives’ lack of neutrality and sheds light up their own moral commitments 
to a certain, limited understanding of human agency. But it is only once one has broken 
through the corral’s fence and found oneself in the wider field that the limitations of the 
corral become apparent. It is to a description of this move we now turn.    
 
1.2.2.1  The Ethical Field: Encapsulated History 
 Taylor contends that the fatal flaw of single-term moralities is that it “perpetrates 
a drastic foreshortening of our moral world, by concentrating only on what we are 
obligated to do.”135 By excluding or ignoring “what it is good to be” we lose a broader 
sense of what it means to be human. Still, even though much contemporary philosophy 
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has focused on the right over the good, there is a sense in which the two can never be 
completely disassociated: 
 The sense that such and such is an action we are obligated by justice to perform 
 cannot be separated from a sense that being just is a good way to be. If we had the 
 first without any hint of the second, we would be dealing with a compulsion, like 
 the neurotic necessity to wash one’s hands or to remove stones from the road.136  
 
This, perhaps, reaffirms our dis-ease with Spock: in his application of logic, he seems 
intent on sundering “being” (a friend) from “doing” (application of logic).  
 By articulating a more robust or “thicker” anthropology, Taylor appeals to our 
need for “life goods” and “constitutive goods.” Part I of Sources of the Self elaborates 
these in detail. For our purposes, it is enough to note that by “life good” he means what it 
is good for humans to be. The language of virtue, literary exemplars, and Christian 
hagiography all provide patterns for a person’s life. But what motivates the person, 
anchoring and coordinating one’s aspirations, Taylor calls the “constitutive good.” This 
good is what moves us to act. A courageous soldier gives his life because of love of state; 
a martyr suffers death for love of God. Homologous actions do not betray identical 
intention: each can explain himself, can articulate why he acted in such a manner, 
through an appeal to of motivational content, or the good, orienting his life.  
 There is an intertwining of “life good” and “constitutive good” such that what one 
wants is rooted in, and articulated through appeals to, why one reckons this good. This is 
part of our task as thick evaluators and it proves itself an exercise in humanity: we must 
examine our lives, what we desire to be, and discern and gain clarity on the constitutive 
good that motivates us and anchors us. We grow in articulacy and come, gradually, to 
recognize gaps between what we are and who we desire to be. In coming to know what 
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we love, we find the motivation to strive to attain it; we make changes, we evaluate and 
re-evaluate, we gain a sense for why we are motivated, we press onward.  
When we place the robust vision of human agency Taylor advocates against the 
etiolated depiction of the corral dweller, we see why the human drive to flourish needs 
more than just a single-term morality. Within the corral, we have to discount just what a 
transition to the field offers us: a chance to consider both what it is good for us to be and 
what it is that we love. The fullness of our lives cannot be subtended by a single term 
because one size of life cannot fit, and one regula cannot measure, all:  
 The fullness of ethical life involves not just doing, but also being; and not just 
 these two but also loving…what is constitutively good. It is a drastic reduction to 
 think that we can capture the moral by focusing only on obligated action, as 
 though it were of no ethical moment what you are and what you love. These are 
 the essence of ethical life.137  
 
The conceit of single-term morality, to “capture the moral” and fix it into a code, simply 
cannot encompass the scope, or plumb the depths, of what it means to be human. Iris 
Murdoch concurs, adding  
 The concept Good resists collapse into the selfish empirical consciousness. It is 
 not a mere value tag of the choosing will, and function and casual uses of ‘good’ 
 (a good knife, a good fellow) are not, as some philosophers have wished to argue, 
 clues to the structure of the concept. The proper and serious use of the term refers 
 us to a perfection which is perhaps never exemplified in the world we know 
 (‘There is no good in us’) and which carries with it the ideas of hierarchy and 
 transcendence.138  
 
Good’s transcendence does not, she continues, mean an appeal to God – she is atheist. It 
means, though, a refusal to index the good to human calculation. Instead of accenting the 
necessity of obligation, she advocates growing in attention through the contemplation of 
the Good. This is not “the planning of particular good actions but an attempt to look right 
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away from self towards a distant transcendent perfection, a source of uncontaminated 
energy, a source of new and quite undreamt-of virtue.”139 Murdoch and Taylor align: 
there is more to life than what the single-term moralities hold. In the light of the Good, 
Taylor and Murdoch would have us see, the hero of the CWS appears pallid and anemic.  
 The transition from corral to the field also reflects Taylor’s rejection of the 
“confused inarticulacy of modern naturalism.”140 A naturalist account of humans treats its 
subject as it would any other object in nature, eschewing “what we might call subject-
related properties.”141 Appeals to motivation, or intention, only “express the way we feel, 
not the way things are.”142 A naturalist-inspired approach to morality dismisses as fuzzy 
or unscientific any non-measurable property. So reduced, one seems able to calculate 
what it is right to do – the single-criterion – and develop procedures necessary to do it.  
 What Taylor sees is how naturalist approaches take as a premise a point in need of 
argument, namely, “that our accounts of man should be naturalistic in just this sense.”143 
What supports this claim? Is it that “objectivity” is objective or that neutrality is neutral? 
This seems to beg the question, as the stance of “objectivity” reflects a value of a subject. 
In valuing “objectivity” the inquirer claims to remove anything “fuzzy” or subjective, but 
this performs its own contradiction: in valuing objectivity, the agent projects value upon 
the research field. To this effect, Taylor cites Richard Lewontin in a footnote:  
 It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept 
 a material explanation of the phenomenal world but, on the contrary, we are 
 forced by our a priori allegiance to material causes to create an apparatus of 
 investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter 
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 how counterintuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover that 
 materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a divine foot in the door.144 
 
A supposedly neutral inquiry can be anything but; as we see above, a materialist 
commitment decides in advance both the questions and the answers one will entertain.  
 Discomfited by the corral’s narrowness, “we are induced to burst the boundaries 
of the foreshortened world and recognize the relevance for this world of what we are and 
love, as well as what we do.”145 Note the verbs: induced and recognize. He wants us to 
see that the subtraction stories cavalierly narrating God’s death are stories. They are 
narrations, deliberately arranged and structured (dia); subtraction stories, like all stories, 
have a mythos or plotline that organizes the events of history into a narrative.146 Yet there 
are other ways of telling the story, and Taylor offers an alternative. A Secular Age 
performs by interrupting the monologue of the substitution narrative and offers a 
competing account to those who see secularism as the consequence of “subtraction 
stories” or as a result of Intellectual Decline.147 Through narrative and metaphor, Taylor’s 
story functions as an ad hominem argument that gives us both a new way of framing 
history (interpretation) and experiencing for ourselves whether the transitions he recounts 
do, in fact, make better sense of our lives. He brings us to the edge of the corral and, 
helping us to recognize what is missing from this picture, stirs our imaginations to 
consider which of our potencies are not being actualized within the current framework. 
He uses an ad hominem approach, engaging our subjectivity and rousing us to consider 
just how it is we inhabit the immanent frame and whether a better way is possible.   
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 What Taylor appeals to, however, is something “subtraction stories” seek to 
dismiss. What animates our capacity as strong-evaluators is not whim or passing fancy 
but an insatiable desire for fullness. Indeed, he claims it is “axiomatic that everyone, and 
hence all philosophical positions, accept some definition of greatness and fullness in 
human life.”148 Additionally, “I believe there is no escaping some version of what I called 
in an earlier discussion ‘fullness’; for any livable understanding of human life, there must 
be some way in which this life looks good, whole, proper, really being lived as it 
should.”149 Once we realize that our yearning for fulfillment cannot be sated by the thin 
gruel of the corral, we may begin to move toward the field. But this step is not without its 
own difficulties. For while the enclosure of the corral could be criticized for truncating 
the scope of our humanity, it had its comforts; within its confines, we were sheltered 
from the pressures and travails that come with venturing outside into new territories.  
In moving into the broader field, led by a desire for fulfillment, we must confront 
and feel the full force of Taylor’s “cross pressures.” We are being led to experience  
 A mutual fragilization of different religious positions, as well as of the outlooks 
 both of belief and unbelief. The whole culture experiences cross pressures, 
 between the draw of the narratives of closed immanence on one side, and the 
 sense of their inadequacy on the other, strengthened by encounter with existing 
 milieu of religious practice, or just by some intimations of the transcendence. The 
 cross pressures are experienced more acutely by some people and in some milieu 
 than others, but over the whole culture, we can see them reflected in a number of 
 middle positions, which have been drawn from both sides.150  
 
Our exit from the corral exercises us, and this in two ways. As strong evaluators, we must 
discern our desires and coordinate in relation to some form of the good. We must exercise 
our humanity and grow in articulacy, yet we are exercised by choices: can we be sure that 
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this exit is for the best? How do we negotiate the nova of options and spiritual paths set 
before us? Liberation into the field marks us with the grace and curse of freedom.  
 Taylor grasps what the Grand Inquisitor saw all too clearly: freedom is fraught 
and perilous. In the field, we are forced to bear the burden of freedom: 
 Instead of a firm foundation for appeasing human conscience once and for all, you 
 chose everything that was unusual, enigmatic, and indefinite, you chose 
 everything that was beyond men’s strength, and thereby acted as if you did not 
 love them at all – and who did this? He who came to give his life for them! 
 Instead of taking over men’s freedom, you increased it and forever burdened the 
 kingdom of the human soul with its torments.151 
 
The freedom of the field places at a remove from the security of the corral, rendering us 
vulnerable to forces beyond our control. What we gain in expanded horizons and greater 
opportunities for exploration we lose in a sense of certainty, security, and order. In the 
field, we must choose from a seemingly endless host of options; we are free to choose, 
yet we are fated to live the consequences of our choice tormented by the thought that we 
may have chosen poorly.   
 Encapsulated within the field metaphor is an ambiguous gain: we attain an insight 
into the insufficiency of the corral but the liberation into the wider expanses of the field 
burden us with having to commit ourselves to something we can live for. If we are 
induced to break free from the corral, what we gain in freedom and a hope for fulfillment 
carries the price of having to negotiate a host of options. Exiting the corral involves a 
gamble, a risk, a reckoning with a host of new pressures. For the field is wide and many 
pathways are possible; from behind us, old friends cry out for us to return to the corral 
while, in the distance, we see the silhouettes of others who have gone in search of 
something more. We find ourselves as though on a mountain pass: 
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 In the midst of whirling snow and blinding mist, through which we get glimpses 
 now and then of paths which may be deceptive. If we stand still we shall be 
 frozen to death. If we take the wrong road we shall be dashed to pieces. We do 
 not certainly know whether there is any right one. What must we do? “Be strong 
 and of a good courage.” Act for the best, hope for the best, and take what 
 comes…If death ends all, we cannot meet death better.”152   
 
Having inhabited the space of the corral, we have seen for ourselves that it is ultimately 
inhospitable for humans and we move beyond it. We begin to inhabit an ethical life 
wherein we can come to “know what to do but also know what we want to be, and more 
crucially makes us love the good.”153 Instead of a single code, we find many ways of 
living that appeal to us. We are called to roll the dice, to pledge ourselves to the search 
for fulfillment. It is a fraught gain, for now we must face the nova of options that defines 
Secular3 and discern, among the goods, which holds out to us the promise of fulfillment.  
 
1.2.2.2  The Ethical Field: Function  
 How, then, does the metaphor (1) carry us “amidst” history and (2) can it ferry us, 
or point us, beyond itself? 
 Obviously, in terms of spatial imagery, the metaphor is contrastive. The restricted 
domain of the corral contrasts with the wider-range of inquiry made possible by the field. 
Taylor gave us a feel for the narrowness and limited scope of the corral and, by 
extension, of the broader CWS in which the corral is rooted. We have seen its limitations, 
confronted its hidden biases, and we have listened to Taylor’s counter-narrative. 
Whereupon, having heard an account that made better sense of elements ignored or 
discounted within the corral, we ventured forward. Yet the gain in freedom comes at the 
expense of a sense of security, even if ersatz. For released into the field, standing between 
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the corral and forest, we are exposed and vulnerable. Countless voices call to us. We 
open our eyes and strain our ears to discern how, and toward what, we should move.   
 The move from corral to field does not entail leaving the immanent frame but in 
finding a way to live within it anew. This is fraught with potential and peril. No doubt, 
within the field’s expanses we may resurrect the ancients’ question What is it good to be? 
Even more, we can ask in our own way a question posed by Augustin: “What is that I 
love when I love you, my God?” It is our vocation to find, as Thomas Becket seeks in 
Becket, “an object worthy of my freedom.” To enter the field is to discover one must 
exercise agency within history: we are not rudderless ships, listing in the sea of time, but 
agents capable of charting a course. Where do we go when, buffeted by wind and blinded 
by rain, dragged by currents and threatened by rocks, it is hard to steer or find a clear 
course? There is no single-criterion formula or rubric to guide us. We must discern.  
 Turning to (2), does the field direct us beyond itself? This is harder to answer 
because Taylor is coy. He says he desires to talk about “our sense of things. I’m not 
talking about what people believe.”154 Or, in analyzing closed world structures, “I will 
not be arguing either for or against an open or closed reading.”155 He shows us options, 
offering a three-cornered engagement between secular humanists, neo-Nietzscheans, and 
acknowledgers of some good beyond life.156 The field he opens admits of many pathways 
and there are many ways to dwell thereon: some ways appeal to an immanent 
transcendence, others to God or the Transcendent itself, still others hold that fulfillment 
requires nothing other than self-reliance. The way of the field, it seems, is to confront 
many ways.   
                                               
154 Taylor, A Secular Age, 325.  
155 Ibid., 551.  
156 Ibid., 636-7.  
 58 
 We might see the metaphor of the field, then, as a deliberate indirection. It does 
not definitely indicate which way to go. Instead, it records our liberation into a 
burdensome freedom: we are freed to take a stand for ourselves but pressured by a host of 
options. It is faced with these options that we can make a wager with our very selves by 
discerning something of surpassing value toward which to direct our lives. The push and 
pull of many voices, of competing positions, will buffet our ears and make us question 
which direction we should head. Forward, backward, or stay in place: to what do we 
commit our freedom?  
 
1.2.3 Untracked Forest  
 If Taylor succeeds in guiding his reader from the corral to the field, it remains to 
be seen whether one enters the forest. A move toward the forest’s edge, he admits, “is 
hard to talk about…clearly and in a recognized common language.”157 This is because 
 The forest is virtually untracked. Or, rather, there are old tracks; they appear on 
 maps which have been handed down to us. But when you get in there, it is very 
 hard to find them. So we need people to make new trails. That is, in effect, was 
 Iris Murdoch has done.158  
 
Old routes, laid down in a different time and rooted in a different social imaginary, seem 
increasingly incapable of guiding modern pilgrims toward an encounter with the 
Transcendent. I call this Taylor’s Narnian insight. Returning from Narnia, the children  
felt they really must explain to the Professor why four of the coats out of his 
wardrobe were missing. And the Professor, who was a very remarkable man, 
didn't tell them not to be silly or not to tell lies, but believed the whole story. 
"No," he said, "I don't think it will be any good trying to go back through the 
wardrobe door to get the coats. You won't get into Narnia again by that route. Nor 
would the coats be much use by now if you did! Eh? What's that? Yes, of course 
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you'll get back to Narnia again some day. Once a King in Narnia, always a King 
in Narnia. But don't go trying to use the same route twice.159   
 
The Professor does not deny the existence of Narnia, nor does he see the “modern” world 
as prohibiting access to it. He is mindful, though, that the route that took the children 
there in the first place cannot do so again. There is no hint of nostalgia for what has been; 
rather, one must remain watchful and attentive for signs of new pathways.  
 I think the reason Taylor finds this “hard to talk about” is because entering the 
forest demands a response to a personal summons; there is no “pre-paid tourist package” 
that guides a person into the forest, offering a direct route toward what it is that 
“commands our fullest love.”160 To the contrary, entrance into the forest is perilous, for 
one risks losing oneself in the attempt to find oneself in the presence of the Transcendent 
who bids us enter. In the metaphor of the “forest” is a cipher for a passionate itinerary 
that is animated by our deepest desires. We are led by our restless desire beneath the 
forest’s canopy where we navigate not only its depths but also, and more importantly, our 
own. In coming to name and know these depths, we are gradually tutored into a language 
not of our own devising, a language of divine pedagogy that promises and enacts within 
those open to it a “transformation” of our drives and desires.161  
 It must be said: not all who stand in the “ethical field” behold the forest as 
invitatory. There is no shortage of persons who are content to remain resolutely on the 
plain. The potential transformation luring some into the forest is seen, at least by those 
standing with Nietzsche and Nussbaum, as a threat. To them, the forest is spurned as a 
“doomed wilderness whose edges were being constantly and punily gnawed at by men 
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with plows and axes who feared it because it was wilderness.”162 The metaphor is not 
neutral. There are boosters who encourage (Illich, Hopkins), and knockers who 
discourage (Nussbaum, Nietzsche), entering its depths. The latter sentiment seems to hold 
sway for our age, he muses, appears “very inhospitable to forest-dwelling.”163 If we 
regard Taylor’s itinerary so far as directing us to a place of indirection as we stand on the 
field, then it is incumbent upon us to understand what pressures may lead us to the forest 
or induce us to remain where we are.  
 
1.2.3.1  The Untracked Forest: Encapsulated History  
Following Taylor, it seems that being drawn into the forest involves committing 
to three premises. First, “acknowledging that life is not the whole story,” and admitting 
“the point of things is not exhausted by life.”164 Second, enacting a “radical decentering 
of the self.”165 And third, effecting a stance of “agape/karuna” through a willing 
renunciation of life that, in a paradoxical return, promises to bring about the flourishing 
of life. Committing oneself in such a way, though, is incredibly difficult because 
 We have moved from a world in which the place of fullness was understood as 
 unproblematically outside of or “beyond” human life, to a conflicted age in which 
 this construal is challenged by others which place it (in a wide range of different 
 ways) “within” human life.166    
 
What is contested in our age, unlike previous eras, is where one finds fulfillment. 
Nothing compels entrance to the forest; one does so because one seeks something beyond 
oneself that will lead to fulfillment. But among the field-dwellers, appeals to the God or 
the Transcendent finds both boosters and knockers. Let’s tease this out a bit.  
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 We have in our age a seemingly endless array of “life goods” and “constitutive 
goods” vying for our allegiance. A distinctive mark of Secular3 is the “nova effect, 
spawning an ever-widening variety of moral/spiritual options, across the span of the 
thinkable and perhaps even beyond.”167 Thinkers like Nussbaum, for instance, regard 
efforts to “transcend humanity” as potentially “mutilating us.”168 For her, human 
fulfillment can be found without appeal to external transcendence; the Modern Moral 
Order possesses all necessary resources to enable flourishing. A neo-Nietzschean spin, by 
contrast, rejects both appeals to anything beyond the immanent frame (appeals to external 
transcendence) and the sufficiency of the Modern Moral Order. For this group, the 
possibility of “untroubled happiness is not only a childish illusion, but also involves a 
truncation of human nature.”169 Finding ourselves in the company of other plain-dwellers, 
we see various “spins” on what is necessary to attain flourishing: an appeal to (a) external 
transcendence, (b) internal transcendence, and (c) no transcendence, just “will to power.”  
 Options (b and c) agree, against (a), in at least one important respect: they hold 
that there is nothing beyond life. Taylor sketches out what he takes to be the climate of 
our era in which the appeal to transcendence beyond human life (a) meets resistance: 
1. Life, flourishing, driving back the frontiers of death and suffering are of 
supreme value.  
2. This was not always so; it was not so for our ancestors and for people in 
other earlier civilizations. 
3. One of the things which stopped it being so in the past was precisely a 
sense, inculcated by religion, that there were “higher” goals. 
4. We arrive at (1) by a critique and overcoming of (this kind) of religion.170  
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On this telling, it was the insidious role of religion in (3) that held us back from affirming 
the supreme value of human life. We can recognize this as subtraction story explaining 
how, once we removed the obstacle of religion, the human situation improved. And, as 
Taylor sees it, this is a dominant, if not hegemonic, view among religion’s knockers.  
 Within the immanent frame, the “spin” of the Closed World Structure is prima 
facie closed to any appeal to extra-human transcendence. But the consequence of the 
CWS is that “the field is turned into another corral.”171 That is, “life” emerges as the 
constitutive good that orients and motivates life. But it should be noted that within the 
CWS “Life” is not personal, it does not call, it does not woo, it does not entice with the 
promise of transformation. Oriented by “Life,” Nussbaum can appeal to the Modern 
Moral Order as sufficient to furnish the resources necessary to bring about flourishing. Or 
Nietzsche, in a Dionysian key, can encourage a form of life in pursuit of one’s maximal 
potential by unleashing the “will to power.” Even if they would regard one another with 
mutual skepticism, “Neo-Nietzscheans and secular humanists together condemn religion 
and reject any good beyond life.”172 
  Against its knockers, those who appeal to extra-human transcendence can gamely 
point to the “continued disappointments of secular humans”173 in achieving its end. 
Tipping his own hand, Taylor observes how the position of exclusive humanism 
 closes the transcendent window, as though there were nothing beyond. More, as 
 though it weren’t an irrepressible need of the human heart to open that window, 
 and first look, then go beyond. As though feeling this need were the result of a 
 mistake, an erroneous world-view, bad conditions, or worse, some pathology.174   
 
Once more the question arises: which position gives the better account of our lives? 
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 What makes the question of a “better account” so difficult to answer is that there 
is the array of options available to us. Standing amidst the crowd on the ethical plain, it 
seems “an ultimate surd that people find very different ways to God, or the Good, or 
Nirvana, ways that seem to involve incompatible assumptions.”175 Of course, many of us 
know exclusive humanists who live with charity and confessing Christians who are 
hostile to the stranger. We know humanists who seldom, if ever, raise the question of 
“God” but who are committed to building a better world. Figures such as Murdoch appeal 
to a transcendence beyond human flourishing, akin to Plato’s impersonal Good, but her 
itinerary responds to the allure of beauty and not, as an avowed atheist, to God.  
 Even though Taylor’s theological commitments prevent him from taking on board 
fully Murdoch’s approach, it is instructive to peer down the path she blazes. For her, an 
appeal to beauty provides an occasion for “unselfing.” She writes  
 Art, and by ‘art’ from now on I mean good art, not fantasy art, affords us a pure 
 delight in the independent existence of what is excellent. Both in its genesis and 
 its enjoyment it is a thing totally opposed to selfish obsession. It invigorates our 
 best faculties and, to use Platonic language, inspires love in the highest part of the 
 soul. It is able to do this partly by virtue of something which it shares with nature: 
 a perfection of form which invites unpossessive contemplation and resists 
 absorption into the selfish dream life of the consciousness.176  
 
The contemplation of beauty develops habits of attention, of learning to direct a “just and 
loving gaze upon an individual reality.177 Great art “teaches us how real things can be 
looked at and loved without being seized and used, without being appropriated into the 
greedy organism of the self.”178 Further still, she believes “it is in the capacity to love, 
that is to see, that the liberation of the soul from fantasy consists.” She continues 
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 The freedom which is a proper human goal is the freedom from fantasy, that is the 
 realism of compassion. What I have called fantasy, the proliferation of blinding, 
 self-centered aims and images, is itself a powerful system of energy, and most of 
 what is often called ‘will’ or ‘willing’ belongs to this system.179 
 
The process of “unselfing” is an askesis or disciplining oneself to see beyond the self. 
Her aim is not to annihilate the self but to enact a transformation that enables one to see 
with new eyes. Learning to gaze lovingly at what is beyond myself and beyond my 
control, I am “rewarded by a knowledge of reality.”180 
 What we see in Murdoch, and find in the exemplars Taylor cites, is less a 
disengaged argument or logical proof than incarnate testimony: in recounting the routes 
they have traversed, he hopes to inspire us to follow their lead. Can he do otherwise? 
Having rejected appeals to apodictic, one-size-fits-all approaches, his only option is to 
appeal to exemplars who have gone before us. His strategy is not to incapacitate his 
opponent or demonstrate that Nietzsche, or Nussbaum, is totally wrong. With 
characteristic magnanimity, he observes “no position can be set aside as simply devoid of 
insight.”181 He means to capacitate us, to help readers to recognize competing ways of 
dwelling on the field and to evaluate which, if any, can fulfill the “highest spiritual or 
moral aspirations for human beings, while showing a path to the transformation which 
doesn’t crush, mutilate or deny what is essential to our humanity.182 Exemplars do not 
give us a behavioral code but show us, in word and deed, how one might live.  
 Taylor’s appeal to biographies, rather than argument or syllogism, does not 
impose, but proposes, examples of itineraries into the forest. The nova of options 
confronting us on the plain is met by examples of exemplars whose stories we need  
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 we need to enlarge our palette of points of contact with fullness; there are those 
 which involve a contemplative grasp of this fullness (Bede, Havel,  epiphanies of 
 Loyola, Jonathan Edwards); as well as visions of the negative absence of fullness: 
 desolation, emptiness, and the like. And there are those which consist in life-
 changing moments, being “surprised by love”. This distinction can  be, of course, 
 merely notional: that is, the same event may partake of both.183  
 
By reflecting on the lives of the converted, in hearing their stories, we grasp how “they 
bring into view something beyond that frame, which at the same time changes the 
meaning of all elements of the frame.”184 We find in the examples of our forbearers a 
source of inspiration to respond to desire of our restless hearts seeking fulfillment.  
  
1.2.3.2  The Untracked Forest: Function 
 Carrying us “amidst” history, the forest metaphor leads us to the field’s edge. The 
dense ridge of trees spreads before us: obstacle and invitation. For those who see no 
reason to sacrifice the light of day to walk beneath the canopy of trees, who have no 
desire to cut and hack their way through the brush, there is scant reason to enter. Some 
would question the desire to enter because all resources necessary for flourishing are 
already available in the field. Yet there are those who have heard a voice from the forest 
depths who decide to enter its depths without knowing where they are going or how they 
will get there. Yet they set forth in search of fulfillment and, in the process, come to find 
their stories drawn up into a larger account of those who have gone before us to seek, 
those who have found, and even those who have been surprised by, the Transcendent.  
 In a way similar to the field’s indirection, a forest makes for an ambiguous 
metaphor. We know Fangorn forest was reputed to be haunted but, in the Lord of the 
Rings, the Ents became heroic allies of the Fellowship. In Faulkner’s “The Bear,” Sam 
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divests himself of his gun, his watch, and his compass – tools of the modern hunter – and 
finds himself lost in the woods. There, in woods’ depths, without direction or orientation, 
he sees the bear. Prone and vulnerable to nature, it is an epiphanic moment 
 Then he saw the bear. It did not emerge, appear: it was just there, immobile, fixed 
 in the green and windless noon’s hot dappling, not as big as he had dreamed it but 
 as big as he had expected, bigger, dimensionless against the dappled obscurity, 
 looking at him. Then it moved. It crossed the glade without haste, walking for an 
 instant into the sun’s full glare and out of it, and stopped again and looked back at 
 him across one shoulder, Then it was gone. It didn’t walk into the woods. It faded, 
 sank back into the wilderness without motion as he had watched a fish, a huge old 
 bass, sink back into the dark depths of its pool and vanish without even any 
 movement of its fins.185  
 
Forests, though, are dangerous: ask Hansel and Gretel. And Taylor observes that 
“religious faith can be dangerous. Opening to transcendence is fraught with peril.”186 
Contact with the Transcendent may tempt one toward a crusade intent on purifying the 
world of its ills; or, transformed by agape, to put one’s life on the line for the neighbor.  
 Can the forest ferry us beyond the CWS? Yes, but not easily. Read along the grain 
of the subtraction narratives, the metaphor seems foolish: why ever leave the field? But if 
we pause to think maybe, just maybe, there is more to our story than the affirmation of 
life, or that the fullness for which we long can be sated only by risking such a venture, 
then we might be goaded into the forest. There can be no denying the risk: this is not a 
pre-packaged pilgrimage where one walks the way of the Lord only to stay in four-star 
hotels each night! We, like Faulkner’s Sam, must make ourselves vulnerable as we enter 
the forest and face the peril and promise of being transformed by our journey.  
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1.3 Taylor’s Map: How a Road from Quebec Leads to Cork  
 Let me draw together the strands of my argument. I will first recapitulate my 
general argument that Taylor’s story of our “secular age” is a performative text. Second, I 
will evaluate the nature of Taylor’s map. Third, I will begin my more explicit 
engagement with William Desmond’s philosophy. If Taylor has given us a sense for how 
and why the question of the transcendent became exercising, my proposal is to consider 
how Desmond enables us to exercise transcendence as a spiritual practice. The transition 
recorded here follows the road from Taylor’s Quebec to Desmond’s Cork.  
 
1.3.1 Text as Performance 
 In Parts I and II I tried to demonstrate that Taylor’s us of ad hominem reasoning 
affected not only his approach to negotiating moral disagreements but also the narrative 
unspooled in A Secular Age. He rejects, as insufficient to the thickness and depth of 
human life, recourse to apodictic-style arguments. Such arguments appeal to an external, 
supposedly neutral, criterion as the canon by which one can resolve disputes. The gist of 
this type of argument is that if we could get the right, if we could establish the right 
procedure, then we could resolve our disagreements. Apodictic arguments are on the 
lookout for an unassailable and universal principle, always and everywhere binding.  
 Subtraction stories textually instantiate this form of argument. These stories 
recount how, in earlier times, constraints placed on humans (superstitions, religion) 
worked against human flourishing. Once these impediments were removed, however, 
things improved. These are stories of addition by subtraction: by liberating ourselves 
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“from certain earlier, confining horizons, or illusions, or limitations of knowledge”187 we 
gradually come of age as courageous, illusion-free, adults.188 The loss of religion, the 
increased sense of autonomy or of the buffered self, these are taken as net gains over the 
conditions of the past. All that was lost, needed to be lost in order for humans to flourish. 
Then we were held back, in those dark ages, but now we stand beneath reason’s light.  
 Centuries before Taylor’s effort, Hegel narrated a version of the Enlightenment’s 
subtraction story that contains a prescient critique. For the Enlightenment, Hegel writes, 
faith is “a tissue of superstitions, prejudices, and errors.”189 Ludwig Heyde continues: 
 What the Enlightenment asserts is in principle not foreign to the people. The 
 Enlightenment does nothing more than awaken the rationality and critical sense 
 which lie as yet dormant. That is why it carries out its activity by way of a 
 peaceful diffusion through the entire society. The mentality of the society changes 
 gradually without any real opposition.190   
 
The change in conditions of possibility of belief, the dawn of what Taylor called Secular3, 
did not shift suddenly. It took time to incubate in a process, Hegel writes, 
 comparable to a silent expansion or to the diffusion, say, of a perfume in the 
 unresisting atmosphere. It is a penetrating infection which does not make itself 
 noticeable beforehand as something opposed to the indifferent element into which 
 it insinuates itself, and therefore cannot be warded off. Only when the infection 
 has become widespread is that consciousness, which unheedingly yielded to its 
 influence, aware of it.191   
 
Note, first, the changes wrought by the Enlightenment were not wrought directly, as 
though presented as propositions and accepted after reflection. It was more akin to 
diffusion, atmospheric, inescapable like the germs from a sneeze. The Enlightenment was 
something caught, not taught, and we only become aware of it after it grasped us.  
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 Second, and here we find the critique, Hegel’s metaphor portrays this insight as 
virulent; like a virus, it infects faith and  
 infiltrates the noble parts through and through and soon has taken complete 
 possession of all the vitals and members of the unconscious idol; then ‘one fine 
 morning it gives it comrade a shove with the elbow, and bang! crash! The idol lies 
 on the floor.  On ‘one fine morning’ whose noon is bloodless if the infection has 
 penetrated to every organ of spiritual life. Memory alone then still preserves the 
 dead form of the Spirit’s previous shape as a vanished history, vanished one 
 knows not how. And the new serpent of wisdom raised on high for adoration has 
 in this way painlessly cast merely a withered skin.192  
 
The fever caused by the Enlightenment breaks “one fine morning” when the idols of 
superstition are cast down and broken. Reason triumphs! Until, at least, we see that it has 
erected “the new serpent of wisdom” as an object of adoration. The Enlightenment’s anti-
idolatrous drive undermines itself by falling before an idol of its own devising. Hegel’s 
critique: the Enlightenment’s exorcism of the supernatural requires its own exorcism.  
 Taylor’s style of argument and narration better accounts for such vicissitudes and 
contradictions. Whereas apodictic reasoning took as its model a style of inquiry 
originating in the scientific revolution, ad hominem reasoning has deeper roots, extending 
at least as far as Socrates. What is distinctive, especially in our age, is that rather than 
assuming an aloof or disengaged stance, ad hominem reasoning demands greater 
proximity among interlocutors. It requires going “to the person” as a fellow traveler. No 
doubt: it is time-consuming and arduous to engage in the back-and-forth of sharing 
stories. Yet one can find oneself in the story of another: on hearing Taylor’s tale, one can 
find oneself implicated in it and behold one’s life appears in a new light. Niggling and 
unresolved issues arrange themselves in new patterns, nagging questions are addressed, 
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longstanding dissatisfactions find succor. I called this a “capacitating” argument because 
it empowers its hearer to make an ameliorating transition toward a better form of life.   
 So why tell a long story that, he claims, could and should have been longer?193 
Taylor’s recourse is to narrative because “we grasp our lives in a narrative.”194 He 
challenges subtraction stories by telling a counter story that acts as a mirror; our 
challenge is to judge how well we see ourselves reflected. Again, Taylor has precedents 
in this approach. The prophet Nathan195 told a story of terrible injustice and kindled 
David’s anger, but Nathan’s story is David’s. So implicated, David experiences the 
judgment leveled against him, and repents. Walking to Emmaus, the stranger’s re-telling 
of events sparks a flame within the disciples. Their story is re-narrated by their 
companion who walks with them and opens the scriptures anew. With eyes opened at the 
breaking of the bread, they return to their companions not to resume an old way of life 
but capacitated to live anew in the light of what had happened.196  
 The zig-zag movement of Taylor’s story destabilizes the hegemony of 
modernity’s subtraction stories and, by exposing their weaknesses and shortcomings, 
makes possible a new understanding of our age. I tried to express the main movements 
and contrasting “feel” of his story by showing how his metaphors encapsulate history and 
express ways of dwelling in our age. By allowing ourselves to be implicated in his 
account, we are capacitated to see our lives, and our history, with new eyes. The sealed-
off borders to the Transcendent may not be as solid as some of religion’s knockers would 
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have us believe, the “eclipse of the transcendent” may be less an inescapable feature of 
history than a remediable blindness.   
 
1.3.2 A Taylor-made Map: Is There Any There There? 
 
A line from 2017’s Twin Peaks expresses well Taylor’s map: “This map is very 
old, but it is always current; it is a living thing.” By narrating transitions from the “corral” 
to the “field” to the “forest,” Taylor sketches a map accounting for historical landmarks 
and developments as well as the existential forces that weigh upon, push, and pull those 
living in our age. Taylor is less interested in erecting “Do Not Enter” signs than he is in 
showing how various routes or modes of life arose, were appealing, and continue to have 
appeal. He allows us to inhabit the map, to get a feel for its topography, and he gives us 
some avuncular advice and indications about how we might venture into the forest.  
 The map tells an old story, dating back many centuries, but it is a story we cannot 
help but to find ourselves within. We recognize that shifts have taken place. In many 
social settings, at least in the West, the name “Jesus” is less likely to occasion the tip of a 
hat, or a bend in the knee, than it is to elicit the name of a lawyer over charges of 
proselytization. Taylor gives us a sense of how we got here and what this means for how 
we understand ourselves. He maps out a story with many twists and turns, remarkable 
convergences, and remarkable coincidences. But it is not entirely retrospective: by 
implicating the reader, by providing a counter-narrative that gives an alternative setting to 
the “facts” of history, we can decide the trajectory we will follow the future.  
 So, what do the bounds of our age look like? Recall that the beating of the 
bounds, in earlier eras, “involved the whole parish, and could only be effective as a 
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collective act of this whole.”197 As an event within history, it interwove time with space, 
kairos and topos, as the parish re-defined its boundaries and defined what, and by 
participation who, was within the bounds and who was out. The act provided as much a 
sense of geographical coordinates as it did an existential terrain helping to define where, 
and to whom, parishioners belonged.  
 What distinguishes the bounds of our age, on Taylor’s narration, is a perduring 
openness to moving beyond toward a sense of fulfillment neither mapped nor mappable. 
The restless stirring of the human heart must be taken account of in to get any semblance 
of an adequate picture of human life: much to the chagrin of reductive efforts. 
Furthermore, neither the Modern Moral Order nor Nietzsche’s dithyrambic appeals have 
stilled our yearning hearts and burning desires. We have a seemingly insatiable thirst for 
transcendence. Taylor cannot compel us by logical argument to enter the sacred but he 
does provide exemplars who have gone before us. We can follow their tracks. Taylor’s 
map is, indeed, a “living thing” that grows with each new itinerary taken.   
 Allow me, though, to raise a potentially scuttling objection. Put pithily: what if 
there isn’t any there there? What if appeals to transcendence are, actually, appeals to 
nothingness? Taylor may be right that all humans feel drawn to attain human fulfillment. 
He may, moreover, be correct in giving a powerful account of what it is to live beneath 
the “eclipse of transcendence.” But what is to prevent this from being a snipe hunt? “Go 
out and pursue the snipe,” we are told, but behind our backs it is whispered, “if there is 
any such thing at all.” Paul Janz seems to be making this critique when he observes: 
 The crux of the problem…stems from Taylor’s continuous treatment of 
 transcendence merely according to its linguistically or conceptually analytical 
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 definition as that which is “beyond” the immanent (which effectively turns out to 
 be the merely negative definition of transcendence as “not the immanent”).198  
 
For Janz, the issue is a “the term ‘transcendence’ is not yet an independent or 
‘ontological’ source of anything; it is rather solely a product of logical thinking, and 
entirely abstract and negative one at that.”199 Janz’s critique: Taylor has repeatedly 
gestured in the direction of transcendence, has furnished exemplars who claim to have 
encountered this “source,” but he has not yet demonstrated or shown us that the 
Transcendent is really out there. A gap would seem to appear between logic and ontology 
or, for that matter, theology. “Go out and hunt the divine snipe. Enter the forest and risk 
the encounter,” our well-meaning uncle tells us, and gives us a reliable map. But this begs 
the question: the quest for new itineraries to God is possible because we know of 
exemplars who have forged new itineraries to God. But what reason do we have, apart 
from a yearning for fulfillment, for setting out in the first place?  
 I think Janz makes an important point. It would be helpful were Taylor to give an 
account “of how that which is transcendent announces itself uniquely and genuinely as a 
life-meaningful authority for questions of moral sources or human fullness.”200 It seems 
to me that Taylor does this, in a way, by means of his exemplars. Conversion stories give 
us instances of embodied palimpsests which recount, in and through their lives, how the 
Transcendent has made a new life possible. Janz, though, wants a more robust accounting 
for how the Transcendent enters into human history. Indeed, the weight of his point must 
not be ignored. A reader who has accompanied Taylor through A Secular Age may feel a 
stir of desire to embark on a new itinerary to the sacred, may want to uncover a new 
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route, yet may nevertheless pause. The hesitation: a lack of confidence that what, or who, 
is sought in the forest actually abides there. We are left to wonder whether our map is 
indeed a reliable guide, whether it reveals openings through which we might begin to 
approach the Transcendent, or if what seems to be openings are actually spots where the 
ink of the map has been rubbed away and needs to be filled in. The map is complete, 
there are no openings to the Transcendent, this is all there is.   
 
1.3.3  From Quebec to Cork   
 With Janz’s question in mind, let me begin to pivot toward the work of William 
Desmond. Desmond distinguishes his project from Taylor’s in the following observation:   
 My emphasis is less on telling the story of modernity, offering hermeneutical 
 narratives of the complex unfoldings of multifarious impulses, inspirations, 
 trends, dreams, excesses, rational sobrieties, and so forth, defining the shaping of 
 modernity. My interests have a certain metaphysical character to them.201 
 
It is in this “metaphysical character” of Desmond’s thought that I believe we can find a 
necessary supplement to Taylor’s map. Indeed, I want to argue that Desmond is a figure 
necessary for those who dwell on the plain, who yearn for a sense of fulfillment, but feel 
so exercised or vexed by the question of transcendence they can hardly assay all their 
options, let alone choose to commit themselves to any one of them.  
 I am convinced that Desmond can assist those who feel beset by the surfeit of 
choices. His philosophy, he writes, aims “to bring a developed habit of mindfulness to 
bear on what is at play in being, especially with regard to the basic presuppositions, 
sources, and orientations toward the ‘to be’ that mark our being in the midst of things.”202 
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The task I set before myself is to understand both how Desmond enacts this goal and how 
his works can be approached in such a way that they aide in developing a “habit of 
mindfulness” attentive and responsive to the Transcendent. I do this by approaching 
Desmond’s philosophy in the light of ancient spiritual exercises, broadly described by 
Pierre Hadot as “voluntary, personal practices intended to bring about a transformation of 
the individual.”203 Desmond’s philosophy needs to be undergone and allowed to re-ignite 
a feeling of metaphysical astonishment that raises anew and opens a pathway to 
encountering the Transcendent. Desmond’s philosophy works by capacitating his readers, 
systematically and poetically, to perceive the world in a new way. 
 We leave Quebec, for now, and move to Cork. Taylor has given us reason to 
believe that stories of the impossibility of transcendence, or the demise of the 
Transcendent, may be premature. Our passage is aided by a conviction that Taylor’s map 
is a living document open to further additions. Thus, we need to consider Desmond’s 
“Augustinian odyssey embarked upon in the wake of Hegel”204 to see if we can learn 
from him how to exercise transcendence in a way capable of sating the spiritual hunger in 
our age. Lessons learned in Cork can be delivered back to Quebec to preserve and 
advance Taylor’s work. Preserve: offering a response to Janz’s desire for “some sort of 
critical or rationally demonstrative account, however indirect it might have to be, of what 
the meaningfully authoritative ‘content’ of the transcendent might be for human life.”205 
Advance: answering Taylor’s call for “new itineraries” capable of guiding seekers toward 
a horizon where we may behold the new dawn of the Transcendent in a secular age.  
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Chapter 2 
 
A Crack in Everything: 
 Introducing William Desmond’s Metaphysics 
 
Achilles is not quite invulnerable; the sacred waters did not wash the heel by which 
Thetis held him. Siegfried, in the Nibelungen, is not quite immortal, for a leaf fell on his 
back whilst he was bathing in the dragon’s blood, and that spot which it covered is 
mortal. There is a crack in everything God has made. 
-Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Compensation” 
   
 
 
This chapter introduces readers to William Desmond and his metaphysical philosophy. 
Born in Cork, Ireland, in 1951, Desmond describes himself as having grown up in the 
Middle Ages, “an Irish Catholic, fostered on a sense of the mystery of God and God’s 
ways, on a sympathy for the rejected and the outside whom we cannot judge not to be 
God’s favored, fostered, too, on an esteem that God’s creation, nature, was good.”206 At 
an early age Desmond fell in love with poetry, especially Wordsworth, and later took an 
interest in the works of Shakespeare. After a year spent in the Dominican novitiate, he 
enrolled at University College Cork where he eventually focused his studies on English 
and Philosophy. After earning an MA in philosophy, with a focus on Collingwood’s 
aesthetics, he moved to America where he earned a PhD in philosophy at Penn State 
University. After completing his PhD, Desmond taught at St Bonaventure for one year 
(1978-79) before returning to Ireland with the intention of making his home there. This 
was not to be: three years later, he returned to America to teach at Loyola University in 
Baltimore (1982-94). In 1994, he again crossed the Atlantic to take a position at the 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium, where he taught until retiring in 2017.  
                                               
206 William Desmond, Perplexity and Ultimacy (Albany: SUNY, 1995), 2.  
 77 
Befitting one fêted as “Ireland’s most distinguished living philosopher,”207 
Desmond’s work engages an array of thinkers – Heraclitus to Hegel, Plato to Nietzsche – 
and topics ranging from metaphysics to ethics to aesthetics to religion. His interlocutors 
include Richard Kearney, Cyril O’Regan, John Caputo, and a growing body of students 
who write appreciatively of his wisdom and generosity. Not least among these is 
Christopher Ben Simpson whose work has gone a long way in making Desmond’s 
thought more widely known.208 Finally, two of his monographs have been the focus of 
special issues of journals209 and two volumes of essays inspired by his thought have been 
published within the last decade.210  
In the introduction to Between System and Poetics, Anthony Kelly describes 
Desmond’s philosophical ambition as follows: “Desmond sees it as his task to find an 
adequate place for genuine alterity, the other which is nevertheless not alien to revitalize 
the transcendent and to show its ineluctability for the ontological constitution of the 
human and of any understanding of the human which can lay claim to adequacy.”211  A 
daunting task, to be sure, seeing as Desmond’s philosophy is incorrigibly metaphysical in 
character and, he admits, “metaphysics is a word not in good odor in some quarters 
today.”212 Yet, Richard Kearney observes, Desmond has always had a skeptical eye for 
the fast and quick, for cheap notions of the destruction of metaphysics when not 
properly understood or when used as an excuse to ignore the rich complexity of 
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the Western philosophy of Being, as if one could just sweep it aside and begin all 
over again from scratch, from the ground zero of our transcendental egos.213   
 
Kearney aptly likens Desmond to the solitary marathoner, a thinker in for the long haul. 
This seems fitting especially given the request Desmond makes of would-be readers:  
I do not ask for uncritical readers, but I do ask for disciplined readers – reader 
who have studied hard and long, who can take their time to think; readers who 
have not shunned solitude; readers suspicious of themselves before being 
suspicious of others; readers patient when demands are made on them; readers 
themselves adventurers; readers who ask for more than the rhetorics fashionable 
in academic philosophy, and who hate the substitution of “relevant” ideology for 
the seriousness of truth…214  
 
Desmond’s philosophy, as will become apparent, offers no shortcuts and cannot be 
traversed quickly. A decision to take up his work requires risking being transformed as 
one reads. This is philosophy as askesis, as a formative exercise, aimed not at doling out 
discrete thoughts but at cultivating a renewed mode of mindfulness.   
Those familiar with the mood of contemporary philosophy, however, may feel 
reluctant to accept this invitation. Per his olfactory allusion, Desmond admits: 
 I know that metaphysics is a word not in good odor in some quarters today, 
 whether among some technical virtuosi of the analytical persuasion, or among the 
 hermeneutical mandarins of the Continental persuasion, to say nothing of the 
 dithyrambic textualists among the deconstructionists.215 
 
An “unrepentant” metaphysician, Desmond insists we “need to ask the question of being; 
we need to ask the question of human being; we need to ask the question of the being of 
God.”216 One wonders: is this the wish of a philosopher too stubborn to accept the 
overcoming of metaphysics? Clearly, it would seem, Desmond has not yet read John 
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Manoussakis’s recent essay which begins with the following observation: “William 
Desmond is arguably in our times the last metaphysician.”217 
 As mentioned, my project advances a reading of Desmond’s metaphysics as a 
form of “spiritual exercise” capable of awakening a sense of the Transcendent and 
transforming the way one views the world. Thus, when a major philosopher of religion 
dubs the figure whose thought you promote “the last metaphysician,” you should 
probably take note. To be sure, Manoussakis is not alone in thinking that metaphysicians 
are, or should be, extinct. Consequently, before I argue for a theological appropriation of 
metaphysics, I need first to canvas some fairly strident critiques of metaphysics coming 
from Martin Heidegger, John Caputo, Richard Kearney, and Merold Westphal, to see 
whether a theological engagement with metaphysics is advisable, let alone possible.  
 This chapter proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I employ Taylor’s ad hominem 
strategy to engage Heidegger, Caputo, Kearney, and Westphal in a form of capacitating 
argument. Rather than showing how Critic-X incapacitates all attempts at metaphysics, or 
how Desmond incapacitates Critic-Y, I consider how each critic brings to light 
inconsistencies, contradictions, and missteps that have hampered earlier attempts at 
metaphysics. Each of our critics is right to level a “justified refusal of what is not to be 
affirmed,” but while each “no” forecloses an earlier effort at metaphysics, this does not 
necessarily mean the “no” forecloses all future efforts.  Indeed, the salutary “no” of 
skepticism, for Desmond,  
grows out of the presentiment that there is a norm or ideal that is short-changed or 
betrayed…the “no” of genuine skepticism is the overt expression of something 
more deeply recessed – something not just a matter of negation.218 
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An ad hominem or capacitating approach permits us to see how critique proves error-
reducing. The “no” of critique affirms by recognizing absence and each critic identifies 
“something that is missing” in earlier practices of metaphysics. Indeed, this is a crucial 
task of metaphysics: as we will see, the absence metaxology remains mindful of is not an 
empty nihil but, rather, what Desmond calls a “fecund void.”219  Thinking along with 
these critics leads me to propose five “commandments” to be obeyed by any metaphysics 
wishing to be considered a resource for theological reflection.   
 In Part II, I offer a broad introduction to Desmond’s systematic metaphysics. I 
stress systematic because he maintains, “one can reflect systematically without 
necessarily claiming possession of the system in the closed and totalizing sense.”220 
Metaphysics needs to think with categories but its task cannot be delimited by its 
categories; metaphysicians must remain always “mindful of what exceeds system.”221 
Hewing closely to Simpson’s schema, I orient the reader to Desmond’s metaxological 
framework and the key concepts essential for understanding his project. Throughout, I 
draw attention to areas of overlap with Taylor’s project.   
 In Part III, I examine how Desmond’s philosophy functions to inculcate a style of 
metaxological mindfulness. Metaphysics does not offer, at least as Desmond practices, a 
disengaged description of being. We are implicated in the happening of being and 
metaphysics reflects our effort to account for what it means “to be” caught up in the 
midst of things. Desmond, like Taylor, tries to tell us our story in a way that gives us to 
perceive what it means “to be” anew. Here we see how Desmond complements and 
deepens Taylor’s map by bringing to the surface otherwise recessed resources. 
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Metaxology, we may come to appreciate, is not simply a method of thinking 
philosophically; it offers itself and makes possibly metaphysics as a way of life. 
I conclude by first affirming my belief in Desmond’s ability to preserve Taylor’s 
project and I how he advances it. Second, more playfully, by offering a metaxological 
reading of the line, “there is a crack in everything God has made.” So read, the “crack” is 
no tragic flaw but, rather, a graced opening allowing us to experience “the deepest 
ontological intimacy of our being.”222 Finally, I lead us into a pub where I propose 
Desmond as the metaphysician of the “crack” and explore how his understanding of 
metaphysics makes it possible to approach metaxology as a form of spiritual exercise.  
 
2.1 Contesting Metaphysics: Between Knockers and Boosters  
 It is common coin among philosophers and theologians that metaphysics and 
ontotheology are synonymous. Surely Iain Thomson is not alone in believing that 
“Heidegger’s Destruktion of the metaphysical tradition leads him to the view that all 
Western metaphysical systems make foundational claims best understood as 
‘ontotheological’.”223 Yet, even in Heidegger’s own writings,224 the equation of 
metaphysics and ontotheology demands nuance. John Betz, following Cyril O’Regan, 
asks whether Heidegger has “forgotten or misremembered something?”225 Might it be 
possible Heidegger’s his description of metaphysics as ontotheology too-cavalierly lumps 
together all practices of metaphysics, from Plato to Aquinas to Hegel to Desmond? Betz 
suspects this the case: “Unfortunately, under Heidegger’s solvent influence, all these 
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colors bleed into one.”226 So while it is right for Heidegger, Caputo, Kearney, and 
Westphal to reject ontotheology, this rejection may not necessarily require a wholesale 
jettisoning of metaphysics. On the contrary, a consideration of each of their positions 
may actually exhibit how these thinkers permit a range of stances. Rather than a binary 
either/or, metaphysics can admit a range of knockers, boosters, and those in-between. 
2.1.1 Martin Heidegger 
 We get to the heart of Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics as ontotheology with 
his question, “How does the deity enter into philosophy?”227 He answers: 
 assuming that philosophy, as thinking, is the free and spontaneous self-
 involvement with beings as such, then the deity can come into philosophy only 
 insofar as philosophy, of its own accord and by its own nature, requires and 
 determines that and how the deity enters into it.228  
 
For Heidegger, the god of ontotheology does not irrupt freely into the human order: this 
is not the theophanic deity of the Burning Bush or Jesus’ Baptism and Transfiguration. 
The god of metaphysics, rather, has been dragooned into philosophy and placed at its 
service. Philosophy, as it were, writes the job description and employs god in a narrowly 
circumscribed position. This is a longstanding problem because Western metaphysics 
since its beginning with the Greeks has eminently been both ontology and 
theology, still without being tied to these rubrics. For this reason my inaugural 
lecture What is Metaphysics? (1929) defines metaphysics as the question about 
beings as such and as a whole. The wholeness of this whole is the unity of all 
beings that unifies as the generative ground.229  
 
In the final sentence, we recognize Aristotelian and Hegelian metaphysics as prime 
culprits of “ontotheology” as their philosophy aims at giving an account, a logos, of 
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beings that includes theos as subtending the whole. The god comes into metaphysics, not 
as the wholly other, but to serve as the divine glue binding all beings (ontos) together.  
 The god of metaphysics, then, proves a functional god who acts as the “causa 
prima that corresponds to the reason-giving path back to the ultima ratio, the final 
accounting.”230 This god is implicated within creation and placed at its service. Evoking 
Pascal’s critique of the god of the philosophers, Heidegger claims causa sui is 
 the right name for the god of philosophy. Man can neither pray nor sacrifice to 
 this god. Before the causa sui, man can neither fall to his knees in awe nor can he 
 play music and dance before this god.231   
 
It would be better, as he sees it, to abandon “god as causa sui” and to step back out of 
metaphysics where a “god-less thinking” may prove to be more open to the advent of the 
true God “than onto-theo-logic would like to admit.”232 One may be better equipped to 
think the Holy Other by resisting efforts to reduce the Divine to the immanent realm.  
 Essentially what Heidegger rejects, D.C. Schindler observes, is the “absorption of 
theology into philosophy.”233 Yet, as Westphal notes, this critique does not hit all 
metaphysicians. “It is not always sufficiently noticed that his paradigms are Aristotle and 
Hegel and that the target of his analysis of ‘the onto-theo-logical constitution of 
metaphysics’ is a tradition that stretches from Anaximander to Nietzsche, which isn’t 
quite the same as the tradition that stretches from Augustine to Kierkegaard.” 234 
Heidegger’s atheism is less an outright denial of God à la Nietzsche than a 
methodological decision to dislodge the god co-opted by a certain strand of metaphysics. 
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In this, Heidegger enacts a repetition of Kant’s “I have found it necessary to deny 
knowledge in order to make room for faith.”235  
 Accordingly, claims of Heidegger’s “overcoming” of metaphysics need to be 
finessed. Certainly, he overcomes a type of metaphysics, one that incorporates god into 
its system as an explanatory cause, a “cog” in the machine. Such metaphysics, as 
ontotheology, obviates the distinction between Being and beings; it inscribes god and 
beings within the same framework and tasks god with making “the whole of reality 
intelligible or transparent to human understanding.”236 Evacuated from this picture is any 
sense of mystery because “in the light of a cause-effect coherence, even God, for 
representational thinking, can lose all that is exalted and holy, can sink to the level of a 
cause, of causa efficiens.”237 Heidegger’s justified refusal is directed toward a 
metaphysics denuding being of wonder and sacrality.  
 Westphal succinctly and helpfully summarizes Heidegger’s critique:  
1. Onto-theology is calculative thinking 
2. Onto-theology is representational thinking 
3. Onto-theology is bad theology238 
 
These share a common root: a “rationalist demand for total intelligibility.”239 Onto-theo-
logy turns the biblical God into a god, a being among beings, invoked only to hold the 
system together and to “make sense” of the whole. But it would be too hasty to interpret 
Heidegger’s advocacy for a god-less thinking as a summons to, or warrant for, outright 
atheism. Even if he demonstrates little personal interest in theology, his “overcoming” of 
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metaphysics as ontotheology can be read as a salutary effort to chasten the pretense of 
human reason in its effort to corral the divine. Maybe Heidegger is not so radical, having 
as a forbearer Augustine: si comprehendis non est Deus (if you understand, it is not God).  
 Let me conclude by articulating a first “Commandment” for a theological 
engagement with metaphysics. Inspired by Heidegger: Thou Shalt Not Index the Divine to 
Human Reason. Even if often interpreted as a hostile “knocker,” a nuanced reading of 
Heidegger recognizes that his critique does not apply universally to metaphysics. His 
“no” to ontotheology can be read as pointing to something recessed, something in need of 
being drawn out by an adequate metaphysics. A metaphysics capable of interacting with 
theology (1) cannot set a priori terms for God’s arrival and (2) cannot invoke god to 
“make sense” of the whole or to render the whole transparent to human reason.  
 
2.1.2 John Caputo 
 Christopher Ben Simpson summarizes Caputo’s “problem” with metaphysics as 
follows: “Metaphysics is not faithful to life insofar as it is an abstract system that 
privileges static unity in order to provide a stable foundation for life.”240 It is not faithful 
to life and abstract because it offers “eloquent assurances about Being and presence even 
as factical existence was being tossed about by physis and kinesis.”241 Elsewhere, Caputo 
sharpens this criticism, decrying metaphysics for providing a disengaged “account of 
what is called ‘mind-independent being’, that amounts to an account of the way things 
are when we are not there.”242 If metaphysics wants to study the “really real,” then 
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“physics is all the metaphysics we’re ever going to get.”243 His advice to an aspiring 
metaphysician stings: “brush up on your ‘superstring field theory’ or whatever will 
supersede superstrings next week.”244 Metaphysics has been supplanted by physics: 
better, then, to bone up on math than to waste oneself speculating on being and substance.  
 Metaphysics, he continues, privileges a static unity that claims to provide a stable 
foundation for life. For him, neither religion nor metaphysics can lay claim to a 
perspicuous viewpoint or unassailable foundation on which to stand. Metaphysics, like 
religion, “is a human practice…always deconstructible in the light of the love of God, 
which is not deconstructible.”245 Metaphysics, in other words, purports to provide the 
“system” in which all things fit and in which the flux is controlled. But in its attempt to 
measure and manage the vicissitudes of daily life, metaphysics betrays by removing us 
from the flux.246 
 Finally, lest any doubts linger about Caputo’s feelings, he writes with brio  
 I do not embrace a naturalist metaphysics, no more than I embrace a 
 supernaturalist metaphysics. I resist every embrace of metaphysics. When it 
 comes to embraces, I vastly prefer flesh and blood (which is my materialism).247  
 
Having sworn off metaphysics, Caputo offers instead his “radical hermeneutics.” This 
approach, he avers, stays with the difficulty of life, avoids the “easy assurances of 
metaphysics,” and “pushes itself to the brink and writes philosophy from the edge.”248 
 The hot vehemence Caputo directs against metaphysics leads him to proffer what 
he calls a “cold hermeneutics” that does not believe in  
                                               
243 Ibid., 191.  
244 Ibid., 192.  
245 John Caputo, On Religion (New York: Routledge, 2001), 113.  
246 Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, 1.  
247 Caputo, The Insistence of God, 191.  
248 Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, 3.  
 87 
“Truth” – it renounces all such capitalization – something hidden by and stored up 
in a tradition which is groaning to deliver it to us. It has lost its innocence about 
that and is tossed about by the flux, by the play, by the slippage. It understands 
that meaning is an effect…Just when the metaphysics of presence is about to 
convince us that being clings to being, that truth is a well-rounded whole, a 
hermeneutical or eschatological circle, cold hermeneutics opens up an abyss.249  
 
Caputo desires to remain faithful to the messiness of the quotidian, to remain in the flux 
rather than seeking a back door out of it. There is, moreover, a Heideggerian trace in 
Caputo’s denial of a “Truth” that can be systematized or controlled. There exists no 
privileged access to, or possession of, the Truth; one cannot claim any Archimedean 
point that affords an uninhibited or disengaged view. 
 We can see in Caputo, furthermore, a link between his claim that “meaning is an 
effect” and his understanding of God. “The meaning of God is enacted in these multiple 
movements of love, but these movements are simply too multiple, too polyvalent, too 
irreducible, too uncontainable to identify, to define, or determine.”250 God is not “the 
Truth” arrived at through disengaged speculation, nor is God the object of privileged 
propositions guarded by magisterial authority. God, for Caputo, “is not only a name but 
an injunction, an invitation, a solicitation, to commend, to let all things be commended, to 
God.”251 The meaning of “God” is not arrived at through disengaged speculation but 
through action; it is enacted in “openness to a future that I can neither master nor see 
coming.”252 True religion comes not from acquiring knowledge or infallible propositions 
but is lived as a “restlessness with the real that involves risking your neck.”253 God comes 
to us as a question, not an answer, and we enact religion as our response.  
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 This suggests two further commandments. 2nd Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be 
Faithless to the Flux. 3rd Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Produce Counterfeit Gods.  
 2nd Commandment: If we hope to allay Caputo’s concerns about metaphysics, it 
seems that it must give a faithful account of the flux of the everyday. This means it must 
account for concrete lived reality while remaining attentive to the inherent fragility of 
existence. Within the quotidian, furthermore, there is an ethical summons to fidelity to 
the Other beyond codified obligation. Metaphysics cannot only not evade the flux but 
must also inform an ethic of “risking one’s neck” for one’s neighbor.  
 3rd Commandment: if we have any desire to claim to have knowledge of the 
Absolute, we must foreswear absolute knowledge. We cannot pretend to have privileged 
access to, or an infallible knowledge of, Truth. Knowledge of God arises indirectly, 
amidst the flux, as we are moved by metaphors and “thrown above” by hyperboles (hyper 
+ ballein) toward an encounter with God. The God of metaphysics cannot be one we craft 
as an idol; a God worthy of the name is not a god conjured from our own resources. A 
praiseworthy God arrives unbidden, unexpectedly, and catches us off guard.  
 
2.1.3 Richard Kearney 
 At first blush, Richard Kearney might appear more comfortable being grouped 
among the knockers. He writes, for instance, that 
for too long theology and metaphysics have identified the divine with the most 
all-powerful of Beings. Sovereign, Self-sufficient substances. Transcendental 
Forms. First and Final Causes. Immutable essences.254  
 
And, with Paul Ricoeur, he observes  
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without the encounter of Greek metaphysics with biblical religious thought, 
philosophers “would have never reached the idea that Being is the proper name of 
God and that this name designates God’s very essence.”…this conjunction of God 
and Being was to survive for many centuries – from Bonaventure and Aquinas to 
Gilson and the neo-Scholastics. Thus did the God of Exodus secure ontological 
tenure in the God of metaphysics.255  
 
Like Heidegger, Kearney regards God’s cooption into metaphysics as ontotheology’s key 
transgression because of its “tendency to reify God by reducing Him to a being (Seinde) – 
albeit the highest, first, and most indeterminate of all beings.”256   
 When Nietzsche and Freud trumpet God’s death, Kearney once again agrees with 
Ricoeur: the death of god they celebrate is the false god of ontotheology, the god who 
“who deserves to die.”257 After the atrocities of the Shoah 
so dies the omnipotent God of ontotheology understood as Emperor of the World. 
So also dies the omniscient God of “self-sufficient knowledge” that places the 
“powerful over the good and law over love and humility that are superior to law.” 
And along with the omnipotent and omniscient God goes the omnipresent God 
who condones evil as well as good. So dies, in short, the Omni-God of theodicy 
invoked to justify the worst atrocities as part of some Ultimate Design.258 
 
One imagines Kearney presiding at the wake of the “Omni-God,” reciting over the casket 
Etty Hillesum’s prayer “You God cannot be God unless we create a dwelling place for 
you in our hearts.”259 We must abandon as otiose the God of “power and might” and risk 
an encounter with the kenotic God of the Incarnation, the one who divests the divine 
being of omnipotence. The God who comes after the death of the God of metaphysics is 
not the “Highest Being” but, rather, the one encountered as a “promise, a call, a desire to 
love and be loved that can not be at all unless we allow God to be God.”260  
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 Thus, amidst the rubble of the collapsed “Grand Metaphysical Systems that 
construed God in terms of formal universals and abstract essences,”261 Kearney does not 
leave us destitute. In fact, he charts amidst the debris a course directed by what he calls 
“anatheism” as capable of opening a space 
where we are free to choose between faith or nonfaith. As such anatheism is about 
the option of retrieved belief. It operates before as well as after the division 
between theism and atheism, and it makes both possible. Anatheism, in short, is 
an invitation to revisit what might be termed a primary scene of religion: the 
encounter with a radical Stranger who we choose, or don’t choose, to call God.262  
 
Kearney’s anatheism does not rest on metaphysical certainties or syllogisms; it makes, 
instead, a wager or “existential drama” calling us to discernment and decision.263 We may 
return to God; we may not. Anatheism is less a command than a coax to openness “to 
someone or something that was lost and forgotten by Western metaphysics.”264 We 
cannot dance before or sing praises to the Omni-God, nor can the God of metaphysics 
still our restless hearts. Perhaps, though, just perhaps the opening of anatheism can lead 
us to the God who comes after the God of metaphysics, enabling us to hear the call of the 
God who may be, a God who will and wants be God for us…if we allow it.  
 In place of the “Grand System,” Kearney privileges what he calls “micro-
eschatologies” manifesting and disclosing God in the everyday. For Kearney, the 
eschaton is not a cataclysmic event; it is a “sundering” breaking open and revealing the 
presence of the divine in the everyday, a “sacramental vision” attuned to immanent 
transcendence.265 Through the concept of micro-eschatology, Kearney exhorts us to train 
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our eyes not to a far-off horizon but to the quotidian where we encounter the divine in the 
mundane, hearing the woo of the Holy One in “the least ones calling for a cup of cold 
water, asking to be fed, clothed, cared for, heard, loved.”266 He describes this as a micro-
eschatological “fourth reduction” returning us to the everyday and thrusting us into “face-
to-face encounters of our ordinary universe” where the divine is disclosed in the face of 
the stranger, where we intuit the presence of the divine amidst St. Teresa’s pots and pans.  
 In his critique of metaphysics as ontotheology, Kearney aligns with Heidegger; in 
his call for us to remain in the day-to-day, he stands with Caputo. On his own, he remains 
without equal as an interpreter of texts. Indeed, Kearney makes for a most hospitable 
author as his prose invites the reader to dwell within the text and to reconsider it from 
within. He does not merely write about texts but philosophizes through them in a way 
that reveals otherwise concealed resources. His hermeneutical phenomenology, 
moreover, extends beyond texts toward a hermeneutic of lived existence. He offers, for 
instance, “a number of more personal reflections on the enigma of transfiguration, as it 
relates to the specifically paschal testimonies of the resurrected Christ.”267 He writes 
The post-paschal stories of the transfiguring persona remind us that the Kingdom 
is given to hapless fishermen and spurned women, to those lost and wandering on 
the road from Jerusalem to nowhere, to the wounded and weak and hungry, to 
those who lack and do no despair of their lack, to little people “poor in spirit.” 
The narratives of the transfigured-resurrected Christ testify that after the long 
night of fasting and waiting and darkness and need – afloat on a wilderness of sea 
– breakfast is always ready. The transfiguring persona signals the ultimate 
solidarity, indeed indissociability, of spirit and flesh.268  
 
If the God is to be credible after the Shoah, after the death of God, it will be no “Omni-
God.” The Kingdom’s God speaks “in stories and act of love and justice, the giving to the 
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least of creatures, the caring for orphans, widows, and strangers; stories and act which 
bear testimony – as transfiguring gestures do – to that God of little things.”269 The micro-
eschatological reduction awakens us to the immanent transcendence of the little things 
and gives us to behold the world with eyes open to the everyday epiphanies of the divine.  
 Hence a 4th Commandment: Thou Shalt Be Attuned and Attentive to Everyday 
Disclosures. A compliant metaphysics will not impose categories but will empower an 
interpretation of the day-to-day attentive to the “small things left behind, unheard and 
unseen, discarded and neglected.”270 It calls for hermeneutical metaphysics that does not 
pine for a different world, but one that makes it possible for us to live in our world 
differently, attentive to “epiphanies of the quotidian” revealing the Divine not in Power 
and Might but in “mustard seeds, grains of yeast, tiny pearls, cups of water.”271   
 
2.1.4 Merold Westphal 
 I treat Merold Westphal last not only because he is the most hospitable of our 
thinkers to a theological engagement with metaphysics but also, and blessedly, he sets out 
his own criteria. But before I enumerate these and try to formulate his commandment, let 
me position him vis-à-vis the other thinkers.  
 Like Heidegger, Caputo, and Kearney, Westphal insists on the need to overcome 
onto-theology. And, like Kearney and Caputo, he is committed to a form of hermeneutic 
phenomenology. But compare the following with Caputo’s take on “the Truth” 
the truth is that there is Truth, but in our finitude and falleness we do not have 
access to it. We’ll have to make do with the truths available to us; but that does 
not mean either that we should deny the reality of Truth or that we should 
abandon the distinction between truth and falsity. Moreover, the most we should 
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claim for this claim itself is that it is true, that it is the best way for us humans to 
think about the matter.272    
 
Now recall Kearney’s refusal of the metaphysical traits ascribed to the “Omni-God”: 
In order to have a biblical, personal, eschatological, and ethical God, the goal 
Kearney and I share, it is necessary to overcome ontotheology. This does not 
require that we abandon abstract and impersonal metaphysical categories in our 
God talk, but only that we put them in their proper, subordinate place.273  
  
We must overcome ontotheology, but this overcoming need not require jettisoning all 
metaphysics. Instead, we need a chastened metaphysics that recognizes (1) the limits of 
human reason and (2) puts metaphysics at the service of faith.  
 In a recent article, Westphal engages Kant, Heidegger, and Marion in an effort to 
understand why “metaphysics is seen as abusing the life of faith by leaving no room for 
“it.”274 In his treatment of Kant, for instance, he detects an apparent paradox:  
We seem to be overcoming metaphysics in order to make room for metaphysics. 
But there is no contradiction here. The metaphysics to be overcome is not the 
same as the metaphysics for which room is made. The one is an enemy of faith, 
the other is an essential component thereof.275  
 
Kant, on Westphal’s reading, resists the encroachment of any dogmatic metaphysics that 
(1) asserts human reason as the “highest tribunal by which all questions of right (quid 
juris) regarding our God talk are to be settled” and (2) reshapes God to “fit the 
Procrustean bed by which it defines human rationality.”276 But, it should be noted, neither 
this critique, nor those of Heidegger or Marion, deal the death stroke to metaphysics. In 
fact, and quite to the contrary, Westphal reads these critiques as having the potential to 
capacitate a metaphysics that can contribute to and serve the life of faith.  
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The capacitating power of critique becomes most apparent in the essay’s 
conclusion. Westphal reminds his reader that, up until this point, he has been “focused on 
overcoming metaphysics, on its danger to the life of faith, its role as abuser of biblical 
faith.”277 And by “overcoming metaphysics” he means the metaphysics that would fall 
prey to the charge of ontotheology. So far, nothing new. Then he writes  
but I have said only three things, and ever so briefly, about the use of metaphysics 
for the life of faith: first, that faith and the theology that accompanies it 
presuppose and include metaphysical beliefs; second, that this metaphysics can be 
and must be different from the metaphysics that needs to be overcome… third, 
that this metaphysics will need to be a humble metaphysics, acknowledging that it 
rests on faith and not pretending to be the Voice of Pure Reason.278  
 
In other words: (1) some type of metaphysics is inescapable; (2) ontotheology will not 
do; (3) the metaphysics needed to serve faith emerges from within faith and cannot 
proceed as a form of disengaged inquiry. Finally, he writes, “the metaphysics that 
properly belongs to faith, not as its ground but as its cognitive content, must be a 
pragmatic metaphysics.” Such a pragmatic metaphysics would “arise out of the practice 
of faith” and inform “private prayer, character formation, public worship, and service to 
others.” It would be a practice “embedded in a spirituality that is simultaneously an 
inward journey, and upward journey, and an outward journey. It is not a preamble to faith 
but a reflection that arises out of faith and seeks to serve the life of faith.”279   
Finally, a 5th Commandment: Be Still and Know: Metaphysics is a Vocation. A 
theologically viable metaphysics will recognize that metaphysics finds its origin as a 
response to something other to it. Rather than a neutral practice of abstract reflection, 
metaphysics arises because of a presentiment that its searching is a consequence of 
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having first been sought and called by something anterior to it. The overcoming of 
metaphysics as ontotheology may, should we allow Westphal to play the role of Moses, 
delivers us from the land of captivity and frees us to take faltering steps out into the 
Promised Land led by the voice of the One who bids us to come. Metaphysics is not a 
map we draw for ourselves but, rather, the itinerary along which we are drawn.  
 
2.1.5 Capacitating Metaphysics 
 
 In an effort to emulate Taylor’s ad hominem strategy of argument, I have tried to 
engage Heidegger, Caputo, Kearney, and Westphal as representing a continuum of 
“boosters” and “knockers.” Each “no” raised in a justified refusal of earlier practices of 
metaphysics, I am claiming, need not be read as an embargo on all future metaphysics. 
To the contrary, each offers a corrective negation, a “no” affirming an absence, indicating 
something recessed and in need of being surfaced. Metaphysics, in effect, can be 
capacitated by learning from previous missteps. Allow me, then, to propose Desmond’s 
philosophy as a viable metaphysics in compliance with our Five Commandments: 
1. Thou Shalt Not Index the Divine to Human Reason (Heidegger) 
2. Thou Shalt Not Be Faithless to the Flux (Caputo) 
3. Thou Shalt Not Produce Counterfeit Gods (Caputo) 
4. Thou Shalt Be Attuned and Attentive to Everyday Disclosures (Kearney) 
5. Be Still and Know: Metaphysics is a Vocation (Westphal) 
 
Throughout the forthcoming exposition of Desmond’s philosophy, I will advert attention 
to the ways in which his metaphysics prove eminently faithful to these directives.  
 
2.2 Speaking of Metaphysics: Approaching Desmond’s Philosophy  
 I entitle this section “speaking of metaphysics” because it introduces to the 
categories and vocabulary Desmond uses throughout his philosophy. While there is truth 
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in Catherine Pickstock’s claim that “Desmond is astonishingly direct and astonishingly 
clear,”280 Simpson’s observation is equally apt: “Desmond’s work can be complex, dense, 
meditative, and full of neologisms.”281 Thus I begin by considering the nature and task of 
Desmond’s metaphysics. I then take up key categories: “ethos,” the “fourfold way,” and 
his tripartite understanding of transcendence. These furnish our “grammar” for speaking 
metaphysically, one we will continue to build upon and enrich throughout this project. 
 
2.2.1 Metaphysics Defined 
  
Desmond’s Being and Between opens with the primordial metaphysical question: 
What is being? What does it mean to be?282 This is not the question of what it means to 
be this or that but what it means to be at all. A seemingly simple question becomes, upon 
reflection, maddeningly complex; for, as Aristotle noted, “there are many senses in which 
a thing may be said to ‘be’” (to on legetai pollachōs).283 Aristotle and Aquinas, for 
instance, recognized three ways that being can be “said”: the univocal, the equivocal, and 
the analogical, none of which is capable of giving an exhaustive account of being’s 
meaning. They understood that metaphysics “puts a strain on language.”284 This is, 
though, a necessary and inescapable strain: we cannot but take up the question of being 
because “in all our thinking, and living, certain fundamental senses of being are already 
at work, and continue to be at work, even when we claim to be ‘postmetaphysical’.”285 
Or, per Westphal, some engagement in metaphysical reflection is unavoidable.  
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If Desmond and Westphal are correct, if some type of metaphysics is necessary, 
we must ask: which one? If a theologian wants to make friends with a metaphysician, to 
whom should she turn? There is a range of choices, ranging from Aristotle to Aquinas to 
Hegel to Badiou. Some of them fall afoul of the “Five Commandments” enumerated 
above: Aristotle and Hegel were, for Heidegger, culprits of ontotheology while others, 
like Badiou, manifest little interest in the God question. In my estimation, Desmond is a 
theologian-friendly metaphysician who harbors no aspiration to constructing a grand 
“system” in which to schematize or explain the whole of being.  His task, rather, is “to 
revitalize the transcendent and to show its ineluctability for the ontological constitution of 
the human”286 by awakening his readers to the intimate strangeness of being.  
For Desmond, metaphysics is not an architectonic or totalizing system but “a form 
of reflective thinking under fidelity to the truth of what is thus at play.”287 The final 
clause is key: “at play” indicates that his philosophy arises in the midst of, and as a 
reflection upon, finding oneself “in the midst of beings.”288 Instead of a disengaged or 
abstract “answer” to the question of being, Desmond’s metaphysics is better thought as a 
form of mindfulness, a method of reflection leading us “along the road” as we plumb the 
question of being. By remaining faithful to what is “at play,” his philosophy originates in, 
and stays faithful to, everyday flux. This becomes clear if, recalling the dual meaning 
meta (“in the midst” and “beyond”), we follow his suggestion that 
this double sense of “meta” can be taken to correspond to the difference of 
ontology and metaphysics. Ontology (as a logos of to on) can be taken as an 
exploration of given being as immanent; metaphysics can be seen as opening a 
self-surpassing movement of thought that points us to the porous boundary 
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between immanence and what cannot be determined entirely in immanent 
terms.289  
 
The question of being that arises from dwelling amidst beings (ontology) can spur us into 
a mindfulness of what is in excess of, or beyond, beings (metaphysics). Rather than a 
denial of the quotidian, metaphysics begins amidst the flux and guides us to reflect upon 
the fact that “all beings, events, processes are, or happen to be. That they are at all is 
something that exceeds what they are.”290 Mindful attention to the ordinary proves 
revelatory of how extraordinary being is. 
 We are in need of this renewed mindfulness because –here Desmond and Taylor 
align – we have lost our sense of wonder at the sheer existence of being. One of the 
symptoms of the “eclipse of the transcendent” in modernity is an “epistemic irritability 
with the equivocity of being” 291 that fuels a rage for imposing order: 
One thinks of the modern mathematization of nature and the hope of empowering 
technological interventions. One thinks of how in the scientific objectification of 
nature, externality is stripped of all its qualitative textures, these being consigned 
to mere secondary qualities…There is an evaporation of the good as defining the 
teleology of being. The good of the whole is no longer there, and in its place we 
find ontologically devalued thereness.292    
 
Like Taylor, Desmond detects a shift away from appeals to the transcendent and an 
increasing reliance upon the power of human reason. With the rise of modernity, the very 
nature of metaphysical reflection transforms. What had been a festive mindfulness of 
“enchanted” world, porous to intermediation with the divine, is strangled as the passages 
between the immanent and the transcendent orders became clogged. Desmond, 
                                               
289 William Desmond, “The Metaphysics of Modernity” in The Oxford Handbook of Theology and Modern  
European Thought, eds. Nicholas Adams, George Pattison, and Graham Ward (Oxford: OUP, 
2013), 546.  
290 Ibid., 545. Emphasis added.  
291 Ibid., 547.  
292 Ibid., 547-8.  
 99 
responding to Taylor, observes, “the movement to this Western buffered self goes 
together with the disenchantment of the world and the construction of the immanent 
frame. This construction leads by circuitous ways to default atheism, as I would put it.”293 
 Unlike Taylor, however, Desmond does not respond to this “clogging” by means 
of a counter-narrative. He issues, instead, a call for a “return to the sources of 
metaphysical thinking.”294 He hearkens us to heed Socrates’ words that “this is an 
experience which is characteristic of a philosopher, this wondering (thaumazein): this is 
where philosophy begins and nowhere else.”295 Metaphysical thinking begins, he writes,   
in a primal astonishment. Astonishment itself is primal. It is elemental and 
irreducible. Plato speaks of thaumazein as the pathos of the philosopher. This is 
sometimes translated as wonder and this is not inappropriate. Astonishment, 
however, captures the sense of being rocked back on one’s heels, as it were, by 
the otherness of being in its givenness. Plato says pathos: there is a pathology in 
metaphysics. There is a suffering, an undergoing; there is a patience of being; 
there is a receiving that is not the production of the metaphysician or mind.296  
 
Herein we find a synopsis of what Desmond take to be the nature and task of 
metaphysics. Its nature: metaphysics originates as a response to suffering a “certain 
shock or bite of otherness.”297 Metaphysics reflects being opened, both being as opened 
toward us and our being opened as a result of it addressing us. The task of metaphysics, 
then, is keep alive this astonishment, to remain faithful to its vocation to renew the 
“opening to transcendence that comes first to us.”298 
 So far, Desmond’s metaphysics avoid transgressing our commandments. 
Whatever the cause of astonishment, Desmond recognizes that metaphysics (1) is not 
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self-wrought or projected by us, (2) responds to something that exceeds the limit of our 
speech, thereby requiring a plurivocal attempt to speak of it, (3) induces a mindfulness 
arising “amidst” the flux, and (4) is a vocation responding to the summons of 
transcendence. Desmond’s, in short, is a searching metaphysics that seeks to return to the 
sources that elicit and refresh our sense of wonder that being is at all.  
 In sum, one must see Desmond’s metaphysics not as a hegemonic “system” but as 
style of mindfulness reorienting how we dwell amidst beings (meta) in a way making us 
mindful of what is in excess of beings (meta). What Desmond offers in place of a system 
is a systematic approach keen on teasing out the interconnections and inter-mediations 
occurring between beings. If ontotheology inscribes the deity within “the system,” a 
systematic approach provides a mode of inquiry committed to retaining its openness to 
what cannot be contained by the system. This marks a significant counter-move to the 
modes of mindfulness typically associated with modernity, where 
instrumental mind takes for granted, in a potentially mindless way, the beings that 
are given, and goes to work with its categories on what is there, devoid of 
metaphysical astonishment before the that of its being there at all. It bustles with 
activity, but just this its virtue may crowd out an essential otherness. To restore 
mindfulness of this, one must stop thinking in that mode, stop thinking that 
instrumental thought exhausts the energy of thinking. Silence, patience, a 
different ontological vigilance is needed. Solitude may prepare an opening for 
different thought, for a celebrating mindfulness of being.299   
  
Desmond’s philosophy encourages an “ontological vigilance” mindful of what 
“instrumental mind” brackets out. Metaphysics, as a practice, aims to put us in touch with 
energies otherwise recessed and ignored in modernity. Contemplative receptivity 
mindfully takes “as granted” the beings that are given and, attuned to this gratuity, 
permits us to dwell anew within what Desmond calls the metaxu or ethos of being.   
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2.2.2 The Ethos of Being: the Metaxu 
 Far from being a disengaged practice, Desmond’s metaphysics is better viewed as 
a response to one’s awakening “in the midst” of beings and feeling oneself struck into a 
sense of astonishment at being’s very givenness. This astonishment refreshes our sense of 
what it means to be: beings are not neutrally “just there” but are perceived as a part of a 
dynamic system of signs pointing beyond themselves toward their ultimate origin. 
Desmond’s refusal to separate ontology from metaphysics leads him to plead 
for a practice of philosophical thinking that does not float above the ethos of 
being in abstraction, but comes to itself in the midst of things. There the 
astonishing being given of being(s) opens us for thought, and cries out against any 
form of Laputan abstraction. We start in the midst of things, and we are open to 
ourselves as more reflectively thoughtful, we already are in a porosity of being, 
and are ourselves as this porosity of being become mindful of itself.300    
 
Unlike the residents of Swift’s Laputa, the floating island whose residents become lost in 
abstractions and must be struck with a “bladder” to remind them to move, Desmond’s 
metaphysician remains engaged with the happening of being; metaphysics enjoins a 
practice of dwelling amidst beings mindful of a source in excess of being. 
 Having considered the what of metaphysics, we need to consider its whence. 
Central to Desmond’s vision is this insight: metaphysics originates in “the between” or, 
as found in Plato’s Symposium, the metaxu. This is the “ethos” or   
ontological context or overdetermined matrix of value in which our human ethos 
and ethics come to be articulated. This is prior to, and in excess of, every specific 
ethical determination that we define. For we reconfigure the elemental ethos, and 
so stay true or betray or disfigure its promise. What is at play in it cannot be stated 
univocally or made fully evident at the outset, since it is through the reconfigured 
ethe that we gain some sense of its potencies.301  
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Here Desmond indicates a vital distinction between the “reconfigured” and “primal” 
ethos of being. In every age, humans dwell and negotiate their lives within the metaxu. 
What he advocates is a “step back” permitting us to look intentionally at our own ethos 
and to discern how our reconfiguration of it reflects, or distorts, the primal ethos. His is 
an archaeological endeavor to peer beneath the practices and values of any particular age, 
any reconfigured ethos, in order to explore “the enabling sources and powers that give 
being to be as it is, and give it to be as good.”302  
 This may become clearer if we connect Desmond’s metaxu or ethos with Taylor’s 
“social imaginary.” Taylor’s social imaginary, he writes, is much broader and deeper 
than the intellectual schemes people may entertain when they think about social 
reality in a disengaged mode. I am thinking, rather, of the ways people imagine 
their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between 
them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper 
normative notions and images that underlie these expectations.303  
 
Both Taylor and Desmond emphasize that the social imaginary and metaxu are anterior to 
ourselves. Rather than being a determinate “thing,” it is better to think of each as a matrix 
or encompassing context providing us with the “know how” by which we negotiate our 
shared space. Both reflect the “common understanding which makes possible common 
practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy”304 expressed in cultural mores, 
customs, institutions, and expectations. But because they operate in the background, we 
are seldom aware of them – only when there is an occurrence of breakdown or an 
interference with the normal flow of events do we become thematically aware of the 
assumptions informing our practices. I highlight the word flow since neither the social 
imaginary nor the ethos is static. As we considered previously, between the years 1500 
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and 2000 there were dramatic shifts within our common practices and beliefs that were 
not implemented by fiat but that crept in over time 
 Social imaginary, however, is not a synonym for metaxu. In my estimation, the 
social imaginary is better situated within the narrower realm ontology whereas the 
metaxu offers a more capacious metaphysical view. As I see it, the social imaginary 
describes the pre-theoretical way humans function and negotiate their lives. It describes 
this background as the “largely unstructured and inarticulate understanding of our whole 
situation, within which particular features of our world show up for us in the sense they 
have.”305 These often-unstated assumptions inform, shape, and give coherence to our 
practices: things “make sense” against this horizon. Yet, the accent is primarily 
ontological in describing how “ordinary people ‘imagine’ their social surroundings,”306 
and live immanently in the midst of other beings.  
 Now, recall Janz’s critique of Taylor: Taylor repeatedly gestures in the direction 
of transcendence, he gives examples of those who have encountered the transcendent, yet 
he has not demonstrated or given any account for there actually being a transcendent 
anything. Taylor mapping of our age says much about being amidst beings but does not 
point beyond itself in an explicit way toward anything beyond being, namely, God. In 
Desmondian terms, Taylor’s map reflects an ontology dealing with being as immanent, 
being amidst beings. Limited to this first sense of meta, he stands in need of a 
metaphysical supplement capable of convincing the seeker – even if via indirections – 
that the search for the Transcendent is not a snipe hunt.  
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 Herein we find where Desmond’s metaxu is capable of making a helpful 
intervention by providing a more robust account of what it means to be in the between. 
Taylor’s genealogy in A Secular Age offers an account of how we came to live and 
negotiate our lives within the “immanent frame” in a way either open or closed to the 
question of the transcendent. It is a richly suggestive ontological/phenomenological 
portrait of how our “social imaginary” came to be formed, what was gained and lost 
through its formation, and how we ourselves might feel anew the “cross-pressures” 
unsettling us, goading us to ask whether or not we might strike out in search of the 
transcendent. But note: Taylor remains at the level of ontology which can take being for 
granted. Desmond, in his exploration of the metaxu, wants to push readers to consider 
how being must be approached as granted, gratuitous, and wholly unnecessary. So, 
whereas Taylor provides an account of how things came to be as they are, Desmond’s 
more capacious metaphysics poses a more primordial question: why beings are at all?  
Desmond’s explicitly metaphysical inquiry is by no means hostile to A Secular 
Age. In fact, it serves to widen and deepen Taylor’s map. For Desmond, the metaxu 
encompasses both an ontological concern for being amidst beings (first meta) and a 
metaphysical appreciation for how beings “point” to what is beyond finite being (second 
meta). But we only arrive at the second meta through a mindful consideration of the first. 
Approached as a form of metaphysical reflection, metaxology opens mindfulness “to 
transcendence by means of an exploration of the signs of irreducible otherness, even in 
immanence.”307 As I develop later, this complements Taylor by making possible a new 
way of comporting oneself within our age. If Taylor’s ontological approach can be 
faulted as taking being for granted, then we will engage Desmond’s metaxological 
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approach to re-awaken a sense of being as gratuitously granted and to allow our 
philosophical gaze to be directed to the creative and sustaining source of all that is.  
  This re-awakening is necessary to respond to Janz’s critique and to negotiate the 
terrain beneath the “eclipse of the transcendent.” Taylor and Desmond equally take an 
ambivalent stance toward the regnancy of instrumental reasoning in our age. Without 
denying technology’s benefits, Desmond detects within modernity a a problematic 
“devaluing objectification of being” and the “subjectification of value.”308 This means: 
Being is objectified in that it is neutralized or devalued or evacuated – emptied of 
any value or worth or goodness in itself – and made into a “merely empirical” 
mechanism. The subjectification of value comes about as there is a “revaluation” 
of value in terms of human self-determination that comes to see the supreme 
value as freedom understood in terms of human autonomy – ultimately flowering 
to reveal its core in the will to power.309  
 
The dialectic between “objectification of being” and “subjectification of value” is, as 
Simpson notes, reciprocal. Its dialectical movement generates, furthermore, the belief that 
“humans cannot be truly autonomous if there is any value or good other than that which 
they create.”310 This, for Desmond, results in the antinomy between autonomy and 
transcendence.311 He observes, “The antinomy: absolutize autonomy, and you relativize 
the good as other, or more than our self-determination; absolutize the good as other and 
you must relativize autonomy.”312 One thinks immediately of Kant, but Hegel and 
Nietzsche are no less beholden to an antinomy stressing self-determination and bristling 
at any semblance of heteronomic interference.  
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 This iteration of the modern ethos, however, is not the whole story. Indeed, an 
important contribution of deconstruction has been to challenge modernity’s “notion of a 
fixed univocal unity.”313 Deconstruction destabilizes the sediment of modernity, thereby 
exposing the modern ethos as but one possible figuration. The gain in this insight is in 
exposing how “the constructed ethos tries to absorb the giving ethos.”314 The ethos of 
modernity takes itself for granted but, in the wake of deconstruction, we see it as an 
achievement. Instead of rushing to reconstruct in the wake of deconstruction, Desmond 
wants us to perceive the primordial ground that manifests such hospitality to our 
constructions but that resists being exhausted by our efforts. We need to learn, that is, to 
read the signs of the reconfigured ethos that give us a glimpse of the primordial ground, 
the elemental metaxu, as bespeaking its originary source.  
 If the eclipse of the transcendent leads to an etiolated sense of being by limiting it 
to an immanent ontology, Desmond’s task for a metaxological metaphysics is restorative 
and therapeutic. That is, he conceives metaphysics as enabling us to take a step back from 
the modern milieu and to ask with Peggy Lee, “Is that all there is?” Desmond’s “no” 
comes by way of a mindfulness renewed through a practice of metaphysics which   
is not just the philosophical discipline that examines and evaluates the arguments 
for their rational cogency; not just the philosophical interpretation of the ethos as 
reconfigured in lights of the fundamental notions of a particular era, or people, or 
particular way of life; metaphysics, at its most deep, requires philosophical 
mindfulness of the primal ethos as such.315     
 
From amidst the reconfigured metaxu Desmond desires us to awaken to and become 
mindful of the “intimate strangeness of being.” Strangeness: being has “an otherness, 
                                               
313 William Desmond, Beyond Hegel and Dialectic (Albany: SUNY, 1992), 287.  
314 Desmond, Ethics and the Between, 45. Emphasis original.  
315 William Desmond, “God, Ethos, Ways,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 45 (1999):  
13—30 at 27.  
 107 
indeed marvel, of which we are not the conceptual masters.” Intimate: “this very 
strangeness allows no stance of thinking ‘outside’ being – we are participants in what we 
think about.”316 A properly attuned metaphysical mindfulness perceives the “crack” in 
modernity’s shell and permits us to be drawn by the intimate strangeness of being as it 
invites us to behold anew the primal ethos and coaxes us to refresh ourselves at the spring 
of the elemental metaxu where we remember of the good of the “to be.”  
 All of this is easier said than done. But Desmond has forbears resisting the 
neutralization or commodification of the metaxu. Of his own ethos Gerard Manley 
Hopkins wrote, “…the soil is bare now, nor can foot feel, being shod.” Clad in our mass-
produced shoes we are now, as then, insulated from the earth and soil; we have lost our 
taste for earth’s sacredness. We live, today, in an era where even to broach the question 
of the sacred, let alone God, can be interpreted as gauche or inappropriate. Ours is a time 
of what Desmond calls “postulatory finitism” which “first supposes, then later 
presupposes, that the finite and nothing but the finite constitutes the ultimate horizon for 
human thinking, one greater than which none can be thought.”317 Postulatory finitism is 
akin to a deep “sleep of finitude” content to slumber without being bothered by talk of the 
transcendent. From within his own scholarly career he recalls “a time when to mention 
God or religion in the company of advanced intellectuals was like mentioning sex in a 
prudish Victorian drawing room. An icy silence would descend, and the silence 
communicated more than overt argument possibly could: we do not now talk of these 
things.”318 
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One way of getting at the theological importance of Desmond’s thought is by 
recognizing him as leveling a direct challenge to the postulatory finitism of our age. By 
attempting to renew metaphysical mindfulness by stirring up a sense of astonishment at 
the gratuity and givenness of being, he aims to re-open the question of the divine. 
Contrary to Nietzsche’s madman, God is not dead. We need, though, to be stirred from 
the sleep finitude and to dare to encounter the divine once more. It is the task and goal of 
Desmond’s philosophy to lead us on something of a purgative itinerary that opens us so 
that we may come into contact with the Source of creation’s beauty on whose account, 
“nature is never spent” and because of whom in all created beings abides “the dearest 
freshnesss deep down things.”319   
 
2.2.3 The Fourfold Sense of Being 
 
I pivot now to Desmond’s fourfold – the how of metaxology – by linking the 
metaxu with metaphysics. A neologism, “metaxological philosophy is concerned with a 
logos of the metaxu, or a wording of the between.”320 Our lives, Desmond holds, unfold 
between diverse extremes: birth and death, nothing and infinity, abysses of 
abjectness and superlatives of heights, interiorities of secret intensity and 
exteriorities of vast extension. Human being is a between-being, but more often 
than not these extremes are recessed in the domestication of everyday life.321  
 
Yet metaxological philosophy is not limited to reflecting on human being, for it seeks to 
discern “in the very ontological robustness of immanent otherness an original 
communication of an even more radical otherness, hyperbolic to the terms of immanence 
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alone.”322 This is a searching metaphysics, exploring the ethos attentive to disclosures of 
something in excess of the immanent order; it is a philosophy attuned to epiphany, 
mindful that “what is hyperbolic in immanence points to what is hyperbolic to 
immanence.”323 We cannot abandon the flux because we come to mindfulness within it. 
Our question is not whether to dwell in the ethos, but how: 
if there is a return to the recalcitrances of given immanence, in their otherness to 
self-defining thought, there is also a searching of the “more” of the given world, 
as charged with signs of what exceeds immanence alone. Reading the signs of this 
“more” as communicated in the saturated equivocity of the given world is 
intimate to the vocation of metaxological metaphysics.324  
 
To interpret these signs, we turn to the “fourfold sense of being” to orient us to a practice 
of metaphysics enabling us to recognize the metaxu as a milieu allowing communication 
with other beings and as porous to the creator and sustainer of being itself.  
 Desmond’s “fourfold” engage seriously Aristotle’s observation, “being is said in 
many ways.” The fourfold provides systematic categories for thinking and speaking about 
being without any pretense to being “the system” in which being is schematized or 
dominated. As both systematic and hermeneutic, it “offers itself as an unfolding 
interpretation of the many sides of the plenitude of the happening of being, as manifest to 
mindfulness in the between.”325 This is a fraught undertaking because remaining 
absolutely true to the plenitude of this happening is all but impossible for us, and 
indeed failure of some sort is inevitable. But this impossible truthfulness is asked 
of us, even if inevitable failure brings us back to the truth of our finitude. This 
failure may itself be a success of sorts, in renewing metaphysical astonishment 
before the enigma of being that was, and is, and always will be too much for us, in 
excess of our groping efforts.326   
 
                                               
322 William Desmond, The Intimate Universal (New York: Columbia, 2016), 167.  
323 Ibid.  
324 Ibid. 
325 Desmond, Being and the Between, xiii.  
326 Ibid.  
 110 
The inevitable failure of metaphysics to be “absolutely true” recalls Heidegger’s critique 
of ontotheology: whatever it is that gives being to be cannot be indexed to human reason. 
We will always come up short as we stutter and stammer to speak what exceeds speech. 
Like Levinas for whom the Saying always exceeds the Said, we might say that within the 
metaphysician’s vocation the act of Responding always exceeds any Response. 
 The fourfold denominates four voices or senses of being: univocal, equivocal, 
dialectical, and metaxological. If being can be said in many ways, this is not because we 
are accomplished polyglots who wantonly ventriloquize through being. On the contrary, 
and truer to the vocation of metaphysics as a response, we are tutored into a metaphysical 
articulacy by the fourfold thereby enabling us to speak of the plurivocal happening of 
being. This is essential if we wish to articulate a coherent metaphysics given that “our 
understanding of what it means to be comes to definition in a complex interplay between 
indetermination and determination, transcendence and immanence, otherness and 
sameness, different and identity.327 To be true to being in the between, to dwelling in the 
metaxu, we need a way to speak faithfully of determinacy (univocity) and indeterminacy 
(equivocity), of immanence and transcendence, and of the interplay between otherness 
and sameness (dialectic and metaxology). The fourfold provides a set of imbricating 
lenses revealing, with every addition, a richer and more finessed way to think about and 
respond to being. Rather than seeking to dissolve metaphysical perplexities, the fourfold 
(re)attunes us to the plurivocity of being and bids us to remain open to the sources of 
“wonder” and “astonishment” that inaugurate and animate philosophical inquiry.  
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2.2.3.1  Univocity and its Limits 
 
 We begin with the univocal sense of being which Desmond takes to be 
“motivated by a desire to reduce the manifoldness of given being to one essential 
meaning.”328 Univocity stresses “sameness, or unity, indeed sometimes immediate 
sameness, of mind and being.”329 No doubt, univocity speaks to common sense and we 
are reminded of Bishop Butler’s quip, “a thing is itself and not any other.”330 Univocity’s 
rallying cry: to be is to be intelligible, and to be intelligible is to be determinate.331 
 Without question, univocity is indispensable. We daily talk of discrete things – 
this jar, that car. Certain fields of inquiry, such as math, science, and engineering require  
univocal precision: recall the 1999 Mars Climate Orbiter disaster because English units 
were not converted to the metric system or 1968’s Mariner I’s failure due to a misplaced 
hyphen.332 Without gainsaying the need for determinacy and precision, though, Desmond 
observes that “recurrently throughout modernity, certain scientific orientations to nature 
have tended toward the reductive.”333 The univocal sense is “indispensable in identifying 
and distinguishing” beings in the quotidian, but there remains always more to being than 
what can be measured or managed. Being is more ambiguous and complicated than 
strictly univocal, or scientistically reductive, approaches would have us believe.  
 That said, it takes but a cursory look at philosophy’s history to reveal no shortage 
of thinkers who take univocity as the ideal canon of human knowledge. In its ontological 
and logical forms, one thinks of Parmenides, Pythagoras, Aristotle, Duns Scotus, 
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Spinoza, and Deleuze. For univocity in the form of a “calculative mathesis”334 one turns 
to Descartes, the early Wittgenstein, and Badiou. Additionally, the siren’s song of 
univocity continues to be heard in our own day. When Thomas Nagel published Mind 
and Cosmos as a challenge to “reductive materialism,” the outcry was astonishing. Steven 
Pinker denounced the book as “The shoddy reasoning of a once-great thinker” and Daniel 
Dennett described Nagel as part of a “retrograde gang” whose work is “cute and it’s 
clever and it’s not worth a damn.”335 Nagel’s heresy? He had the audacity to claim 
the great advances in the physical and biological sciences were made possible by 
excluding the mind from the physical world. This has permitted a quantitative 
understanding of that world, expressed in timeless, mathematically formulated 
physical laws. But at some point it will be necessary to make a new start on a 
more comprehensive understanding that includes the mind.336  
 
Without denying the power of math and sciences, Nagel recognized their inability to 
wholly and definitively explain all phenomena. A more comprehensive approach is 
needed to accommodate what more reductive accounts leave out. This critique of 
reductive materialism comes, no less, from a philosopher who not only lacks a sensus 
divinitas but also strongly opposes any invocation of a transcendent being.337   
 Neither Nagel nor Desmond reject univocity; determinacy is necessary for 
intelligibility. They deny, though, that univocal determinacy exhausts intelligibility. In 
fact, Desmond argues, “the will to absolute univocity is self-subverting, and cannot evade 
its own opposite, equivocity. This very insistence on univocity itself proves to be 
equivocal, for no univocal meaning can be given to the univocal insistence.”338 Reductive 
                                               
334 Desmond, Being and the Between, 50.  
335 Andrew Ferguson, “The Heretic,” Weekly Standard, March 25, 2013, accessed August 17, 2017,  
http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-heretic/article/707692 
336 Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos (New York: Oxford, 2012), 8.  
337 Ibid., 12.  
338 Desmond, Being and the Between, 82.  
 113 
materialism abstracts from the plurivocal flux and fails to account for the emergence of 
the mind. This leads him to observe that “simply as self-transcending, mind is an 
anomaly to the universal mechanism; it is excess, a surplus, ultimately indeed a surd. In a 
word, scientific univocity reduces being to something that cannot account for scientific 
mind itself.”339 Univocity’s reach, like apodictic reasoning’s, exceeds its grasp.  
 In Plato’s philosophy, Desmond finds an intimation of a way to preserve the 
determinacy of univocity without the pretense of rendering all being determinate. He 
recalls how, above the gates to Plato’s Academy, a sign is said to have read: Let none 
who has not studied geometry enter here! For Plato, the rigors of geometry were 
propaedeutic for the study of philosophy. Desmond contrasts the figure of Plato with 
Aristotle, for whom thaumazein or wonder terminates in  
a determinate logos of a determinate somewhat, a tode ti. But this end is a death 
of wonder, not its refreshening at a level of mindfulness marked by deeper or 
higher metaphysical sophistication. Not surprisingly, Aristotle invokes geometry 
to illustrate the teleological thrust of the desire to know (Meta, 983a13ff). What is 
geometry but a figure for determinate knowing in which all the ambiguity of 
perplexity is overcome or dissolved in the solution340   
 
Geometry, for Plato, was essential to philosophical inquiry because it trained the would-
be philosopher in the rigors of logic and critical thinking. Philosophy, beginning in 
wonder, requires “midwives” possessing, like Socrates, the know-how and finesse to help 
others “discover within themselves a multitude of beautiful things, which they bring forth 
into the light. But it is I, with God’s help, who deliver them of this offspring.”341 For 
Aristotle, geometry proves less the training ground than the telos or destination of 
philosophy. Philosophical inquiry, rather than preserving wonder, “must end in the 
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contrary and, according to the proverb, the better state, as is the case in these instances 
when men learn the cause.”342 Nor is the desire for geometric precision exclusive to 
Aristotle: one may think of Descartes, Spinoza’s ordo geometricus, Kant, and Husserl.343  
 The rage for order that leads to the privileging of geometric precision as the ideal 
standard for knowledge is not limited to philosophy or its history: there is no shortage of 
reductive approaches (behaviorism, scientism) requiring being to fit within a determinate 
system of categories. Such efforts manifest the ongoing relevance of what Pascal 
considered the l’esprit de géometrie. The “geometric mind” fixates on “objective truths 
such as we pursue in the hard sciences and mathematics.”344 Desmond playfully describes 
the geometrically-minded systematizers as those “who (mis)behave like the ugly sisters 
of Cinderella: the glass slipper will fit the foot, must fit the foot, never mind the blood on 
the carpet!”345 The ambiguities of human reality cannot all be fitted into a single system; 
we require, rather, Pascal’s l’esprit de finesse. A spirit of finesse resists temptations to 
dominate being, preferring instead a subtler and more discerning approach. It recognizes 
and appreciates being’s inherent equivocity and, rather than seeking to squelch it, aims to 
be mindful of the ambiguity and flux. The finessed mind does not revile geometry or 
univocity but sees it as part of a larger whole.  
 
2.2.3.2  Equivocity and the Restlessness Search for Wholeness 
 
 Desmond’s equivocal sense of being refers “to a plurality that resists reduction to 
one univocal meaning and one alone.”346Whereas univocity accents unity, sameness, and 
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clarity, equivocity stresses manyness, difference, and ambiguity. One is reminded how 
the word dog can refer both to a pet or to a star with “no community of meaning between 
the earthly and heavenly dog.”347 Taken equivocally, dog has two distinct meanings. 
There is a limit, though, to the fluidity of equivocal speech. Just as pure univocity  
is a limit, so it is difficult to find absolutely pure instances of equivocity, which 
would imply a difference without even the hint of a possible mediation. 
Absolutely unmediated difference seems to be absolutely unintelligible; for even 
to state the putative absolute difference is in some way already to transcend it.348 
 
Any attempt at an absolute or thoroughgoing equivocity proves self-subverting because 
equivocity is limited by an unavoidable recourse to determinacy: discourse is constituted, 
as Ricoeur observes, “by a series of sentences whereby someone says something to 
someone about something.”349 For equivocal speech to be communicative, it must be 
about some determinate something. Despite its recognition of fragmentation and flux, 
equivocal speech cannot evade speaking of integral beings, even if only to call their 
integrity into question or to point out its inherent instability.  
 Within our daily lives, we find ourselves situated between the theoretical limits of 
absolute univocity and absolute equivocity, inflexible determinacy and unremitting flux. 
How one stands between the extremes will be influenced by the reconfigured ethos or 
“social imaginary.” Aristotle, for instance, took a dim view of equivocity due to  
his commitment to the law of identity and the law of excluded middle. A being is 
itself and not another thing. It is logically impossible to suppose that the same 
thing is and is not, as some think Heraclitus said. To be is to be determinate, a 
tode ti. If this is the case, our quest for intelligibility will always be marked by a 
certain predilection for univocity.350  
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Elsewhere, in Book III of Rhetoric, we find one of Aristotle’s more ironic statements: “It 
is a general rule that a written composition should be easy to read and therefore easy to 
deliver.”351 Aristotle’s target is not surprising: Heraclitus. Aristotle continues, observing 
to punctuate Heraclitus is no easy task, because we often cannot tell whether a 
particular word belongs to what precedes or what follows it. Thus, at the outset of 
his treatise he says, “Though this truth is always men understand it not”, where it 
is not clear to which of the two clauses the world “always” belongs.352  
 
For a thinker such as Aristotle, for whom geometric precision serves as the ideal canon 
for human reasoning, any trace of Heraclitean flux must be brought to heel. And, as we 
have seen, he is not alone in desiring to exorcise ambiguity. René Descartes, in the 
Discourse on Method, articulates as his first rule that the investigator ought 
never to accept anything as true that I did not plainly know to be such; that is to 
say, carefully to avoid hasty judgment and prejudice; and to include nothing more 
in my judgments than what presented itself to my mind so clearly and so distinctly 
that I had no occasion to call it into doubt.353 
 
Let there be no doubt: this l’esprit de géometrie was hardly exhausted with Descartes’s 
death in 1650. In our own age, Terry Pinkard observes the gradual abatement of the 
acrimonious relationship between “continental” and “analytic” philosophers; to dismiss 
the continentals as “a bunch of wooly minded gasbags”354 no longer carries the punch it 
once did. Cool comfort, indeed, as the majority of Anglo-American philosophy 
departments are analytic in orientation; so-called “wooly” thought is perhaps tolerated, 
but toleration is hardly the same as celebration or appreciation. 
 Due to its recovery of equivocity from the stranglehold of modernity’s fixation on 
univocal determination, Desmond expresses measured approval of certain strains of 
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postmodern thought. Indeed, I think he would gladly take on board Caputo’s description 
of deconstruction as 
organized around the idea that things contain a kind of uncontainable truth, that 
they contain what they cannot contain. Nobody has to come along and 
“deconstruct” things. Things are auto-deconstructed by the tendencies of their 
own inner truth. In a deconstruction, the “other” is the one who tells the truth on 
the “same”; the other is the truth of the same, the truth that has been repressed and 
suppressed, omitted and marginalized, or sometimes just plain murdered…355  
 
With Caputo, Desmond recognizes in all things an inextirpable ambiguity resistant to 
constraint. Hence the contribution of deconstruction in unsettling univocal complacency. 
The “inner truth” of being refuses constraint and its struggle against repression calls out 
to us, demands that we open our ears and eyes, to look again for what has been concealed 
beneath the too-neat and too-tidy accounts rendered by univocal reduction.   
Desmond’s appreciation of equivocity’s truth does not rely solely upon the work 
of contemporary philosophy. Long before the efforts of Derrida, Caputo, Foucault, and 
Judith Butler, William Shakespeare penned Macbeth as the play about equivocity: 
“Radical equivocity attaches to time, to daring, to trust, to power, to the elementals, to the 
nefarious powers, to sleep, to life itself and to death. ‘Fair is foul and foul is fair.’”356 It is 
the story of double appearances: a loyal vassal and his hospitable wife exposed through 
their act of traitorous regicide.357 Consider the flux following Duncan’s death  
Old Man: ‘Tis unnatural/Even like the deed that’s done. On Tuesday last,/A 
falcon, tow’ring in her pride of place/Was by a mousing owl hawked at and killed.  
 
Ross: And Duncan’s horses, a thing most strange and certain,/Beauteous and 
swift, the minions of their race,/Turned wild in nature, broke their stalls, flung 
out,/Contending ‘gainst obedience, as they would make/War with mankind.358 
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Throughout Macbeth, Shakespeare deconstructs the stable categories of good and evil, 
light and darkness, pure and impure. Hands are washed free of blood yet remain bloody; 
courage screwed to the sticking place is cowardice. Perhaps there is no better instance of 
the suppressed “truth of the other” than the ghost of murdered Banquo who bursts death’s 
constraint to give silent testimony to his concealed, nay murdered, truth.  
  Mindful attention to equivocity requires an ongoing hermeneutic of the interplay 
of text and action. Actions, like words, can bear of multiple meanings. Recall Casablanca 
You must remember this 
A kiss is just a kiss/A sigh is just a sigh 
The fundamental things apply/As time goes by 
 
A lovely sentiment, but true? Univocal reasoning wishes it so: everything is what it is, 
and no other. Equivocal reasoning notes a difference: the kiss of “Let him kiss me with 
the kisses of his mouth!” (Song 1:2) is not the same as “Judas, is it with a kiss that you 
are betraying the Son of Man?” (Lk 14:48). A kiss can be a kiss, a physical gesture, but it 
cannot be reduced only to a gesture; there is more to it than univocity can convey.  
 It is here we see metaxology’s ability to negotiate the space between univocity 
and equivocity by preserving the truth of each and refusing to slide into univocal 
dogmatism or equivocal skepticism. Metaxological metaphysics neither insists on a 
single univocal regula nor does it valorize equivocal flux in its indeterminacy. In short, 
what recommends Desmond’s approach is its ability to mediate between those “who are 
obsessed with inflexible determinacy and those who turn away from any kind of 
determinacy with disgust.”359  
 We can see how our earlier consideration of Taylor’s argumentative style 
illuminates Desmond’s strategy. By discerning and preserving the truth of both univocity 
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and equivocity, Desmond’s metaxological approach capacitates both voices by holding 
them in a creative tension. He positions himself between univocity and equivocity to 
show how each speaks truthfully, albeit incompletely, of being. Instead of committing to 
one or the other voice, he searches for a way to capacitate speech in a way that can speak 
in multiple tongues, plurivocally. If all is not one (univocity) and all is not flux 
(equivocity) then we need a more nuanced, subtler, language able to speak of the metaxu 
the truth of both. Taylor gets at this interplay by recollecting Pascal’s image of the reed: 
“the human being in the universe has all the fragility of a mere reed, but its greatness lies 
in the fact that it is a thinking reed.”360 The human is so fragile, Pascal writes, “a vapour, 
a drop of water is enough to kill him” yet, in all the universe, “man would still be nobler 
than his slayer, because he knows that he is dying…The universe knows none of this.”361 
The sublime can simultaneously “fill us with awe” while “reminding us how little we 
are.”362 We are equivocal beings: we are yet need not – and at some point will no longer 
– be at all. We incarnate, in our very being, the interplay of these voices.  
 As a result, Desmond’s philosophy “works” to the extent it implicates the reader 
within the metaxu and initiates a process of attunement to the voices at play within being. 
Rather than a hegemonic system imposed from above, Desmond’s metaphysics is better 
likened to a process of learning a foreign language by immersion in the flux. We learn 
vocabulary words and grammar, but our appropriation of the language comes about 
inductively, tentatively, and we often fumble when we try to say the right word. But, as 
we grow in articulacy, we find ourselves capacitated to give an account of what it means 
to be in the between: we see the world differently and understand ourselves in a new 
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light. Metaxology, in sum, seeks to provide a tutorial empowering us to speak more 
faithfully about being because it permits us to dwell more mindfully amidst beings.  
This becomes clearer if we consider how the dynamism of our desire bespeaks a 
restless longing for wholeness. Desmond, showing his Platonic slip, recalls for his 
readers the discussion of desire found in the Symposium363 where Socrates claims  
anyone who has a desire desires what is not at hand and not present, what he does 
not have, and what he is not, and that of which he is in need; for such are the 
objects of desire and love. (200e) 
 
Desire is not self-enclosed and has not the resources to sate its lack. Desire is intentional, 
it is for something, which leads Desmond to observe how desire always already  
reaches beyond itself. For this reason, lack is not solely negative: it attests to the 
stirring of an impetuous power through which desire begins to be more than itself. 
Negatively understood, it is a witness to unfulfillment; positively understood, it 
may make desire aware of itself and so awaken it to what is more than itself.364  
 
Desire impels us to reach outside of ourselves in a quest for wholeness. We do not merely 
have desire, like a passing craving for chocolate; desire, rather, is constitutive of 
creaturehood. It is “a form of life which, while originating in lack, wars with lack, 
seeking thereby to keep despair at bay.”365 But the lack animating desire does not betray 
desire as indigent or impoverished. Though the end is absent – otherwise we would not 
desire – it is not wholly absent; our anticipation of the end “is a relation which, in being 
dissatisfied with the gulf between a desire and its goal, refuses sheer absence.”366  
For Desmond, desire’s telos is present in its origin, disquieting desire by 
reminding it of its lack and as-yet unachieved wholeness. Yet it is nothing less than the 
presence of the telos that impels us to begin the adventure of negotiating our identity in a 
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process he calls “selving.”367 Disquieted desire propels us on a passionate itinerary 
which, recalling Plato, is driven by Eros as “the name for our pursuit of wholeness, for 
our desire to be complete.”368 In acknowledging this drive, Desmond stands with 
Augustine and Aquinas:  
You stir man to take pleasure in praising you, because you have made us for 
yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you.369 
 
Because the will is a power of the rational soul, which is caused by God alone, by 
creation…Second, it is evident from the fact that the will is ordained to the 
universal good. Wherefore nothing else can be the cause of the will, except God 
Himself, Who is the universal good: while every other good is good by 
participation, and is some particular good, and a particular cause does not give a 
universal inclination.370 
 
We are made and ordained to be agents of desire, unsettled and driven by an abiding 
longing that impels us outward in search of fulfilment. No matter what we count as 
possessions, we are always first possessed by a desire admitting no finite satisfaction: 
ours is a ceaseless, restless, and passionate quest for wholeness.  
 Desire is a response elicited by the advent of being. We are, so to speak, struck 
into desire by being awoken to the ceaseless interplay of the univocity and equivocity of 
being. We come to ourselves a world of constant flux, one in which beings are born and 
die, come into being and pass away. Spread out before and behind us, we are aroused by 
and summoned to behold what Desmond calls the “infinite succession” of beings, 371 a 
notion tied to the categories of  
of univocity and equivocity in this sense. Our immediate inclination is to perceive 
the external world as a dispersed multiplicity of univocal particulars. In time, 
inevitably, this fixed definiteness is loosened up by our recognition of becoming 
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and its open-endedness. Things in their determinate particularity, carried beyond 
themselves by the generating power of becoming, pass away and ultimately 
disappear into the indefinite succession of other particulars.372  
 
We need both univocity and equivocity to speak truly of the infinite succession of beings 
we encounter in the world of external becoming because 
external becoming might be seen as the dynamic process of coming to be and 
passing away that concretizes particular entities, yet is not spent by the plurality 
of already realized particulars. It is open to the possibility of bringing into being 
and endlessly continuing the line of such entities.373   
 
Metaxology holds in creative tension the univocal stability of particular entities with the 
equivocal dynamism of becoming. It preserves the truth of each voice and permits them 
to express “two sides of the same orientation to the immediate.”374  
 To capacitate our ability to speak faithfully of the metaxu’s dynamism, 
metaxology makes use of univocal and equivocal categories. Neither one, on its own, is 
capable of accounting for the happening of the between. Univocity downplays flux in 
favor of determinacy; equivocity revels in indeterminacy but betrays determinate 
particularity. Both capture elements of the truth, but neither expresses the truth of being 
exhaustively. By resisting the pressure to offer an either-or to the universal 
impermanence of being, metaxology makes possible a more finessed understanding of the 
infinite succession of beings.  
 
2.2.3.3  The Dialectical Sense of Being 
 The dialectical sense of being draws attention to “a process of interplay between 
same and different, between self and other.”375 Dialectic, Desmond continues, is  
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etymologically in the same family as “dialogue”: mindful communication 
between self and other. Dialectic can refer us to a rhythmic process of unfolding, 
whether of process or events, thoughtful articulations or communications. There 
are many forms of dialectic. Socratic-Platonic dialectic, for instance, is bound up 
with dialogical openness to others. Modern dialectic, of which Hegel is perhaps 
the master exponent, is shaped by the ideal of autonomous thinking in which the 
self-determination of a process tends to be given primary place.376  
 
In this section, we shall consider how the practice of dialectic mediates between the self 
and other in search of a more inclusive unity. Rather than denying ambiguity, dialectic 
“thinks through” equivocity en route to a whole capable of reconciling differences.377 The 
question: does the sense of the “whole” attained by dialectic remain truthful to being?  
 At its simplest, the practice of dialectic “seeks to recover what the univocal sense 
offers”378 without turning away from the complexities and ambiguities of the equivocal. 
It claims to uncover a unity beyond flux, a deeper and more abiding totality comprising a 
coherent whole. In thinking through the flux and gathering it into a whole, dialectic offers 
a nuanced version of univocity’s mantra. Yes: to be is to be intelligible, but to be wholly 
intelligible is to part of an encompassing whole.  
 Hegel, for Desmond, serves as the exemplar of modern dialectic. We risk, though, 
misreading Hegel if we naively assume he operates according to a formal method. As 
Desmond observes, “Hegel offers no static formalization of thesis, antithesis, synthesis 
(now recognized by scholars to be attributed to Fichte, more properly speaking).”379 
Taylor, reinforces this insight in noting how dialectic is neither a method nor approach: 
If we want to characterize Hegel’s method in his great demonstrations we might 
just as well speak of it as “descriptive”, following Kenley Dove. For his aim is 
simply to follow the movement in his object of study. The task of the philosopher 
is “to submerge his freedom in [the content], and let it be moved by its own 
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nature” (PhG, 48). If the argument follows a dialectical movement, then this must 
be in the things themselves, not just in the way we reason about them.380  
 
To borrow Taylor’s phrase, Desmond reads Hegel as offering a hermeneutical dialectics 
“which convince us by the overall plausibility of the interpretations they give.”381 Hegel’s 
system is often seen as “the consummation of reason”382 but Desmond denies this claim. 
For Hegel “hides nuances, nuances that, if resurrected for rethinking, shed a different 
light on metaphysical thinking, and the possibilities of its contemporary renewal.”383 By 
inquiring into the truth and limits of dialectic, Desmond exposes the nearly-imperceptible 
cracks in Hegel’s philosophy, exposing openings in the Hegelian system capable of 
leading us toward a renewal of metaphysical thought.  
 The goal of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, Desmond suggests, is to give an 
“insight into what knowing is.”384 This requires an investigation into the role of 
mediation. Mediation, for Hegel, “is nothing but self-identity working itself out through 
an active self-directed process.”385 The following gives a sense of this process: 
The movement of a being that immediately is, consists partly in becoming an 
other than itself, and thus becoming its own immanent content; partly in taking 
back into itself this unfolding [of its content] or this existence of it, i.e. in making 
itself into a moment, and simplifying itself into something determinate. In the 
former movement, negativity is the differentiating and positing of existence; in 
this return into self, it is the becoming of the determinate simplicity. It is in this 
way that the content shows that its determinateness is not received from 
something else, nor externally attached to it, but that it determines itself, and 
ranges itself as a moment having its own place in the whole.386 
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Hegelian mediation is self-mediation: “through self-mediation he endeavors to complete 
(captured pictorially in the image of the circle) the incomplete self-knowledge of 
immediacy.”387 In a line sending shivers down Caputo’s spine, the consummation of self-
mediation leads to totality: Das Wahre ist das Ganze, the true is the whole.388   
 We should register no small degree of awe at the scope of Hegel’s self-mediating 
Idea. For here we find an approach with much to recommend itself to those who wish to 
preserve the truth of univocity and equivocity. Hegelian dialectic, first, describes a 
dynamic and gradually unfolding process which remains true to the flux of change over 
time. His own example of the bud à blossom à fruit illustrates a finessed understanding 
of the organic unfolding of this process.389 Second, dialectic does not shirk away from 
having to take account of the other; indeed, what Hegel calls the process of self-sublation 
(aufheben) describes how the Subject becomes determinate by sublating its other in a 
process that simultaneously cancels and preserves the other. Through sublation, the 
distinction between “self” and “other” is abolished by preserving the “other” within the 
self. Thus, Hegel’s dialectic holds out the promise of guiding us safely between the 
Scylla of a dogmatic univocity and the Charybdis of a chaotic equivocity. And, if we take 
the unfolding of Hegelian dialectic as a description of history’s unfolding, we could chart 
through the ages a record of inexorable progress as Geist unfolds itself forward in time as 
it becomes increasingly determinate and moves toward its ultimate consummation.   
 Yet, as Desmond is keen to alert us, we should be skeptical of Hegel’s grand 
system. For while dialectic does take account of equivocity, it does so in a way failing to 
respect the irreducible alterity of the other. As Simpson writes, “the dialectical sense 
                                               
387 Ibid., 144. 
388 Ibid., 19.  
389 Ibid., 2. 
 126 
taken on its own tends to absolutize itself and its self-mediation such that thought 
thinking itself becomes a univocal totality that is deaf to any mediation but its own – a 
solipsistic circle that closes in on itself.”390 In other words, while dialectic does account 
for plurality, it is a plurality subsumed into a larger whole. This, Desmond contends, is 
clearest in Hegel’s theology where God “others” Himself  
in finite creation, not to allow finite creation to be as irreducibly other to Himself, 
but because without God’s own self-othering, God Himself as beginning is all but 
nothing. The creation is God’s self-othering and hence not other, but the 
ontological mediating detour in God’s dialectical self-mediation with Himself.391   
 
Desmond, consequently, refuses to take part in the “coronation of absolute spirit” or 
consummation of Hegel’s “system” when “Hegel places the crown on its head, and the 
hymn he sings is Aristotle’s Te Deum to noesis tes noeseos. This is Hegel’s highest amen 
to being.”392 It is an “Amen” directed not toward the God who transcends the whole but, 
rather, to the God who has become the whole. Little wonder, given this depiction of 
Hegel’s God, Heidegger refused to sing or dance before it.  
 Modern dialectic – in its Hegelian iteration – runs aground because it subsumes 
alterity into a totalizing whole: “Hegel’s speculative unity is marked by, as we might call 
it, a kind of ‘dialectical univocity’.”393 Hegelian self-mediation results in a closed system 
unfolding from germ to full maturity according to its own logic. Looked at theologically, 
although it pays lip service to God, it cannot admit of revelation or irruptive grace, as 
these would require an intrusion into the system by a God who transcends it. Moreover, 
this would be a God alien to orthodox Christianity: the movement of Hegel’s dialectic 
unfolds from a state of lack and moves through stages toward ever-greater determinacy. 
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God, in effect, has to become God over time. God is posse, possibility, but not that of 
Cusa or Kearney, neither of whom hold that God creates in order for God to be God.394 
Prayerful appeal to the transcendent seems impossible because there is no transcendent 
Other; Hegel’s god occupies the same plane as humans. We are left, Desmond’s writes, 
with God’s “counterfeit double”395 who masquerades as the Transcendent Other while 
remaining squarely within the immanent realm. 
 In attempting to think through the equivocity of becoming to recuperate a sense of 
univocity, Hegel’s dialectic overreaches and inscribes god within the system. As 
Heidegger noted, philosophy employs Hegel’s god: render the whole of reality 
transparent to human reason. This is not the god before whom we bow and pray but, 
rather, the one who subtends the centrality of the human being. Hegel writes: 
The love of truth, faith in the power of mind, is the first condition in philosophy. 
Man, because he is mind, should and must deem himself worthy of the highest: he 
cannot think too highly of the greatness and the power of his mind, and with this 
belief, nothing will be so difficult and hard that it will not reveal itself [sich 
eröffnete] to him. The essence of the universe at first hidden and concealed 
[verborgene und verschlossene], has no power which can offer resistance to the 
search for knowledge; it has to lay itself open before the seeker – to set before his 
eyes and give for his enjoyment, its riches and its depths.396  
 
In mediating between self and otherness, Hegel’s dialectic places humans center stage. 
Hegel’s Geist, Taylor observes, “lives as spirit only through men. They are the vehicles, 
and the indispensable vehicles, of his spiritual existence, as consciousness, rationality, 
will.”397 He continues, noting how for Hegel “I as a human being,”  
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have the vocation of realizing a nature which is given: and even if I am called on 
to be original, to realize myself in the way uniquely suited to myself, nevertheless 
the scope for originality is itself given as an integral part of human nature, as are 
those unique features of me on which my originality builds. Freedom for man thus 
means the free realization of a vocation which is largely given.398  
 
Desmond regards this as “dialectically instrumentalizing” the individual who becomes 
“an instrument of the absolute whole: man, so to say, is the means by which God comes 
to self-determination; man is the medium of God’s knowing.”399 Hegel’s god needs us, 
indeed uses us, to become god; transparent knowledge of reality is not a gift given to 
humanity but the achievement of Geist through humanity.  
 Hegel’s practice of dialectic is found wanting because, in its commitment to 
preserving a sense of being’s univocity, it downplays equivocity. Although it pays lip-
service to alterity, it does so in a way that fails to preserve the otherness of the other. 
Hegel, in other words, over-emphasizes the “self” in self-determination, thereby reducing 
the Other to an instance of the Same. In Hegel’s system, there is a place for everything 
and everything in its place. One hears the howls from Caputo and Levinas! 
 This becomes clearer by situating the practice of dialectic within the metaxu. 
Recall the question posed at the end of the last section: how do we mediate with an 
infinite succession of beings? Infinite succession, we saw, describes the external world of 
becoming. Confronted by an infinite stream of beings who come to be and pass away, 
how do we “make sense” of the external world of becoming. Impelled by a desire for 
wholeness, how do we remain true to being’s determinacy and ambiguity? Neither 
univocity nor equivocity appear sufficient: a univocity without equivocity is static 
lifelessness, and equivocity without univocal determinacy would overwhelm us with 
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chaotic flux. We yearn for wholeness, but neither seems capable of sating our appetites. 
How are we to respond from within the metaxu, the “Desmondian open space” where we 
feel wooed by both voices and their promise for wholeness?  
 What keeps us intact and permits us to withstand the univocal and equivocal 
forces buffeting us is called intentional infinitude, or “the power of open dialectical self-
mediation displayed in the articulation of human desire.”400 Intentional infinitude refers 
to our restless desire for the infinite. Our desire to mediate between unity and multiplicity  
seeks unity, rather than dispersal. We want to mediate between ourselves and the 
world; but more, we want to communicate ourselves to ourselves. Desmond 
describes this potency as circular, though not in a closed way, and founded in the 
appreciation that humans seek to know themselves. In this search they strive for 
open wholeness, as the desired end to their infinite restlessness.401   
 
A single clause distinguishes between intentional infinitude and Hegel’s dialectic: 
circular, though not in a closed way. Indeed, if we trace its roots to more ancient 
practices, intentional infinitude attests to the salutary potential of dialectic. In Socratic-
Platonic dialogues, interlocutors journeyed together and engaged one another in open-
ended in cooperative argument that seldom terminated in cut-and-dry answers. Perhaps 
this is the point: instead of giving “the answer” they offer “the invitation” to discern for 
oneself what it is that we love and, through discernment, grow in articulacy about their 
loves. As an exercise, dialectic preserves practitioners from complacency by reminding 
them that no single answer, no thing of any sort, can still the restless human heart.  
 Compared with Socratic-Platonic dialectic, Hegel’s totalizing system represents 
dialectic’s modern mutation. For whereas dialectic was an ongoing and unending practice 
for Socrates, Hegel employs dialectic in a way privileging self-mediation and  
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takes its sights from the ability of thought to think what is other, and to bring the 
other into relativity to itself. The conclusion then drawn is that the thought that 
thinks the other overreaches the other; hence in thinking the other as a thought, it 
ends up as the thought that thinks itself, but now inclusive of otherness.402  
 
By closing the circle and terminating the dialectic in favor of the self, Hegel’s dialectic 
betrays the dia by abrogating the open-endedness of intermediation. Dialectic’s rhythmic 
give-and-take, call and response, is arrested and freezes the community of being into a 
totalized whole. Its sentiment: “I go toward the other out of my own lack, I tend to the 
other not primarily to attend to the other, but as perhaps requiting my own lack. I am 
tempted to possess the other to enable my own achieved self-possession.”403 There is 
something vampiric or predatory about the self, or Spirit, who brings itself about not by 
reverencing the other but by using the other instrumentally to effect one’s emergence.  
 In the end, while it succeeds in recuperating a sense of univocity from the flux of 
equivocity, modern dialectic fails to account fully for the inherent ambiguity and 
universal impermanence of being. Dialectic recognizes alterity, but only in order to 
instrumentalize the other as a means to achieving its own end. Dialectic betrays eros by 
settling for what is not infinite. The problem: dialectic enacts a closure upon itself, 
creating a system in which individuals are sublated into the larger whole. Otherness is 
preserved, but at the cost of being counted now amidst the Same. The accusation of 
ontotheology sticks: this is not the God of the Whole but God as the Whole.  
 
2.2.3.4  The Metaxological Sense of Being 
 The metaxological sense of being is Desmond’s neologism, a combination of the 
Greek metaxu or “middle” with logos meaning “word, discourse, account.” Metaxology, 
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Desmond writes, “sees philosophy as seeking a logos of the metaxu, an intelligible 
account of what it means to be between or intermediate.”404 It stresses 
the mediated community of mind and being, but not in terms of the self-mediation 
of the same. It calls attention to a pluralized mediation, beyond closed self-
mediation from the side of the same, and hospitable to the mediation of the other, 
or transcendent, out of its own otherness. It puts the emphasis on an 
intermediation, not a self-mediation, however dialectically qualified.405  
 
In its emphasis on “pluralized mediation,” metaxology “tries to redeem the promise of 
equivocity beyond univocity and dialectic.”406 Whereas Hegel’s dialectic suppressed 
equivocity, metaxology recuperates equivocity and balances it with univocity.   
 Jere O’Neill Surber indicates how metaxology moves beyond Hegel’s dialectic: 
1. While univocity and equivocity remain…complexly interrelated, the true 
complexity and nuance of their interrelations cannot be adequately 
described in terms of some dialectical synthesis or “higher univocity.” 
2. Although a systematic framework for exploring this complex web of 
interrelations is indispensable, it cannot constitute the sort of “closed 
system” that the dialectical stance implies. 
3. While a metaxological perspective is not opposed to concepts…its 
concepts must continually maintain their connection with concrete 
experience, which lends to them a sort of openness and “jaggedness” or 
“irregularity of contour” suppressed in the dialectical approach.407 
 
In other words, metaxological philosophy (1) strives to preserve the truthfulness of both 
univocity and equivocity, (2) resists closure upon itself as “the system,” preferring to 
retain its openness to the happening of being, and (3) swears off any pretense to “taking 
the measure” of being; indeed, its fidelity to the flux of being means that there is a 
surplus to being that remains inexhaustible by philosophical concept.   
 Metaxology cannot be thought of as attempting to transcend the metaxu or to offer 
a way of escaping the flux. On the contrary, it is a form of reflection attuned to beginning 
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media res. “In a literal sense,” for Desmond, metaxology is necessary because “being 
between is an inter-esse, where the interest is in the being of the inter. All genuine 
interest is inter-esse, not at all just what we normally call self-interest. The latter bends 
the inter-esse back to the self from the inter. True interest is beyond self-interest, for it is 
truly beyond self and is in the inter.”408 Metaxology as a way of life, endeavoring to 
remain faithful to and speak truthfully of what it means to be in the between.  
 Now, while not antagonistic to all practices of dialectic, metaxology may be seen 
as needed in order to avoid Hegel’s “dialectical reduction.” 409 Whereas Hegelian 
dialectic privileges a singular self-mediation encompassing the Other within the Same, 
metaxology remains committed to a form of double-mediation. For Desmond, to be true 
to the nature of the metaxu means remaining mindful not only of self-mediation but also 
of the inter-mediation originating in what is other to the self. “Genuine philosophical 
thinking,” he avers, “must be both self-mediating and also open to the intermediation 
between thought and what is other to thought, precisely as other.”410 In this way, 
metaxological philosophy makes good on the promise of the dia in dialectic by resisting 
efforts to subsume the other into its categories, preferring instead to initiate a dialogue 
with the other. Such a give-and-take, essential to metaxology, renders it a dialogical, 
rather than a monological, practice. Instead of a soliloquy delivered by a self who “struts 
and frets his hour upon the stage,” metaxology initiates dialogue. To be metaxological 
means that one “dwells with the interplay of sameness and difference, identity and 
otherness, not by mediating a more inclusive whole but by recurrence to the rich 
ambiguities of the middle, and with due respect for forms of otherness that are dubiously 
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included in the immanence of a dialectical whole.”411 In its commitment to abiding within 
the flux and ambiguity of existence and giving ear the call of voices suppressed in other 
philosophical practices, metaxology affects a stance of ongoing vigilance, open and 
attentive to the call of the other. Metaxology, so framed, becomes akin to a form of 
philosophical prayer listening for and willing to respond to the call of the Other.  
Whereas Hegel, as Aristotle before him, sought to achieve a determinate system, 
Desmond resists closure of the whole. Rather than proceeding by imposing categories 
upon being, metaxology proceeds more tentatively and in a style hewing closely to 
Socratic-Platonic dialogue. “I think of Socratic dialogue as witnessing to an honesty to 
where we find ourselves,” he writes, “an honesty also willing to confess that in the midst 
of the ordinary something beyond comes to make a call on us. We can receive the 
call(er), or we can turn away from the invitation.”412 Westphal and Kearney nod in 
agreement, as Desmond manifests an openness to Kearney’s micro-eschatology, the 
irruption of the transcendent into the immanent order, and to Westphal’s understanding of 
the nature of metaphysics as a vocation, a response to having first been called.  
Instead of seeing metaxology as a “penthouse” on top of the univocal, equivocal, 
and dialectic sense of being, Desmond envisions it as a way of bringing “to truer 
articulating what is at work in them.”413 The Hegelian slip shows as each sense of being 
is aufgehoben and incorporated into the metaxological. Metaxology neither supplants nor 
annuls these voices but hold together to allow each to speak of being. Metaxology 
symphonically weaves together each voice and allows it to speak its truth yet balances 
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these voices so no one dominates the other. As a task, then, metaxology leads to a 
“practice of a kind of thinking”414 mindful of the plurality of voices at play within being.   
Like dialectic, metaxology is a mode of mindfulness that “tries to think beyond an 
oscillation back and forth between univocity and equivocity, while facing both of these 
fair and square.”415 And, like Socratic-Platonic philosophy, metaxology unfolds as an 
ongoing dialogue – a process of being questioned and questioning – with being. Yet this 
surfaces a paradox: every time we question, we acknowledge a lack (otherwise we would 
not ask) and a presentiment of what is missing (we are, after all, asking about something). 
So, he asks, “How can mind be beyond lack, be somehow already full?”416 His answer: 
Plato (as we see from the Meno, and elsewhere) was attentive to the issue and puts 
the essential question: if we are in search, how do we recognize what we seek, did 
we not already have some sense of what we seek? If we did not have this prior 
sense of what we seek, we could not seek it at all in the first place. Contrariwise, 
if we do have this prior sense, why do we seek at all, since we already seem to 
have what we seek, and we cannot really seek what we already have?417   
 
For Desmond, the paradoxical lack points “deeper than lack to a more positive condition 
of being.”418 Like Plato, Augustine, and Aquinas, Desmond posits the presence of the end 
(telos) as abiding at the origin of our search (arche). Desire moves not from indigent lack 
to fullness but from the presentiment of plenitude toward actual plenitude.  
 This will become clearer if we return to the Symposium and the myth of Eros. 
Recall how Socrates, speaking in the voice of Diotima, recounts the birth of Eros to the 
group gathered at Callias’ bacchanal. Eros, Socrates-Diotima recounts, was conceived on 
the night of Aphrodite’s birthday. Poros, or “resource,” became drunk on nectar and fell 
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asleep in the garden. Penia, or “poverty,” who had been begging outside the gates of the 
party seized this opportunity to “relieve her lack of resources: she would get a child from 
Poros.” The offspring of Poros and Penia, Eros bears a likeness to both  
he is always poor, and he’s far from being delicate and beautiful (as ordinary 
people think he is); instead, he is trough and shriveled and shoeless and homeless, 
always lying on the dirt without a bed, sleeping at people’s doorsteps and in 
roadsides under the sky, having his mother’s nature, always living in Need. But 
on his father’s side he is a schemer after the beautiful and the good; he is brave, 
impetuous, and intense, an awesome hunter, always weaving snares, resourceful 
in his pursuit of intelligence, a love of wisdom through all his life, a genius with 
enchantments, potions, and clever pleadings. (203d)  
  
Eros is a being of the between: between mortality and immortality, poverty and riches, 
wisdom and ignorance. Indeed, Eros serves as one of the daimons, traversing the space 
between gods and mortals “conveying prayer and sacrifice from men to gods, while to 
men they bring commands from the gods and gifts in return for sacrifices” (203a). Eros 
appears as the “paradoxical mixture of poverty and plenitude,”419 the child in whom 
abundance and lack intermingle.  
Too often, it appears, the dual parentage of Eros as the offspring of Poros and 
Penia is commonly forgotten. Hegel, for one, so stressed the indigence of Geist that no 
heed was paid to Poros; Hegel’s god moves from lack to fullness, from indeterminacy to 
determinacy, through a process of self-determination that overcomes what is lacking. A 
metaxological consideration of desire remains attentive, however, to Eros’s two 
inheritances: the surplus wealth of Poros and the poverty of Penia. Heir of both, Eros is 
born into a state of enriched poverty, bearing within itself a promissory note guaranteed 
by Poros’s surplus riches. Though it does not yet possess the fullness of its patrimony, the 
promise of fulfillment goads Eros’s restless adventuring. Contrary to the image portrayed 
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in movies and novels, a properly Erotic itinerary is not one of promiscuity but of 
pilgrimage guided by desire’s restlessness toward the promise of infinite fulfillment.  
 Our restless desire for fulfillment, animated by the enriched poverty of Eros, 
implicates us in the metaxu and as a metaxu. The between describes not only where we 
find ourselves on the map of being (topology) but also who we are as beings 
(anthropology). We began to see this, at least inchoately, when we discussed “intentional 
finitude” as the way we respond to infinite succession. Faced with the coming-to-be and 
passing-away of beings, we experience a drive to “mediate between unity and 
multiplicity in our search for wholeness.”420 We experience ourselves as being between 
lack and fullness and we intermediate between ourselves and things in search of 
wholeness. Our enriched poverty resists premature closure: no, this will not 
satisfy…continue your search. But the promise of dialectic, at least in its more modern 
forms that emphasize the self in this mediation, is betrayed when the circular movement 
between self and what is other terminates in the self. The vicissitudes of the flux are, in 
dialectic, brought under determinate control; the circle of inter-mediation is gradually 
closed in upon itself. The dynamism of being is ossified.  
  
2.2.4  Transcendence: Exterior, Interior, Superior 
 
 In this section, I consider the role of “transcendence” in metaxological 
philosophy. Transcendence, like being, can be said in many ways. Indeed, we have 
anticipated this discussion when we took up the nature of infinite succession, intentional 
infinitude, and actual infinitude. We need now to clarify how Desmond’s three types of 
                                               
420 Desmond, Desire, Dialectic, and Otherness, 179.  
 137 
“transcendence” arise from amidst the between and point beyond the metaxu. If 
metaphysical mindfulness arises in the midst of beings, then 
the question of transcendence has nothing to do with a leap out of being into the 
void, but with the deepest mindfulness of what is emergent in the middle itself. 
Again, the double meaning of meta is relevant. “Meta” is being in the midst; 
“meta” is also reference to what is beyond, what is transcendent. Metaxological 
metaphysics must think the doubleness of this tension between being in the midst 
and being referred by self-transcendence to the transcendence of what is other, 
what is over and above.421  
 
Tutored into a form of metaxological mindfulness, we will be able to recognize how the 
signs we encounter in the midst of the metaxu point beyond themselves to a superior 
transcendence on account of whom being is at all.  
 
2.2.4.1  Exterior Transcendence (T1) 
 Desmond claims: “the happening of the between is a metaxological community of 
transcendences.”422 Note, first, the between or metaxu is not static; it is a happening, an 
ongoing event. Metaxology reflects upon this happening in a plurivocal manner:  
Univocity puts the stress on something or someone determinate, this or that 
character or thing. Equivocity puts the stress on something more indeterminate, 
something neither this nor that, something ambiguous, especially in the heart of 
acting human beings. Dialectic puts the stress on a togetherness of oneself and 
others, on a meditation of our differences in the exchange with each other. 
Metaxology does not dispose of these three senses but aligns them more truly 
with what in the between is more than determinable and beyond our self-
determination. It is attentive to many-meaninged inter-play, bringing more to the 
fore the plurivocity of inter-mediations between oneself and others.423  
 
As a happening, second, the between possesses a communal character. The “happening” 
does not take place solely within each being; it happens between and amidst them. Thus, 
when Desmond refers to the “community of transcendences,” he is indicating how at the 
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basic and most primordial level of being, each and every being is in relationship with 
what is other to it. To be at all is to be in relationship because being is relational. 
 The first transcendence in this community is what Desmond calls “exterior 
transcendence” (T1). We saw this above when we treated infinite succession, referring to 
“the transcendence of beings as other in exteriority.”424 It is easy to take for granted that 
beings are other to us and exist independently of us, each with its own integrity. Exterior 
transcendence, Simpson observes, keeps us mindful how “the otherness of the world 
precedes and exceeds our thinking of it.”425 There are determinate beings other to us and 
irreducible to any system; being, in its intransigent resistance to schematization, bears 
witness to something in excess of determinacy. Being as other to us is not indeterminate 
or awaiting our impress to give it form; being as other to us is and remains 
overdeterminate and cannot be fixed or frozen in place. Esse Semper Maior: being is 
always greater and its overdeterminacy cannot be systematized or exhausted.  
 A metaxological mindfulness of T1 remains alert to how we are always immersed 
within a world of beings. Beings come into being and pass away; flowers bloom and 
wither, animals are born and die. “There is a constitutive doubleness that, as coming to be 
and passing away, is inscribed ontologically on their being as becoming.”426 This 
doubleness affects the way we perceive and reflect upon what it means to be. In the tree 
outside my window, a robin builds her next. Ontically, I know what she is: a bird. I see 
her and am aware of her ontological doubleness: last spring, she was not but now in late 
summer, she is; in a year, in all likelihood, she will be no longer. She has being now, but 
                                               
424 Desmond, Art, Origins, and the Absolute, 268.  
425 Simpson, 46.  
426 Ibid., 90.  
 139 
only fleetingly.427 Along with every other finite being, she bears within herself the crack 
of equivocity rendering her susceptible to the ebb and flow of time.   
 Metaxological mindfulness does not, however, despair at the inherent fragility of 
being. This is because the wash of infinite succession 
can both appall us and exalt us. We face our own nothingness, and yet we feel 
ourselves strangely native to the cosmos. We shrink to nothing before the 
immensity, and yet we sing our thanks out into the openness. And there are 
breakthroughs beyond the sense of void infinity, such as made Pascal afraid, into 
an appreciation of infinitude as plenitude. We breathe the glory of the sublime 
creation, in its disproportion to our power to master it.428   
 
Where the ontic question probes what something is in its determinacy, and the 
ontological question considers how something perdures as an identity-in-impermanence, 
it falls to the metaphysical question to ask after the whole of being: why being at all? 
 For one metaxologically attuned, the question Why being and not nothing? erupts 
as a response to having heard the address of being. We come to be in the midst of being’s 
happening and grow mindful of how beings are interconnected and intermediate with one 
another. Metaphysics begins, consequently, as a response to dwelling amidst and stirred 
into mindfulness by being. The external world communicates itself, poetically expressed 
by Gerard Manley Hopkins in As kingfishers catch fire: 
 Each mortal thing does one thing and the same: 
  Deals out that being indoors each one dwells; 
  Selves—goes its self; myself it speaks and spells, 
  Crying What I do is me: for that I came.429   
 
Metaxology responds to the address of exterior transcendence and empowers our 
response. Philosophical approaches guided by Descartes, for instance, would look 
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askance at this approach, perhaps even deeming it eccentric. And, in a way, metaxology 
is eccentric: it is neither centered in nor does it index being to the Cogito because it is 
elicited as a response in a dialogue initiated from outside oneself.  
The vector directing every act of self-transcendence finds its origin, accordingly, 
not in the self but in the advent of transcendence. Again, recall Augustine’s response to 
creation as he seeks the object of his love. Over and again, no being satisfies his quest, 
each pointing beyond itself and the created order toward its Creator.430 Far from a 
dispassionate looking about, his odyssey is an eccentric quest enacted as a response to 
experiencing the call of exterior transcendence manifested in beauty. Augustine, having 
been addressed by being, is implicated in a quest to move beyond himself toward being 
(T1) and, finding no created thing capable of satisfying his restless desire, toward the one 
of whom all beings in exterior transcendence sing “He made us” (Ps 99:3).  
 
2.2.4.2  Interior Transcendence (T2) 
  Confronted by the oscillation of exterior beings as they come to be and pass out 
of being, we are struck with metaphysical wonder: why anything at all? Being does not 
unfold neutrally before us; rather, we are drawn into the interplay of being where we take 
a stand on ourselves. What Desmond called earlier intentional infinitude proves doubly 
implicating, by launching us into a quest for an ultimate origin and exposing within 
ourselves the abyssal depths of a restless desire to know. Thus, the “transcendence” in 
self-transcendence conveys both (1) the act of reaching out beyond oneself and (2) an 
awareness of transcendence abiding within the depths of one’s being. Interior 
transcendence (T2) indicates “the transcendence of self-being such as we meet especially 
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in the self-surpassing power of the human being.”431 The capacity for self-transcendence 
renders us creatures of possibility who, in freedom, take a stand on who we become: 
the meaning of possibility can here be defined immanently rather than just 
determined externally. There is possibility as freedom, perhaps even as the 
promise of free finite creativity. Human self-transcendence awakens to itself in 
the astonishing givenness of being, awakens to its own astonishing powers of self-
surpassing. Human beings are finite yet exceed finitude in their self-surpassing.432  
 
Self-transcendence, moreover, bears the dual mark of eccentricity and ecstasy. Self-
transcendence originates in its being awakened to itself in the midst of beings, an 
awakening instigated by the address of being. Self-transcendence is eccentric in being a 
response to having been astonished. As ecstatic, it is not just “outer reaching” but other 
reaching: it reaches out toward being other to itself, directed by being’s call to the self. 
The “vector of transcendence”433 originates neither in the self nor is it self-authored; its 
origin is external and, consequently, each act of self-transcendence must be thought of as 
a response to a prior summons. We are open to self-transcendence, to reaching out 
beyond ourselves, because we are first opened by transcendence.  
  Self-transcendence responds to and is guided by our awaking to what Desmond 
calls the “intimate strangeness of being.” Intimate strangeness 
refers to the middle condition of our thought of being: being is strange because it 
has an otherness, indeed marvel, of which we are not the conceptual masters; it is 
intimate, in that this very strangeness allows no stance of thinking “outside” being 
– we are participants in what we think about. Being indeed gives us to be before 
we think about the meaning of what it is to be. The strangeness of being is as 
much about us, as we are within it.434  
 
Stirred by being, one knows oneself as one among other beings, yet recognizes that their 
“strangeness” eludes any conceptual schema. We know beings intimately because we are 
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among them and we are because of them, yet they elude capture by our concepts. Self-
transcendence possesses, then, a double movement. The self is awakened by the advent of 
transcendence, the address of being other to self; the self is awakened to transcendence, 
impelling it outward in a ceaseless quest for wholeness.  
 
2.2.4.3  Superior Transcendence (T3) 
 We turn now to what Desmond calls actual infinitude, superior transcendence, or 
transcendence itself (T3). This is not to be confused with “the highest being in the sense 
with which God is often identified – namely, the ens realissimum.”435 The God of whom 
he writes is not “a” being because transcendence itself (T3) is  
in excess of determinate beings, as their original ground; it would be in excess of 
our self-transcendence, as its most ultimate possibilizing source. It would be 
beyond the ordinary doublet of possibility/reality, as their possibilizing source; it 
could not be just a possibility, nor indeed a realization of possibility. It would 
have to be “real” possibilizing power, more original and other than finite 
possibility and realization. It would have to be possibilizing beyond determinate 
possibility, and “real” beyond all determinate realization.436  
 
What is most distinctive about “transcendence itself” can be encapsulated in one word: 
possibilizing.437 Transcendence itself is the possibilizing source of the other two 
transcendences as their origin and sustaining ground.  
 Desmond’s “possibilizing” God bears no relation to the god rejected as 
ontotheological. Ontotheology’s god takes up residence and has a job to do within the 
immanent order. Such a god becomes, as Westphal writes, “a Highest Being who is the 
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key to the meaning of the whole of being.”438 With Heidegger, Desmond views Hegel’s 
god as the palmary example of ontotheology. For Hegel, “God ‘needs’ man, and hence is 
defined as what it is or may be in terms of its relativity to us.”439 Rather than a 
possibilizing divinity, Hegel’s god is one for whom divinity remains but a possibility:  
a God that is not truly what it may be in the beginning, but has to become itself, 
fully realize what it might be, or may be, in a process of becoming or self-
becoming, in which it is teleologically, or eschatologically, more fully itself or 
complete at the end of the process. I think this way of thinking runs a grave risk of 
producing counterfeit doubles of God, even it gives to some the satisfaction of 
being needed by God.440  
 
Hegel’s god is an “erotic absolute” defined by an “indefinite abstraction or lack; self-exit 
into otherness; return to self through and from the otherness; now in the end explicit self-
constitution, finally determined as fully real.”441 This god unfolds and is driven by the 
indigent lack of Penia with scant recognition of the enriched poverty inherited by Poros.  
 By describing it as possibilizing, Desmond means to extricate “transcendence 
itself” from the plane of being. Desmond’s God is not a being but, rather, the origin, 
creator, and sustainer of being. This is not a God of inner potentiality or a need to create. 
God’s relationship to the whole is asymmetrical and non-reciprocal: God possibilizes 
being, gives being to be at all, but not in order to achieve any self-serving goal. God does 
not need humanity to work out God’s issues or to become God. The origin, creator, and 
sustainer of all creates not out of poverty but from overabundance; God possibilizes the 
whole of creation for no “reason” other than the sheer goodness of being itself.  
 Any recourse to a God not confined to our immanent order cannot but stress our 
language. Indeed, Desmond recurs to several metaphors in an effort to express a sense of 
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the transcendent God who evades capture in finite speech. Instead of the “erotic absolute” 
who needs creation, he employs metaphors of the agapeic absolute,442 absolute original443 
and agapeic origin444 to draw attention to the “too muchness” and excess of God’s 
creative power. Metaphoric speech is inescapable when speaking of God. For instance  
The absolute original as depth is a metaphor for the ground of being. 
Interestingly, the Latin for “high,” altus can also mean “deep”…As a vertical 
transcendence, the absolute original is beyond a univocal either/or; it is double, 
both high and deep. It requires a metaxological both/and. As height, it is 
transcendent to the world; as depth, it is its immanent ground…This ground, or, 
better, this grounding, is the profound upsurge of the power of being, that most 
intimate constituent of beings without which they would be nothing…To say that 
the absolute original is the ground is to say that all finite being is shot through 
with its own dynamic orientation toward absoluteness, toward its own potential 
wholeness and participation in infinite for which all creation grown.445  
 
Note how the metaphor works to portray “transcendence itself” as intimately present to 
the whole of creation. It spans the heights and depths of created being; indeed, by 
grounding creation it leaves upon the created order a trace of its creative excess, an 
enriched poverty, orienting us toward fulfillment. The metaphor opens consideration 
what it means to be in the midst of being (meta) while gesturing beyond itself to what is 
beyond being (meta) as the creative and possibilzing source of all that is.  
  Let me conclude this section by drawing upon Kearney’s meditation on The Song 
of Solomon 3:1-4. This provides not only a clearer sense of Desmond’s three 
transcendences but also shows how they implicate one another. Kearney begins by 
quoting the Shulamite bride  
Upon my bed at night I sought him whom my soul loves;  
I sought him, but found him not; I called him, but he gave no answer. 
“I will rise now and go about the city, in the streets and in the squares; 
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I will seek him whom my soul loves.” I sought him, but found him not. 
The sentinels found me, as they went about in the city. 
“Have you seen him whom my soul loves?” 
Scarcely had I passed them, when I found him whom my soul loves.  
 
For Kearney, as Desmond, “the anxious, expectant seeking of the love-struck bride is 
reversed into a being-found, that is, a being desired.”446 A nocturnal yearning stirs the 
bride and impels her from the bedchamber. This is not a feckless search, a random 
casting about, but a deliberate quest for her Beloved. She knows the one for whom she 
seeks, the one who awakened within her the stirring of a desire that takes her out into the 
city streets (T2). She canvasses the city in search of traces of her beloved (T1). But, as 
Kearney points out, “it is only after the bride has passed the sentinels who found her that 
she finds Him whom her soul loves.”447 It is because God first calls to us, calls us into 
being, calls us into relationship, that we can call out and search for God. The deepest 
longing of the human heart is an enriched poverty endowed by its Creator who is at once 
the origin and end, arche and telos, of desire and its fulfillment.  
 The range of transcendences considered (T1 – T3) comprise what Desmond calls 
the metaxological community of being. As should be clear from his inclusion of self-
transcendence, we are each of us included within the community of transcendence 
wherein each and every being intermediates with what is other to itself. The world around 
us is not a neutral tableau populated by monads; it, too, has been called forth and is 
sustained by Transcendence itself. The beauty of creation addresses us as we are struck, 
or pierced, by a face, a vista, a song. Metaxological reflection does not bring us into the 
community of transcendence; it as a response to awakening within it, in media res, as we 
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are launched upon our own iteration of the Augustinian itinerary ab exterioribus ad 
interior, ab inferioribus ad superiora: from exterior to interior, from inferior to superior.  
 
2.3  Minding the Between: The Furrowing Brow of Immanence 
 In this final part, I round out our consideration of Desmond’s systematic 
metaphysics by thinking through the modes of “minding” the between. For Desmond, 
mindfulness of being unfolds in stages: astonishment, perplexity, and curiosity. There is  
something excessive and overdetermined about the astonishing beginning; then 
there is a troubled indeterminacy and sense of lack, in the perplexity of mind that 
is subsequently precipitated; finally, there is a drive to definitive and 
determination in curiosity that seeks to overcome any survival of troubled 
indefiniteness and lack, such as we find in perplexity.448  
 
He distinguishes these modes because, in the modern era, we have stressed the 
determinate drive of curiosity and recessed the other two. In tracing the evolution of our 
mindfulness of the between, he actually gives us a metaphysical genealogy in many ways 
complementary to Taylor’s. Hence “the furrowing brow of immanence” describes the 
historical process moving from “wide-eyed astonishment” to “squinted-eye perplexity” 
to, finally, the “furrowed brow of curiosity” insistent on total determinacy.  
 On the ontological level, Desmond’s description of our preference for l’esprit de 
geometrie over l’esprit de finesse complements Taylor’s. But, as a metaphysical account, 
Desmond opens up a new vista for us to explore: for while the modes of mindfulness may 
forget their origin in astonishment, they can never un-inherit their ancestry. The curious 
mind may bristle at, or think itself allergic to, overdeterminacy, but astonishment abides 
in its DNA. By re-activing even long-dormant seeds of astonishment within our 
mindfulness, metaxology holds the promise of renewing the way we live in the between.  
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2.3.1 Wide-Eyed Astonishment: Porosity of Being and Passio Essendi 
 “The beginning of mindfulness,” Desmond writes, “is in an original wonder 
before the givenness of being. Such wonder is often recognized but its significance is not 
always plumbed.”449 This insight has roots in Aristotle, Plato, and Thales of Miletus. 
Thales, Plato writes in the Theatetus was so enraptured by the stars he fell into a well.450 
Aligned with these figures, Desmond considers “the advent of metaphysical thinking is in 
a primal astonishment.” Indeed, this astonishment is primal, elemental, and irreducible:   
Plato speaks of thaumazein as the pathos of the philosopher. This is sometimes 
translated as wonder and this is not inappropriate. Astonishment, however, 
captures the sense of being rocked back on one’s heels as it were, by the otherness 
of being in its givenness. Plato says pathos: there is a pathology in metaphysics. 
There is a suffering, an undergoing; there is a patience of being; there is a 
receiving that is not the production of the metaphysician or mind.451  
 
Note the imagery: we are rocked back, we suffer and we undergo the address of what is 
other to ourselves. In astonishment, we experience the “bite of otherness”452 inflicting a 
wound opening us to what is other than ourselves. We are open because opened by the 
givenness of being, a givenness defying delimitation by concept or exhaustive expression 
by speech. The overdeterminacy of being breaks upon us as a “rupture and renewal, at 
once a refreshed distancing and a drawing close of mind and being.”453 Unlike Frodo, 
who bore a sliver of the Morgul-knife within his shoulder, this wound does not inhibit or 
threaten to incapacitate our adventure; to the contrary, the rupture of astonishment 
capacitates us by rending us open to what is other to ourselves and prompts us to pose the 
question of what gave us to be. Wounded by astonishment, we ask: Why anything at all? 
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 Calling to mind our “Five Commandments,”454 let us consider the following 
description of astonishment as the source of metaphysics. Astonishment, Desmond holds,  
opens a mindfulness that we do not self-produce. Astonishment is a precipitation 
of mindfulness before something admirable, or loveable, or marvelous, 
communicated from an otherness that has the priority in speaking to the porosity 
of our being. It comes to us, comes over us, and we open up in response. We do 
not first go toward something, but find ourselves going out of ourselves because 
something has made its way, often in startling communication, in the very depths 
or roots of our being, beyond our self-determination.455  
 
If metaxological mindfulness originates in this sense of astonishment, the punches thrown 
by critics against metaphysics will not land. Metaphysics, first and foremost, responds to 
the advance of something other and outer to ourselves. It does not privilege any singular 
locus for “the Truth” because it originates in the everyday encounters, amidst the flux, 
where we are struck by what is “admirable, or loveable, or marvelous” communicating 
itself and pointing to something in excess of itself. Metaphysics answers the call heard as 
we stand amidst beings (meta), a call directing us beyond beings (meta) to the source of 
being itself. Opened by astonishment, we are creatures of ecstatic desire reaching 
outward and otherward from the abyssal depths of our enriched poverty as our desires 
strains forward toward the promise of ultimate fulfillment.   
 There is something inescapably childlike about astonishment. A girl grasps her 
father’s hand and says in hushed awe, “Look, the moon!” A boy devours fairy tales and 
play-acts them for his family. Children live comfortably in the “primal and elemental” 
stage of astonishment, unafraid to show their wonder or to ask the “big questions.”456 
Indeed, childhood astonishment may augur the future: she may become a physicist, he an 
                                               
454 (1) Don’t index the divine to human reason, (2) Do not be faithless to the flux, (3) Do not produce  
counterfeit Gods, (4) be attentive to everyday disclosures, (5) Metaphysics is a vocation 
455 Desmond, The Intimate Strangeness of Being, 106.  
456 Desmond, Being and the Between, 11.  
 149 
actor. Yet, though we grow out of childhood, we do not have to lose our capacity for 
childlike awe. Desmond observes, “the child is not only the father to the man, but the 
man is the shield of time that shelters, or denies, the idiotic child he was born as.”457 How 
many of us began careers only to lose zest and joy because, rather than nurturing a sense 
of childlike wonder or awe, we banished our inner child to the cellar?  
 My point: Desmond’s description of astonishment not only informs by describing 
it but, in returning us to its origin in the metaxu, it also invites us to recollect experiences 
of being “rocked back” or “struck.” This invitation requires a level of finesse, a certain 
patience, and a willingness to consider “the nuances of singular occasions.”458 But by 
ruminating on the “nuances of the singular,” metaxology can bring to light otherwise 
concealed or recessed depths. In fact, I believe we can get at two more concepts central to 
Desmond’s metaphysics –the “porosity of being” and the passio essendi – by looking at 
the following example drawn from the work of Hans Urs von Balthasar.   
Balthasar describes how, “the little child awakens to self-consciousness in his 
being-called by the love of his mother.”459Translated into metaxological terms: the advent 
of the mother is irruptive and invitatory; her loving smile and tender caress addresses the 
child, simultaneously enabling and inviting the child’s response. Balthasar continues: 
Since, however, the child in this process replies and responds to a directive that 
cannot in any way have come from within its own self – it would never occur to 
the child that it itself had produced the mother’s smile – the entire paradise of 
reality that unfolds around the “I” stands there as an incomprehensible miracle: it 
is not thanks to the gracious favor of the “I” that space and the world exist, but 
thanks to the gracious favor of the “Thou.” And if the “I” is permitted to walk 
upon the ground of reality and to cross the distance to reach the other, this is due 
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to an original favor bestowed on him, something for which, a priori, the “I” will 
never find the sufficient reason in himself.460  
 
Desmond would agree: mother and child have their own integrities and inter-mediate. 
The awakening of self-consciousness, or the beginning of mindfulness in astonishment, 
have a similar dynamic: the call of transcendence engenders self-transcendence. Still 
more: the call of the other, the in-breaking of the other’s address, capacitates the “I” by 
astonishing the “I” into movement. movement.  
So, what does metaxology add?  
 For starters, metaxology surfaces the means by which intermediation is possible: 
the porosity of being. Desmond describes the porosity of being as the “between space 
where there is no fixation of the difference of minding and things, where our mindfulness 
wakes to itself by being woken up by the communication of being in its emphatic 
otherness.”461 One must resist reifying this idea by thinking of discrete beings as having 
“pores” or “openings” permitting transit and mediation. Porosity is not something to be 
had because it is no thing at all. If the porosity of being, however,   
is not determinate objectivity neither is it indeterminate or self-determining 
subjectivity. There is fluidity and passing – a liquid matrix. The porosity is prior 
to univocal objectivity and it is prior to intentionality. In and through it we are 
given to be in a patience of being more primal than any cognitive or pragmatic 
endeavor to be.462  
 
Porosity is more akin to the enabling milieu or the dynamic and ongoing happening of 
intermediation. There is something intrinsically paradoxical about it: 
Strange wording: filled with openness. For such a porosity looks like nothing 
determinate and hence seems almost nothing, even entirely empty. We cannot 
avoid what looks like the paradoxical conjunction of fullness and emptiness: 
being filled with openness and yet being empty. This is what makes possible all 
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our determinate relations to determinate beings and process, whether these 
relations be knowing ones or unknowing.463 
 
To be human means being confronted with this paradox. Astonishment fills us with 
emptiness: we behold being filled wide-eyed wonder, but wonder is no thing. We 
undergo at once the fullness and lack and later, in reflecting upon what is lacking, we 
intimate fullness. Etymologically heir to Poros, porosity conveys the enriched poverty, 
intermingling lack-and-fullness, at the heart of desire.  
As a ceaseless happening, Desmond suggests meditating on porosity as a kind of 
“passing in passage.” An elusive concept, he connects this “passing in passage” with the 
act of creation which “arising in being and setting, coming to be and passing out of being, 
creation brings to be the porosity within whose intermedium all things live and move and 
have their being.464 Porosity is creation’s endowing endowment: it is given to be in the 
creative act and it gives creation to be a dynamic happening. So, far from an inert “block” 
or static creation, porosity endows creation with the character of an intermedium or 
vibrant field of intermediation. The metaxu, seen in this light, shimmers with movement. 
The community of transcendence (T1-T3) does not simply take place on the metaxu as 
though on a proscenium. The metaxu pulses with happening of the between, the potent 
fluidity “passing in passage” as it doubly intermediates the “passing in passage” amidst 
created beings (meta) as its overdeterminate excess points beyond creation toward its 
creator (meta). The “porosity of being” means there is, indeed a crack in everything…and 
everyone. We are, Desmond writes, “the porosity of being become mindful.”465  
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 Herein we find an otherwise recessed feature of anthropology brought to light by 
metaxological reflection. Porosity is not a transitory feature or a function of history. One 
way of reading A Secular Age would be as a narrative of how once we were porous but 
now we are buffered. Desmond wants to resist such readings because porosity is 
ontologically constitutive, not just historically relative, though it may be true that 
some epochs exhibit a feel for it, while others reconfigure the ethos of being, and 
human being, and the porosity is driven underground, say, or out of mind, say, or 
warped into forms not true to the promise of the original givenness.466  
 
The porosity of being is anterior to any effort to reconfigure the ethos. Indeed, every era 
is but a reconfiguration of primal ethos. This means, accordingly, 
We do not have to identify the primal ethos of being either with a more porous 
world or with a more buffered world, though a more porous world is closer to the 
threshold of a more original receiving of being, less cluttered by the construction 
we have made according to the desires of our own endeavor to be. That there is a 
reconfigured world means that the modern world we have so configured has a 
relative character: it may reveal some potencies of the given ethos but it also may 
hide or repress or cover over other potencies.467  
 
Every era, every “social imaginary” or reconfigured ethos, is relative to the primal ethos: 
each era shapes and forms it, but no reconfiguration exhausts it. Any given 
reconfiguration of the ethos may be more, or less, faithful to the “promise of the original 
givenness” but no reconfiguration will ever encapsulate or drain its endowment.  
 A recuperation of these repressed potencies has significant theological 
consequences. Responding to Taylor’s account of the buffered self, Desmond observes 
perhaps it is the case today that many people have difficulty praying because we 
have a diminished feel for this more original porosity of being. Of course, if it is 
true as Professor Taylor says that we have become buffered ourselves, this should 
not be at all surprising. In the process of buffering ourselves we have not more 
truly realized our promise, in fact, to the contrary, we have reconfigured ourselves 
in forgetfulness, if not in mutilation, of the communication of original porosity.468  
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For Desmond, the distinction is not that we were porous and are now buffered. This latter 
description would be untrue and betray our constitutive porosity: we may be clogged or 
reconfigured against porosity, but porosity cannot be annihilated or overcome. It needs to 
be purged and awakened through a renewed sense of astonishment.  
 To Balthasar’s account metaxology contributes an expanded and enriched horizon 
in which the address of being can be issued and answered. To be sure, there is something 
instinctively right about Balthasar’s observation: ideally it is the mother (or father) whose 
love awakens the child to itself. But as Kearney urges, we need always be on the lookout 
for micro-eschatologies, the epiphanies of the everyday. By recollecting experiences of 
astonishment, by meditating on the overdeterminate happening of being, we can become 
alert to how the “nuances of the singular” communicate something in excess of 
singularity. We can be stirred by the intimation of transcendence within us, passing in 
passage through us, weaving us into whole of the metaxu. 
 Also at play within Desmond’s treatment of the porosity of being is what he calls 
the passio essendi. The passio conveys the sense that before we grasp at being (conatus 
essendi) we have first to be given to be. It reminds us that “given being is mine, but that it 
is not given to me by myself.”469 For Desmond, the passio  
tells against every autism of being. In it is already an intimate mark of being in 
community. That communicability surges up in our passion of being means that it 
is already given as an active promise of being in relation to our very being at all. 
The doubleness of relativity (self-relation is never without other-relation) is 
expressed in the fact that we are conatus essendi as well as passio essendi. We are 
the endeavor to be as well as the patience of being.470  
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The interplay of the conatus and passio essendi are likewise central to Desmond’s 
thought, so let me give a sense of how a wide-eyed astonishment might take note of them.   
 For Desmond, the passio essendi refers to a patience or undergoing going of being 
and is the older twin of the conatus essendi. Emerging in the porosity of being, the passio  
refers to a certain ontological patience signaled by the fact that we are first 
recipients of being, of being received in being, before we flower as being active. 
There is an ontological receiving before there is an existential acting. As 
something ontological, this receiving is constitutive of our being but it is not self-
constituted. To call it passio is not to imply a mere dead thereness devoid of its 
own energetic life. Its own life is not first owned by it; it is given to be its own on 
the basis of a giving that is not its own.471 
 
Yet the receiving of the passio is no feeble receptivity. Better to think of it as an 
endowment seeding the self with freedom: one is given to be in order to become. Before 
one intermediates between beings (T2) or beholds being as other to oneself (T1), one must 
first be given to be. Only after “coming to be” can one assert oneself in freedom.   
 Students of philosophy, however, are surely more familiar with the passio’s 
younger twin, the conatus essendi, who figures prominently in Spinoza’s thought. The 
conatus communicates a sense of grasping at being and self-assertion. Its exemplars 
include Thrasymachus, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Spinoza, Hegel’s self-determining Geist, 
Kant’s autonomous subject, and Nietzsche’s Übermensch. Over the course of the modern 
era, “the intimacy of being, articulated as passio essendi and conatus essendi, mutates 
into the twins of subordination and dominion, submission and overcoming. The first is 
the passio made abject, the second the conatus made superject.”472 The recession of the 
passio and the gradual clogging of porosity leaves the conatus to seize the center stage.  
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By no means does Desmond want to deny the conatus. His intention, though, is to 
finesse our understanding of it and to re-balance it with its. Indeed, part of this finessing 
involves surfacing an ambiguity overlooked modern promoters of the conatus. Whereas 
thinkers such as Spinoza and Nietzsche interpret the conatus as self-assertive, Desmond 
calls attention to an etymological fact that co-natus, properly speaking, is not  
an endeavor to be but a being “born with.” Conatus refers us to a more original 
birth (natus) a being given to be which is always with or from another (co, cum). 
The pluralization is there but occluded in the ordinary way of thinking of self-
interests and the conatus. The endeavor to be is often the more noted aspect of our 
being because it defines us as a doing of ourselves. Especially in the West, we 
forget the fertile doubleness about the endeavor to be…More truly, the conatus 
refers us back to the patience of being, and indeed to a coming to be, a birthing.473  
 
We are both a conjoined “patience of being” and an “endeavor to be”; we incarnate both 
the passio and conatus. We assert ourselves because we have been given to be and this 
given being endows us with the porosity that permits self-transcendence. A reappraisal of 
the co-natus enjoins an even deeper mindfulness that beings are not monads: relationship 
is not epiphenomenal but constitutive of our having been called into existence. When it 
comes to our inherent rationality, Lady Gaga sings the anthem: we are “Born This Way.”  
 Sourced deep in the philosophical tradition, metaxology is rooted in experience of 
originary wonder or astonishment. Struck by the advent of transcendence, we are “rocked 
back on our heels.” Astonishment is a wide-eyed response: our eyes expand in order to 
take in the happening, but there is too much to apprehend all at once. Considered 
metaxologically, however, astonishment reveals more than just the bite of otherness 
catching us off guard. Mindful consideration draws attention to elements of the metaxu 
otherwise taken for granted: the porosity of being and the passio essendi. Porosity: the 
metaxu shimmers with the “passing in passage” of beings intermediating with one 
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another, yet as each era passes by and the primal ethos undergoes constant 
reconfiguration, “…nature is never spent; there lives the dearest freshness deep down 
things.” Passio essendi: being cannot be taken for granted but as granted and gratuitous. 
Being is, yet need not be. The rupture of astonishment that there is anything at all 
includes a moment of self-reflection I am, although I need not be. Try as we might, the 
gratuity of being exceeds our grasp, remaining always overdeterminate.  
 Desmond often refers to astonishment as “agapeic” because “it arises from a 
surplus or excess out of which an affirmative movement of mind as self-transcending 
emerges.”474 And, elicited by agape, one’s self-transcending response is not simply for 
purposes of a return to the self. I do not go out from myself toward the other to 
appropriate the other and through the other to return to myself. I go toward the 
other because the other is for itself and always irreducible to what it is for me.475   
 
There is a prodigal festiveness to agapeic astonishment; it possesses an unconstrained 
exuberance in need of being shared, poured out, and given away freely. The agapeic 
mind, “names a mode of thought thinking what is other to thought, in which there is a 
release of thinking from itself toward the other as other.”476 As we shall see as we 
consider the gradual furrowing of immanence’s brow, the way we mind the between has 
lost touch with its origin in agapeic astonishment. Other forms of mindfulness may 
wander far from their home of origin, but they cannot extirpate their lineage.  
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2.3.2 Perplexity’s Squint 
 As we have seen, a metaxological understanding of astonishment points to two 
openings. There is, first, an “inarticulate coming towards us of the intimacy of being.”477 
We undergo the opening rupture of being’s advent, the passio essendi opening us and 
awakens us to the porosity of being. Second, having been opened, self-transcendence 
records our efforts to exercise our freedom in search of greater determinacy. The 
awakening of the passio empowers the adventuring of the conatus as it asserts itself in 
freedom. The rupture of otherness, witnessed in astonishment, inaugurates the process of 
selving wherein the power of the passio giving us “to be” concretized through the self-
articulation of the conatus. The human being remains inescapably a human becoming as 
it negotiates its identity within the metaxu after having been given to be in the metaxu.  
 For Desmond, perplexity arises subsequent to astonishment and denominates a 
mode of mindfulness attuned to the outward striving and self-assertion. Perplexity arises 
subsequent to astonishment. As Simpson notes, “the intimate strangeness of being gives 
rise not only to astonishment but also to perplexity. In perplexity, the focus of 
mindfulness is drawn to the strangeness of being, while the intimacy of being becomes 
recessed, ambiguous, ambivalent.”478 Whereas astonishment luxuriates in being 
enveloped by being’s overdeterminacy, perplexity finds itself ill at ease. Instead of 
overdeterminacy and surplus, perplexity detects indeterminacy and negative equivocity. 
Perplexity, astonishment’s prodigal son, sets out to “make sense” of indeterminacy and 
puts the stick to the conatus as it strikes out to assert its freedom and autonomy.   
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In perplexity, the “eyes” narrow to size up what had bowled one over. Squinting 
eyes enframe and take the measure of what is other to the self. For Desmond,  
perplexity is not patience to the otherness of being in quite the same way as is the 
original astonishment. In its troubled mindfulness there works a vector of self-
transcendence that would go toward this otherness of being and, if possible, 
overcome its own perplexity. Perplexity is felt as a lack of definite cognition, 
driving out beyond itself to overcome that lack.479  
 
The perplexed mind is troubled by overdeterminacy. The exuberant “It is!” of 
astonishment gives way to “What is?” and impels perplexity forward in an act of inquiry. 
What was undergone and received in the event of astonishment elicits a counter-
movement, one aimed at “making sense” or “getting to the bottom” of what took place.  
 Perplexity is “erotic” insofar as it arises out a sense of indigence. Erotic perplexity 
is driven by a desire forgetful of the endowed poverty inherited from Poros. Desiring to 
overcome its felt lack, erotic perplexity’s seeking 
is qualified by the aim of alleviating perplexity’s own troubled mindfulness. In 
this regard, it is tempted to turn the self-transcending into a search that finally is 
for the sake of returning the self to its own epistemic peace or satisfaction with 
itself. Then I go toward the other out of my own lack, I tend to the other not 
primarily to attend to the other, but as perhaps requiting my own lack. I am 
tempted to possess the other to enable my own achieved self-possession. 480  
 
Erotic perplexity regards what is other to self in terms of instrumentality. Whereas 
agapeic astonishment’s self-transcendence moves in affirmation of otherness, erotic 
perplexity’s self-transcendence moves to utilize otherness to sate its own need.  
 Perplexity, though, need and must not sever all ties with astonishment. Consider 
the first chapter of Michael Buckley’s Denying and Disclosing God where he examines 
the increasingly fraught relationship between science and faith. Galileo accepted, as 
many today do not, a version of Augustine’s insight in De Genesi ad literam: “the 
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language of scripture is adapted to the preconceptions and understanding of the culture in 
which it was written. Its grammar does not bear upon the issues of astronomical 
inquiry.”481 Only when we confuse the grammar of the “Book of Nature” and the “Book 
of Scriptures” do we find them contradictory. But because of God’s authorship, both 
Revelation and Nature proclaim the Creator. For Augustine, faith and science were hardly 
antagonistic. What arose in response to the advent of the holy one (faith) did not forbid 
ordered inquiry into nature (science). A certain porosity allowed for an intermediation of 
the truth provided one distinguishes the grammar according to which each speaks.  
 By the end of the 17th century, however, the intermediation between faith and 
science became more difficult. The lives of Galileo (1564-1642), Kepler (1571-1630), 
and Newton (1642-1727) trace a series of scientific developments interpretable as a 
gradual “perplexed squinting” gradually delimiting scientific inquiry to an immanent 
field of study. Buckley describes the consequences of this shift as resulting in 
three distinct settlements negotiated between the new knowledge and the ancient 
faith: in Galileo, they are separate enterprises, neither contradicting the other and 
neither having a place within the other. Where certainty is found, the one will 
correct the other as is the case with any knowledge. In Kepler, they are finally a 
single enterprise, a deduction of what is likely and appropriate within the universe 
from the triune nature of God and the suggestion or the confirmation of that 
deduction from observation and mathematic. In Newton’s universal mechanics, 
science gives to religion crucially important evidence, its methodology, and its 
foundation in fundamental religion.482   
 
Each in his own way, these were thinkers variously hospitable to God. For Galileo, 
“religion and science differ in subject matter, purposes, appropriate methods, or 
procedures, and language. If these differences are maintained, each can contribute to the 
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general advance of human beings toward real knowledge.”483 Kepler, by contrast, took 
the doctrine of the Trinity as an a priori and sought to unify astronomy and theology. 
This alignment means scripture and geometry are equally theological languages: “the 
study of geometry, then, and all of those things whose truth is geometrical, is finally the 
study of God.”484 Newton turns Kepler on his head. Instead of arguing from an a priori 
belief in the Triune God, Newton frames “a science that was universal in its compass and 
which argued to the divine reality from the nature of the world.485 For Newton, then, the 
basis of creation was not the Creative God of whom all creation sings but, rather, a 
universal mechanics giving “a foundation to both mathematics and religious belief.”486 
 If we look at the movement from Augustine to Galileo, and from Galileo to 
Newton, I think we can get a sense of how perplexity has evolved. In Augustine, there is 
a sense of porosity between the human and creation. We saw this, earlier, in Book X of 
the Confessions and in his insight in De Genesi ad literam. In Augustine, we have a sense 
of the balance of the passio and conatus. By the time of Galileo, however, the balance 
has begun to tip. Instead of a fluid intermediation between religion and science, Galileo 
presages Stephen J. Gould’s NOMA (Non-Overlapping Magisteria) wherein faith and 
science have nothing to do with one another: live and let live, so to speak. A generation 
later, we find in Newton a thinker for whom the precision of the universe requires a God. 
His cosmos is a system, 
a unity composed of the sun, planets, and comets whose masses and motions are 
proportioned so carefully that they “could only proceed from the counsel and 
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dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being.” Mechanics, if it is to be faithful 
to its reduction of movement back to force, must go beyond mechanical causes.487  
 
By Newton, we have a cosmos stripped of metaphysical excess or overdeterminacy. The 
God countenanced by a perplexity bereft of astonishment is a deus ex machina invoked as 
necessary to push the start button on the universal mechanism. There seems no place in 
this system for the theophanic God who offers the divine name in Exodus 3:14 or the God 
revealed at Jesus’ baptism. Rather than disclose its name, Newton’s god it “from the 
mechanics that has furnished the warrant for his existence and attributes.”488  
 Newton is not alone in being possessed by a rage for order. Descartes, Hegel, and 
the early Wittgenstein are all erotic perplexity’s epigone as each seeks to bring a sense of 
determinacy to the whole. The point: in eras dominated by erotic perplexity, the 
chiaroscuro of exterior transcendence (T1) will be regarded as a sign of troubling 
equivocity in need of determination. Hence the “squint” of perplexity: one squints in 
order to narrow the range of vision, to bring the object of inquiry into greater relief. 
Wide-eyed astonishment cedes to the perplexed gaze which, having registered, It is! tries 
to overcome its own sense of ignorance by establishing more concretely what it is.  
 As a mode of metaphysical mindfulness, perplexity is itself a metaxu, between 
astonishment and curiosity. There is no “one-speed” perplexity, because it admits of a 
range. It can be wooed by l’esprit de finesse and remain in close contact with its roots, 
preserving a balance between the conatus and the passio. It can be seduced by l’esprit de 
geometrie to wander far from its origin in astonishment as it strives to “get the measure” 
of what it beholds. Newton, to my mind, seems the incarnation of perplexity: harnessing 
the power of the conatus, he works out a mechanics of the cosmos at least prima facie 
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hospitable to the divine. Heidegger’s critique of ontotheology’s god lands: this is hardly a 
god before whom one sings, or dances, or offers prayers. Could it be otherwise? Only 
thinly connected to its origin in astonishment, Newton’s “God was not encountered as a 
presence; God was inferred as a conclusion from what one did encounter.”489 
 
2.3.3  Curiosity’s Furrowed Brow 
 Desmond’s third form of mindfulness is curiosity. When perplexity strays too far 
from astonishment, it mutates and becomes increasingly hostile toward being. For the 
curious mind the overdeterminacy of astonishment 
can be too easily forgotten, just as also the troubled indeterminacy of perplexity 
can be dulled. If to be is to be determinate, here to be is nothing if it is not 
determinate. Being is nothing but determinacy and to be exhausted in the totality 
of all determinations. The danger: hostility to ontological astonishment is twinned 
with the annihilation of the wonder of being itself.490  
  
Curiosity abhors vagueness and imprecision; for the curious mind “being is a mere 
strangeness to be domesticated; beings are mere strangers over against us to be fixed and 
conquered – strangers to be made, by us, no longer strange.”491  The play of equivocity 
cannot be countenanced and must be brought to heel: to be is to be determinate, and all 
will be determined. If astonishment was rocked back by overdeterminacy, and perplexity 
sought to get the measure of a seemingly indeterminate happing, the task curiosity sets 
itself is to give the measure as it tries to solve the “problem” of being.  
 Desmond regards curiosity as astonishment’s “ungrateful child.” It is modernity’s 
l’enfant terrible at whose impatient insistence the ethos has been reconfigured  
out of distrust of equivocity, expressed in the univocalizing mentality of dualistic 
opposition that produces a devaluing objectification of being on one side and a 
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subjectification of value on the other side. Both sides deprive value of ontological 
ground, and this devaluation, in turn, forces the subject to step into the emptiness 
where it manifests itself in a reactive activism, itself expressing a will to power 
that will to ground itself, or that claims to be self-generating, or indeed that in 
final exasperation dismisses all grounding and proudly stands there as groundless 
will to power that will brook no resistance from any other, that will make no 
apology for itself, but simply will insist that its way will be the way and the truth, 
and that it will get its way.492  
 
Petulant curiosity turns its back on the festivity of astonishment (It is!) and the 
wanderlust of perplexity (What is?) to state soberly: What is it? as it trains its gaze at the 
“determinate being there of beings.”493 
 If Newton proved an exemplar of a hypertrophied perplexity, let me offer Denis 
Diderot (1713-84) and Baron D’Holbach (1723-89) as exemplars of how the narrow eyes 
of perplexity become the furrowed brow of curiosity. At their hands, Newton’s universal 
mechanics undergoes a drastic modification. From Newton, Buckley writes,  
Diderot and d’Holbach accepted the universality of mechanics, that the 
mechanical method could deal with all of reality from mathematics to theology; 
what they rejected of Newton was his claim that the mechanical study of natural 
phenomena necessarily leads to a non-mechanical principle, to a transcendence 
source above nature, i.e., to God. From Descartes, Diderot and d’Holbach refused 
his metaphysics or first philosophy as nonsense – as Newton had before them; but 
from Descartes, they accepted the autonomy of mechanics, i.e., that all physical 
reality was mechanical and must be explained through mechanical principles.494  
 
For Diderot and d’Holbach, there is no need to invoke the divine in order to make sense 
of the universe or its operations. The universe is a self-contained whole, closed in upon 
itself. By enacting a synthesis between “universal mechanics (à  la Newton) with only 
mechanical principles (à la Descartes)” and revolutionizing “natural philosophy by 
making matter no longer inert, but dynamic,” Newton’s deus ex machina becomes a deus 
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otiosus, “not so much denied as unattended to, detached and uninvolved, not influential in 
the world and of human beings, and finally yielding to oblivion.”495 
 One of the key factors contributing to the rise of modern atheism was actually the 
inaction of theologians who bracketed out appeals to religious experience. Enamored of 
the explanatory power of scientific inquiry, they appealed less and less to the specifically 
theological sources that gave life to faith: out goes appeals to prayer, liturgy, mystics, 
saints, and scripture. Buckley observes, “to bracket the specifically religious in order to 
defend the God of religion was to assert implicitly the cognitive emptiness of the very 
reality one was attempting to support.”496 Theologians hitched themselves to the system 
of universal mechanics, convinced this would provide the sure and steady foundation to 
ensure the stability of their system. Yet thinkers such as Diderot and d’Hollbach aw what 
Wittgenstein expressed: “a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is 
not part of the mechanism.”497 Curiosity, with its brow furrowed, brushes off appeals to 
God as “wooly” and unnecessary: if it cannot be measured, it cannot matter. Little 
wonder the metaphysical question Why anything at all? is written off as absurd.  
 In no way is this to be taken as a wholesale rejection of curiosity: in its insistent 
focus on determinate beings, curiosity is true to being. As we considered, we have a need 
for univocal precision. Curiosity betrays the truth of being, however, when it insists 
univocity is the truth, whole truth, and nothing but the truth. While Desmond wants to 
preserve the healthy impulse of curiosity, he resists scientistic reductionism and its 
attempt to conflate curiosity with the extent of “being and knowing.” For 
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scientism the outlook takes hold that the univocalizing approach is the one and 
only approach. This is a contradiction of the plurivocity promised in the other 
modalities of wonder. Determinate curiosity has its place within the embrace of 
the more original sense of wonder, and while it occludes it, it cannot itself even 
function, much less prosper, if it does not dip back again and again into the primal 
modality of the originating astonishment.498  
 
Recalling Taylor, there appears a homology between the “buffered self” and curiosity. 
Both have lost a taste for the transcendent, both affect a pose of disengaged inquiry and 
self-directed autonomy. They exhibit what Desmond calls an “allergy to transcendence” 
(T3) because their understanding of “self-transcendence has been yoked to a model of 
autonomous self-determination: the self is the law of itself.”499 
 Both curiosity and Taylor’s “buffered self” need to be led back to the wellspring 
of astonishment. We may have reconfigured ourselves to be buffered, but “buffering” 
cannot be, per Desmond’s anthropology, an irreversible fait accompli. Not only are we 
constitutively porous, we are porosity made mindful of itself. This porosity permits an 
intermediation between stages of mindfulness. The metaxu admits of other 
reconfigurations, and we may contribute to future reconfigurations by our efforts to re-
awaken our age to a sense of astonishment. Human mindfulness is not fated or 
condemned to sojourn in the metaxu bereft of wonder. The furrowed brow of curiosity, 
too, may be struck by something in excess of determinacy – despite its best efforts – and 
find itself renewed. Considered ontologically, the map of our age accounts for how 
curiosity became the dominant mode of mindfulness. Read in a metaxological light, 
however, one can perceive itineraries conveying us along return routes leading us to a 
rekindling of astonishment. This is because we move 
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from ontological astonishment before being toward ontic regard concerning 
beings, their properties, patterns of developments, determinate formations, and so 
on. It is essential to the becoming of our mindfulness that we move into curiosity. 
The overdeterminate is saturated with determinations, not an indefiniteness empty 
of determinacy. The question “What is it?” turns toward the given intricacy of 
this, that, and the other thing, and there can be something even reverent in this 
turning, for it too shares in our porosity to the astonishing givenness.500  
 
Ungrateful curiosity may furrow its brow and lock itself away to obsess on “this, that, 
and the other thing” but even at its most anti-social, curiosity cannot rid itself of its origin 
in wonder and awe. Even in its tunnel-like fixation on determinacy, it may turn a deaf ear 
to the woo of astonishment, but it is not wholly deaf. It may not initially recognize itself 
in the web of the metaxu but it is not impossible that, given the right twitch upon the 
thread, for curiosity to be rocked back once more to marvel with wide-eye: It is! 
 Desmond’s approach to metaphysics capacitates us with an approach to reflection 
remarkable in its scope and its ability to offer a finessed account of what it means to live 
in the metaxu. Rather than telling us about it, he tries to develop our ear for the 
plurivocity of being and our eyes to recognize the crack in all beings. He shows, too, how 
our mindfulness of being undergoes shifts depending on our proximity to astonishment 
that inaugurates metaxological mindfulness. The spectrum of mindfulness becomes the 
speculum in which we are given to recognize ourselves. The renewal of wonder we need, 
however, is not a once-and-for all occasion but an ongoing commitment: 
So long as life continues, one has to say yes to wonder. This is not a matter of 
reviving our capacity for wonder. In a way, we do not have a capacity for wonder; 
rather we are capacitated by wonder – and capacitated through it to wise 
mindfulness. Since this capacitation is not determined through ourselves alone, 
we alone cannot revive it. Wondering is not a power over which we exercise self-
determination; it witnesses to a given porosity of being that endows us with the 
promise of mindfulness. If there is to be a revival of the capacity, it is in coming 
home again to this porosity – and its capacitating of our powers.501      
                                               
500 Desmond, The Intimate Strangeness of Being, 283.  
501 Desmond, The Intimate Universal, 262-63.  
 167 
We may not be able to “exercise self-determination” when it comes to astonishment, but I 
believe we can embark upon a series of exercises that can sensitize us to the advent of 
astonishment. Indeed, we began this process some time ago when we began to learn the 
grammar and explore the nature of metaxological metaphysics. Metaxology’s paradox: 
we are capacitated by knowing our incapacitation. This is a lesson learned over and 
again: metaphysics is capacitated by the advent of transcendence; our grasping at being 
(conatus) is capacitated by our being given to be (passio); our being-in-relation to being 
is capacitated within the community of transcendence in which we live and move and 
have our being; our incapacity to reduce being’s flux actually capacitates us to perceive 
the irreducible porosity of being, the “crack in everything,” ourselves included. Our 
incapacity to sate our restless capacitates us to embark on the adventure of selving as we 
journey forward toward the promise of wholeness for which we most desperately long. 
Recognizing our incapacity to control the Transcendent capacitates us to develop a form 
of patient mindfulness, attuned to the goodness and gratuity of creation, as we await in 
hope for any signs or hints of the advent of the One who sings us into being.  
 
2.4 Conclusion: Discovering the “Crack” in Everything 
 
 In Philosophy and Its Others, Desmond speaks “of the naming act of 
philosophical mindfulness as thought singing its other; for in singing we meet an 
outpouring of articulation of enigmatic affirmative power, even when the song airs the 
grief of suffering being.”502 In keeping with this theme of thought as singing, I want to 
conclude this chapter with three brief considerations.  
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 First task: allow me to offer another word about the relationship between Taylor 
and Desmond. At the end of the last chapter, I expressed my belief that Desmond 
preserves and advances Taylor’s project. In this chapter, I suggested a way of reading 
Desmond’s understanding of the metaxu as a metaphysical supplement to Taylor’s 
ontological “social imaginary.” A metaphysical supplement, attentive not only to how 
beings are but why they are, may help to allay Janz’s concern over Taylor’s reticence 
about offering a demonstrative proof for the Transcendent. Desmond, we shall see soon 
enough, offers a series of indirect “ways to God.” In this way, we might think of 
Desmond as Taylor’s consigliere who assures Janz, “Yes, yes, there is a there there. His 
map is trustworthy.”  
 As well as providing indirect ways to God, Desmond’s philosophy tutors us in 
what Taylor calls a “subtler language.”503 This is needful because our modern language:  
1. Has lost, and needs to have restored to it, its constitutive power. 
2. The loss of this power means we deal instrumentally with the realities 
which surround us; their deeper meaning, the background in which they 
exist, the higher reality which finds expression in them, remain ignored. 
3. Our language has lost power to Name things in their embedding in this 
deeper/higher reality. 
4. This incapacity of language is a crucial facet of an incapacity of being, 
that our lives are reduced, flattened. 504 
 
Metaxology, in its attentiveness to the plurivocity of being, attunes us to otherwise 
obscured depths. The language of metaxology works to inform and form the reader. Cyril 
O’Regan rightly identifies metaxology as moving beyond the level of flattened discourse 
when he describes how metaxology is doubly poetic 
first in the discursive sense that philosophy is a raid on the inarticulate that enlists 
in its articulation any and all available forms of discourse (e.g. symbol, myth, 
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comedy, tragedy), and second in that the making (also unmaking) of selves and 
community has dramatic pattern with both comic and tragic elements.505  
 
Desmond’s texts, as O’Regan observes elsewhere, “perform nothing less than a 
fundamental reopening of a philosophical discourse, which, from its first appearance in 
the Occidental tradition, intends the origin as the really real.”506 Metaxology can draw the 
reader into a form of metaphysical meditation able to allow a revelation or a disclosure of 
what otherwise easily remains concealed. We need many words, multiple metaphors and 
symbols, in order to awaken us to being’s depths. Metaxology attempts to finesse the 
curious mind, the instrumental mind, by wooing it back to the sources of astonishment.  
 Confronted by the Mystery of God the curious mind, or Taylor’s buffered self, 
recoils and throws its hands up in exasperation. God, actual infinitude, or Transcendence 
itself: the divine resists enclosure and capture in “the system.” Hopkins saw this: 
 We guess; we clothe Thee, unseen King, 
 With attributes we deem are meet; 
 Each in his own imagining 
 Sets up a shadow in thy seat.507   
 
Desmond offers us a metaphysically rich yet ever-humble form of speech cognizant of its 
own limitations. Metaxology is wounded speech, bearing within it the rupture of 
transcendence. But we are capacitated by this wound, not only to speak a metaphysically 
subtle language but also, and more importantly, to watch vigilantly for any sign or 
disclosure of Transcendence’s advent. In enjoining us to a patient watchfulness, 
metaxology becomes for us a way of living something akin to a philosophical prayer.  
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 Second task: let me return to Emerson for whom the presence of “a crack in 
everything God has made”508 points to an intrinsic vulnerability or fatal flaw afflicting 
beings. His quote invokes two flawed heroes, but the truth of his observation is 
universally applicable. Hero or villain, saint or scoundrel, every being bears a crack.  
The crack, though, need not be an occasion for sorrow. We bear upon us, within 
us, an open wound resistant to closure. Interpreted metaxologically, the crack is an 
opened opening, a rupture of the self by transcendence which opens us to transcendence. 
We bear this wound as a mark of our eccentricity, as it comes from outside ourselves, and 
this wound renders us beings of ecstasy capable of reaching beyond ourselves to the one 
who awakened us. In the metaxu, the crack in all finite beings is simultaneously a sign of 
fragility and utter gratuity. We turn inward, to our abyssal depths where, in awe-struck 
astonishment or the intentional solitude of prayer, we encounter an abiding otherness 
marking one’s intimacy to self. There is also the communication of the incognito 
God in the deepest ontological porosity of one’s soul, so deep that it seems like 
nothing, since too the porosity is itself no thing – the open between space in 
which communication of the power to be is given and different selvings take 
determinate form. One is never alone, even when one is alone.509  
 
On account of the crack in everything, ourselves included, we can awaken to the intimate 
universal: and interior presence weaving us into community with the whole of being.    
 The crack in everything gives the metaxu it iridescent shimmer as beings mediate 
themselves and intermediate with one another. Indeed, it possibilizes metaxology, for it 
“dwells with the interplay of sameness and difference, identity and otherness, not by 
mediating a more inclusive whole but by recurrence to the rich ambiguities of the middle, 
and with due respect for forms of otherness that are dubiously included in the immanence 
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of the dialectical whole.”510 The porosity of being is ontologically constitutive, the 
“condition of our being opened (intimately) and to our being open (potentially universal) 
to what is other and beyond us.”511 Rather than being incapacitated, we are capacitated to 
read the metaxu as a sign of immanent transcendence, the abiding presence and daily 
disclosures of the Transcendent who gives being to be and sustains creation in existence.  
 Third task: philosophy as singing its other. There is an expression regularly heard 
through the pubs of Desmond’s native Ireland: How’s the crack? In a pub, the “crack” is 
not a thing, but it is also not nothing. The crack is the milieu, the happening, the 
intermediation of beings, the “passing in passage” between the bar and the musicians 
playing in the corner and the laughter and stories shared at tables. A night of good crack: 
family from overseas are in town and the whole family turns out for a few pints. A fiddle 
player taps her bow and the seisiun lifts off with a set of fiery reels. An elderly couple, 
whose dancing days should be long behind them, forget themselves and dance a two-
hand. A poem is recited, a song is sung, an aire is played: the gathering goes quiet. A joke 
told brings peals of laughter. A marriage proposal. A first kiss. New love. No one 
element makes the night, no one instrument accounts for all the music, but in the “passing 
in passage” they interweave and contribute to the happening of the night. Good crack.    
Good crack must not be taken for granted but only ever as granted, an unexpected 
and welcome happening, never duplicable and always unique. It cannot be planned and 
must emerge of its own accord, unfolding organically and drawing participants into itself. 
It is not the achievement of the conatus as an endeavor, but the co-natus as a “being born 
with” each other in the moment. It is an undergoing, a suffering of something beyond the 
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group, something that galvanizes the evening and leaves all in attendance wanting more. 
One becomes attuned to the crack and develops a knack for “sniffing it out.”  
Desmond offers us a metaphysics of the crack. As a happening, we only come to 
recognize “the crack” in the midst of it, awaking it its excess media res. By the time we 
are asked, “How’s the crack” it already englobes us. To respond, “ah, it’s good crack” 
says almost nothing, but how say more? Any respond will stammer because no word can 
say it all. To describe the crack risks betraying it. Sometimes we have to find other ways 
of speaking – art or poetry or song – to convey the too-muchness. 
Desmond gives us the subtler language, a form of poetic attunement, needed to 
speak faithfully of the metaxu’s happening. Rather than imposing an interpretation or 
trying to capture the between, he leads us into it with a renewed mindfulness of its 
richness and ambiguities. Desmond gives us a way of wording the between, of standing 
within the metaxu in a way open and hospitable to undergoing it. Though Wordsworth’s 
entire poem sings of this, let me quote the last two stanzas of “The Tables Turned” 
Sweet is the lore which Nature brings; Enough of Science and of Art; 
Our meddling intellect   Close up those barren leaves; 
Mis-shapes the beauteous forms of things:  Come forth, and bring with you a 
 We murder to dissect.    heart 
    That watches and receives.512   
 
We, too, must arise and “quit” our books and venture, adventure, forth to immerse 
ourselves in the metaxu. We must stay the knife of murderous concepts and wait, 
patiently, in a stance of watchful receptivity. Like the happening of an Irish seisiun, we 
are not called to close our ears to what unfolds before us. We are bid to enter, to 
experience, and undergo what it means to be in the between.   
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 I am convinced that Desmond’s theological achievement is found in his ability to 
give us a way of recognizing and interpreting the metaphysical “crack” in everything. 
And by “give us a way” I mean that he capacitates us for wonder because he does more 
than inform us about astonishment. His texts cannot just be read or gone over; they must 
be undergone. To make my case, I turn in the next chapter to consider “The Poetics of the 
Between” to give an account for how Desmond’s philosophy works as a form of 
“spiritual exercise.” As we walk more intensively with Desmond, we will invite French 
philosopher Pierre Hadot to join us as we consider how regarding metaxology as a 
practice of a way of life has precedent in the history of Western thought.  
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Chapter 3 
 
The Poetics of the Between: 
Metaxological Metaphysics as Spiritual Exercise 
 
 
What is needed is a conversion to an attitude in which existing is more than taking, acting 
more than making, meaning more than function – an attitude in which there is enough 
leisure for wonder and enough detachment for transcendence. What is needed most of all 
is an attitude in which transcendence can be recognized again. 
-Louis Dupré, Transcendent Selfhood 
 
 
 In its infinitival form, “to exercise” can be taken in two ways. In some contexts, it 
means “to vex” or “to exasperate” while elsewhere it can mean “to engage” or “to 
practice.” In chapters one and two, we explored why Charles Taylor and William 
Desmond regard the question of transcendence as “exercising” in the first sense. Taylor’s 
immanent frame and Desmond’s reconfigured ethos both try to account for what many 
experience as the “eclipse of the transcendent.” In chapter one, I considered how A 
Secular Age offered a persuasive historical narrative of this eclipse. Taylor’s map, I 
argued, “works” to implicate the reader: Taylor does not simply tell us a story but tells us 
our story. By weaving us into the map, his text performs by inducing a sense of the cross-
pressures experienced by those dwelling within the immanent frame. I concluded the 
chapter by surfacing Paul Janz’s critique of Taylor and suggested we take a trip to Cork 
where, in Desmond’s philosophy, we might find a needed supplement to Taylor’s map.  
 In chapter two, I introduced Desmond’s systematic metaphysics as a resource for 
reflecting on what it means to be “in the between.” Metaxological philosophy, like 
Taylor’s map, also implicates its reader and works to re-orient the way one perceives the 
ongoing happening of the metaxu. We probed Desmond’s systematic philosophy  
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in the sense of a disciplined understanding of enabling connections; connections 
stabilized but not frozen by sameness; connections defined and developed by 
dynamic difference; connections not enclosed in one immanent whole; and all in 
all, connections enabling complex interplays between sameness and difference, 
interplays exceeding the closure of every whole on itself.513  
 
Yet metaxology is hardly the architectonic “system” rejected by many of metaphysics’ 
critics, for it neither dragoons God into its service (ontotheology) nor claims an exclusive 
possession of “The Truth.” It remains true to its humble origins, arising as a response to 
having been provoked by astonishment. Desmond’s is a finessed approach to 
metaphysics, attentive to the plurivocity of being and committed to keeping the voices in 
play within an open, rather than closed, whole. Although he does not tell the story of 
modernity as Taylor does, we saw areas of overlap and I gestured to ways in which 
metaxology complements and develops Taylor’s map.  
This chapter argues for reading metaxology as a form of “spiritual exercise” and 
does so by considering the poetic dimension of Desmond’s thought. Like “exercise,” the 
word “poetic” bears a double meaning. First, he distinguishes poetics from systematics: 
Poetics deals with creative overdetermination; systematics with created 
determinations and self-determinations. Poetics reveals the more original coming 
to be, or showing; systematics articulates forms of interconnection that issue from 
the more original forming. Poetics concerns the forming power(s), prior to and in 
excess of determinate form, for it is intimate with the overdetermination of the 
original source(s).514  
 
Echoes of passio essendi and the porosity of being resound: being must be given to be 
before it can be reflected upon. Systematics reflects upon what Desmond calls 
“becoming” wherein “one becomes a determinate something, out of a prior condition of 
determinate being and towards a further more realized or differently realized 
                                               
513 William Desmond, God and the Between (Malden: Blackwell, 2008), 10.  
514 Desmond, “Between System and Poetics: On the Practices of Philosophy,” 21.  
 176 
determination of one’s being.”515 Metaxological poetics do more than point or designate; 
they are revelatory, permitting us to peer beneath the surface of “becoming” to consider 
the dynamic process of “coming to be.” As Desmond observes, “becoming itself suggests 
something more primordial about coming to be. Creation is connected with this more 
primordial coming to be – a coming to be that makes finite becoming itself possible but 
that is not itself a finite becoming.”516 Singing within the reconfigured metaxu or the 
immanent frame, Peggy Lee croons “Is that all there is?” and Desmond responds once 
more with a lilting No. Every finite being points back toward and serves as a sign of a 
more originative power giving being to be at all.  
There is also a second sense of poetics at work. For Desmond, poetic language is 
not just a rhetorical  
embellishment that otherwise puts drapery over the sturdy drab furniture of 
thinking. It has more to do with enactment: the words are not just a matter of “talk 
about” a something, but are uttered or written somehow to bring to pass a 
happening, to enact it mindfully. Performance is a (per)forming, a coming to be of 
significant form, through (per) a passing from silence to speaking. The saying is 
as important as the said; and sometimes the saying says more than the said.517  
 
“Poetic” in this case expresses how a text’s language can enacts a performance. Rather 
than laying out a grand system, Hadot might observe that Desmond’s goal is “to put the 
minds of his readers or listeners to work, placing them in a specific disposition.”518 
Poetics here indicates how rhetoric not only describes but also implicates the reader 
within the happening of the metaxu. At times, his texts roil and vibrate as metaphor, 
allusion, symbol, and hyperbole collide. This is hardly a result of careless writing: 
                                               
515 Desmond, God and the Between, 248.  
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517 Ibid., 26. Italics original.  
518 Pierre Hadot, The Present Alone is Our Happiness, trans. Marc Djaballah and Michael Chase  
(Stanford: Stanford, 2011), 59.  
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metaxological poetics enacts a discursive performance aimed at arousing a sense of the 
metaxu’s dynamism. Desmond’s texts, I believe, cannot simply be “gone over” and 
mined for analytic arguments or syllogism. To be appreciated, they must instead be 
“undergone” as a form of spiritual exercise. Metaxology is not just a way of thinking; it 
is, instead, a way of perceiving in an entirely new way. In terms of the last chapter, we 
can be attuned to detect the presence of the “crack in everything” and to discern how the 
“crack” serves as a sign, pointing beyond the immanent realm toward the creative origin 
of being itself.  
Approaching metaxological metaphysics as a form of spiritual exercise, I believe, 
can aide the willing reader in cultivating attitude in which, as Louis Dupré notes above, 
transcendence can be recognized again. My argument unfolds in three parts. I begin with 
Pierre Hadot for whom philosophy is “a concrete act, which change[s] our perception of 
the world, and our life: not the construction of a system. It is a life, not a discourse.”519 
By exploring Hadot’s understanding of spiritual exercise, we gain insight into (1) how 
they cultivate philosophy as a way of life and (2) how metaxology might be interpreted 
similarly. In Part II, I test my wager by interpreting Desmond’s “Return to Zero” as an 
exercise in “Learning how to Die.” By pushing nihilism to its limits, this exercise induces 
not despair but “a different nihilism: a nihilating of despair in despair.”520 Guided by 
Desmond, one enters the darkness of nihilism in order to be reborn into a state of 
“posthumous mindfulness” renewed in its sense of the elemental goodness of being. In 
Part III, I consider how posthumous mindfulness attunes us to the poetics of the between, 
what Desmond calls the “hyperboles of being,” as pointing beyond the immanent order 
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520 Desmond, God and the Between, 31.  
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(T1-T2) to the Transcendent (T3). By way of these hyperboles, in Chapter IV, I shall 
consider how metaxology offers four “itineraries to the sacred” fitting for those who 
desire to encounter the Transcendent again in our secular age.  
 
3.1 Pierre Hadot: Philosophy as a Way of Life 
 Mention of “spiritual exercise,” at least in the company of those familiar with 
Christian spirituality, will likely evoke Ignatius of Loyola’s Spiritual Exercises. By 
spiritual exercises, Ignatius meant every method 
of examination of conscience, meditation, contemplation, vocal or mental prayer, 
and other spiritual activities, such as will be mentioned later. For just as taking a 
walk, traveling on foot, and running are physical exercises, so is the name of 
spiritual exercises given to any means of preparing and disposing our soul to rid 
itself of all its disordered affections and then, after their removal, of seeking and 
finding God’s will in the ordering of our life for the salvation of our soul.521    
 
His Exercises unfolds over the course of four “Weeks” as the retreatant undertakes a 
process of discerning God’s will. The goal of the 30-day retreat is not to tell the retreatant 
where to go or what to do; what is intended, rather, is a conversion of heart enacted by 
God’s grace. Instead of accruing gobbets of facts or information, the Exercises facilitate 
an encounter whereby the retreatant may grow affectively in an “interior knowledge of 
the Lord, who became human for me” in order that he or she may come to “love him 
more intensely and follow him more closely.”522 Ignatius’s Exercises are not meant 
primarily to be read or studied but received and lived out in a life of discipleship.523 
 Though rightly regarded as an innovation in Christian Spirituality, Ignatius’s 
Exercises are not without precedent. Paul Rabbow’s Seelenführung convincingly 
                                               
521 Ignatius of Loyola, Spiritual Exercises, ed. George Ganss (New York: Paulist, 1991), 121. 
522 Ibid., 148.  
523 The Spiritual Exercises are not a do-it-yourself program. Undertaken as Ignatius envisioned, they are  
part of a living tradition as the Exercises are “handed over” from the director to the retreatant.  
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demonstrates how Stoic and Epicurean contained “spiritual exercises of the same kind as 
we find in Ignatius of Loyola.”524 The Stoics, Hadot continues, 
declared that philosophy, for them, was an “exercise.” In their view, philosophy 
did not consist in teaching an abstract theory – much less in the exegesis of texts – 
but rather in the art of living. It is a concrete attitude and determinate lifestyle, 
which engages the whole of existence. The philosophical act is not situated 
merely on the cognitive level, but on that of the self and of being. It is a progress 
which causes us to be more fully, and makes us better.525  
 
Unlike today, where philosophy would typically be approached as an abstract or 
theoretical discipline, ancient philosophy was the practice of the whole person. This 
insight is a signal contribution of Hadot’s scholarship: philosophy was not just a way of 
thinking but contributed to one’s very way of being; it was, “above all, a way of life.”526    
 Hadot defines spiritual exercises as “voluntary, personal practices intended to 
bring about a transformation of the individual, a transformation of the self.”527 
Approached in this light, we may read Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations and catch sight of 
the practice of spiritual exercises – captured live, so to speak. There have been a 
great many preachers, theoreticians, spiritual directors, and censors in the history 
of world literature. Yet it is extremely rare to have the chance to see someone in 
the process of training himself to be a human being.528  
 
As Maria Antonaccio observes, “this idea of self-training is at the heart of Hadot’s thesis 
that ancient philosophy was not primarily an abstract mode of discourse, but rather a 
form of askesis, a practice of shaping oneself to an ideal of wisdom.”529 Aurelius offers a 
guide to the practice of daily life. His wisdom can be appropriated even by those who 
wish to hit the snooze button as they try to avoid the day: “When you have trouble getting 
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up in the morning, let this thought be in your mind: I’m waking up in order to do a man’s 
work.”530 Nearly two millennia after the death of this Roman emperor, readers still turn to 
the Meditations both out of historical interest and in them we “catch a person in the 
process of doing what we are all trying to do: to give a meaning to our life, to strive to 
live in a state of perfect awareness and to give each life’s instants its full value.”531  
 To provide a sense of how philosophy can be a way of life, Hadot distinguishes 
“between discourse about philosophy and philosophy itself.”532 Philosophical discourse 
was divided into three parts: logic, ethics, and physics. By this he means that when 
it comes to teaching philosophy, it is necessary to set forth a theory of logic, a 
theory of physics, and a theory of ethics. The exigencies of discourse, both logical 
and pedagogical, require that these distinctions be made. But philosophy itself – 
that is, the philosophical way of life – is no longer a theory divided into parts, but 
a unitary act, which consists in living logic, physics, and ethics.533   
 
Stoic philosophy, for instance, required putting theory into practice. Thus Epictetus: “A 
carpenter does not come up to you and say, ‘Listen to me discourse about the art of 
carpentry,’ but he makes a contract for a house and builds it…do the same thing 
yourself.”534 Philosophical discourse and philosophical life are incommensurable yet 
inseparable; presaging Kant, the ancients understood well: philosophical discourse 
without practice is empty, philosophical practice without theory is blind.535 
 How does one move from discourse about philosophy to the actual practice of 
philosophy itself? How does one learn to live the philosophical life? Unfortunately, 
“although many texts allude to them, there is no systematic treatise which exhaustively 
                                               
530 Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 201. 
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532 Ibid., 266.  
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535 Kant: “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind,” CPR A51/B76. 
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codifies the theory and technique of philosophical exercises (askesis).”536 Still, we do 
have clues. In On Exercises Musonius Rufus “affirms that people who undertake to 
philosophize need to exercise.”537 This, Hadot continues, indicates how the notion 
of philosophical exercises has its roots in the ideal of athleticism and in the 
habitual practice of physical culture typical of gymnasia. Just as the athlete gave 
new strength and form to his body by means of repeated bodily exercises, so the 
philosopher developed his strength of soul by means of philosophical exercises, 
and transformed himself.538     
 
In addition, we have two lists of spiritual exercises courtesy of Philo of Alexandria: 
One of these lists enumerates the following elements: research (zetesis), thorough 
investigation (skepsis), reading (anagnosis), listening (akroasis), attention 
(prosoche), self-mastery (enkrateia), and indifference to indifferent things. The 
other names successively: reading, meditations (meletai), therapies of the 
passions, remembrance of good things, self-mastery (enkrateia), and the 
accomplishment of duties.539  
 
The range of activities indicate just how “these exercises in fact correspond to a 
transformation of our vision of the world, and a transformation of our personality.”540 
One does not undertake a process of spiritual exercise merely in order to think differently; 
one does so, rather, in order to be-in-the-world in a transformed mode.  
 A full treatment of ancient spiritual exercises is beyond my project’s scope and 
my competence. My more limited task: to explore how philosophy can function as a 
spiritual exercise capable of transforming our perception of reality. Following Hadot, I 
examine philosophy as an exercise in (1) learning to live, (2) learning to die, and (3) 
learning to read. In each, I to understand, first, how philosophy can be undertaken as a 
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way of life and, second, how contributes to reading metaxology as a form of spiritual 
exercise capable of transforming the way we live in and perceive the world.  
 
3.1.1 Learning to Live 
  
For Hadot, “the passage from discourse to life is a tightrope walk that is hard to 
make up one’s mind to try.”541 This seems an odd claim, especially if the goal of ancient 
philosophy was to transform one’s life by raising “the individual from an inauthentic 
condition of life, darkened by unconsciousness and harassed by worry, to an authentic 
state of life, in which he attains self-consciousness, an exact vision of the world, inner 
peace, and freedom.”542 Who would not want to live authentically? As we shall see, 
putting philosophy into practice requires much more than reading about philosophy. 
Indeed, it requires an investment of self as one undertakes a sustained and deliberate 
effort to recognize and retrain one’s passions. The tightrope image is apt for it, like the 
Jamesian open space, draws one out into a position of vulnerability. One hovers above 
the abyss and must find and preserve one’s balance in order to cross over safely.   
A key obstacle to attaining the balance necessary to cross this tightrope can be 
summed up in a word: passions. For the ancients, the “principal cause of suffering, 
disorder, and unconsciousness were the passions: that is, unregulated desires and 
exaggerated fears.”543 Each philosophical school regarded philosophy as “therapeutic of 
the passions” capable of transforming an “individual’s mode of seeing and being.”544 
Stoics believed “all mankind’s woes derive from the fact that he seeks to acquire or keep 
possessions that he may either lose or fail to obtain, and from the fact that he tries to 
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avoid misfortunes which are often inevitable.”545 Epictetus’s Enchirdion begins by 
observing: “Some things are in our control and others not. Things in our control are 
opinion, pursuit, desire, aversion, and, in a word, whatever are our own actions. Things 
not in our control are body, property, reputation, command, and, in one word, whatever 
are not our own actions.”546 We should focus only on things within our control for these 
are “by nature free, unrestrained, unhindered.” Things outside control should be regarded 
as “weak, slavish, restrained, belonging to others.” As a therapy, Stoicism trained 
practitioners to discern the difference between what can and cannot be controlled and to 
balance between them. One needed to develop a discerning eye:  
Work, therefore, to be able to say to every harsh appearance, “You are but an 
appearance, and not absolutely the thing you appear to be.” And then examine it 
by those rules which you have, and first, and chiefly, by this: whether it concerns 
the things which are in our own control, or those which are not; and, if it concerns 
anything not in our control, be prepared to say that it is nothing to you.547   
 
Such a transformation of vision does not take place instantaneously nor can it be achieved 
simply by reading about discernment. It requires a process of askesis to recognize 
disordered passions and sustained effort to bring one’s passions back into balance.   
The balance sought within the philosophical life is cultivated through an attitude 
of attention (prosoche). Hadot describes this as “a continuous vigilance and presence of 
mind, self-consciousness which never sleeps, and a constant tension of the spirit.”548 
Attention is cultivated through and enacted as an active stance before the real in which 
“the philosopher is fully aware of what he does at each instant, and he wills his actions 
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fully.”549 Hardly an abstract purely cognitive act, attentiveness is an embodied disposition 
or a way of living in the world.  Ongoing practice cultivates attentiveness as a habitus or 
a settled disposition as prosoche is made incarnate and allows its practitioner to 
concentrate fully upon the present moment.550 Attention makes possible a releasement, a 
letting-things-be; instead of trying to impose oneself on what is other to the self, one 
allows for the genuine manifestation of alterity. Attention is a form of hospitality, 
welcoming the other as other and not as we would have the other to be.  
As a practice of metaphysical thinking, metaxology also fosters a form of 
attentive mindfulness, one “that does not float above the ethos of being in abstraction, but 
comes to itself in the midst of things.”551 Desmond continues: 
Of course, human living is not abstract theory but also practical and ethical. Our 
being in the midst extends to a mindful way of life and a life of mindfulness. 
There is something before the contrast of theory and practice, or the subordination 
of one to the other. Original mindfulness is not so much an act as a passion. It is a 
patience before it is an endeavor, a receiving before it is an activity.552  
 
Metaxology tutors one to live within the metaxu, knowing that before we can take a stand 
on or grasp at being (conatus), we have first to be given to be (passio). Before we can 
assert ourselves or grasp at being, we must first be receivers. Metaxology possibilizes a 
meditative way of dwelling within the metaxu, attentive to “certain elemental experiences 
or happenings, or exposures that keep the soul alive to the enigma of the divine.”553 This 
is a form of “hyperbolic watchfulness,” keen to discern in the happening of the metaxu 
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how the “crack” in everything can be interpreted as a sign pointing to and revealing the 
Transcendent.554  
 In the writings of the Stoics, we find several techniques for cultivating prosoche. 
Through a practice of praemeditatio malorum we are “to represent to ourselves poverty, 
suffering, and death. We must confront life’s difficulties face to face, remembering that 
they are not evils, since they do not depend on us.”555 William Irvine calls this technique 
“negative visualization” aimed at rousing us into an appreciation of what we have.556 He 
cites Epictetus’ advice to parents: when you kiss your child goodnight, “silently reflect on 
the possibility that she will die tomorrow.”557 In Part II, we shall consider how Desmond 
offers a variant of this meditation – “The Return to Zero” – as a necessary ingredient in 
rekindling a sense of astonishment needed for the practice of metaxological metaphysics.  
Attentiveness can also be developed through the meditative reading of poetry, 
literature, and philosophy. Even activities such as research and investigation can cultivate 
attentiveness. The study of physics, for instance, was especially important for Epicurean 
philosophers. Indeed, note the effect Epicurus’s doctrine has on Lucretius: 
For as soon as your reasoning [Epicurus] begins to proclaim the nature of things 
revealed by your divine mind, away flee the mind’s terrors, the walls of the world 
open out, I see action going on throughout the whole void…from all these things 
a sort of divine delight gets hold upon me and a shuddering, because nature thus 
by your power has been so manifestly laid open and uncovered in every part.558  
 
Herein we find an ancient example of a text being doubly poetic: the written text 
functions not only to inform Lucretius, not only to “tell about” something, but also to 
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form him by transforming his vision of the cosmos. A text of Epicurean “reasoning” 
enacted within Lucretius a moment whereby he came to behold a cosmic happening.  
 Finally, Hadot also describes a “method of physical definition” as practiced by 
Marcus Aurelius. This is a way of beholding reality “in its nudity, by separating it from 
the value-judgments which people feel obliged to add to it, whether by habit, under the 
influence of social prejudice, or out of passion.”559 Sexual intercourse, so viewed, is 
described as the “rubbing together of abdomens, accompanied by the spasmodic 
ejaculation of a sticky liquid.”560 Music fares no better: 
A seductive melody…you can despise it if you divide it into each of its sounds, 
and if you ask yourself if you are lesser than each one of them taken separately; if 
you are, you would be filled with shame. The same thing will happen if you 
repeat this procedure in the case of the dance, by decomposing it into each 
movement or each figure…In general, then, and with the exception of virtue and 
its effects, remember to head as quickly as you can for the parts of a process, in 
order, by dividing them, to get to the point where you have contempt for them. 
Transpose this method, moreover, to life in its entirety.561  
 
Neither music nor dance should induce a person to get “carried away,” so by breaking 
each into its elements, one gains perspective on it. As an exercise in divide-and-conquer: 
even the most daunting tasks can be decomposed into smaller, more manageable, parts. 
As a way of life, this is a stance of ongoing vigilance within each moment enabling one 
to resist being overwhelmed even by unexpected occurrences.  
 Metaxology, likewise, employs a method of decomposition. As a philosophical 
practice, it seeks to discern the voices at play within the happening of the metaxu. Space 
is made for the symphonic interplay between univocity, equivocity, and dialectic. One 
“decomposes” the senses of being into its parts, not in order to vitiate the metaxu but in 
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order to discern within each voice its contribution to the happening of the whole. Unlike 
Aurelius, for whom decomposition sought to attain to mastery, metaxological 
decomposition means to expose the “crack” in everything and awaken a sense of the 
mystery at the heart of being. To assuage those suspicious of metaphysics, we might take 
as a tag-line for metaxological metaphysics: we desire not mastery but to know mystery.  
 
3.1.2 Learning to Die 
 The practice of spiritual exercise, whether cultivated within the discipline of 
sustained prosoche or through commitment to ongoing dialogue, serves as an affirmation 
of one’s existence. Spiritual exercise does not involve fleeing the world or denying the 
quotidian flux. Instead, it involves our way of beholding the world from a renewed 
vantage point. Indeed, we can come to see the world in a new way: the praemeditatio 
malorum awakens us to the fragility and gratuity of existence, Aurelius’s “method of 
physical definition” permits us to see things as they, in their most elemental form. If 
spiritual exercise transforms perception, this is because it involves a self-duplication  
in which the “I” refuses to be conflated with its desires and appetites, takes up a 
distance from the objects of its desires, and becomes aware of its power to 
become detached from them. It thus rises from a partial and particular vision to a 
universal perspective, be it that of Nature or that of the Spirit.562   
 
This is a movement we saw described as Desmond’s “Augustinian odyssey” ab 
exterioribus ad interiora, ab inferioribus ad superiora. Like metaxology, Hadot’s 
spiritual exercises begin media res: there is no privileged or neutral starting point, 
because one begins in the midst of reality. “I” take a stand in the midst of reality, 
distinguishing myself (T2) from the flux of the external world (T1). This inward 
movement, however, directs me also beyond the flux as the vector self-transcendence 
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directs me upward and outward toward a sense of the whole. The inward movement of 
spiritual exercise is complemented with an outward straining beyond the self.  
 No practice captures this dual movement better than what Hadot calls “learning to 
die.” Socrates famously observes in the Phaedo:   
I think that a man who has truly spent his life in philosophy is probably right to be 
of good cheer in the face of death and to be very hopeful that after death he will 
attain the greatest blessings yonder…the one aim of those who practice 
philosophy in the proper manner is to practice for dying and death.563  
 
Of course, Socrates did not harbor a secret death-wish. The practice of death is purgative 
in gradually separating the soul from its bodily concerns: 
Does purification not turn out to be…to separate the soul as far as possible from 
the body and accustom it to gather itself and collect itself out of every part of the 
body and to dwell by itself as far as it can both now and in the future, freed, as it 
were, from the bonds of the body…any man whom you see resenting death was 
not a love of wisdom but a lover of the body, and also a lover of wealth or of 
honors, either or both.564   
 
No morbid fixation, this is an exercise intending “to liberate ourselves from a partial, 
passionate point of view – linked to the senses and the body – so as to rise to the 
universal, normative viewpoint of thought, submitting ourselves to the demand of the 
Logos and the norm of the Good. Training for death is training to die to one’s 
individuality and passions, in order to look at things from the perspective of universality 
and objectivity.”565 
 As a spiritual exercise, the practice of death is not limited to Plato. The 
Epicureans and Heidegger made use of it, as did Seneca, Aurelius, and Montaigne.566 
Since I treat Desmond’s version of this meditation in Part II, let me focus here on its 
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overall effect. Why, one might ask, should anyone give ear to Charon’s exhortation to 
mortals? What is the gain? Let us listen to Charon as he ferries across the River Styx:  
Fools (I might say), why so much in earnest? Rest from your toils. You will not 
live forever. Nothing of the pomp of this world will endure; nor can any man take 
anything hence when he dies. He will go naked out of the world, and his house 
and his lands and his gold will be another’s, and ever another’s.567  
 
Why should anyone take to heart Aurelius’ apothegm “Each of life’s actions must be 
performed as if it were the last,”568 or Horace’s carpe diem? Why are Christians signed 
on Ash Wednesday “you are dust and to dust you shall return” (Gen 3:19)? 
 We meditate on death because “training for death is a spiritual exercise which 
consists in changing one’s point of view. We are to change from a vision of things 
dominated by individual passions to a representation of the world governed by the 
universality and objectivity of thought.”569 This conversion, or metastrophe, involves 
both an inward contraction as one examines oneself and recognize one’s finitude and an 
outward expansion as the soul soars toward the infinite. Delivered from bodily 
preoccupations, the soul takes wing to range across the expanse of the cosmos. By 
practicing death, the philosopher becomes “aware of his being within the All, as a 
miniscule point of brief duration, but capable of dilating into the immense filed of infinite 
space and seizing the whole of reality in a single intuition.”570 We see things, as it were, 
from the other side of death; with Charon, we look upon the shores of mortal concern and 
behold how the things we pursue in life – riches, honors, property, power – come to 
naught. To imagine how we would behold ourselves from the side of death “confers 
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seriousness, infinite value, and splendor to every present instant of life.”571 The 
philosopher learns to die and is born again to the fragility of existence and sees  
all things are mutually intertwined, and the bond is holy; and there is hardly 
anything unconnected with any other thing. For things have been coordinated, and 
they combine to form one universal order. For there is one universe made up of 
things, and one God who pervades all things, and one substance, one law, one 
common reason…and one truth....572  
 
The practice of death invites us to live anew in the present moment and “to rediscover a 
raw, naïve vision of reality” and to behold “the splendor of the world, which habitually 
escapes us.”573 To view life from the side of death gives one the vantage point from 
which to perceive how what is past cannot be undone and what is future cannot be 
controlled: one can act only in the present moment.  
 Training for death raises us “from individual, passionate subjectivity to the 
universal perspective” and is ingredient in the philosopher’s “greatness of soul” as one 
purged of illusion and capable of beholding reality as it is. 574 This exercise is not a denial 
of life but an attempt at rekindling a sense of primal delight and wonder at being at all.   
 
3.1.3 Learning to Read 
 At the core of any undertaking of spiritual exercise, and consequently at the core 
of the philosophical life, is a desire for transformation. One undertakes these exercises 
with a desire to grow in self-knowledge, to gain control over one’s passions, and to lead a 
more authentic and integrated life. The diastole of prosoche contracts the soul inward as 
it cultivates vigilance and a discerning eye on life’s essentials; the systole of metastrophe 
expands the soul toward a cosmic view of nature and a sense of being interwoven within 
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the Whole. The goal of these exercises was “a kind of self-formation, or paideia, which is 
to teach us to live, not in conformity with human prejudices and social conventions – for 
social life is itself a produce of the passions – but in conformity with the nature of man, 
which is none other than reason.”575 The process of uncovering the authentic self, 
furthermore, admits of any number of metaphors: training in spiritual gymnastics, 
Plotinus’s image of sculpting a statue, Plato’s allusion to Glaucos, the sea-god whose true 
figure remains hidden until shorn of its barnacles.576 In sum, “all spiritual exercises are, 
fundamentally, a return to the self, in which the self is liberated from the state of 
alienation into which it has been plunged by worries, passions, and desires.”577  
 The philosophical way of life cannot avoid personal upheaval and reorientation as 
one embarks upon this “return to self.” The philosopher is fated to live “in an 
intermediate state.”578 The philosopher is an incarnate metaxu pulled between “the non-
philosophical and the philosophical life, between the domain of the habitual and the 
everyday…and…the domain of consciousness and lucidity.”579 Nevertheless, although 
this intermediate state often requires periods of solitude for introspection and self-
examination, it is not a solitary endeavor. Ilsetraut Hadot describes how, with the rise of 
philosophical schools in Athens, the philosopher became a “spiritual guide” 
(kathegemon) or “the one who leads, who shows the way.”580 One stands in relation to 
one’s teacher or master who instructs the student in this way of life. She continues: 
in the fourth century BC, all philosophical schools had regarded the written word, 
the book, only as a temporary measure in place of personal instruction. For Plato 
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the only valid form of philosophical instruction was a dialogue, which consists of 
questions and answers – dialectic. This form of instruction actually presupposes 
the active participation of the student, because the dialectical dialogue can only 
proceed when the respondent gives critical approval at every stage of the dialogue 
– that is, when questioner and respondent, teacher and student, reach agreement at 
every stage of thought.581  
 
Dialogue between student and teacher, or the inner dialogue required for an ongoing 
examination of conscience, is unending. The point of philosophical dialogue is not to 
arrive at a solution but, rather, is to journey along the road together in search of the truth. 
 What the Hadots suggest is the necessity to approach philosophical texts as 
dialogue partners. Pierre Hadot: “I always prefer to study a philosopher by analyzing his 
or her works rather than trying to uncover a system by extracting theoretical propositions 
from these works, separated from their contexts. The works are alive; they are an act, a 
movement that carries along the author and the reader.”582 A text must be approached as a 
dialogue partner: one must be implicated in its unfolding dialogue, and allow oneself to 
be questioned and, in turn, be willing to question the text. What Sandra Schneiders says 
of Scripture seems applicable here, for approaching the philosophical text as a dialogue 
partner means “taking a chance on hearing one’s name called at close range.”583  
 The trouble in our day, Hadot contends, is that we have forgotten how to read. We 
have forgotten how works of philosophy and theology emerge from within life of an 
author and the author’s community. Scripture scholars, of course, know well the 
importance of the Sitz im Leben for exegesis. Yet how many courses present Plato, or 
Augustine, Aquinas, Hume, or Nietzsche without putting them into context? How often 
do theologians succumb to a form of “theologology” or “talking about talking about 
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God” without actually undertaking philosophical reflection or, dare one say, encouraging 
prayer?584 To be sure, it is no mean feat to identify an argument, evaluate its merits, and 
assess its overall coherence. But Hadot is right to resist reducing philosophy to merely 
analyzing a text’s argument. Philosophy, like theology, should be approached as an 
exercise teaching us how to read again by training us “how to pause, liberate ourselves 
from our worries, return into ourselves, and leave aside our search for subtlety and 
originality, in order to meditate calmly, ruminate, and let the texts speak to us. This, too, 
is a spiritual exercise, and one of the most difficult.”585 
  No doubt, Desmond is acutely aware of how the poetics of a text contribute to 
informing and forming the reader. In his own writing, he finds that:  
one can find some extremes of abstract dialectic – I can do that – leaving some 
readers exasperated or gasping for more familiar concreteness – and then, by 
contrast, the eruption of another language – poetic – seemingly entirely other, 
imagistically concrete, too concrete for some abstract thinkers. Some of my 
readers are discomfited by this doubleness. Others, I am happy to report, approve 
of it in some way. Perhaps the mixture of being discomfited and being moved has 
something right about it.586  
 
Metaxology weaves together the abstract and the concrete to refresh our mindfulness of 
the dynamism of the metaxu. Instead of “the system,” Desmond provides his reader with 
an invitation into a meditative consideration of what it means to be. The poetics of the 
text, intermingling the abstract and the concrete, induce within the reader a sense of dis-
ease and disorientation. This interplay throws us off-step and exposes those places where 
our pattern of thought has fallen into a rut and how we have grown inured to the 
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plurivocity of being. Metaxology’s poetics force us to slow down and to discern the 
voices at play within the text and, over time, in the metaxu itself.  
 In this vein of spiritual exercise, we might regard Desmond as teaching us how to 
read in the space between philosophy and religion. Of his own upbringing he writes: 
if the influences shaping me as a young person were those of a strong Irish 
Catholicism, this was one in which something like a pagan appreciation for the 
earth was not absent, and no absolute incompatibility between these two was felt. 
This reflects a feel for nonhuman nature as a creation in which traces of the 
enigmatic God are not absent.587 
 
Desmond teaches us “to read” attentive to the fundamental porosity of being. Philosophy 
and religion are not separated by an insuperable wall but by a porous threshold. Each 
possesses its own integrity, but this is an integrity-in-relation because philosophy and 
theology both attempt to respond to the intimate strangeness of being. Instead of pitting 
them against one another, he invites us to stand at this threshold to behold, paradoxically, 
how the poverty of philosophy and religion is a sign of their richness.588 His texts “speak” 
not of an “absolute system” but of a docta ignorantia or learned ignorance whereby the 
“knowing of nonknowing…is the point of exodus where intellectus must seek a new 
faith, a new fidelity, or rather renew a fidelity that its previous efforts to know seem to 
have betrayed.”589 To occupy the space between philosophy and religion necessitates 
reflecting on being-as-given and, mindful of the “crack,” reflecting on the giver-of-being. 
Learning to read Desmond’s philosophy as a “poetics of the between” does not lead 
conceptual mastery over the metaxu but, rather, forms us to recognize the abiding 
mystery at the heart of being giving rise to and animating philosophy and theology.  
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 We are about to immerse ourselves in the “poetics” of metaxology by exploring 
how metaxology “works” to renew our mindfulness of the between. As will become 
clear, although these exercises are analogous to the psychagogy of Platonic or Stoic 
practices, they possess a pronounced theological character rendering them mystagogic 
exercises. As I argued previously, metaxological metaphysics originates in being 
awakened by the advent of transcendence; it is, thusly, first and foremost a response to 
the poetics of the metaxu. In this it is akin, as Hadot’s alludes, to the way 
a bicycle’s movement provided for its lights. In the night one needs a light that 
illuminates and allows one to guide oneself (this is theoretical reflection), but in 
order to have light, the generator has to turn by the movement of the wheel. The 
movement of the wheel is the choice of life. Then one could move forward, but 
one had to begin by moving for a very short time in the dark.590  
 
We turn now to consider how metaxology teaches us “how to die.” We begin by peddling 
in the dark, beneath the “eclipse of the transcendent” in the hope that by turning our 
metaphysical wheels we might produce light enough to navigate the darkness.  
 
 3.2 Metaphysics as Askesis: “Return to Zero” and Posthumous Mind 
 I now test my wager that William Desmond’s metaphysics can be undergone as a 
form of spiritual exercise. To borrow from Charles Taylor, I believe Desmond’s 
metaphysics can be “tested in practice”591 or, better still, that metaxology can be “tested 
through practicing it.” To test a theory in practice, means “not to see how well the theory 
describes the practices as a range of independent entities; but rather to judge how 
practices fare when informed by the theory.”592 Approaching metaxology as a “way of 
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life” requires one approach the text with a willingness not only to be informed about 
metaphysics but also, and more importantly, to be formed by undergoing it.  
 A few preparatory notes. First, given my interest in Desmond’s contribution to 
theology, I focus primarily upon God and the Between. God and the Between concludes a 
metaphysical trilogy published between 1995 and 2008 and manifests a rich maturing of 
his thought.593 This decision, too, is strategic and pragmatic. Strategically, a limited scope 
permits a more intensive engagement with the text. Pragmatically, few scholars are 
willing to read through the whole of one thinker’s oeuvre. If theologians are going to 
“take up and read” one of Desmond’s books, this is the one.  
 Second, in probing how the text works and what it accomplishes, we are exploring 
metaxological poetics. This requires considering poetics both rhetorically and 
performatively. In the chapter and the next, I consider how metaxology works to renew 
the reader’s mindfulness of the Transcendent. If the last chapter gave us a broad outline 
of what metaxology is about, these next chapters show what it can do. Expressed in 
Austin’s notion of speech acts, we are looking at how one can be informed by the text’s 
illocutionary act (rhetorical poetics) and potentially formed through its perlocutionary 
effect (by being awakened to and implicated within the poetics of the metaxu).   
 Third, I believe Desmond offers our age something akin to what Jean LeClercq 
describes as philosophia or a practice designating “not a theory or a way of knowing, but 
a lived wisdom, a way of living according to reason.”594 Moreover, what is observed of 
Rupert of Deutz well apply to Desmond who similarly writes “with such a deeply 
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religious feeling and such a rich poetic orchestration that he awakens in his reader new 
conceptions of mysteries.”595 Full disclosure: I admit my hermeneutic proposal is 
tentative and exploratory. Desmond does not cast his thought within the mold of 
“spiritual exercise.” Paradoxically, my argument succeeds only to the degree that it fails: 
my words are not meant to dispel mystery but to show how Desmond’s philosophy works 
by reawakening the reader to the enigmatic nature of existence. Instead of availing myself 
of the high noon of reason which casts no shadow, I want to linger beneath the 
crepuscular sky as we dare to undergo the full effects of the “eclipse of the transcendent.”   
 Betraying my own Ignatian roots, I divide this first exercise into three parts. First, 
I offer a metaxological “composition of place” to offer a sense of where we begin. 
Second, I follow the itinerary of Desmond’s “Return to Zero” as a process of undergoing 
nihilism. Third, I examine the “fruit” or “grace” of this exercise by considering what 
Desmond calls “Posthumous mind.” If this succeeds in suggesting how this exercise 
might inculcate a renewed way of perceiving, in Part III I will take up a consideration of 
just what posthumous mind permits us to perceive.  
 
3.2.1 Composition of Place: The Reconfigured Metaxu 
  
Ignatius of Loyola describes the first of his Spiritual Exercises as “a meditation 
by using the three powers of the soul.”596 By “meditation,” Michael Ivens comments, he 
means “a prayer in which material is thought out or mentally processed, in the light of 
faith and in the desire to hear and respond to God’s word to oneself.”597 And by “using 
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the three powers of the soul” he indicates how the whole person is to be engaged. Ivens 
describes the unfolding of Ignatian meditation as involving three movements: 
1. Summoning to consciousness a truth already held in the memory. 
2. Exploring the content with the mind. 
3. The response of the affections (or of the “heart”).598 
Like ancient practices, Ignatian meditation requires the active engagement of the 
retreatant: one receives the Spiritual Exercises willingly, with a desire to come to know 
God’s will in one’s life. What distinguishes this as a spiritual exercise, Hadot observes, is 
“these exercises are not merely of thought, but of the individual’s entire psychism.”599  
 As mentioned earlier, there survives no extant treatise codifying the practice of 
ancient spiritual exercise. Yet, given the rootedness of Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises in 
ancient soil, it seems warranted to use his text as a template for approaching Desmond’s 
philosophy as a type of spiritual exercise. For while the content of the exercises varies 
over the course of the retreat, the approach one takes to each meditation remains basically 
the same. Thus, before entering into each prayer period, Ignatius counsels the exercitant 
to offer a preparatory prayer: “ask God our Lord for the grace that all my intentions, 
actions, and operations may be ordered purely to the service and praise of his Divine 
Majesty.”600 What Hadot observed of ancient practices remains true even within 
contemporary approaches to Ignatian spirituality: one embarks upon the Exercises with a 
desire for transformation. After this prayer stating one’s desire, Ignatius turns to a “first 
prelude” called the “composition of place.” As Ivens notes, “in imaginatively composing 
a place or situation corresponding to the subject of prayer, one ‘composes oneself’, in the 
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sense of ‘getting oneself together’, or becoming recollected.”601 One recollects, 
deliberately and thematically, where one is now and how one stands before God. One 
steps back from the quotidian to gain perspective on one’s life. Composition of place is 
not a flight from the real, but an intensification of attention to it, allowing the present 
moment to manifest itself fully. This is an Ignatian iteration of prosoche whereby one 
opens oneself to being addressed by the real: we cannot meditate apart from the flux of 
the day-to-day but only from amidst and as part of it.   
 A metaxological “composition of place” begins in “the between” by considering 
how our age has reconfigured the primal ethos. Much of the work in the first two chapters 
tried to trace the contours of this map. For Desmond, our age has been configured 
according to the drive of the curious mind: “The momentum of modernity dominantly 
conceives our development as away from astonishment and perplexity towards as definite 
a determinate cognition as possible.”602 This momentum can be variously described. One 
might see is as a “coming of age story” in which scientific materialism “is seen as the 
stance of maturity, of course, of manliness, over against childish fears and 
sentimentality.”603 Or one might follow Auguste Comte who opens his Introduction to 
Positive Philosophy by positing three states passing through “the theological or fictitious 
state, the metaphysical or abstract state” to culminate in the “scientific or positive 
state.”604 Nor is Comte alone in expressing “irritation with intractable perplexity,”605 as 
thinkers such as Sam Harris, Richard Dawkins, and Daniel Dennett continue to attest. 
Any vestige of “mystery” needs, especially for the New Atheists, to be exorcised. Our 
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age seems bewitched by a Cartesian dream of mathesis universalis manifested in “an 
unprecedented will to univocalize being.”606 As we stretch out being upon the 
Procrustean bed of univocity, we have no room for concepts of the good. The Platonic 
form of the Good is rejected, Aristotle’s entelechy is jettisoned,607 and Descartes does 
away with final causality. The latter comes with a hefty price because, Buckley writes, 
“the self-enclosed physics of Descartes was established as autonomous, however much it 
might find its roots in first philosophy. Once launched, it was on its own with matter in 
movement inevitably finding its predetermined contours. With the Universal 
Mathematics, Descartes removed any final causes, any notae or vestigial of god, from the 
world.”608 A point of contrast: whereas Augustine heard creation sing of its transcendent 
Creator, the Cartesian universe falls mute. Rather than sing of a creator, Descartes’s 
mechanical universe invokes its god as a divine linchpin holding the system in place. 
 Our composition of place includes both a consideration of the reconfiguration of 
exterior being or topos (T1) and the reconfiguration of our self-understanding as 
anthropos (T2). Stated in metaxological terms, we live in an era wherein “our conatus 
essendi seems rather spurred into an activism, a self-activation that can lead even to an 
extreme of hyper-activism. Then the passio essendi is forced into recess as the conatus 
essendi, expressing itself without hindrance, goes into overdrive.”609 A hypertrophied 
conatus coupled with the devaluation of being leaves us in a state of ontological nihilism. 
Modern thought has, Desmond notes, grown accustomed to the standard 
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distinction of fact and value. We think of being as there, just there, a fact or set of 
fact. We think of values as human constructions that are imposed or projected on 
the otherwise valueless being. In itself being is worthless. The degrading of the 
value of being is itself the product of the mind of mathematical and scientistic 
univocity; it lacks the sense of metaphysical integrity that the univocal can 
sometimes reveal. This scientistic univocity produces ontological nihilism.610 
 
Given this image of the human agent as the sole author and determiner of being’s value, 
it is little wonder we see the development of an antinomy between autonomy and 
transcendence. Ludwig Feuerbach was aware of this antinomy: “to enrich God, man must 
become poor; that God may be all, man must be nothing.”611 So also Zarathustra who 
sings in praise of the Higher Man 
 Before God! But now this God has die! You Higher Men, this God was your  
greatest danger.  
Only since he has lain in the grave have you again been resurrected. Only now  
does the great noontide come, only now does the Higher Man become – 
lord and master.  
 Have you understood this say, O my brothers? Are you terrified: do your hearts  
fail? Does the abyss here yawn for you? Does the hound of Hell here yelp 
at you? 
 Very Well! Come on, you Higher Men! Only now does the mountain of  
mankind’s future labour. God has died: now we desire – that the Superman 
shall live.612  
 
The self-assertion of autonomy has no tolerance for talk of the Transcendent. Zarathustra: 
if there were gods, how could I endure not to be a god? Therefore there are no gods.613 
 Louis Dupré captures well the consequence of our modernity’s reconfigured 
ethos: “In the present situation, the very reality of the transcendent is at stake, more than 
its specific conceptualization. The very possibility of a relation to the transcendent in the 
modern world has come under fire.”614 Desmond reiterates this in a metaxological key: 
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Third transcendence (T3) has been made problematic in modernity, both by a 
univocalizing objectification of first transcendence (T1), and by developments of 
second transcendence (T2), especially when this last defines itself in terms of its 
own autonomy. Then a logic of self-determination stands guard over all our 
thinking, and the thinking of what is other to our self-determination.615    
 
For the curious mind committed to univocity, Transcendence can be neither measured nor 
managed and so cannot be counted. A self-transcendence (T2) concerned only with 
preserving autonomy cannot but regard recourse to Transcendence (T3) as a threat. 
Modernity’s reconfigured ethos bears the mark of a “postulatory finitism” refusing to 
postulate a God, either because the Transcendent is irrelevant or anti-human.  
  A metaxological composition of place does not allow us to shirk from standing 
beneath the “eclipse of the transcendent.” On the contrary, we have no choice but to stand 
beneath its hoary light and to consider the implications of ontological nihilism. 
“Valueless being leads to nihilism,” Desmond notes, and “it does not matter whether by a 
scientific, political, or aesthetic route.”616 Indeed, it is hard not to see the signs of such 
nihilism surrounding us: ecological crises, surging nationalism, global poverty and 
inequality. As Pope Francis observed in Evangelii Gaudium: “…today we also have to 
say ‘thou shalt not’ to an economy of exclusion and inequality. Such an economy kills. 
How can it be that it is not a new item when an elderly homeless person dies of exposure, 
but it is news when the stock market loses two points?”617 Nietzsche extolled the will to 
power as a substitute for God’s death: “This world is the will to power – and nothing 
besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power – and nothing besides!”618 Yet, if 
we have truly succeeded in “wiping away the entire horizon” and “drinking up the 
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sea,”619 these words seem cool comfort. For Desmond, “if all being is valueless, we too 
are valueless finally, in the valueless whole, and all our brave, heroic valuing is 
swallowed by the valueless whole.”620 Severed from a Transcendent source, is not every 
instance of self-assertive striving little more than a “tale, told by an idiot, full of sound 
and fury, signifying nothing”?621 Beneath the eclipse, we stand in a “Desmondian open 
space,” feeling the buffets and pull of the wind and the tension of the crushing silence of 
the nihil. Here we open our ears to hear once again the song of creation sung by a 
transcendent Creator.  
 
3.2.2 Exercising Nihilism? The “Return to Zero” 
 Desmond’s “Return to Zero” is a meditation on the implications of the total 
eclipse of the Transcendent. It is meant to exercise those undertaking it. He writes: 
Suppose though there is some truth to nihilism. Suppose the origin is worthless, 
the world void of inherent value, our energy of being either reactive to or 
transformative of this worthlessness. What then? No transformation we can effect 
will change the basic truth of being: It all comes to nothing. But this outcome also 
includes us, and all our grand projects come to nothing. Our reconfiguration of the 
primal ethos comes to lack any ultimate point.622   
 
Imagine: existence is worthless. Nothing we do, no endeavor or project, changes this: the 
absence of value goes all the way down and includes ourselves. The weight of 
nothingness presses upon us and slowly penetrates into the marrow of our being. In this 
meditation, we are meant to experience “such coming to nothing in our knowing, our 
                                               
619 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), 181.  
620 Desmond, God and the Between, 28.  
621 Dennis Vanden Auweele argues that Nietzsche evades Desmond’s critique. Although a compelling  
reading of Zarathustra’s “Other Dance Song,” he misses Desmond’s point: Nietzsche may well be 
offering an existential “no” to the divine origin, but can he follow through on the full implications 
of this utterance? “Metaxological ‘Yes’ and Existential ‘No’: William Desmond and Atheism,” 
Sophia 52 no. 4 (2013): 649—654.  
622 Desmond, God and the Between, 29.  
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doing, our feeling for life.”623 Desmond wants us not only to think about but to feel how 
the crush of the nihil recasts our lives within the metaxu. We are implicated in  
1. Knowing: the more we rationalize life the more life seems to lack reason. 
Englobed by the nihil of nihilism, the ohne warum (without why) of the 
rose is hardly a mystical insight, the threshold of reason. Without a 
determinate why reason comes to see itself a surd. 
2. Doing: Nietzsche’s “will to power” may encourage us to leave our mark 
upon being, but what fuels this courage?  
3. Feeling: “the élan of life is drained when we lose the aesthetic feel of the 
agape of being.” We move from cheap thrill to cheap thrill – think of the 
popularity of horror films – but, in the end, it all comes to nothing. 624 
 
We are indeed clever animals, capable of any number of ruses to anesthetize ourselves 
against the nihil. Yet Desmond challenges us to face squarely the implications of a 
thoroughgoing nihilism and to experience fully the consequences of a radicalization of 
our finitude. He holds before our faces a dark mirror and asks, “Can you see yourself 
reflected? Can you feel in your blood the chill grasp and utter despair of nothingness?”  
 In effect, Desmond invites us to stroll along the shore of Dover Beach where we 
can stand beneath the “eclipse of the transcendent” to behold how  
The Sea of Faith 
Was once, too, at the full, and round earth’s shore 
Lay like the folds of a bright girdle furled. 
But now I only hear 
Its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar, 
Retreat, to the breath 
Of the night-wind, down the vast edges drear 
And naked shingles of the world.625 
 
Desmond would have us stand resolutely upon this “darkling plain.” He bids us to discern 
within the “melancholy, long, withdrawing roar” not the end of belief but a silent prelude 
to a renewed porosity to the Transcendent. Passed gall of nihilism, we drink it to the lees.  
                                               
623 Ibid.  
624 Ibid.  
625 Arnold, “Dover Beach” 
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 As an exercise, the “Return to Zero” challenges us to “live the shattering” of 
nihilism deeply.626 We must feel the full weight of nothingness:  
We do come to nothing. We are as nothing: a double ambiguous conjunction of 
being and nothing. We are but as nothing, and experience our nothingness as the 
frailty of our finitude, as the perplexity of being that resists being dispelled, as the 
mystery of being that remains despite our best conceptual maneuvers. The truth 
brings us to despair of truth, and of ourselves, and of the good. Nihilism, the truth 
of nihilism brings us to despair of God.627  
 
This is not the ersatz nihilism of teenage angst. Nor is Desmond trying to get us simply to 
understand its implications. This is askesis, a practice we undertake in order to feel fully 
the force of the nihil. In this exercise, none is spared the blow of Nietzsche’s Götzen-
Dämmerung as its blows shatter our idols and bring to nothing even the greatest 
monuments to our conatus essendi. This exercise leads us into the desert – Shelly’s 
“antique land” or Dupré’s desert of modern atheism – where we cannot evade irony: 
Look on my Works, ye Mighty, and despair! 
Nothing beside remains. Round the decay 
Of that colossal Wreck, boundless and bare 
The lone and level sands stretch far away.628 
 
The “Return to Zero” requires us to face a dark reality: everything comes to nothing. The 
inherent instability and equivocity of being – the “crack in everything” inflicts all finite 
beings the wound of constitutive nothingness. Ozymandias’s epitaph strikes deep into the 
heart, but not for the reason he envisioned. What had once been an awesome sight 
intended to evoke despair in his enemies remains a source of the deepest despair: the 
ravages of time reduced his accomplishment to rubble and will do likewise to all of our 
endeavors. Despair indeed: all being is as nothing and will return to the nothing.  
                                               
626 Ibid. 
627 Ibid.  
628 Percy Bysshe Shelly, “Ozymandias,” in The Major Works, ed. Zachary Leader and Michael O’Neill  
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 198.  
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 This evocation of “despair” has theological resonance. The setting of the First 
Week of Ignatius’s Spiritual Exercises weaves the retreatant into a dialectic of sin and 
grace, brokenness and wholeness. One despairs of sin, not to elicit God’s mercy, but as a 
response to realizing the depths of God’s love. Despair is a dark grace: we despair of sin 
because we see truly our feeble “no” against the horizon of God’s “yes” to us. Our 
despair becomes a purgative prelude to a revitalizing encounter with the Father. And, in a 
Lenten reflection delivered in Munich in 1945, Karl Rahner describes how it can even be   
the true greatness of man to despair. Only such a despaired one, who has finished 
and figured out everything and has noticed that behind everything there is 
nothing, is the actual, the true man, who has elevated himself above the everyday 
bourgeois, who bravely and honestly professes the only greatness of man that 
there is: the honest realization of man’s nothingness; the greatness of man is the 
knowledge of his misery.629  
 
True despair can dispel one of illusions, show the caducity of one’s idols, and expose the 
emptiness of the human heart that longs for ultimate fulfilment. One must not shirk away 
from this process. Indeed, speaking to women and men who had lived through bombing 
raids, Rahner exhorts his listeners to abide within their “rubbled over hearts” because  
When you stand firm and don’t flee despair, nor in despairing of your former gods 
– the vital or the intellectual, the beautiful and the respectable, oh, yes, that they 
are – which you called God, if you don’t despair in the true God, if you stand firm 
– oh, that is already a miracle of grace which shall be bestowed on you – then you 
suddenly will become aware that in truth you are not at all rubbled-over, that your 
jail is closed only to empty finiteness, that its deadly emptiness is only the false 
appearance of God, that his silence, the eerie stillness, is filled by the Word 
without words, by him who is above all names, by him who is everything in 
everything. And his silence tells you he is there.630   
 
                                               
629 Karl Rahner, The Need and the Blessing of Prayer, trans. Bruce Gillette (Collegeville: Liturgical Press,  
1997), 5.  
630 Ibid., 8.  
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With Rahner, Desmond unflinchingly confronts the winnowing darkness and learns: 
“Whatever can be taken from you is never God.”631 The crisis of despair, from the Greek 
krinein or “to decide,” rouses us from somnolence and demands we take a stance. “In a 
paradoxical way, the night of nihilism may come to the aid of metaphysical mindfulness. 
For this night makes the light itself perplexing. It makes us wonder if we really know 
anything important at all, even as we progressively come to know everything 
determinate.”632 As with Rahner, so with Desmond: as the false gods erected throughout 
our life disintegrate beneath the weight of despair, the breakdown of the idols need not 
break us. Indeed, amidst the dust and rubble, this breakdown makes possible the Holy 
One’s breakthrough.   “Coming to nothing,” in the end, “may be the reopening in us of 
the porosity of being.”633 
  Plato saw philosophy as a training for death, a catalyst for a conversion 
(metastrophe) of the soul. Marcus Aurelius, too, exhorted himself to a mindfulness of 
death in order to remain attentive to the present moment: “each of life’s actions must be 
performed as if it were the last.”634 With them, Desmond hears the grating whisper: 
memento mori. Yet Desmond does not want merely to be mindful of death but to become 
possessed of a mindfulness that has passed through and been purified by death. Thus, he 
writes, “the return to zero may be the nihilism of despair, but it need not only be that. It 
may be a different nihilism: a nihilating of despair in despair.”635 The poetic force of 
Desmond’s prose is in full display in the following passage: 
                                               
631 Ibid.  
632 Desmond, Being and the Between, 203.  
633 Desmond, God and the Between, 29.  
634 Hadot, The Inner Citadel, 135.  
635 Desmond, God and the Between, 31.  
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One wanders a desert that bleaches with burning light, or one is exiled to a Siberia 
of soul that freezes, or one is fleshed together with perishing, as with one’s 
Siamese twin; one has become as nothing, and one is kissed, before one knows it, 
by the angel of death. What is the kiss? It is a Golgotha of our human hubris. The 
kiss opens our sightless eyes. One sees the same things but sees the sameness as 
other. The wings of the angel beat quietly but in the unbearable terror of her 
approach being suddenly shows the beauty of thereness as absolute gift. Being is 
given, and it is given for nothing – nothing beyond the goodness of its being, and 
of its being given. The terror liquefies the world that one has fixed. The world 
configured as worthless also seems to dissolve. Something else is offered: a taste 
of the elemental goodness of the “to be” – abundance without a why, beyond the 
sweetness of its being at all. Here commences the reversal of nihilism, and a 
redoubled search for God, for we seem to be given again, redoubled in being.636  
 
Recalling the double sense of “poetic,” consider first the rhetorical power of the text. This 
is not an indifferent description but a passionate appeal; arid desert to frigid tundra to the 
shadow of death, Desmond wants to involve the whole reader into undergoing this 
meditation. Carnality and sensuality abound as we are kissed, taste, and see with purged 
eyes. In a single passage, we find a phantasmagoria of images and metaphors; the text, so 
to speak, is saturated with a too-muchness verging on the hyperbolic.  
 This is the point of the text’s hyperbole: it aims, literally and literarily, to “throw 
us over” (hyper + ballein) into the happening of which it speaks. Again, rather than 
telling about this happening, the text implicates the reader in the unfolding of the angel’s 
wings and allows us to undergo the “kiss of death.” We are drawn rhetorically into an 
elemental happening, invited into a purgative un-making that both threatens and promises 
some form of re-making. The rhetorical saturation the passage performs by throwing the 
reader into this poeisis which renews our perception of reality. This is not a logical proof 
or a dispassionate argument. On the contrary, it is a passionate wrangling (from the Latin 
patere = to suffer) aimed not at changing our minds but at transforming our perception. 
The text is an arena of encounter where we, like Jacob at the Jabbok Ford, wrestle with a 
                                               
636 Ibid., 31-32.  
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shadowy figure who seems intent on bringing about our demise. We strain against our 
opponent and, at daybreak, find ourselves victorious. Successful passage through the 
“Return to Zero,” however, bears with it a steep cost. Jacob limped away from his 
nocturnal battle with a dislocated hip. Similarly, we suffer an existential dislocation: the 
“Return to Zero” gives us to behold the world around us with eyes purged by death’s 
kiss. Even if we sojourn at length in the desert, we do so as heirs of Israel who bear 
within their bodies the trace of those willing to struggle with God.  
 Without question, this is a fraught proposition. The “Return” is a painful process. 
The shattering of our idols, the dissolution of our illusions, may lead one to the utter 
despair of godlessness. Yet, amidst the dust and rubble, one may catch sight of the outline 
of the Angel of Death. The wreckage of the conatus essendi lets in new light as we 
behold with astonishment: all that is, is, though it need not be. No longer neutral or 
valueless, we behold being in its elemental goodness. For Bede Griffiths, Taylor 
recounts, this is the moment of conversion when the buffered layers are transpierced and 
the world is seen with renewed eyes. Even the sky, for Griffiths, was experienced as too 
awful to behold because “it seemed as though it was but a veil before the face of God.”637 
To use a more traditional metaphor, the “Return” is a via purgativa through which “we 
find ourselves in the reversion to what we are without God, which is nothing.”638 Without 
God we are nothing, yet we are not nothing: we are.  
 As an ascetic practice, the “Return to Zero” functions as a purgative exercise 
intended to “un-clog” our primal porosity and reawaken us to the passio essendi. In this 
way, it is an archaeological undertaking: it leads us downward into the depths of being 
                                               
637 Taylor, A Secular Age, 5.  
638 Desmond, God and the Between, 338.  
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itself, depths paved over by modernity. This exercise intends to transform our disposition 
toward creation into one of “deep openness to the ontological enigma of the ‘that it is’ of 
beings.”639 The anarchic shattering of the nihil uncovers the archē of existence itself and 
awakens us to its too-muchness and overdeterminacy. “This is,” he writes, “the elemental 
wonder of metaphysical astonishment: astonishment at the sheer being there of the world, 
its givenness as given into being, not the ‘what’ of beings, but ‘the that of being at 
all.’”640 The kiss of death opens our eyes to the goodness of the elemental ethos whose 
vibrancy has been covered over or anodized by modernity. Our return to our origin 
releases us for “a new interface with creation”641 mindful of the goodness of creation and 
attentive to the call of its creator. The poetics of the text permit a return to the origin so 
that we may come to perceive, in the archē, the abiding presence of the Transcendent 
who is creation’s origin and end (telos).  
 
3.2.3 Posthumous Mind 
 Willingly undertaken as a spiritual exercise, meditating through the “Return to 
Zero” cultivates a “way of mindfulness, beyond the reductive alternatives either of being 
as reduced to a particular finite teleology (the kind that some attribute, not justly, to 
premodern views) or of being as reduced to the valueless world of modernity, be it the 
worthless thereness of the scientistic picture, or the purposeless being beyond good and 
evil of Nietzschean becoming.”642 Dubbed “posthumous mindfulness,” it is a recurrent 
theme throughout Desmond’s work. In Philosophy and Its Others, he describes it as “a 
thinking from the future when we are dead, about the ontological worth of the present, 
                                               
639 Desmond, Is There a Sabbath for Thought, 13.  
640 Ibid.  
641 Desmond, God and the Between, 32.  
642 Ibid., 32.  
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imagined from beyond death as our past. (The Irish call death slí na fírinne: the way of 
truth).”643 Posthumous mind offers not merely a new way of thinking but expresses the 
transformation of perception itself:  
So imagine this: what would it be like to die, and come back to your home after a 
hundred years? Would you like to see everything changed, utterly changed? 
Would you be dazed? Would you be lost? What would you mourn? What are the 
nameless, intimate things we now love, and which in our posthumous return we 
would delight to greet again? Or rather, the intimates of being that might greet us, 
like old, trusted friends? These things have no name in the technicist’s 
vocabulary, no price in the economist’s world. Yet they give charge to life and 
worth of a different sort. What do we love now, that its loss or desecration would 
grieve us to the roots on our return? If we cannot name any golden thing, anything 
that now blesses being, anything that we would want to perpetuate into the future, 
perpetuate even beyond our death and regardless of death, has not life become 
metaphysically bankrupt?644   
 
For one accustomed to analytic argument, this cannot but be bamboozling. To my mind, 
the way to make sense of passages such as this – other than writing them off as 
digressions – is to apply Hadot’s observation about ancient philosophers to Desmond: 
they “did not aim, above all, to provide a systematic theory of reality, but to teach their 
disciples a method with which to orient themselves, both in thought and life.”645  
 As a way of beholding, posthumous mind stands in continuity with yet moves 
beyond its ancient forebears. With Plato, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, and Plotinus, 
Desmond’s meditation is “linked to the contemplation of the Whole and elevation of 
thought, which rises from individual, passionate subjectivity to the universal perspective. 
In other words, it attains to the exercise of pure thought.”646 Nevertheless, for Desmond, 
this “pure thought” does not involve any disengaged, disinterested, or neutral stance 
toward reality. The posthumous minded person is not a voyeur peering into the flux or 
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one who refrains from entering into reality. In fact, the opposite is the case: the “Return” 
brings about a rebirth of astonishment at the givenness of being itself. “The kiss of the 
angel of death awakens posthumous mind to the thought of God,” Desmond observes, 
because by meditating “coming to nothing awakens us to finitude as finitude, and thus 
also to the beyond of finitude in the very gift of finitude.”647  
 The reader’s eyes glaze over: “Desmond, grasp the nettle and give an argument!” 
Herein rests the problem for, as Desmond claims, “there is no absolutely univocal way to 
God.”648 Yet, while metaxology offers no “geometry of God,” geometry certainly does 
not exhaust all modes of thinking. Dostoevski, “on the morning of his first death,” 
undergoes a rebirth of mindfulness: 
He was sentenced to death for political conspiracy. He was halfway into death, on 
the verge of execution, tilted over the brink of nothing. There was no geometry of 
death to help. But he was suddenly reprieved, brought back from death, 
resurrected to life again. The sweetness of the morning air struck him, the song of 
morning birds, the sky. He was stunned into marveling at the sheer fact of being. 
This is the resurrection of agapeic astonishment. But it is experienced in a 
blinding and a groping. Will systematic science ever do justice to what is 
communicated in this stunning and resurrection?649  
 
Unexpectedly drawn back from the brink of nothingness, Dostoevski perceived 
everything with renewed senses. He sees the world with reborn eyes: he stared into the 
abyss and his eyes were purged by death. His reprieve gives him, as it were, a “new 
lease” on life attuned to the very goodness and gratuity of existence. “To be” can no 
longer be taken for granted because, having confronted its fragility and gratuity, it is 
beheld in astonishment as granted. 
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 Desmond’s point: there are modes of mindfulness beyond Pascal’s esprit de 
géométrie. Yet, in an age in which life is often regarded as “finite and nothing but 
finite,”650 it is difficult to recognize the elemental goodness of being. But, in something 
of a reversal of Taylor’s sense of disenchantment, Desmond asks: “Is it possible that an 
age could fall under a bewitchment? Could it be that especially since the early nineteenth 
century many of the major intellectuals of the era live under the bewitchment of 
godlessness?”651 Elsewhere he broaches this exploring whether our age has been 
“ensnared in a kind of spell” and lulled into the sleep of finitude.652 So, rather than seeing 
our age as disenchanted, he suggests we have been bewitched into a state of postulatory 
finitism. Postulatory finitism delimits the agenda of questions our age is permitted to ask. 
Indeed, many of us live als ob or “as if” the question of the ultimate had ceased to be a 
live or valid question. Just as we no longer inquire about “aether” or “phlogiston,” we 
increasingly have less occasion to inquire about God: there is no place for God in an 
increasingly mathematical order because if it cannot be measured, it cannot matter. 
Nevertheless, as Dostoevski reminds us, there are modes of mindfulness capable of 
perceiving the elemental goodness of “to be.” If many in our age have been bewitched 
into this sleep, if we ourselves have felt a sense of drowsiness as our eyelids droop with 
skepticism, we ask: is there a counter-charm?     
 Alas, there is no technicolor prince(ss) whose kiss can break this spell. To lift the 
enchantment, one must undertake the arduous route of nihilism, risk the “Return to Zero,” 
and push postulatory finitism to its limits. By undergoing the buffets of the nihil, we 
submit to being flayed by thoughts of coming to nothing, we watch as the idols erected 
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by the conatus crumble. We find ourselves seated next to Job, surrounded by loss, yet 
within the maelstrom and chaos we cry out “I know that my redeemer lives!” (19:25). We 
pass through death but we do not die; indeed, we are stirred into wakefulness. We sense a 
seepage, perhaps even a trickle, as our primal porosity is gradually unclogged. And so we 
drink from this uncovered well, we drink of a water ever ancient and ever new, and are 
regenerated, born again to see the good of “to be.” The scene of the breakdown of 
finitude’s idols becomes, after the night of godlessness, occasions the breakthrough 
reborn mindfulness. We are awakened from the sleep of finitude and freed into a world 
revitalized to live and move and have our being able to perceive the gift of creation.  
 The cultivation of posthumous mind is rooted in ancient practices. As Hadot 
observes, ancient askesis called for “a kind of self-duplication in which the ‘I’ refuses to 
be conflated with its desires and appetites.”653 Spiritual exercise requires not that one flee 
the quotidian but find a way of beholding it in a new way. Posthumous mind  
as the metaphysical imagination of being dead, involves mind in a step beyond 
time, and so is both in and out of time. It involves a doubling of the self between 
the here and the beyond. In looking on life as if dead, the self discovers distance 
in time, outliving time, rummaging through time for what made it good.654   
 
This doubling of self is a redoubling, simultaneously intensive in “going most intimately 
into the depths of our being” and extensive “in carrying us beyond ourselves, in promise 
of community with all others, human and nonhuman, but also with the divine origin, as 
giver, sustainer, and consummation of all that is.”655 Nevertheless, posthumous 
mindfulness does not allow one to linger within the Empyrion, for the “Return” does not 
mean to escape the flux but to renew our mindfulness of it. We do not see a different 
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ethos or an alternative reality; rather, we see through the reconfiguration of our ethos and 
catch sight of the primal ethos of being. With eyes purged of the rheum of finitude, we 
behold reality with eyes capable of perceiving the “crack” in all things as pointing 
beyond themselves toward a creative origin. We behold reality with eyes purged of the 
rheum of finitude and perceive the “crack” of infinitude in all beings. Posthumous mind 
does not make us indifferent to the poetics of the between; on the contrary, it aims to 
renew our sense of astonishment that being is at all.  
 
3.3 Mindfulness Reborn: Idiotic, Aesthetic, Erotic, Agapeic  
  
 By approaching the “Return to Zero” as a spiritual exercise leading one through 
the darkness of ontological nihilism, it is possible to be reawakened from the 
bewitchment of postulatory finitism. The Angel of Death’s kiss stirs us from the sleep of 
finitude and gives us to perceive the metaxu with renewed eyes. Posthumous 
mindfulness, however, cannot be counted as an end-result of logical argument. It is an 
undertaking, an undergoing, jolting one from somnolence into wakefulness. One is struck 
or rocked back; this astonishment, Desmond writes, “has the bite of an otherness given 
before all our self-determining thinking: it opens a mindfulness that we do not self-
produce.”656 In the next chapter, we will consider how Desmond’s philosophy 
accomplishes this by exploring reformulation of four traditional “proofs” for God’s 
existence. These reformulations do not offer univocal “proofs” but articulate four 
hyperbolic “ways.” By cultivating a metaxological mindfulness by practicing these 
metaphysical exercises, we can become attentive to the overdeterminacy of being and 
provoked into raising the metaphysical question: why is there anything at all?  
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 Posthumous mindfulness describes a way of perceiving oneself within the 
community of transcendences (T1-T3). A renewed sense of the passio essendi reminds us: 
before you could take a stand on being, you were given to be. One senses again the fluid 
intermediation and dynamic passing of the porosity of being: to be, in some enigmatic 
way, is to be intimately related to all other beings. One is re-woven into the metaxu as a 
member of the community of being.657 The universal impermanence of being, mortally 
wounded by the equivocal “crack” in everything, sings no dirge but points beyond itself 
to its infinite source. Posthumous mind becomes a gift: having passed through death, slí 
na fírinne, we are greeted by Aletheia who gives us to behold all things anew.  
 In a sense, one needs to meditate through, or have existentially undergone, the 
“Return to Zero” as essential for understanding metaxological metaphysics. Like ad 
hominem style of argument Taylor employs, this meditation capacitates us to view the 
metaxu otherwise. Just as Taylor does not tell us about a different history but narrates 
history differently, so too does posthumous mind give us to perceive reality in a new 
way. In the next four sections, I want briefly to describe just how undergoing the 
“Return” capacitates us to behold reality anew by rendering us attentive to the hyperboles 
of being: idiotic, aesthetic, erotic, and agapeic. We encounter these hyperboles within the 
immanent order of the metaxu but, as hyperboles, they “throw us over” (hyperballein) 
toward the transcendent. Again, Desmond’s hyperbolic language is not merely a form of 
rhetorical poetics but, rather, performs by directing the reader’s attention beyond the 
between and toward the Transcendent (T3). In the next chapter, I treat more fully how 
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each of these ways offers an “indirection” to God; here, though, I consider what 
posthumous mind allows us to behold with new eyes.  
 
3.3.1 The Idiocy of Being 
 In the reconfigured ethos of modernity, being is taken for granted. To the curious 
minded, being is no more than a neutral substrate to be examined, manipulated, and 
mastered. Yet, as Desmond describes in Dostoevki’s near-death experience, one’s 
perception of the world can be transformed by staring into the abyss of death. The world 
ceases to be “just there” and is seen as though first the first time. There is a disorientation 
as one is wrenched from the ruts of everyday practice and put on new footing. How many 
breaths had Dostoevsky taken before his morning? Pulled back from the brink of 
oblivion, he felt his senses purged and came to exult in what he had hitherto taken for 
granted. To perceive the idiocy of being means, as Hadot observed, “to get rid of the 
conventional and routine vision we have of things, to rediscover a raw, naïve vision of 
reality, to take note of the splendor of the world which habitually escapes us.”658  
 By no means is “idiocy” pejorative. Going back to its Greek roots (idiotes), 
Desmond wants to convey a sense of “what is private, intimate, not publicly political.”659 
This sense of idiocy “goes to the roots of intimacy of self-being, our pre-objective, indeed 
pre-subjective, powers of being. Here we come alive again to the porosity of our own 
being and its passio essendi.”660 We find ourselves unclogged, senses purged, because 
struck by the incommunicable excess of being. The world is beheld as though for the first 
time and with reignited astonishment. Yet idiocy is not solipsistic, enclosing us in upon 
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ourselves; it is, rather, a hyperbolic happening: within the immanent order, we are 
astonished that anything is at all. We are propelled outside of ourselves because 
addressed by and implicated within the happening of exterior being (T1). Once more, we 
find a familiar vector moving ab exterioribus ad interiora. The advent of exterior 
transcendence stirs within us a sense of abiding intimacy. Desmond rightly recalls 
Augustine’s God who is interior intimo meo (more intimate to me than I am to myself).661 
Self-transcendence (T2), we saw earlier, is not self-wrought; it is, rather, an empowered 
response made possible by an abiding presence within the depths of one’s restless desire.  
 Exercising the “Return” results in an idiotically reborn mindfulness, and this in 
two ways. First, it occasions a renewed sense of the gratuity of being: It is! yet need not 
be. The fragility of being reminds us that all finite being is marked by a constitutive 
nothingness: it is, for now, but will eventually cease to be. Posthumous mind, without 
being blind to this fragility, has a sense of the elemental goodness and gratuity of being. 
Second, like Dostoevsky and Scrooge, idiotic rebirth affects the way we dwell within the 
community of beings. Rather than casual onlookers, we experience ourselves as engaged 
participants in the metaxu. Self-transcendence responds to the abiding presence of 
being’s intimate strangeness and bids us to dwell amidst exterior being in a renewed way.     
 Perhaps we can detect in Wittgenstein a similar development in appreciating the 
idiocy of being. Recall how he begins his Tractatus with the following proposiitons:   
1. The world is all that is the case. 
1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not things.  
1.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by their being all the facts. 662  
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Early in the Tractatus, it seems as though the entirety of world is to be subsumed into a 
univocal logic wherein reality is reduced to the “finite and nothing but the finite.” All that 
is can be examined as an amalgamation of facts. Yet, by the work’s end, we become 
aware of a sort of “mystical” upheaval. Wittgenstein’s initial attempt to reduce the world 
to atomistic proposition breaks apart as language cannot exhaust or constrain reality: 
 6.4321 The facts all contribute only to setting the problem, not to its solution. 
 6.44 It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists. 
 6.45 To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole – a limited  
whole.  
Feeling the world as a limited whole – it is this that is mystical.  
 6.522 There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make  
themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.663  
 
As he writes in 6.54, his “propositions serve as elucidations” akin to rungs on a ladder 
allowing us to climb beyond the propositions. Once we have ascended and reached the 
summit, we kick away the ladder and “see the world aright.”664 He seems to have intuited 
the “crack” within atomic facts and, rather than mourn the caducity of his system, 
interpreted these cracks as signs pointing beyond immanence toward the transcendent.       
 My point: within the workaday world, the idiocy of being is easily submerged and 
forgotten. In a different voice, Denise Levertov poetically expresses how 
 Days pass when I forget the mystery. 
 Problems insoluble and problems offering 
 their own ignored solutions.  
 Jostle for my attention, they crowd its antechamber 
 Along with a host of diversions, my courtiers, wearing 
 Their colored clothes; cap and bells.665  
 
Our re-awakening to the too-muchness of being occurs, as with Wittgenstein, with the 
breakdown of a univocal logic incapable of constraining the mystical element of 
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existence. Or it can be rekindled by passing through an encounter with death. Regardless 
its origin, the bite of astonishment, that it is at all, does not offer new information about 
the world; rather, it forms us to behold the world anew by rendering us porous to 
elemental mystery. Levertov concludes her poem: 
     And then 
 Once more the quiet mystery 
Is present to me, the throng’s clamor 
Recedes: the mystery 
that there is anything, anything at all, 
let alone cosmos, joy, memory, everything, 
rather than void: and that, O Lord, 
creator, Hallowed One, You still, 
hour by hour sustain it.666  
 
A renewed sense of being’s idiocy instigates an existential stirring, a mindfulness of what 
is and remains in excess of any system. Our grasping at being (conatus) is forced to relax 
into and recognize the primal passio, the originary address of being that remains beyond 
our control. The woo of mystery calls us to recognize the abiding presence of the intimate 
universal abiding within our depths and sustaining the whole of creation in its being.  
  
3.3.2 The Aesthetics of Happening 
 The capaciousness of posthumous mind is reflected both in its ability to be 
astonished that being is and in its openness to being astonished by the particularity of any 
given being: that this is. For Desmond, in aesthetic rebirth    
astonishment becomes ontological appreciation of the incarnate glory of the 
manifest creation which, showing itself sensuously, exceeds finitization. Native to 
the material world, our nativity is saturated with rich ambiguity resistant to our 
intervening domestications. Appreciation of immanence passes a threshold of 
immanence into mysterious love of transience that exceeds transience.667  
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If Desmond’s description of this is not entirely clear, perhaps it would help to think of 
how a father holds his newborn infant. This is not a baby like any other baby, for it is this 
child, my child whom I love beyond all telling. The exquisite fragility of each finger and 
toe, the boundless potential of a life, is swaddled in blanket and placed gingerly within 
the father’s eager arms. He makes contact physical contact not with an anonymous future 
but with this future, this being, who has a name: my daughter, my son, my beloved.  
 Aesthetic rebirth re-weaves the astonished subject into the community of being. 
We move from a Cartesian Subject-Object or disengaged apprehension of the world and 
find ourselves in congress with reality. This results in a renewed sense of togetherness: 
This togetherness is both “objective” in that it is there, out in the world, and 
“subjective” in that it is here in the concrete thereness of our fleshed presence to 
the world. I call the rebirth aesthetic, because aesthetic invokes both ta aesthētika 
of other-being and aisthēsis on our part. There is an immediate dynamic flow 
back and forth between the aesthetic things and our aesthēsis, a fluency richly 
articulated, though not acknowledged initially in our reflective categories. Our 
patience of being vibrates in attunement with the saturated glory of creation.668    
 
Aesthetic rebirth elicits ecstatic affirmation: This is beautiful! My child! There is a 
surplus incapable of being exhausted by any words. Aesthetic rebirth attunes us not only 
to beauty in general but renders us receptive to the beauty of each finite being.  
 Let me offer an example of aesthetic rebirth found in The Little Prince. When the 
little prince meets the fox, he is in a state of sorrow because he has found that the rose on 
his planet is not unique: in a garden he finds five thousand roses like his. When he meets 
the fox, he invites the fox to play with him. Yet the fox demurs for, as he says, “I am not 
tamed.” To tame, the fox observes, “means to establish ties.” The bond of friendship, 
forged over time, transforms the way they behold one another. When they become 
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friends, when they establish ties, then, “To me, you will be unique in all the world. To 
you, I shall be unique in all the world.” In a deceptively simple manner, Antoine de 
Saint-Exupéry’s text directs us to the poiesis of friendship. After they have become 
friends, and just before the prince takes leave of the fox, he re-visits the rose garden. 
Again he stands before the other roses but he sees them in a new way, in a new light:   
“You are not at all like my rose,” he said. “As yet you are nothing. No one has 
tamed you, and you have tamed no one. You are like my fox when I first knew 
him. He was only a fox like a hundred thousand other foxes. But I have made him 
my friend, and now he is unique in all the world.” 
"You are beautiful, but you are empty," he went on. "One could not die for you. 
To be sure, an ordinary passerby would think that my rose looked just like you--
the rose that belongs to me. But in herself alone she is more important than all the 
hundreds of you other roses: because it is she that I have watered; because it is she 
that I have put under the glass globe; because it is she that I have sheltered behind 
the screen…because it is she that I have listened to when she grumbled, or 
boasted, or even sometimes when she said nothing. Because she is my rose.669  
Aesthetic rebirth equips one with eyes to discern within ordinary the penumbra of the 
extraordinary. There is a re-opening of one’s porosity to what is other to oneself. When 
the prince returns to the fox, the fox shares with him a secret: “it is only with the heart 
that one can see rightly; what is essential is invisible to the eye.” Posthumous mind bears 
a sort of second-sight, a sight beyond physical sight, capable of penetrating the shell of 
“valueless being” to perceive what is at the core of reality.  
Aesthetic rebirth leads us to experience how we are able to glimpse what Duns 
Scotus called haecceitas or the “thisness” of each finite being. Being is not “neutrally 
present” but is an active “presencing” announcing itself. Hopkins captures this: 
 Selves—goes itself; myself it speaks and spells, 
 Crying What I do is me: For that I came.670  
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The sensuous manifestation of being calls out to each of us. Moreover, this is not “being” 
as monumental unity, proclaiming itself in one voice. It is plurivocal, addressing us in 
many and various ways: in the cry of the child, the power of the hurricane, the gloaming 
of a summer’s evening. Aesthetic rebirth focuses our attention not on the broad category 
of “beauty” because it re-orients us to the singularity of each given being. We return to 
Kearney: “Transcendence in a thornbush. The Eucharist in a morsel of madeleine. The 
Kingdom in a cup of cold water. San Marco in a cobblestone. God in a street cry.”671 
Posthumous mind permits us to discern how the singularity of each being – its haecceity 
– actively proclaims its origin in a Creator who calls the whole of being into existence.  
 
3.3.3 The Erotics of Selving 
 Whereas the “idiocy of being” and the “aesthetics of happening” are hyperboles 
of exterior transcendence (T1), what Desmond calls the “erotics of selving” addresses 
how, although we are finite beings, we are nevertheless “infinitely self-surpassing.”672 
Human beings are “intimately hyperbolic” because we are endowed  
with transcending power, but we do not endow ourselves. The immeasurable 
passion of our being as self-exceeding exceeds also the selving we are. It 
witnesses to a more primal porosity to what exceeds us. This erotics of selving is 
hyperbolic to a conatus essendi that drives itself to its own most complete self-
determination in immanence. The passio essendi is marked by a primal porosity 
to what exceeds all determination and our own self-transcending.673  
 
As discussed previously, eros cannot be defined solely by indigence or lack. The progeny 
of poros and penia, it is marked by an enriched poverty, bearing within itself a 
promissory note guaranteed by poros’s resources. By undergoing the “Return,” according 
to Desmond, “we become intimate again with this gifted poverty, and in the elemental 
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eros of our being. To become mindful of the porosity is to come closer to the primal 
ethos.”674 It is an archaeological endeavor, entering into our intimate depths to uncover 
fertile resources easily concealed on account of the incessant grasping of the conatus.  
The “Return” unclogs and reawaken us to the porosity of being. One is struck by 
what Desmond calls the urgency of ultimacy, an “absolute, infinite restlessness for the 
absolute or the ultimate that is not satisfied by any finite good.”675 In its reborn state, 
erotic mindfulness resists the seductions of idolatry as it searches for the object of its 
love; like Augustine, it but finds no finite being capable of sating its infinite longing.676 
Indeed, the inherent equivocity of finite being – the “crack” in everything – points 
beyond finite being toward a creative origin. Desmond adverts to “Augustine’s 
description of the double nature of his own quest for ultimacy” where 
in the middle of things – the exteriors – we come to know the dunamis of our own 
being as an interior middle, a mediating self-transcending power of openness. 
This is the first movement. The second movement is: in the interior middle, 
within the self-transcending urgence of desire, there is an opening to an other, 
more ultimate than ourselves. We are the interior urgency of ultimacy, this is 
ultimacy as superior. This superior ultimate is not identical with our own erotic 
self-mediation; it is irreducible to us and mediates with us – the inferior – through 
the agapeic excess of its own unequalizable plentitude.677  
 
Our most intimate desire is animated by the presence of this superior transcendence 
whose presence piques our appetite for the infinite and goads us along on our quest for 
fulfillment.678 Reborn eros, mindful of the passio, affirms each finite being yet continues 
to move beyond finite being in its quest for the infinite. Every affirmation of finite being 
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is accompanied by a negation as though one were to say inwardly: “You are a being, yet 
you cannot sate my hunger for the infinite. I long for ultimacy.” 
 Revitalized eros does not forsake the conatus although it does correct it by re-
emphasizing the priority of the passio. If contemporary notions of “the erotic” accenting 
the libido dominandi or a drive toward sexual conquest, Desmond’s sense of eros reborn 
absolves itself of the rush to conquest. Instead, it is open to being “wooed” and “willing 
to wait in love.”679 Desmond describes wooing as  
a distension of eros that is true to the intimacy of the passio essendi. There is a 
kind of readiness for gift in this, as when we truly listen to music. We hope to be 
hearers because we are ready to be patient listeners. There is a kind of obedience 
in wooing, and the porosity asked of the attendant is again not unlike a kind of 
praying…Wooing is the passio, faithful to the porosity of love, waiting in patient 
readiness for the surprise of the other, the gift of the secret beloved.680 
 
Westphal’s call for a “humble metaphysics, acknowledging that it rests on faith and not 
pretending to be the Voice of Pure Reason”681 is heard. For Desmond, prayer’s wooing 
cannot be regarded one’s own accomplishment: “Prayer at heart is not something that we 
do. Prayer is something that we find ourselves in, something that comes to us as we find 
ourselves already opened to the divine as other to us and yet as an intimate 
communication with us.”682 Having passed beneath the Angel of Death’s wings, 
unclogged eros allows itself to be wooed by the intimate universal abiding in the deepest 
recesses of one’s being: “When we cry ‘Abba! Father!’ it is that very Spirit bearing 
witness with our spirit that we are children of God” (Rom 8:15-16).  
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Gerard Manley Hopkins beautifully explores the contours and tensions of eros in 
his poem-prayer Nondum (Latin: not yet). The poem’s epigraph comes from Isaiah 45:15 
“Verily Thou art a God that hidest Thyself.” The 22-year old poet writes: 
We see the glories of the earth       We guess; we clothe Thee, unseen King, 
But not the hand that wrought them all:  With attributes we deem are meet; 
Night to a myriad worlds gives birth,  Each in his own imagining 
Yet like a lighted empty hall   Sets up a shadow in Thy seat; 
Where stands no host at door or hearth Yet know not how our gifts to bring, 
Vacant creation’s lamps appal.        Where seek Thee with unsandled feet.  
 
Ingredient in these verses is a sense of unfulfilled longing for the deus absconditus or 
hidden God. Hopkins voices his deep longing for the Holy One yet finds it hard to read 
the signs of creation as pointing beyond the immanent order toward the Creator. Unable 
to endure the silence, we mortals “clothe Thee, unseen King” according to our own image 
and likeness; God becomes imago homini. The poem swells with grievous sorrow as the 
Divine refuses to break its alienating silence. Yet Hopkins endures, moving along “life’s 
tomb-decked way” and he invokes “patience with her chastening wand.” The final verse: 
 Speak! whisper to my watching heart 
 One word – as when a mother speaks 
Soft, when she sees her infant start 
Till dimpled joy steals o’er its cheeks 
Then, to behold Thee as Thou art, 
I’ll wait till morn eternal breaks.683  
 
In no way does this prayer seduce or compel divine disclosure. Hopkins waits, patiently 
and attentively, for the word he longs to hear to spring forth and steel his resolve as he 
endures the dark night. He effects the stance of a listener, a potential hearer, one who 
takes up the night watch for any sign of the Holy One’s advent. Albeit less poetically, 
Rahner observes, “We are the beings of receptive spirituality, who stand in freedom 
before the free God of a possible revelation, which, if it comes, happens in our history 
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through the word. We are the ones who, in our history, listen for the word of the free 
God. Only thus are we what we should be.”684  
 With the balance between the passio and conatus essendi restored, the eros reborn 
in posthumous mind permits us to dwell within the community of transcendence anew. 
Nourished at the wellspring of the passio and mindful of the porosity of being, the 
antinomy between autonomy and transcendence evanesces: rather than competitors vying 
for space, an increase in one’s sense of actual transcendence (T3) allows for an increase in 
one’s freedom (T2). The equivocity in our own being – we are, yet we need not be – is, as 
Desmond observes, “a negation not nihilistic.”685 Every denial serves to affirm something 
more. No finite being encountered in the realm of exterior transcendence (T1) can fulfill 
this longing. Eccentric and ecstatic, self-transcendence reaches outward toward what is 
other to itself. Born-again eros, purged by having passed through the night of nihilism, 
finds itself able to detect and discern the subtle wooing of an abiding intimacy emanating 
from within oneself and guiding one beyond the self. Augustine’s question is, in effect, 
rekindled in the posthumous mind: instead of asking “What is the object of my love?” the 
purgation of the “Return” opens the self to the God beyond the finite order, and gives us 
ears to hear the refrain sung by the chorus of creation: “He made us.”686  
 
3.3.4 The Agapeics of Community 
  
 Just as the rebirth of eros leads one to recognize the intimate universal abiding in 
the depths of one’s being, the resurrection of agape permits one to perceive how all 
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created beings are intimately related with one another. We awaken to our own having 
been given to be and the gratuity of our existence and are struck into astonishment:  
we are given to be before we can give ourselves to be. Nothing is alone, hence the 
idea of finitude as for itself alone, and nothing other, cannot be taken as the last 
word, or the first. The agapeics of community intimates a surplus generosity that 
makes itself available in an absolved porosity of the passio esssendi that ethically 
lives itself as a compassio essendi. This is a sign of something more than the 
ethical, since it incarnates the holy.687  
 
Astonishment is enkindled not only by the non-necessity of other being (idiocy of being) 
but also by recognizing how our own being is non-necessary. We can be rocked back on 
our heels as we see how we are woven into the fabric of creation. The unclogged passio 
essendi bespeaks no autism of being as it is revealed to be a compassio essendi: we 
receive the gift of creation in solidarity with the whole of being. Indeed, Desmond 
reckons the compassio essendi a “graced patience” serving the good of others “even if it 
does little or nothing to serve the advancement of some agenda of the servant.”688  
 Lest there be confusion: Desmond does not oppose eros to agape.689 The 
movement of eros is elicited by agape’s call; or, as Desmond observes, eros “seeks more 
than itself in seeking itself because its energized striving is already empowered by a 
secret agapeic surplus to which it is (called) to remain true, though it is free to turn it 
away and turn itself awry.”690 Here we see how Desmond’s archaeology probes the 
contours of eros to discover the “secret” presence of agape. It is the agapeic advance of 
actual transcendence (T3) that empowers and orients erotic self-transcendence (T2). Eros 
and agape as twinned: eros accents self-mediation whereas agape calls attention to how 
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the intermediation of the metaxu arises from and remains open to the transcendent. The 
hypertrophied conatus of the modern age, as we have seen, clogs the porosity between 
self-transcendence and transcendence as other (T1 & T3) results in eros turannos rather 
than the balance of eros ouranios made possible to posthumous mind.691  
 By undergoing the “Return to Zero,” one is given to behold the metaxu in a new 
way. One is astonished by the idiocy of being and the aesthetics of happening; one is re-
awakened to the elemental wellspring of the passio essendi empowering erotic self-
transcendence. We are stirred to see ourselves as implicated within the community of 
beings: we are not over-and-against others because we are one-amidst-others. What was 
taken for granted by unpurged eyes is beheld by posthumous mind as granted. The 
hyperboles of being – idiotic, aesthetic, erotic, and agapeic – are not “facts about” reality 
but events adverting us to the poesis or happening of being, stirring us to rethinking the 
rethink the “grounding origin” who gives all things to be.692  
 In Perplexity and Ultimacy Desmond asks, “Is there an agapeic mindfulness that 
transfigures the ugly?”693 Faced with the loathsome, the abominable, or the grotesque, is 
there anything capable of stirring within us a response of love? Desmond seizes upon the 
figure of Saint Francis as an exemplar of this agapeic mindfulness. Paul Crowley 
recognizes this when, drawing on Kazantzakis’ Saint Francis, he describes how Francis 
prays to God to ask what more God might be asking of him. He has already 
restored the Church of San Damiano and given up everything else for God. Yet he 
is riddled with fear of contact with lepers. He confides to Brother Leo: “Even 
when I’m far away from them, just hearing the bells they wear to warn passers-by 
to keep their distance is enough to make me faint.” God’s response to Francis’s 
prayer is precisely what he does not want to hear: he must face his fears and 
embrace the next leper he sees on the road. Soon he hears the dreaded clank of the 
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leper’s bell. Yet, Francis moves through his fears, embraces the leper, and even 
kisses his wounds.694   
 
For Crowley, “it is only by driving into the reality of suffering, and not evading it, that 
one can find a pathway to hope and encounter with the sacred.”695 There is an 
overcoming of fear by undergoing what he fears most: in the leper’s embrace, Francis 
submits himself to death and is born again to behold Christ’s figure in each leper, the one 
who had neither “form nor comeliness” (Is 53:2), the one who appeared in history marred 
and despised, the “stone the builders rejected” who is now the cornerstone (Ps 118:22).  
Francis’s kissing of the leper hardly reflects sober calculation. And this is the 
point: the figure of Francis is hyperbolic, one who leads us to ponder what fuels his 
actions and motives by “throwing us over” ordinary logic. For Christians, Francis and the 
saints offer embodied testimony to agapeic hyperbole. Francis enacted the love he 
received from God, moving by grace from a terrestrial logic to a theo-logic which 
boggled his father’s mind and has inspired generations of followers. Viewed with 
posthumous mind, we see how agape cannot ever admit of a logical mean or calculation. 
As Aquinas observes, “never can we love God as much as He ought to be loved, nor 
believe and hope in him as much as we should. Much less therefore can there be excess in 
such things. Accordingly, the good of such [theological] virtues does not consist in a 
mean, but increases the more we approach to the summit.”696 Posthumous mind is alive to 
this excess and finds itself energized and empowered by it. So, too, Taylor who writes: 
“what has always been stressed in Christian agape is the way in which it can take us 
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beyond the bounds of any already existing solidarity.”697 Agape, Taylor writes, “moves 
outward from the guts; the New Testament word for ‘taking pity’, splangnizesthai, place 
the response in the bowels.”698 The woo of agape loosens the grasping hands of the 
conatus and relaxes them into the open receptivity of the passio. Francis kisses the leper 
not out of self-loathing but as an act of other-affirmation; in embracing the leprous other 
and discovers, beneath disfigured flesh, the visage of a transfigured brother.  
 Let us contrast Francis’s diurnal encounter with the leper with Zarathustra’s 
“Night Song.” Francis, we saw, undergoes the dark grace of an answered prayer as he 
embraces the leper as he is moved by an agapeic compassio essendi and impelled into 
service of his neighbor. Francis awakens to a porosity empowering a movement through 
fear into a new way of beholding: he undergoes an encounter with death and is graced 
with a mindfulness reborn by agape. Nietzsche, too, sings of this porosity but in a 
nocturnal key. Das Nachtlied, for Desmond, “is perhaps one of the most beautiful things 
Nietzsche has written, and yet for all its energy of self-affirmation, it is full of a nameless 
sadness, of something missing or missed.”699 It is, ultimately, a hymn to solitude: 
Light am I: ah, that I were night! But this is my solitude, that I am girded round  
with light. 
 Ah, that I were dark and obscure! How I would suck at the breasts of light! 
 And I should bless you, little sparkling stars and glowworms above! – and be  
happy in your gifts of light.  
But I live in my own light, I drink back into myself the flames that break from  
me.   
 I do not know the joy of the receiver; and I have often dreamed that stealing must  
be more blessed that receiving.  
 It is my poverty that my hand never rests from giving; it is my envy that I see  
expectant eyes and illumined nights of desire.700  
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Zarathustra’s song performs a parodic absolution. Whereas Francis’s prayer leads him 
into communion with the leper, the Nachtleid absolves him from community. The 
contrast is stark: Francis’s porosity is a freedom for relationship, Zarathustra exults in an 
autistic freedom from. Francis’s prayerful openness to God (T3) transforms forever how 
he dwells within the metaxu. Yet such a deep weaving into the metaxu is not available to 
Zarathustra, for he regards himself a mediator, a giver, and in no way as receiver. The 
Holy Fool faces fear and finds agape; he is overcome by the compassio essendi and made 
lover of all. The Ultimate Man hungers for wickedness as “spite wells from my solitude” 
yet no draught slackens his thirst “which yearns after your thirst.” 701 Zarathustra’s Song 
incarnates a sense of utter absolution (ab-solo): from himself and by himself, alone.  
 To be reborn to the agapeics of community is to find oneself caught up in the 
interplay of the metaxu. But we are not casual onlookers peering into the happening as 
voyeurs; we are, to the contrary, implicated in the interplay being. Indeed, posthumous 
mind permits us to glimpse how the unclogging of the passio essendi gives rise to the 
compassio essendi. The compassio inverts the will the power: instead of asserting oneself 
over-and-against another, the compassio essendi is the ethical power to will the good of 
the other by standing in solidarity as sister or brother. Perceived with eyes purged by 
death, we can be struck by the agapeic love of community and inquire into the ground 
that gives rise to such generosity and empowers acts of self-sacrificing love and devotion. 
Stirred to recognize the agapeics of community, the entire metaxu shimmers as a 
ceaseless interplay of signs capable of pointing beyond “the between” and directing us 
from the immanent order toward the transcendent source who grounds and sustains all 
being.  
                                               
701 Ibid. 
 233 
3.3.5 Perceiving Hyperbolically  
  Let me offer a summary of Part III. The hyperboles of being we examined – 
idiotic, aesthetic, erotic, agapeic – can roughly be indexed to Desmond’s three 
transcendences. The “idiocy of being” and “aesthetics of happening” both show how 
exterior transcendence (T1) can “throw us above” the immanent order. We can be struck 
that being is at all and by singular being’s thisness (haecceity) and made mindful of the 
endowing source of being. Erotic desire, purged by having passed through the night of 
nihilism, finds itself awakened to the presence of a transcendence within its innermost 
depths. Self-transcendence (T2) is not induced by lack or indigence but as a movement 
toward satisfying a restless longing incapable of being sated by finite grasping. 
Posthumous erotic transcendence does not search, accordingly, for any finite what 
because it longs for an infinite Who whose call animates its longing. Reborn agapeics 
endows us with an ability to see all of the created order as somehow implicated in the 
ongoing act of creation. The intimate universal binds together the entire community of 
being: we participate in a shared economy (oikos + nomos = law of the home). Actual 
Transcendence (T3) or the creative agapeic origin does not impede or interfere with 
autonomy. In fact, in being reawakened to the primordial passio essendi and porosity of 
our being, we find ourselves in a state of absolved freedom: sustained in our being and 
called to dwell anew within the community of transcendence.   
 Posthumous mind does not have a direct eye-line into the divine. What it 
possesses, though, is the gift of perspective: not removed from the flux but a way of 
beholding the flux with renewed eyes, eyes attuned through the darkness of the nihil. 
Posthumous mind is not simply a way of thinking; it is a way of comportment or “being 
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in the world.” Because it has faced squarely its own mortality, it recognizes the wound of 
finitude in each created being and marvels at its gratuity. It is…yet it need not be. No 
cause for sorrow, one is ever and again stirred into astonishment at the prodigal 
generosity of creation. The crack in each thing, a sign of mortality, is the aperture through 
which it contributes to the symphony of creation. In the workaday world, we are all but 
deaf to this melody but, for ears chastened by death, the song heard proclaims the gratuity 
of existence. The hyperboles of creation are not rhetorical flourishes but poetic 
expressions pointing those attuned to them toward the poetic happening of creation itself.  
 
3.4  A Subtler Exercise: The Poetics of the Between 
 
 The reader will not have missed the incorporation of poetry into the text. This is 
deliberate: there are times when poetry, or music, or great art communicate far more than 
prose. Indeed, metaxology requires us to speak of being between, of dwelling within the 
metaxu, with many voices. There are times when abstract language may be appropriate; 
other times require a defter touch. Sometimes a concept must be allowed to sing; 
elsewhere, one must feel fully the gravity of thought. Poetry demands intentionality: one 
must linger on the words and allow the meaning of the verse to unfold. Verses must be 
savored, stewed over, and meditated upon over time. To draw this chapter to a close, let 
me cite Desmond’s poem that begins a chapter entitled “Beyond Godlessness”  
 We have looked too low   In the leap 
 The ground beneath us   Joy looks up 
 Falls away     As well as out 
 & joy leaps up in us    We dare no longer 
 Out of nothing     Look too low 
 Leaps out of itself    We look for more 
 & the elemental world is there  Again 
 Again 
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The poem appears to recount a double rebirth. First, there is the rebirth of the “elemental 
world” arising through the sudden surge of joy. Recall the image of the furrowed brow: 
the curious-minded person is hunched over and fixated upon a determinate this. 
Suddenly, however, the ground falls out; one is caught off-guard as “joy leaps up” as one 
unbidden yet not unwelcome. Rocked back on one’s heels, the world is beheld again as 
one stands, anew, amidst (meta) beings.  
 Nevertheless, the joy that leaps is not alien to us. It is our joy yet not at our 
command; it is intimate yet strange. Joy buoys our gaze, granting it both an outward view 
over being but also an upward view beyond (meta) being. Suddenly, one is freed from the 
sediment and given to roam again freely. The wound of joy disallows us to remain in the 
sediment, thwarts any sense of complacency. No longer permitted to look “too low,” our 
expectant eyes scan the horizon and sit vigil as one awaits patiently, attentively, the 
advent of the one who has stirred us from our slumber and bid us to sit the night watch. 
 Desmond’s poem guides the reader through two rebirths and expresses in 
poetically compressed form the trajectory of Desmond’s entire chapter. The reader, to 
borrow the title of a collection of essays honoring Desmond’s thought, is led to occupy a 
space Between System and Poetics. Within this space, one can learn the grammar of 
metaxology. Being tutored in the grammar of metaphysics, however, is not sufficient; one 
must put it into practice. As Desmond observes, “the metaxological space of the intimate 
universal is always a communal setting for conversion, for metanoia. There is a 
metanoetics of the metaxological: being born again, a second birth in the dimension of 
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the hyperbolic.”702 Metaphysics, rightly approached, can become a disciplined 
mindfulness open to the very goodness of the “to be” of existence.  
 Drawing upon Pierre Hadot’s work, I argued for approaching Desmond’s thought 
as a form of “spiritual exercise.” The non-negotiable terminus a quo for this approach is 
“a real desire to dialogue.”703 As with any spiritual exercise, one must embark upon it 
with a willingness to undergo the transformation of one’s life. Spiritual exercise is a 
pilgrimage, a journey of seeking and finding aimed at transforming the one who sets out 
on it. Whereas a tourist follows a pre-planned itinerary, moving from defined point to 
defined point, the pilgrim’s route is shrouded in mystery. For the terminus ad quem of 
spiritual exercise is not a physical destination but a re-orientation of one’s life and a 
transformation of one’s vision. One sets out from the workaday world upon a quest not to 
conquer but to encounter, not solely to be informed but to be gradually formed and re-
formed as one opens oneself to the divine.  
 I tested my wager “in practice” by reading Desmond’s “Return to Zero” as an 
exercise in death. This is an exercise in which one is invited to live the “shattering” of a 
godless nihilism and experience, paradoxically, a different nihilism: a nihilating of 
despair in despair.”704 Indeed, as Renée Köhler-Ryan observes, this experience of 
nothingness places Desmond in the company of Augustine and Aquinas: “Augustine’s 
nihilne plus and Thomas’s videtur mihi ut palea each speak to Desmond of the 
nothingness which is the ‘return to zero’ without which knowledge of God and of self, as 
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sources of transcendence in intimate relationship to each other, are impossible.”705 Read 
as an exercise, the “Return to Zero” serves as an existential unclogging of primal porosity 
as idols erected by the conatus essendi crumble under the nihil’s weight. Amidst the dust 
and rubble, though, we are struck into astonishment at the senseless gratuity of existence 
– being is! – yet need not be. In a way, posthumous mind is our graced affliction because 
it refuses us to settle for any finite good. All that promised to sate our restless desire 
seems now so much dust and ash. Yet, now that we can detect the “crack” in everything, 
we discern within the hyperboles of being a glimmer of hope. We can allow the signs 
encountered within the metaxu to direct us – even if only indirectly – toward the 
Transcendent origin and ultimate fulfillment of our restless longing.   
 What Desmond offers us is a spiritual exercise drawing on the subtle language of 
poetry. This proves needful because, as Taylor notes of our era, “the constitutive, 
revelatory power of language is totally sidelined and ignored, or even denied. This 
understanding of language-use is correlative with a stance in which we treat things, and 
even each other, in purely instrumental terms.”706 Our language has been bewitched into 
the sleep of finitude and needs to be awakened. Herein lies the promise of poetic speech: 
because it “doesn’t already rely on already recognized structures”707 it can provoke 
readers to see things in a new way. Poetry requires us to pause, to learn to read again, and 
to dwell mindfully on the text. Poetry, Taylor continues, “opens new paths, ‘sets free’ 
new realities, but only for those for whom it resonates.”708 Desmond’s poetics performs 
by opening these new paths. Metaxological poetics both revitalizes our appreciation for 
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the depth of language and also, by attuning us to the hyperbole of being, gives us to 
perceive the happening of the metaxu with new eyes. To draw once more on Taylor, we 
might say that metaxological poetics is less designative or enframing, neutrally pointing 
toward the happening, than it is constitutive.709  By tutoring us into a subtle metaphysical 
language, metaxology “gives us a picture of language as making possible new purposes, 
new levels of behavior, new meanings.”710 In this way, it is a capacitating language that 
endows those tutored not to perceive a different world but to be attentive to the poetics of 
reality in a new and different manner.  
 If posthumous mind enables us to recognize the hyperboles of being and to 
discern the presence of the “crack” in all finite being, then we must explore how we 
might read these signs not only as pointing toward actual transcendence (T3) but also, and 
more importantly, as providing what Desmond regards as “hyperbolic indirections” 
toward the divine. By approaching them in this way, we can read them as self-implicating 
exercises capable of directing willing seekers along a mystagogical itinerary leading to a 
renewed sense of the sacred. It is to this task I now turn.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
709 Charles Taylor, The Language Animal (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2016), 3-50.  
710 Ibid., 4.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Exercising Transcendence: 
 Indirect Ways to God 
 
One must lose oneself in a state devoid of particular form or measure, a state of darkness 
in which all contemplatives blissfully lose their way and are never again able to find 
themselves in a creaturely way. In the abyss of this darkness in which the loving spirit 
has died to itself, God’s revelation and eternal life have their origin, for in this darkness 
an incomprehensible light is born and shines forth. 
John Ruusbroec, The Spiritual Espousals 
 
 
 Approached as a spiritual exercise, Desmond’s “Return to Zero” is capable of 
transforming the way we perceive and abide within the world. Stated in a more traditional 
idiom, the “Return” guides us along a via purgativa through the night of nihilism and, in 
bringing us to and through the nothing, gives us to behold everything anew: being is yet 
need not be. We see through an era’s reconfigured ethos, glimpse the primal ethos of 
being, and are struck into astonishment. We marvel before the overdeterminacy of 
exterior becoming (T1) as beings come into being and pass away. We behold the “crack” 
in everything not as a flaw but as a sign of gratuity and non-necessity. So purged, self-
transcendence (T2) is renewed as we recognize beyond the self-assertive “will to power” 
(conatus) a more primordial power first giving us to be before we grasp at being (passio). 
The “Return” becomes an askēsis of “agapeic nihilism.” The “Return” attunes one to the 
sheer gratuity and of all being. “God gives for nothing,” Desmond writes, yet this 
nihil is not any negating or destructive nihil. God does nothing for Himself; 
everything is done for the other. There is a sense in which nothing is for God. God 
lets be, since everything given by God is for that thing, given for that thing 
itself.711  
 
Agapeic nihilism plunges us into the dark abyss of the nihil where our senses are purged 
and we are given to perceive the ethos anew, allowing a renewed rapport with creation.    
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 In this chapter, I show how metaxology, undertaken as a spiritual exercise, offers 
four “indirections” to God. For Desmond, we have “no direct univocal pathway to God” 
but only “indirections directing human transcending.”712 In Part I, I discuss why there can 
be no univocal “proofs” and explore how we must speak, poetically and indirectly, of 
“ways” to God. In Parts II-V, I explore how the hyperboles of being – idiotic, aesthetic, 
erotic, agapeic – open up four indirections or itineraries leading us toward a renewed 
sense of God, indicating throughout how metaxology contributes to Christian theology 
and enriches Taylor’s map of our age. Guided by Hopkins’s “Hurrahing in Harvest,” I 
conclude by showing how metaxology works to attune readers to disclosures, or 
epiphanies, of the divine. I do this because, as Desmond holds, metaphysics 
is not just the philosophical discipline that examines and evaluates categories and 
arguments for their rational cogency; not just the philosophical interpretation of 
the ethos as reconfigured in light of the fundamental presuppositions and enabling 
(re)sources of intelligibility and value of a particular era, or people, or particular 
way of life; deeper than these, it seeks to open a pathway of philosophical 
mindfulness concerning the primal ethos of being.713   
 
Metaxological askēsis contributes to a way of reflecting about, living within, and 
beholding reality. These exercises can render us attentive to discerning, even in a secular 
age, “signs in immanence of what transcends immanence and that cannot be fully 
determined in immanent terms.”714 We can be tutored to recognize in the hyperboles of 
being signs of a God “more inward than my most inward part and higher than the highest 
element within me.”715 Metaxology returns us to the primal ethos of being wherein, by 
exercising transcendence, we become “epiphanically attuned” to detect in the happening 
of the metaxu traces of the Creator who sings and sustains all of creation into existence.  
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4.1 No Univocal Way to God: The Subtler Language of Indirection 
 According to Desmond, there can be no univocal “proof” for God’s existence 
because univocity “contracts the ontological charge of the aesthetics of happening, makes 
too determinate the porosity of our being, fixes the urgency of ultimacy on objectified 
beings, and overall enfeebles the feel for transcendence as non-objectifiable.”716 Univocal 
proofs seek apodictic certainty and universal applicability but, as we have seen, 
univocity, by itself, cannot account for the full happening of the metaxu. But in an ethos 
reconfigured according to l’esprit de géometrie, it is little wonder we find the likes of 
Richard Dawkins who dismiss Aquinas’s first three “proofs” because they 
rely upon the idea of a regress and invoke God to terminate it. They make the 
entirely unwarranted assumption that God himself is immune to the regress. Even 
if we allow the dubious luxury of arbitrarily conjuring up a terminator to an 
infinite regress and giving it a name, simply because we need one, there is 
absolutely no reason to endow that terminator with any of the properties normally 
ascribed to God…717 
 
Dawkins assumes modernity’s mathesis of nature: the only beings that count are those 
capable of being counted. And he is right: if God is such a being amidst other being, then 
it would illegitimate to absolve the deity from being implicated in the infinite regress. 
Sophomorically posed: if God created everything, then what created God? The god 
Dawkins dismisses would be a countable being within the system, not the God on whose 
account there exists a system in the first place.   
 Treating God as a being amidst other beings is symptomatic of post-Cartesian and 
ontotheological modes of reflection. To counter this tendency, Desmond draws a 
distinction between modern “theory” and pre-modern theōria. On his account, modern 
theory “offers a general hypothesis or model, that itself is as mathematically precise as 
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possible, and that is to be determined as true, verified, in terms of evidence from sense 
experience or experimental data…[it] is an abstraction of mind from being as given, with 
a view to ordering the given, and perhaps to gain control over it.”718 Earlier practices of 
metaphysics, by contrast, possessed a mindfulness rooted in theōria: 
The theōroi were religious delegates sent by the city states to the [pan-Hellenic] 
games, which were themselves religious festivals, celebrations of the largess of 
being, largess evident in the great performances and deeds of outstanding humans. 
Theōroi were sent to enjoy the agape of being as ritualized in religious festivals. 
There is a watching here, a being spectatorial, but it is a joyful vigilance; it is an 
entirely active mindfulness…to the extent that a metaphysician is a theōros, he 
too is called to this essentially joyful vigilance, this celebrating mindfulness of the 
ultimate powers, at play in the between.719  
 
Metaxological mindfulness refuses to be abstracted from the metaxu because it insists on 
remaining faithful to the flux of reality. Rather than an exhaustive system it enjoins a 
contemplative way of life, one vigilantly watchful for the “crack” in everything and 
attentive to signs pointing to the overdeterminacy of being. Whereas univocal proofs 
would ignore equivocity and freeze the flux, metaxology promotes inquiry in the mode of 
l’esprit de finesse. Thus, in lieu of proofs, metaxology plunges us into the metaxu where 
must discern passages or “ways” leading us, even if indirectly, to God.  
  Fidelity to the equivocity of the between requires a subtler philosophical 
language, one employing a discourse “tentative and open, suggestive of what is elusive, 
rather than dogmatically assertive with regard to some reality supposedly mastered.”720 
Metaxology employs four ways of figuring or representing the divine: metaphoric, 
analogic, symbolic, and hyperbolic. We begin with the metaphoric. A living metaphor, 
Desmond holds, “has the power to surprise and open our receptivity to unexpected 
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otherness.”721 A theological metaphor arises from our being amidst beings and directs us 
toward the God beyond being. We know God is not literally a shepherd, but the metaphor 
serves to refresh a sense of God’s fidelity and commitment. Indeed, a well-articulated 
metaphor “has the power to stun us into surprise and open our receptivity to unexpected 
otherness.”722 Poetic metaphors stress the identity between sign and signified: God “is” 
my rock, God “is” my stronghold. The “is” expresses an intimate link between the 
metaxu and God. There would appear to be no limit to the potential metaphors for God: 
from leavening yeast to the host of an eternal banquet, from the rock to the Father of all, 
these metaphors draw strength from and keep us mindful of our porosity to the divine.  
 The use of metaphor, however, is not without peril. It is possible to be tempted 
into univocity: when “God is Father of all” is taken to mean the Transcendent is a male 
with XY-chromosomes, we vitiate the metaphor. Dennis Vanden Auweele observes: 
“metaphors carry the danger that we are ferried (pherein) so far beyond (meta) the 
difference that we identify the sign with God: we conflate the sign for what it 
designates.”723 The “is” of metaphor can be seduced into forgetting difference and can be 
tempted to accent sameness, thereby denuding a metaphor of its communicate power.  
 To address this, we need recourse to analogy. Analogy, Desmond writes, “is a 
relation of likeness, and likening clearly keeps open the space of difference. Hence, if 
univocity is not absolutized, neither is equivocity.”724 The analogical figuration of the 
divine aims to preserve a sense of unity-in-difference and attentive to the “constitutive 
                                               
721 Desmond, God and the Between, 123.  
722 Ibid., 123.  
723 Dennis Vanden Auweele, “The Poverty of Philosophy: Desmond’s Hyperbolic Gifts and Caputo’s  
Events,” in American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 87 (3): 411—432 at 419.  
724 Desmond, God and the Between, 123-4.  
 244 
ambiguity to all our speaking about the ultimate.”725 Speech about God requires 
vigilance: whatever we say of the Divine can never exhaust or fix determinately the 
mystery of being. Metaphor and analogy permit us to speak of God using concepts drawn 
from the metaxu, although no concept can exhaust or capture the divine mystery.   
 Of course, analogy is not without pitfalls. Although intended to preserve a sense 
of equivocity, it can also be statically “fixed” into a mathematical relation on account of 
its root in mathematical proportion, and in that respect one is also inclined to a 
kind of univocity: the difference of the between and ultimate transcendence is 
mapped as a ration on a quasi-univocal grid of relations. Such a grid easily freezes 
into a two-tiered system of otherwise unrelated terms, and hence risk the dualistic 
opposition between “here” and “beyond,” between immanence and transcendence 
as other that it is the greater power of analogy to circumvent.726  
 
Vanden Auweele names the risk: if we “fix” our relationship to the divine through an 
analogy too-closely modeled on mathematics, analogy “recedes then to become our 
‘relation’ to the divine and not our self-transcending ‘relating’ as infused with marvel.”727 
A fixed analogy informs about the divine, whereas a metaxological analogy preserves 
“divine disproportion.”728 Against the temptation to slide into a fixed or determinate 
proportionality (a:b as c:d), metaxology insists on preserving the teaching of Lateran IV 
(1215) that “between Creator and creature no similitude can be expressed without 
implying a greater dissimilitude.”729 When God creates “humankind in our image, 
according to our likeness” (Gen 1:26), the analogical likeness to the divine must be 
tempered by an awareness of the infinite disproportion between us and the Creator.  
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 Symbolic figurations of the Divine stress togetherness. The symbol, Desmond 
writes, “is a throwing together (sumballein) of the differents; it is the sign of a ‘being 
with,’ a sun-ousia. A broken ring is divided and shared by two lovers, each half a token 
of their original togetherness and in their separation a sign of their promised and renewed 
togetherness”730 In a religious symbol, the immanent and transcendent conjoin in 
“equivocal promiscuity.”731 Symbols can elevate the immanent toward the transcendent 
or, in a counter-move, to drag the transcendent downward: 
Suppose we take the erotic absolute as a symbol of God…This symbol is one 
major way of trying to name the involvement of the divine with immanence. God 
is in love with creation, passionate for its good, zealous for the realization of its 
promise and integral wholeness. Is God then dependent on that immanent 
wholeness for God’s own fulfillment?732  
 
Here we find the nub of Desmond’s concern with Kearney’s God. Given the tendency to 
emphasize eros’s penia or lack, the symbol of God as somehow possessed of “eros” risks 
portraying the divine as being in need of humans. Rightly, Desmond is leery of any hint 
of Hegel redivivus, although Kearney’s divine eros does not render God a “counterfeit 
double.”733 Desmond’s caution is warranted for, as Ricoeur observes, “symbols have 
roots. Symbols plunge us into the shadowy experience of power.”734 The metaxological 
symbol plunges into the primal ethos and allows the elemental to comingle with the 
transcendent. Attentive to the surplus of the ethos, symbolic indirection directs 
attentiveness toward “immanent disproportion, or disproportion in immanence 
irreducible to any univocal or dialectical concept.”735 The believer’s “amen” when 
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receiving the consecrated host records the believer’s assent to the symbolic of immanent 
disproportion encountered as the “infinite immanent in the finite, passing incognito in its 
festivity and travail.”736  
 The fourth figuring is hyperbolic. Where the symbol stresses togetherness, the 
hyperbolic figure accents overdeterminacy or excessiveness by giving  
us a figure of the overdeterminate in the determinate and the self-determined, the 
overdeterminate that cannot be exhausted by determinacy or self-determination, 
the “beyond” of immanence in immanence. The symbolic throws together, but 
stuns us with disproportion in immanence; the hyperbolic “throws us above” 
(huper-ballein) in the disproportion between immanence and transcendence, just 
out of that being stunned with excess of being here.737  
 
Alert to the poetic nature of Desmond’s language, we can appreciate his desire for 
hyperbole both to inform readers and to reform, or induce a reborn, mindfulness of what 
exceeds being. Rightly approached, the metaxology provides a staging area or theater 
wherein one may practice or exercise the poetics of the text in order to be implicated in 
and transformed by the poetics of the between. Hyperbole “throws us above” the metaxu 
toward a power beyond any immanent will to power. We are thrown into the presence of 
a Creative Other who preserves creation in its being simply because it is good to be.  
 For Desmond, hyperbole preserves and maximizes the potencies of metaphor, 
analogy, and symbol. Metaxological metaphysics intends for us to be carried away and 
“thrown over” as we celebrate the breakdown of univocal categories and seize the chance 
to explore newly-opened indirections toward the divine. In effect, the incapacitation of 
univocity capacitates our return to the Transcendent by opening up hitherto concealed 
paths. Hence my advocacy for approaching his work as a form of exercise: it is not 
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enough to “go over” the text because they are meant to be undergone. We have, in other 
words, to allow ourselves to be implicated in the text’s rhythm and moved by its beat. 
 To conclude, I return to a point made in the first chapter about ad hominem 
reasoning. Such reasoning, we saw, “is directed at the participants in conversation and at 
the things they posit or value rather than introducing a set of neutral, independent criteria 
from outside the positions of the parties.”738 My proposal was to consider arguments 
based on ad hominem reasoning as capacitating. Instead of scoring points off one’s 
opponent, or engaging in agonistic or winner-take-all combat, a capacitating strategy of 
argument willing enters into a process of dialogue in the hope of showing how a 
transition from position X to position Y would be error-reducing or would make better 
sense of one’s life and experience. Such an approach remains always tentative because of 
its commitment to an ongoing and open-ended search for a “better account.” Taylor’s use 
of this latter form of reasoning endows his texts with their performative character. Instead 
of “telling about” history, Taylor’s texts serve to “implicate us in” an unfolding narrative. 
The text performs by giving readers to experience for themselves the various pressures 
and forces at play. When it comes to narrating the “eclipse of the transcendent,” Taylor’s 
account is not a “show and tell.” Animated by the form of ad hominem and capacitating 
argument considered in the first chapter, A Secular Age draws reader into a dialogue by 
inviting them to try his account on “for size” to test its adequacy.  
 As I hope now to demonstrate, Desmond’s metaxological metaphysics not only 
informs the reader but can also transform the way one perceives the world. These 
indirections do not pretend to be neutral arguments or disengaged proofs. They are, 
rather, finessed approaches akin to gymnasia where one may philosophically exercise 
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oneself not simply by reflecting about the Transcendent but risking a re-awakening to a 
sense of the Sacred. Hence my argument for the doubly poetic nature of Desmond’s 
metaphysics, as rhetorically the texts communicate information and work 
“performatively” to implicate the reading in a process of metaxological formation. The 
willing reader can undergo the text and be transformed. In our age, as Hadot noted, we 
are not accustomed to this style of philosophy. We, or at least many of us, have been 
weaned on the thin gruel of univocity and have lost our taste for more robust fare. By 
reading metaxology within the ancient tradition of spiritual exercises, of approaching 
philosophy as a way of life, I hope to convince readers not that Desmond has an 
irrefutable logical argument for God’s existence but that metaxology can capacitate new 
and exciting ways of thinking philosophically and theologically. Metaxology, approached 
as a type of discursive performance, seems gets the gist of Martin Büber’s story of a rabbi  
whose grandfather had been a disciple of the Baal Shem, was asked to tell a story. 
“A story,” he said, “must be told in such a way that it constitutes help in itself.” 
And he told: “My grandfather was lame. Once they asked him to tell a story about 
his teacher. And he related how the holy Baal Shem used to hop and dance while 
he prayed. My grandfather rose as he spoke, and he was so swept away by his 
story that he himself began to hop and dance to show how the master had done. 
From that hour on he was cured of his lameness. That’s the way to tell a story!”739  
 
Desmond’s hyperbolic indirections, read as spiritual exercises, can likewise cure us of 
our spiritual lameness by rekindling the question of the Transcendent and renewing once-
reliable itineraries to the sacred. It is to this task of renewal, then, I now turn.  
 
4.2 A First Indirection: The Idiocy of Being  
   
 Even students new to the study of philosophy and theology are familiar with 
“proofs” for God’s existence. Some, like Aquinas’s “Five Ways,” are a posteriori and 
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probe the happening of the exterior world for signs of the divine; others, like Anselm’s 
“ontological” argument, are a priori and appeal to nothing other than reason itself. But 
think of how these “proofs” tend to be presented in textbooks, usually as stand-alone 
arguments to be read, analyzed, and evaluated. “A common view of the arguments for 
God’s existence,” Desmond observes, “sees them as neutral uses of reason that are 
purportedly convincing, or not, on the basis of a reason separate from any religious 
claims of revelation or faith.”740 Yet, he continues, “we do an injustice to the ‘proofs’ if 
we abstract them from the ontological context in which they are formulated.”741 His 
metaxological reformulation of traditional proofs, consequently, requires us to remain 
attentive to the interplay between each “way” and its originary ethos.  
 I earlier suggested the “Return to Zero” as propaedeutic for undertaking 
Desmond’s indirections to God. Desmond would concur, writing: “I do not think we can 
fully appreciate these hyperboles without genuine metaphysical mindfulness of the primal 
ethos of being.”742 Hence the need to pass through the purgative night of godlessness and 
to experience the shattering of coming to nothing: all comes from nothing, all returns to 
nothing, yet now it is. By re-awakening to the primal ethos, we are struck by the 
hyperbolic idiocy of being. Shocked by its non-necessity, we face a choice: take being 
“for granted as the final surd, just senseless idiocy” or meditate on it “as granted, though 
as disquieting us with its radical ambiguity, and in that ambiguity tantalizing with a light 
that is not its own light.”743 Our first indirection is guided by this idiotic light.  
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  Let me offer a composition of place by drawing on Desmond’s insight into the 
difference between “becoming” and “coming to be.” We begin, then, by observing how 
the primal givenness of the “that it is” is not a matter of the “becoming” or “self-
becoming” of beings. There is a “coming to be” prior to “becoming.” The latter 
presupposes a prior “that it is,” even granting that this “that it is” is given with an 
open promise, and not as a static and completed fact. Granted, there is the 
openness of (self-)becoming, but there is granted a “being opened” to be, prior to 
determinate becoming. This is idiotic, since all determinate sense presupposes it, 
and no determinate sense can exhaust it. This “being opened” is the primal giving 
of the porosity of being, the between as enabling an astonishing diversity of 
becomings, self-becomings, and together-becomings.744  
 
Roused from the slumber of postulatory finitism, posthumous mind is doubly struck. 
First, it is stirred to recognize that before one can take a stand on oneself, before any 
exercise of the conatus essendi, one must first be given to be through the passio essendi. 
Second, posthumous mind is struck by the bivalent meaning of “being opened.” For, on 
one level, “being opened” testifies to our own condition of being opened by the advent of 
transcendence. On another level, posthumous mind is given to marvel at being opened, 
that is, being as fundamentally porous. So opened, we are mindful of abiding in the 
metaxu not as sealed-off monads but as porous participants implicated in the rhythm of 
being. Indeed, all around us hums as a symphonic interplay of coming to be, of 
becoming, and passing away. We take our place in this cosmic chorus and tremble, for 
we sense its fragility as all of being dangles precariously above the abyss of nothingness.  
 Our exercise begins by acknowledging ourselves as participants in the metaxu of 
creation, which we may regard as a “suspended middle” (schwebende Mitte) hovering 
between being and nothingness.745 One is stirred into astonishment at the idiocy of being:  
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finite being shows a sheer “that it is” which shines with an intimate strangeness. It 
happens to be without inherent necessity, and it might be called a surplus surd, but 
it is not absurd. The surplus givenness makes all finite intelligibilities possible, 
but it is presupposed by all and is not itself a finite intelligibility. Its surplus stuns 
us into mindfulness about what gives it to be at all, since it does not give itself to 
be, or explain itself.746  
 
Rekindled astonishment does not, of course, prove God’s existence.747 But it can re-open 
our sense of the porosity of being, permitting us to perceived with purged eyes a halo of 
gratuity surrounding the whole of being. Rather than a strict logical argument, this 
approach unfolds along a different path. In allowing oneself to be implicated by the text, 
one considers the idiocy of being meditatively, opening oneself to a “mindfulness turned 
towards ultimate sources. Arguments come out of this turn; arguments alone do not get us 
there – and in that sense there is no argument for God.”748 Instead of an abstract proof 
abstract from its originary ground, Desmond’s indirect method returns us to the primal 
ethos where we probe the “crack” in everything to discover how it points beyond 
immanence toward the Transcendent source of being.  
 Readers will recognize echoes of Aquinas’s Third Way749 or cosmological 
argument. Desmond summarizes this “way” as: If all being is possible being, ultimately 
all possible being is impossible.750 He offers this metaxological reconstruction: 
The finite world is contingent: things come into being and pass out of being. In 
the endlessness of becoming, there is one possibility that would be realized at 
some point: namely, that there would be no contingent being. After all, everything 
finite might not be; and at some time, in the infinite time of endless becoming, the 
possibility of everything not being will be. If this possibility of everything not 
being is possible, then nothing could ever come to be; for nothing comes from 
nothing; hence nothing could now exist. Thus, if everything is contingent, not 
even contingent existence now is possible. This is absurd, because the world of 
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contingency is actually given. There must be another being, not contingent, to 
make contingency intelligible, possible, actual.751 
 
Essentially, the equivocity of being communicates a common origin and destiny in the 
nihil: beings come from nothing and return to this nothing. Herein we confront the 
potential surd: in a world of becoming we can ask Why anything at all or Why did being 
come to be in the first place? Is the whole of being little more than “senseless idiocy” or, 
in the enigma of it being at all, does it testify to a creative origin who gives it to be? 
 For Desmond, this surd is not absurd. On the contrary, it entices us to dwell more 
intensively with the mystery at the heart of being. By immersing ourselves in the 
happening of the metaxu, by pondering how beings come to be and pass away, we can be 
stirred or provoked into a mindfulness of   
an Other that is not through another, or does not become through another, but 
through whom all others come to be. One might call this an other origin, 
hyperbolically necessary. This origin is necessary in a sense that has neither come 
to be, nor become; rather it is the reserved source of all coming to be and 
becoming. This other origin, the ultimate necessary being exists – that is, God.752  
 
As an exercise in transcendence, willing immersion in the flux (T1) makes us susceptible 
to the “bite of otherness”753 leading us to recognize the intimate strangeness of being: all 
beings share in existence yet no being, nor the totality of beings, exhausts existence. Or, 
as Brendan Sammon writes, “beings are constituted not only by their unique univocal 
identity but also by an otherness that is bound up with that identity.”754 The “bite” 
provokes contemplation of being’s overdeterminacy and leads us to contemplate why 
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anything at all and “throws us” hyperbolically beyond finite and provokes within us the 
thought of a Transcendent source who gives being to be.  
 This first hyperbolic indirection invites us to abide within the metaxu and to risk 
“being struck (as I think Aquinas was struck) by the incontrovertibility of being.”755 This 
works, though, only if the reader allows herself to be implicated by the text. She must 
accept Desmond’s invitation to dwell mindfully in the metaxu and behold how “the 
incontrovertibility shines out in the given, outlined as gift before the nothing that is also 
now always possible.”756 As a spiritual exercise or what Heyde calls an “experience of 
thought,” one is drawn given to contemplate how “the contingent is not what it is in a 
necessary manner. Its being appears to be a sort of suspension of the hegemony of 
nothingness. Every moment of its existence it hangs, as it were, above the abyss of 
nothingness.”757 Metaxologically exercising the Third Way directs the reader’s attention 
to the primal ethos, rekindles a sense of contingency, and allows the interplay of the ethos 
and Aquinas’s way to point toward a transcendent origin. Victor White captures this 
interplay as provoking a sense of the mystery at the heart of all being: 
St Thomas’s position differs from that of modern agnostics because while modern 
agnosticism says simply, “We do not know, and the universe is a mysterious 
riddle,” a Thomist says, “We do not know what the answer is, but we do know 
that there is a mystery behind it all which we do not know, and if there were not, 
there would not even be a riddle. This Unknown we call God. If there were no 
God, there would be no universe to be mysterious, and nobody to be mystified.758 
 
Stirred to recognize the givenness of being, we are directed beyond givenness to a giver. 
Following this indirection toward the Creator, however, does not permit us to rest as 
though our querying had come to an end. Quite the opposite: the surd not absurd 
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bespeaks an inexhaustible surplus of mystery. Space is created wherein one can reflect 
upon God as enigmatic reason why there is something rather than nothing. The “crack” 
in all things becomes the locus of encounter, the point where the metaxologically attuned 
subject hears the ever ancient, ever new, woo of the Holy One. 
 Before considering how metaxology overlaps with and can contribute to theology, 
it might be helpful to recall our Five Commandments: 
1. Thou Shalt Not Index the Divine to Human Reason  
2. Thou Shalt Not Be Faithless to the Flux  
3. Thou Shalt Not Produce Counterfeit Gods  
4. Thou Shalt Be Attuned and Attentive to Everyday Disclosures  
5. Be Still and Know: Metaphysics is a Vocation  
 
If this indirection awakens a mindfulness of the divine, it does so by drawing attention to 
the overdeterminacy of being. Whatever “God” is, it is not one more being within the 
system, nor is it Kant’s ens realissimum who is “completely determined through its own 
concept.”759 If this is not ontotheology’s God, neither is it a deity encountered by 
infidelity to the flux. As it turns out, it is through our intensive dwelling within the flux 
that gives rise to our awakened sense of the Transcendent. Caputo relaxes: metaxology 
makes no claim to possess “the Truth.” What metaxology calls “God” is not a 
determinate something but, in a way, the least-worst way to name to the intimate and 
inexhaustible mystery at the heart of existence. “God” is not a neutral word but an 
exclamation – God! – to the advent of the One who comes unbidden and whose arrival 
overwhelms our finite and idolatrous concepts. Kearney, too, is allayed: the quotidian 
announces the too-muchness of the Creator, disclosing in the ordinary the extraordinary 
generosity of the divine. Finally, metaxology is a response, a restless venturing forth 
impelled by the presentiment that its searching is a consequence of its first having been 
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sought. The happening of the metaxu does not confront us with a God-shaped hole but, 
rather, awakens us to the presence of a mystery intimated at the heart of all being, a 
mystery neither surd nor absurd but solicitous, bidding us to “come and see.”  
 If metaxology has not (yet!) violated any Commandment, permit me to make a 
connection with the Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. In his “Undergoing 
Something From Nothing: The Doctrine of Creation As Contemplative Insight,” Brian 
Robinette approaches the doctrine as a site for the prayerful contemplation of the sheer 
contingency and gratuity of our being. Like Desmond, Robinette recognizes that God 
does not create to achieve a selfish purpose; there is no determinate why or reason for 
God’s creativity. But being without a determinate reason does not mean creation is 
irrational. In fact, if our metaxological exercises have helped to “teach us how to read,” 
then one might even approach Creatio ex nihilo is a hyperbolic text “throwing us” toward 
the Creator. Thus, to Robinette’s Why create at all? Desmond offers the following: 
Because it is good. Creation is not arbitrary fiat, modeled on the capricious finger 
snap of some oriental despot. The metaphor of originative speaking is suggestive. 
God says “Let there be . . . and there was . . .” Creation is an original speaking 
letting be. Speaking brings the word to existence. The word, speaking, lets being be. 
A word is not a roar. The roar would be more like the diktat of the despotic divinity. 
The word, spoken originatively, is the expression of communicative being. The 
originating word issues from the goodness of generosity. The word is the creative 
expression of being as agapeic and as communicative transcending. Word brings a 
world to be, word communicates a world, lets it issue into a space of sharing with 
others. . . Wording the between: a sung world—a song not only sung, but a song 
giving rise to new singers. The originative word would be the primordial “yes” that 
gives coming to be, a word that is also a blessing with being. We know this 
elementally in our own being given to be, lived as an affirmation of being that first 
lives us before we live it. The agapeic “yes” not only blesses with being, it blesses 
being: It is good to be.760 
 
Robinette muses: “I find this passage astounding, worthy of reading aloud, worthy of 
rumination, worthy of singing, indistinguishable from prayer. What it communicates can 
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only be ‘beheld.’ It does not translate into a hypothesis, even if it provides endless 
pasture for thought. Indeed, one might go so far as to say that our beholding is to share in 
God’s own beholding.”761  
 These insights have deep roots, not least in Aquinas’s own treatment of creation 
in the Summa Theologiae. In Q 104, a.1 he asks, “whether creatures need to be kept in 
being by God?” In other words, is creation a one-off act, a fait accompli or is it an act of 
ongoing preservation? His answer presages metaxology’s response:   
a thing is said to preserve another per se and directly, namely, when what is 
preserved depends on the preserver in such a way that it cannot exist without it. In 
this manner all creatures need to be preserved by God. For the being of every 
creature depends on God, so that no for a moment could it subsist, but would fall 
into nothingness were it not kept in being by the operation of the Divine power.  
 
Herbert McCabe offers a musical image to capture this: “God must be at the heart of 
every being, acting in every action (whether determined or free), continually sustaining 
her creation over against nothing as a singer sustains her song over against silence – and 
that too is only a feeble metaphor, for even silence presupposes being.”762  
 Nevertheless, it is instructive to consider Katherine Keller’s critique of creatio ex 
nihilo. Theology, she contends, taught the West  
to shun the depths of the creation. Christianity established as unquestionable the 
truth that everything is created not from some formless and bottomless something 
but from nothing: an omnipotent God could have created world only ex nihilo. 
This dogma of origin has exercised immense productive force. It became common 
sense…Christian theology, I argue, created this ex nihilo at the cost of its own 
depth. It systematically and symbolically sought to erase the chaos of creation.763   
 
Keller sounds a Caputo-like chord in voicing suspicion, as Robinette observes, that 
“creation ex nihilo represents the ‘dream of metaphysical theology’ enthralled by the idea 
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of God’s absolute dominion over creation and nonbeing, and thus a God who exclusive 
and expels all that evinces liminality, ambiguity, and process.”764 Christian belief in a 
God who creates ex nihilo gradually enshrined “dogmas of omnipotence: not just of the 
biblical lord of great if somewhat unpredictable power, but an immutable, unilateral All-
Power clothed in the attributes of a single male Person (or two; or…).”765 Embedded in 
this belief is a fear of the primordial chaos of the deep recounted Genesis 1:2 
a fear of whatever shadows our light, whatever transgresses boundaries, leaks 
across categories, sneaks out of closets, whatever she-sea might suddenly flood 
our fragile confidence. Fear of the ‘female thing.’ Of all things too deep and too 
fluid: we may call this fear ‘tehomophobia.766 
 
Tehomophobia is reflected in the binary logic of creatio ex nihilo according to which 
“one is either good or evil, corporeal or corporeal, eternal or temporal, almighty or 
powerless, propertied or inferior.”767 Creatio ex nihilo serves not to awaken astonishment 
at creation’s gratuity but, more sinisterly, to bless efforts to control and constrain chaos.  
 Even the word “Creator,” for Keller, comes “barnacled with stereotypes: of a 
great supernatural surge of father-power, a world appearing-zap-out of the void; a 
mankind ruling the world in our manly creator’s image; a gift soon spoiled by its 
creatures’ ingratitude.”768 Such stereotypes are symptomatic of tehomophobia. She 
admits, however, “one need not argue that this grid of dualisms necessarily accompanies 
the ex nihilo argument – only that historically it has done so.”769 It is this admission that 
makes Robinette’s intervention so needful: rather than casting creatio ex nihilo aside, he 
recasts it as a site of transformative encounter. Reading the doctrine contemplatively, a 
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lectio divina, is an exercise capable of forming and informing those who undertake it. 
Such prayerful consideration can allow one to perceive how God’s creative action records 
no act of dominative “power over” but is, in actuality, an act of empowerment as God lets 
“finite creation be as irreducibly other.”770 Or, as Desmond describes it,  
the scandal of absolute power is that it communicates itself in an enabling letting: 
it lets the finite being be as other, it lets it be power – and the letting forces 
nothing, constrains nothing, coerces nothing; it simply releases into the goodness 
of free power itself. The scandal of divine (over)all-power is that it is the ultimate 
patience: it is manifest in giving, in giving away from itself, not giving such that 
the recipient is forced to recognize the good of the giver, for the pure giving is for 
the good of the receiver, who may not comprehend he, she, or it is the recipient.771  
 
A contemplative approach to reading creatio ex nihilo with metaxological eyes opens us 
to dwelling upon the enigma that anything is at all and allows us to be transformed as we 
prayerfully “inhabit that mystery through a long ‘letting go’.”772   
 
4.3  A Second Indirection: The Aesthetics of Happening 
 Desmond’s second indirection approaches the divine by way of the “aesthetics of 
happening.” This approach dwells intensively on the haecceity of individuals: this is. As 
a “happening,” the givenness of being “shines forth with its own intimate radiance, 
coming to manifest its own marvelous intricacy of order.”773 Aesthetic happening, then, 
indicates a “sensuous figuration or figuring forth of the ontological potencies of the 
primal ethos.”774 If the modern reconfiguration of the ethos has left creation “seared with 
trade; bleared, smeared with toil,” posthumous mind perceives the stubborn presence of 
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“the dearest freshness deep down things.”775 To exercise the aesthetics of happening is 
not to formulate a theory about beauty but to risk being implicated in the call of beauty 
and becoming one of the theōroi whose mindfulness is alive to and enlivened signs of the 
Transcendent perceived within “the glory of creation – offered both in given beauty and 
sublimity, and in what we ourselves create.”776  
 We return to the metaxu, this time with an eye to how our experiences of beauty 
might be illuminated with the “finesse of religious poetics.” 777 We can experience beauty 
in any number of ways: the music of Bach’s Cello Suite seeps into the heart; Picasso’s 
Guernica seizes the spectator with its savage beauty and draws one into contemplation. 
Desmond offers the following description of his climbing Dún an Óir, the Fort of Gold: 
On an autumn evening, near the feast of Samhain, I recall climbing the 
promontory at Dún an Óir. The climb was through boggy earth, watery on the 
hillside…The height hovered in the air between earth and sea and sky, their 
conjunction in a massive rock. The late sun spilled over the height as we 
ascended, but the shadow was increasing on this side of land and harbor. Just 
before attaining the top we were wrapped for a time in sober shadow.778 
 
This ascent is “aesthetic” (to aesthētikon) in the broadest way: Desmond is not thinking 
his way up the mountain but physically climbing. Allusions to “sun spilled” and being 
“wrapped…in sober shadow” point to the physicality of this ascent. In a single step, he 
emerges from the shadow to find himself “in a reversed world – a golden world at almost 
the furthest reaches of the Western world.”779 “The sun was a revelation,” he writes, 
But we were not given this gift without some call on us. On the height and on the 
side of the sun, the cliff was sheer. Gulls and crows hung there in the silence, a 
thousand feet above the silent wash against the wall of rock below. More used to 
the level plan, to us this vantage was vertigo. The gut knots at this height, but 
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holding itself together the spirit exults…Sky and sea merged, the water itself 
becoming a golden liquid. The air too, empty of obstruction, was a liquid 
gold…to stand was impossible on the rim of this cliff, and to lie down was almost 
to bow in reverence.780  
 
At dusk he begins his descent, “the sun being obstructed, and me bearing down, like a 
priest with a monstrance, the memory of the other side.”781 
 Without mentioning “God,” Desmond’s recollects how the experience of beauty, 
or of the sublime, points toward something beyond the immanent order. In the happening 
at Dún an Óir, “something beyond wholeness is intimated in the showing there. There is a 
saturated equivocity to the aesthetics of happening.”782 This is a sensuous occurrence: the 
advent or “call” of the sublime is a rupture that somehow releases. The in-breaking of 
beauty unclogs porosity, rekindles a sense of the passio essendi, and breaks us free from 
the stale confines of the enclosed self. To encounter the sublime is to be afflicted with a 
dark grace, a wound serving a monstrance letting the divine shine forth or as a scar of 
one’s fragility and finitude.783 Neither beauty nor the sublime can be corralled by any 
system; both shatter the constraint of concepts yet, in rupturing conceptual frameworks, 
release us to marvel at and bow reverently before the surplus beauty of being.   
 Although he does not offer a metaxological reformulation of it, in God and the 
Between Desmond refers to Aquinas’s fifth way as an indirection leading us to marvel at 
the intelligibility of finite creation. Aquinas’s “way” unfolds as follows:  
For we see that some things that lack intelligence (i.e., material objects in nature) 
act for the sake of an end. This is clear from the fact that they always, or usually, 
act in the same way so as to achieve what is best (and therefore tend to a goal and 
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do not reach it by chance). But things lacking intelligence tend to a goal only as 
directed by one with knowledge and understanding. Arrows, for instance, need 
archers. So, there is a being with intelligence who directs all natural things to end, 
and we call this being “God.”784  
 
This way, John Wippel observes, “begins with something which Thomas regards as 
evident to us from the world of everyday experience. Natural bodies, that is to say, things 
which are equipped with their own natures but lack the power of cognition, act for the 
sake of an end.”785 From our place within the metaxu, the observant eye detects 
something of an “unconscious teleology of nature.”786 Natural beings seem to act 
purposively and the natural order itself can appear to be orchestrated as an ecological 
concert. Lyrics from The Lion King capture the symphony of nature:  
 From the day we arrive on the planet  But the sun rolling high 
 And, blinking, step into the sun  Through the sapphire sky  
 There’s more to see than can ever be seen Keeps the great and small on the  
 More to do than can ever be done     endless round 
 There’s far too much to take in here  It’s the circle of life 
 More to find than can ever be found  And it moves us all.787  
 
The movie opens at dawn; all of creation stirs as music guides bird and beast on their 
journey to behold a new lion king. Nature and its denizens, if only for a moment, appear 
balanced. We suspend disbelief: lions and hyenas and elephants bowing in unison is a 
scene more Isaiah 11:6 (“The wolf shall be a guest of the lamb”) than Animal Planet! Let 
us see, though, if these lyrics might speak more truly, more subtly, than we realize.  
 Desmond wants us to dwell upon Aquinas’s claim that “certain things act for an 
end.” We slow down and fix our attention on the world of exterior becoming. Things 
                                               
784 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1a, 2, 3, quoted in Brian Davies Thomas Aquinas’s Summa  
Theologiae (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 46.  
785 John Wippel, “The Five Ways,” in Thomas Aquinas: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives, ed.  
Brian Davies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 187.  
786 Desmond, God and the Between, 137.  
787 The Lion King, directed by Rob Minkoff, Roger Allers (Disney Pictures, 1994). DVD. 
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lacking in intelligence seem, somehow, to act harmoniously and in concern with the rest 
of creation to “achieve what is best.” For Brian Davies, it is as though Aquinas were 
asking us to consider the whole of creation and be piqued into asking, “How about” 
the fact that female cats regularly and instinctively suckle their newborn kittens 
and thereby help them to become healthy cats? Or what about the fact that my 
heart regularly functions so as to circulate my blood and, accordingly, keep me 
alive? ...In instances like these, he perceives goal-directed activity, but not activity 
that is goal-directed because a human being is at work.788  
 
One is seized not only by the beauty of the metaxu but also by its orderliness. Just as a 
single rose may evoke wonder, so also can one can be astonished at the order of the 
whole cosmos. One can try to take it all in, yet a surplus remains. Sir Elton is right, for 
there is “more to find than can ever be found.” Thus, Desmond offers, “the aesthetics of 
happening is seen to suggest an origin figuratively to be likened to the artist.”789 
 The key word is “suggest.” Instead of a univocal proof790 this indirection reads the 
aesthetic happening of the metaxu as a hyperbolic sign of a divine artist whose “art”  
would not just be the technical imposition of form upon matter, but a more radical 
bringing to be from which both the elemental good of matter and form are 
themselves derived. Its poiesis would originate a coming to be: not just a self-
becoming or selving of beings, not a mechanical ordering, not just a “forming” or 
self-forming, not just an organismic self-organizing, not a work of art giving birth 
to itself. Given this likening, this origination would be unlike any artistry we 
could adequately conceptualize, since our artistry always operates in the context 
of the givenness of being. This other art is hyperbolic to our artistry.791  
 
The intelligibility of creation, considered metaxologically, suggests some type of 
Creative origin. This indirection does not convince by arguing, as though in a syllogism, 
                                               
788 Davies, 47.  
789 Desmond, God and the Between, 137.  
790 Ibid., 140. He continues: “‘Proof’” is the misplaced demand for a univocity that betrays what is most  
powerful and suggestive in that aesthetics of happening, what keeps open the space of 
transcendence, whether that of nature as other, or our own self-surpassing, or that of the ultimate 
transcendence as other to us…Instead of seeking an inappropriate univocity, we need mindfully to 
read the signs.”  
791 Ibid., 137.  
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but by goading us deeper into reflection where we confront the enigma of intelligibility: 
Is the intelligibility of finite intelligibility itself intelligible in finite terms?792  
Does it require reference to a source of intelligibility beyond itself that gives rise 
to the determinate intelligibles? This suggests a variation of the argument from 
coming to be: intelligibility as determinate is there as having come to be, and 
cannot make its own intelligibility intelligible; to make intelligible the intelligible 
means to appeal to a further determining source; since this cannot be our 
intelligence, relative to the cosmos as the aesthetics of happenings, it must be 
other.793      
 
Desmond’s consideration of Aquinas’s way offers no syllogism or proof concluding with 
a triumphant QED. Transposed into a metaxological key and undertaken as an exercise, it 
is more finessed. It enjoins a mindful attentiveness (prosochē) to allow the reality of the 
exterior world to manifest itself. We find, in creation’s intelligibility and beauty, a logic 
or logos we did not impose upon it. Astonished, we consider whether there might be 
something beyond human intelligence, something “huperintelligible”794 endowing the 
created order with intelligibility. For Desmond, recognizing “that beings are intelligible 
at all rouses astonishment and perplexity that cannot be answered in terms of a 
determinate intelligibility.”795 We contemplate the sheer givenness of being, the restless 
beauty of creation, the intelligibility of the tiniest particle and the vast cosmos and we are 
indirected toward an originative source or a God “who not only thinks but loves, or 
whose thinking, as agapeic minding, is love of singulars, or living communities, love of 
the intimate universal not just of the abstract.”796 Jesus’ hyperbolic depiction of a God 
who numbers the hairs on our head (Lk 12:7)797 is more apt than might be supposed.  
                                               
792 Ibid., 138.  
793 Ibid., 138-9. Emphasis original.  
794 Ibid., 139. Consult Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos for a non-theistic view of teleological laws.  
795 Desmond, God and the Between, 139.  
796 Ibid.  
797 A task made easier on the Holy One by some of us who have less to count.  
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The skeptic’s groan is not unheard and Desmond admits: “there is nothing 
univocally clear about this, nor could there ever be…Because this is an aesthetics, it is 
always equivocal to some degree, and always will be.”798 Indeed, the only way for us to 
interpret the “crack” in everything is by venturing outward to confront the equivocity, not 
to control it but to allow it to point us beyond the finite toward the infinite. What is true 
of great works of art is true of anything or anyone worthy of love: we embrace mystery. 
The surplus of meaning behind a text, a painting, a person invites us into ongoing 
engagement. Hence the need to train ourselves through exercise to abide fruitfully with 
the enigmatic. This second indirection may not tie a bow around a discrete object called 
“God” but it can, for those traversing it, create the space wherein may contemplate the 
beauty and intelligibility of creation and discern, in the order, traces of the Divine.  
 This aesthetic itinerary suggests four areas where metaxology and theology can 
converge. Each could be treated at length, but I want only to gesture to places where a 
fruitful engagement might occur. In keeping with Desmond’s own ascent of Dún an Óir, 
I begin with the theme of mystical ascent as found in Bonaventure’s The Journey of the 
Mind to God. Our first step in our ascent requires “setting the whole visible world before 
us as a mirror through which we may pass over to God, the Supreme Creator.” 799 We are 
not called out of the world but, rather, to behold the world rightly, attentive to how “the 
supreme power, wisdom, and goodness of the Creator shine forth in created things.”800 
Bonaventure’s itinerary does not enjoin simply a way of thinking but intends to facilitate 
a grace-guided transformation of vision: 
                                               
798 Ibid. 
799 Bonaventure, Journey of the Mind to God, trans. Philotheus Boehner (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1990), 8.  
800 Ibid. 
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1. First way of seeing: observer considers things in themselves and sees in 
them weight, number, and measure. (T1) 
2. Second way of seeing: the way of faith, believer considers world in its 
origin, development, and end. (T2) 
3. Third way of seeing: follow the created order toward Creator. (T3)801 
 
The movement: from the exterior to the interior, from the inferior to the superior. In at 
least two areas can The Journey and metaxology converge. Both are (1) progressive, for 
each requires ongoing discernment within creation and (2) perfective, for each attunes 
one to perceive the overdeterminacy, or perhaps the graced dynamism, of the between.   
 A second locus would be a metaxological consideration of the icon. Consider the 
saturated equivocity of praying before an icon: is one beholding or beheld or both? Icons 
do not call for a glance but solicit the gaze; as one’s eyes traverse the space between, one 
senses oneself as being drawn or invited deeper. What to the casual onlooker appears a 
finite depiction becomes, in prayer, a portal to the infinite. Nicholas of Cusa expresses 
the overdeterminacy of the icon. “I behold as in a mirror,” he writes, 
in an icon, in a riddle, life eternal, for that is naught other than that blessed regard 
wherewith Thou never ceasest most lovingly to behold me, yea, even the secret 
places of my soul. With Thee, to behold is to give life; ‘tis unceasingly to impart 
sweetest love of Thee; ‘tis to inflame me to love of Thee by love’s imparting, and 
to feed me by inflaming, and by feeding to kindle my yearning, and by kindling to 
make me drink of the dew of gladness, and by drinking to infuse in me a fountain 
of life, and by infusing to make it increase and endure.802  
 
Sensuous imagery overflows as the interplay between beholding and being beheld erupts 
in spiritual frenzy. The proliferation of images and metaphors conveys the too-muchness 
into which one is drawn. The iconic gaze mediates, in metaxological parlance, its own 
hyperbolic indirection throwing us beyond the immanent realm toward the Transcendent.  
                                               
801 Ibid. Bonaventure, of course, did not index his three forms of sight to Desmond’s three transcendences.  
802 Nicholas of Cusa, The Vision of God trans. Emma Gurney Salter (Escondido: Book Tree, 1999), 17.  
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 Lest one think all “ways” are somehow passive or contemplative, one may 
interpret the aesthetics of happening to be inclusive of active indirections. One might, 
therefore, consult Pascal or Dostoevsky for embodied practices leading to transcendence. 
Belief in the Transcendent does not require one to think differently but to comport 
oneself in a new way. Pascal advises someone struggling with belief:  
You want to be cured of unbelief and you ask for the remedy: learn from those 
who were once bound like you and who now wager all they have…follow the way 
by which they began. They behaved just as if they did believe, taking holy water, 
having masses said, and so on. That will make you believe quite naturally, and 
will make you more docile.803  
 
As in ancient exercises, so too here: one must desire some form of transformation and 
then apprentice oneself to those who have learned the way. Similarly, the Elder Zosima 
rejects logical proofs for God, although he suggests another way to be convinced: 
By the experience of active love. Try to love your neighbors actively and 
tirelessly. The more you succeed in loving, the more you’ll be convinced of the 
existence of God and the immortality of your soul. And if you reach complete 
selflessness in the love of your neighbor, then undoubtedly you will believe, and 
no doubt will even be able to enter your soul. This has been tested. It is certain.804  
 
Kearney nods: The Kingdom is found not in dusty tomes or syllogism but in a cold cup of 
water offered to the thirsty stranger and the morsel of bread extended to the hungry 
beggar. But not only in the cup. In the cry of the poor, in the face of the widow and 
orphan, in an act of amnesty for the alien: each and every summons to pour oneself out in 
loving service to others can tap into the infinite wellspring the Creator’s agape and 
gradually reform us to be women and men of agapeic minds. Any event of aesthetic 
happening bears the potential of leading us, throwing us over, toward the threshold of the 
sacred where we can encounter again, or for the first time, the Transcendent God.   
                                               
803 Pascal, Penseés, 125.   
804 Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, 56.  
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 A final point of convergence comes from Joseph Ratzinger.805 His argument 
begins by noting how the act of professing belief in God “implies opting for the view that 
the logos…stands not merely at the end but also at the beginning, that it is the originating 
and encompassing power of being.”806 The logos encompasses the whole of creation, 
reaching “mightily from one end of the earth to the other” (Wis 8:1). He then turns to 
consider the scientific inquiry of nature. Scientists, he observes, also presuppose a logic 
within nature, otherwise their inquiries would be guideless. But where does this logic 
come from? This logic, cannot have been “projected” by humans: nature’s logos is 
discovered, not implanted, by humans. Thus, he proposes viewing nature’s intelligibility 
as “the impression and expression of subjective mind and that the intellectual structure 
that being possesses and that we can re-think is the expression of a creative pre-
meditation, to which they owe their existence.”807  
 Ratzinger cites Einstein for whom, in nature’s laws, “an intelligence so superior is 
revealed that in comparison all the significance of human thinking and human 
arrangements is a completely worthless reflection.”808 But Einstein erects a wall between 
an impersonal god of mathematics and a personal god of revelation. For Ratzinger, this is 
not surprising: as Desmond would observe, this is symptomatic of postulatory finitism. 
Ratzinger: “Can the mathematician who looks at the world mathematically find anything 
else but mathematics in the universe?”809 The drive to universal mathesis may give us 
power and dominion, but in its narrow focus it fails to account for the surplus of aesthetic 
happening: can mathematics account for superfluous beauty or shattering sublimity?  
                                               
805 Joseph Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, trans. J.R. Foster (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2004)  
806 Ibid., 152.  
807 Ibid.  
808 Ibid. 153.  
809 Ibid., 154.  
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 Mindfulness of aesthetic happening leads Ratzinger to posit nature’s intelligibility 
as a sign of its being-thought by a Creator. Such hyperbolic “thinking” is a creative 
release of “what has been thought into the freedom of its own, independent existence.”810 
Nature’s logos points beyond the natural order toward a Creative mind who creates not 
out of compulsion, nor due to lack, but solely out of love. Consequently: 
if the supreme point in the world’s design is a freedom that upholds, wills, knows, 
and loves the whole world as freedom, then this means that together with freedom 
the incalculability implicit in it is an essential part of the world. Incalculability is 
an implication of freedom; the world can never – if this is the position – be 
completely reduced to mathematical logic.811   
 
Desmond agrees: “mindfulness of the signs is not the same as a mathematics of 
design.”812 These “ways” do not guide us to a univocal conclusion; the perform, rather, 
hyperbolically to induce a mindfulness of the too-muchness of the metaxu and “throw us 
over” toward the Transcendent. We undertake Aquinas’s 3rd and 5th ways, or think along 
with Ratzinger, as a way of growing in attuned to the overdeterminacy of being. These 
“ways” provide oases for thought where one may seek refuge from the driving sands of 
the desert of atheism, refresh oneself in meditative waters, and be struck by beauty and 
order into a mindfulness of a God who creates freely and agapeically.   
 
4.4 A Third Indirection: The Erotics of Selving    
 Whereas the idiocy of being and the aesthetics of happening indicate hyperbolic 
indirections discerned in exterior transcendence (T1), the itinerary probed in the erotics of 
selving follows a course set by self-transcendence (T2). This indirection requires us to 
turn inward and to explore the inner dynamism of human desire. “The human being,” 
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Desmond observes, “is intimately hyperbolic as both finite and yet infinitely self-
surpassing. We are endowed with transcending power, but we do not endow 
ourselves.”813 Continuing our Augustinian odyssey, we move from the exterior to the 
interior where, even in the depths of apparent solitude, we are stirred to recognize that we 
are not alone but always already in the presence of the Agapeic Creator and Sustainer.  
 To keep this section manageable, I focus on Desmond’s reformulation of 
Anselm’s ontological argument as an exercise aimed at awakening us to the hyperbolic 
thought of God. I then briefly address the viability of this indirection vis-à-vis Gaunilo 
and Kant, both of whom offered critiques of the ontological argument. I conclude by 
drawing a connection between metaxology and prayer.  
 One of the fruits of exercising the “Return to Zero” was a rekindled sense of the 
passio essendi. Beneath the conative “will to power,” Desmond discerns the presence of 
the more primordial power that gives being to be at all. In his interview with Richard 
Kearney, Desmond asserts, “I’ve tried to talk about the passio essendi as more primordial 
than conatus essendi. Our endeavor to be is subtended by our being given to be. Our self-
affirming will to be emerges out of a more primal being given to be.”814 The emphasis on 
the passio, D. C. Schindler observes, has implications for our understanding of reason: 
Reason does not first set itself in motion, in order thus to achieve itself, but is 
rather at its core by what is other than it (even if this “being moved” is not a dead 
passivity). Reason is therefore primordially receptive in its structure, and its most 
basic act is affirmation and assent, even if it goes on at a later moment to doubt or 
take a critical distance. Reason first “lets be.”815  
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In a similar vein, Desmond speaks at times of the “vocation of reason” as a call to 
“ponder the exceeding” or overdeterminacy of being.816 Human reason, like self-
transcendence, is eccentric and ecstatic: an eccentric response to the advent of 
transcendence as other eliciting an act of ecstatic other-reaching. Drawn by the call of the 
intimate universal, self-transcendence directs us both outward toward exterior becoming 
(T1) and inward into our own abyssal depths (T2) where the echo of this call resounds.  
When he offers his reformulation of the ontological argument, Desmond reminds 
us of the need to remain attentive to the ethos from which the argument springs. Anselm 
did not argue according to the canons of univocal logic or geometry; his milieu was a 
monastery and the generative ground was a life disciplined by prayer and meditation. Too 
often, Desmond observes, “the argument is treated as a kind of logical puzzle: in question 
is the logical validity of the deduction from the concept of God to God’s existence, purely 
on the basis of the concept alone. This is more the neutral universality of reason than the 
living intimacy of the soul.”817 Kant’s critique of the argument misses the mark precisely 
because it severs Anselm’s argument from its ethos. I address this shortly.  
 Desmond’s reformulation invites us into a type of philosophical meditation. We 
begin by recollecting how our posthumous mind beholds the world. We know our 
fragility, our non-necessity, we savor the gratuity of existence. We answer the call to 
ponder the overdeterminacy of being as our imaginations range across the created order. 
We turn, venturing inward and downward; we probe our depths. Now Desmond: 
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Suppose thought thinks itself, and explores the inner abyss of itself, what does it 
come upon? The thought of what is in excess of all excesses. In the exploration of 
thought thinking itself the thought of what is other to thought emerges. The 
overdeterminate thought of what is radically other to determinate thought emerges 
in the immanent self-exploration, even self-determination, of thought itself.818  
 
This passage must be read meditatively. This is no argument moving from premise to 
conclusion. It is an exercise, a performance of thought, pushing reason to its limits. 
Thought confronts what is “in excess of excess” and this excess cannot be determined or 
objectified. In its overdeterminacy, it eludes expression in word or concept. Our foray 
into meditative thinking does not bring us mastery over our depths; to the contrary, it 
chastens us through an encounter with the fathomless mystery at the heart of our reason. 
  This is consonant with Anselm who, in Proslogion 2, describes God as 
“something than which nothing greater can be thought” (aliquid quo maius nihil cogitari 
potest).819 Ludwig Heyde regards this formulation as more of a “rule for thought 
(whosoever wishes to think God must follow the rule that nothing greater than God can 
be thought) than a positive content of thought (what is then the content of this being 
greater than which nothing can be thought?).”820 Anselm’s definition of God, 
paradoxically, succeeds because of its failure as a definition: it fails to point to or indicate 
any determinate thing or being we might call God. God, per Anselm’s definition, cannot 
be picked out of a line-up of deities because God is not the sort of thing that can be 
counted or ordered or identified as being-among-other-beings. Read metaxologically, 
Anselm offers us with a hyperbolic definition of God, one we need to sit with and 
meditate upon. If we are vexed by ambiguity, this is a healthy uneasiness, a sign that 
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“Anselm’s acid” is dissolving our conceptual idols and freeing us to move beyond our 
idols toward the God of whom Augustine wrote: Si comprehendis, non est Deus.821  
 Desmond, in effect, is teaching us how to read in a metaxological register. Instead 
of imposing our logic upon it, he wants us to allow the text to speak on its terms. He does 
not ask us to bracket our experiences or suspend our awareness of being in the metaxu. In 
fact, the exercise works only so long as one brings one’s whole self to it, allows oneself 
to be implicated within the meditation. For, as a spiritual exercise: 
the ontological proof, just in its truth, shatters the illusion of “proof,” whether 
determinate or self-determining, whether univocal or dialectical. It brings us into 
the company of the incontrovertibility of the divine excess, an incontrovertibility 
that is never the outcome of any proof because it is the incognito necessity that 
precedes and exceeds every proof.822    
 
In place of “proof,” this way is a “probe,” giving us to explore our inwardness and to 
follow the flow of porosity to its source. We “go with the flow” and are struck by the 
vector of movement: ab inferioribus ad superiora. We are humbled by our inferiority, 
astonished by the disproportion between our fragile finitude and the Absolute. But before 
we can despair there occurs something like a flash of insight as we realize: 
We could not erotically seek at all, were not the effective urgence of the other 
transcendence already wooing in selving, calling to selving, and bringing back 
selving to transcendence itself, itself that never left and that always was available 
for us as other to it.823  
 
If posthumous mind rendered us attentive to the “crack” within ourselves, this exercise 
encourages us to dwell in the space of rupture. The hyperbolic thought of the God 
encountered via the ontological argument, “shatters in immanence itself the illusion of 
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self-contained immanence.”824 This shattering does not leave us destitute; it creates, 
instead, the space of an empowered openness wherein we find ourselves in intimate 
congress with abiding presence of the Agapeic Creator.  
 I once taught Anselm’s “way” to high school seniors. In place Gaunilo’s “Lost 
Island” one proposed a “Lost Cupcake.” This would be, he proposed, the most perfect 
cupcake ever; I endured the back-and-forth about flavors, size, and types of sprinkles for 
a few minutes before ending the debate. They, like Gaunilo, seem to have been caught off 
guard by Anselm’s hyperbole. At times, even Gaunilo misquotes Anselm, writing of “that 
which is greater than everything.”825 Gaunilo, and my students, violated Heyde’s 
grammatical rule, for the object of Anselm’s definition “is so defined that it remains 
transcendent to the definition.”826 They (mis)read Anselm positing a contrastive 
definition of God, as though God were one among a series. Of course, it takes finesse not 
to think of God as a thing, but this is an error hard to avoid given our finite language. 
This is a peril of language, as our facility with metaphor, analogy, and symbol can easily 
mislead us into thinking we know what we are talking about when we speak of God. 
Anselm and Aquinas would aver: we do not. This metaxological exercise, requiring us to 
remain attentive to hyperbole, draws us toward the original ethos out of which Anselm’s 
way emerged: his own encounter, in prayer, with a God beyond any concept.  
 Rather than going into a detailed analysis of Kant’s critique of the ontological 
proof – or of the cosmological and physico-theological proofs – we can take a shortcut by 
homing in on Desmond’s challenge to Kant. “Kant’s formulations,” he writes, “mirror the 
modern reconfiguration of the ethos, hence they are heir to the univocalization of being 
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consistent with Newtonian mechanism.”827 Absent from Kant’s philosophy is any sense 
of existence as “redolent with the fullness of being, or the astonishing fact ‘that it is at 
all,’ or the glorious good of the ‘to be’.”828 The Proslogion begins with, and unfolds as, a 
sustained prayer to God; of prayer, Kant writes, “kneeling down or groveling on the 
ground, even to express your reverence for heavenly things, is contrary to human 
dignity.”829 Even if Kant had read Anselm’s argument – Desmond believes Kant was 
working with arguments inherited from Christian Wolff and René Descartes – it seems 
unlikely that his critical evaluation would have changed. Uprooted from its originary 
ethos, any “proof” or “way” cannot but limp along anemically. It is hard to imagine 
Anselm’s argument, re-rooted in Kantian soil, thriving at all. 
 Of this “way,” Joseph Gordon and D. Stephen Long observe that, “Anselm is not 
an analytic philosopher providing an irrefutable logical argument; he prays, and in his 
prayers he becomes astonished by what ‘importunes him.’ A way is opened, but it is not 
the univocal way of the modern ethos.”830 They are correct: the “way” is not a direct path 
or a stepwise argument leading a dispassionate inquirer to a conclusion. Hewing closely 
to a metaxological approach, any way to God must follow an indirection returning to and 
being renewed in the primal ethos. This, though, necessitates a subtler approach to 
philosophical reflection. One cannot approach Anselm’s Proslogion and expect to be 
convinced of God’s existence merely by going over the text. It can perform only if 
approached with a vulnerability and an openness to enter into a dialogue by which one is 
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informed831 and potentially transformed. As Hadot observes, “every spiritual exercise is a 
dialogue, insofar as it is an exercise of authentic presence, to oneself and to others.832 
This is especially true in the case of the Proslogion where we are allowed to eavesdrop 
on Anselm’s prayer where thought and prayer intermingle. One can, of course, play the 
role of the voyeur who peers in from the outside, looking in without being looked at. Or 
one can kneel down next to Anselm and risk making his prayer one’s own: “I do not try, 
Lord, to attain Your lofty heights, because my understanding is in no way equal to it. But 
I do desire to understand Your truth a little, that truth that my heart believes and loves. 
For I do not seek to understand so that I may believe; but I believe so that I may 
understand. For I believe this also, that ‘unless I believe, I shall not understand.”833  
 I conclude with a discussion of prayer. In a few lines, Desmond encapsulates 
beautifully the dynamics at play within the erotics of selving and in Christian spirituality: 
Prayer is waking up to the already effective communication of the divine in 
passage: not just our communication with the divine, but our being already in that 
divine communication, within which we participate, now in sleep, now more 
mindfully awake. Prayer is awakening to the passing communication of the divine 
in the finite metaxu. We do not produce it; it is not the result of our determination 
or self-determination; we are “determined,” or better, released into the middle 
where we can sink deeper into ontological sleep, or begin to awake more fully to 
what communicates us to be at all.834  
 
If we approach Anselm as offering not a “proof” but a “way” of prayerful probing, I think 
the hyperbolic nature of his understanding of God comes into focus. For Desmond, 
prayer is not an action of the conatus but is an awakening to something anterior and prior, 
something more primordial: the passio essendi. In our reconfigured ethos, many have 
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fallen into the sleep of finitude, but sleep fitfully. Our days, too, are fitful: in our 
workaday world, where anxiety and depression are common, how are just getting by? 
Addicts, before they hit rock bottom, are convinced that the next role of the dice, the next 
shot, the next hit of heroin will be the last. But it is never “the last.” Suddenly, everything 
collapses. One sinks to one’s knees and prays in a voice not one’s own and in ancient, 
almost wordless, words. Breakdown possibilizes breakthrough; a light pierces the 
darkness and a new way is possible; a new life, a new day, dawns.  
 This Anselmian indirection seeks, in the innermost recesses of the self, to 
commune with this primordial power. Prayer, as Robinette puts it, is a “long letting go” 
as we are caught up in and carried away by a rhythm not of our making. Anselm’s way 
capacitates a “letting go” at our most intimate and porous level where we respond to the 
communication of the incognito God, in the deepest ontological porosity of one’s 
soul, so deep that it seems like nothing, since too the porosity is itself no thing – 
the open space in which communication of the power to be is given and different 
selving take determinate form. One is not alone, even when one is alone.835    
 
The hyperbolic God encountered as “something than which nothing greater can be 
thought” chastens the conatus and blunts its attempts to control the divine. One is aroused 
to a finessed sense of the divine, Deus semper maior, whose summons to us enables each 
act of self-transcendence. In prayer, we watch the antinomy of autonomy and 
transcendence collapse as we realize how we are made for the infinite. Divine power is, 
ultimately, empowering: freeing us to respond to the source of life who gives us to be out 
of love. We open our hands and hearts in prayer and receive what we have always been 
offered and what is ever present: the divine life coursing through us, sustaining us, loving 
us, and knitting us into one body, one agapeic community.  
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4.5  A Fourth Indirection: The Agapeics of Community 
 With each indirection, Desmond encourages us to remain attentive to signs of 
overdeterminacy hinted at in finitude; he wants us to dwell contemplatively on how the 
“crack” in everything bespeaks an originating and sustaining source. Read as spiritual 
exercises, these meditations have not simply informed us about the “crack” but have 
actually worked to form us in a mindfulness of it. We now pursue a fourth indirection, the 
“agapeics of community,” wherein we explore how “our being is in receiving and in 
giving.”836 Whereas the erotics of selving focuses on self-transcendence, this indirection 
probes the intimate relatedness of all beings and intimates what Desmond calls the 
compassio essendi.837 At the end of this section, I will try to show how Desmond’s 
insight contributes to and augments Taylor’s map of our age.  
 I begin by once more invoking Hadot’s contention “that philosophy was a 
concrete act which changed our perception of the world, and our life: not the construction 
of a system. It is a life, not a discourse.”838 As an exercise, this meditation serves to 
transform the way we behold and live within the metaxu. Like the other exercises, it is 
connected with a sense of the elemental goodness of being. This exercise, though, aims 
consider how our communal life serves to reawaken a sense of the good of the “to be.” 
 Let us take as our composition of place an awareness that we are denizens of the 
metaxu. The metaxological sense of being, Desmond remarks, 
articulates being in the between as a community of the plurality of open integrities 
of self-transcending being. The community is not a formation, after the fact, of 
beings first given to be as fully for themselves. They are given to be for 
themselves, but the first giving is a communication of being, and from the first 
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giving they are communicative beings, and hence in immediate rapport with 
beings other than themselves.839  
 
Metaxologically stated: to be is to be in community. As an anthropological claim, this 
rejects a depiction of community as an outcome of a social contract: humans do not 
constitute community; they are themselves constituted by community. Desmond’s claim, 
though, is not limited to human communities. To be at all is to participate within being’s 
community. Moreover, “beings are not monadic but communicative; their selvings are 
self-transcending and embody communicative power, more or less extensive and 
intensive, depending on ontological endowment.”840 The haecceity of each being is not 
mute but self-disclosing; as Hopkins observed, “Selves – goes its self; myself it speaks 
and spells; Crying What I do is me; for that I came.”841 Indeed, Psalm 19:1 restates not 
only of Augustine’s discovery in the Confessions but also Aquinas’s 3rd and 5th ways: 
“The heavens are telling the glory of God; and the firmament proclaims his handiwork.” 
 We stand amidst the plurality of beings in the between and marvel at the 
dynamism of this community. We discern within the flux an abiding ecology – a logos of 
our oikos or home – and are stirred to wonder if the “togetherness of the community of 
immanent being reveals a primal porosity to the communication of an origin or good 
hyperbolic to the immanent ‘whole’.”842 Our task, then, is to consider the enigmatic 
harmony of creation and whether, and how, its sings of its Creator.  
 The exercise begins by returning to the ontological way and probing how it sheds 
light on our being in community. Desmond offers an admittedly unconventional take: 
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The power of the ontological way is just its dwelling on a consummate relation, 
or an ultimate togetherness: the ultimate togetherness of God with the 
mindfulness that comes to wakefulness in human selving. It is the being of the 
human to be communicative, but its communicative being finds itself in an 
inescapable community with ultimate communicative being. We come to the 
community in the ontological intimacy of human being, community given in the 
intimate soul but calling us beyond ourselves, above ourselves.843     
 
Desmond returns to the Anselm’s ontological way and extends its implications. If this 
way leads us to encounter God in the abyssal depths of our being, this encounter does not 
lead us to solipsism or self-enclosure. On the contrary, it awakens our self of porosity not 
only to the Holy One but also to the whole of being. What, or rather Who, we discover in 
meditation is the intimate universal “hyperbolic to self-enclosed subjectivity and any 
objectifying universality.”844 The intimate mystery at the heart of “my” being rests at the 
heart of all beings; it is, simultaneously, intimate and universal which means we are 
constitutively and inescapably in community with one another and with God.  
 The ontological way serves as “a way of immanence, but this immanence itself 
turns out to offer us an intimate symbol/hyperbole of transcendence as other to our own 
self-transcendence.”845 It is an archaeological way, probing our depths where we find 
ourselves confronted with a presence somehow in excess of our depths. The eccentricity 
of this way is captured by Heyde: 
The Other is the source of our ownmost I. The Absolute does not lie outside 
ourselves as a strange reality, but is “ours” as the “Other” that constitutes our own 
being. This also implies that what is most essentially and personally “ours,” is not 
a secure possession. We have received it.846  
 
It is eccentric because it destabilizes the centrality and feigned independence of the “I.” 
The “I” does not set the terms for the Absolute’s arrival, although we need the 
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ontological way to enact a “metaxological rumination and anamnesis”847 to re-member, 
or make present again, our awareness of the Absolute’s priority. I am, and We are, 
because God gives us to be and sustains our being. We traverse this indirection and 
discover: there is no self apart from the metaxu and its Creator but only as a part of it. 
  If each of Desmond’s indirections serves to awaken within readers a sense of 
being’s overdeterminacy, the fourth way stresses in particular the nature of being as 
good. As an exercise, a metaxological meditation upon the community of being enables  
a very different mindfulness of being in the between: an intimation of 
inexpressible good breaks through, inexpressible because overdeterminate, as 
beyond specific determination and our self-determination. Beyond this and that 
good, beyond our self-determination, the overdeterminate good of being shines in 
the fittingness of the community that is the metaxological between.848  
 
We reflect upon the overdeterminate reserves of goodness intimated in the between both 
to learn about the good and, more importantly, to be transformed by it. Desmond: “A 
fitting way of life, keeping reverence, cultivating finesse, devoted to serve, is as needful, 
as is the thoroughness of one’s reflective thinking. More needful.”849 We must turn, then, 
to consider how we are capacitated to respond to this goodness in a life lived out in 
ethical service as participant in the compassio essendi.   
 Now, when Desmond writes about ethics, he is not writing about theories like 
utilitarianism or deontology. He takes, instead, “a kind of ‘step back’ from this or that 
ethical theory, to address the ethos within which ethical theories come to articulation, as 
well as the different ethical potencies that are diversely formed by different ethical 
practices, and expressed reflectively by a variety of ethical theories.”850 His is a search 
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for the surplus source that makes it possible to be good, and not just to do good. In fact, 
for Desmond, metaphysics and ethics are not two separate fields of inquiry, for each 
requires the other. Ethical practice, he contends, 
is mediated by a mindfulness, just as mindfulness is shaped in its openness by 
ethical integrity, and just as the integrity of both openness and mindfulness is 
nourished by living fidelity to the original patience of our being. A corruption of 
one infects the other.851  
 
One need not look far to find evidence of corruption. Consider our ongoing ecological 
and humanitarian crises. Both attest to what Desmond calls the attitude of “serviceable 
disposability” endemic in modernity’s ethos: “things must serve us, be serviceable for us, 
but once they have served their use for us, they are disposable. Used, they are used up. 
Persons are also liable to be treated as disposable items.”852 The elemental goodness of 
the “to be” is relativized and judged based on “its goodness for me.”  
 Desmond’s indirections, by returning us to the sources of mindfulness, can serve 
as a remediation of this corruption. By renewing our sense of being participants within 
the metaxu, Desmond piques our mindfulness of how “there is an ontological solidarity 
that is not neutral but ethical.”853 This ontological solidarity is grounded in and nourished 
by the intimate universal abiding at the heart of all beings:  
we are opened to each other, before we come to ourselves. Here we the porosity 
of our being between as ethically qualified, not only relative to the good of the “to 
be,” but the good of the being of the other, and indeed of selving. This 
communication of the good of the “to be” is not dominated by the conatus essendi 
but, rather, derives from fidelity to the more original compassio essendi.854   
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Earlier, I suggested Saint Francis as an embodied testimony to this sense of the 
compassio essendi, for his heart was moved in a moment of “graced patience” to 
recognize in the leper not a figure of disease but a beloved brother. The past century, to 
be sure, has no shortage of women and men who provide similar testimony to a power 
beyond will-to-power: in the figures of Mother Teresa, Oscar Romero, and Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer we find examples of a compassio essendi which empowers the service of 
others even at great cost to oneself. Not long before her death, Ita Ford wrote the 
following note, tragically testifying to the empowerment of the compassio essendi: 
Yesterday I stood looking down at a 16-year-old who had been killed a few hours 
earlier. I know a lot of kids even younger who are dead. This is a terrible time in 
El Salvador for youth. A lot of idealism and commitment is getting snuffed out 
here now. The reasons why so many people are being killed are quite 
complicated, yet there are some clear, simple strands. One is that many people 
have found a meaning to life, to sacrifice, to struggle, and even to death. And 
whether their life span is 16 years, 60 or 90, for them, their life has had a purpose. 
In many ways, they are fortunate people.  
 
What I'm saying is, I hope you come to find that which gives life a deep meaning 
for you...something worth living for, maybe even worth dying for...something that 
energizes you, enthuses you, enables you to keep moving ahead. I can't tell you 
what it might be -- that's for you to find, to choose, to love. I can just encourage 
you to start looking, and support you in the search. Maybe this sounds weird and 
off-the-wall, and maybe, no one else will talk to you like this, but then, too, I'm 
seeing and living things that others around you aren't...855 
 
Ford remained rightly elusive: whatever, or whoever, empowered her to stay amidst the 
people could not be pointed to or argued toward, but only sought in, and as, love. The 
compassio essendi is not an achievement; instead, it is more akin to a vocation or a 
calling to be and to enact what one has received. We are called to be agapeic.  
 As a way of life, the agapeics of community provides a hyperbolic sign that points 
to the agapeic source of being. We look to the examples set by other women and men and 
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are goaded into contemplating how their lives testify to, or derogate from, a sense of the 
agapeic creator and sustainer of all being. Indeed, this can be read as a truly catholic 
exercise because it requires us to consider not only the examples of well-known martyrs – 
Etty Hillesum, Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr. – but also the lives of countless others 
who witnessed, in various ways, to the elemental goodness of being through lives of 
service to others. We gaze upon those who have shown us how to live because   
the community of agapeic service is a hyperbolic sign of transcendent good. Our 
participation in agapeic transcending is our fullest self-transcendence: our love, in 
transcending self, transcends to transcendence itself. We find ourselves in a love 
that not only passes beyond self, but more ultimately passes between ourselves 
and transcendence itself.856    
 
Agapeic service “is not a matter of possessing power but of being empowered and being 
able to empower – but not with one’s own power but within the energy of the divine in 
which it is one’s privilege to participate.”857 Lives of agapeic service testify to a 
hospitality to the call of the Transcendent who universally holds all of creation in being 
and who intimately dwells within the center of each being. Indeed, for Christians, the 
martyrs themselves possess something of a Christomorphic shape. This is to be expected 
because the compassio essendi “reaches its absolute form in the God of Christ – absolute 
porosity, absolving porosity, passing into and through the mortal agony of the human and 
its passio – absolute passion become a compassio essendi.”858  
 Allow me to link these ideas with Charles Taylor. I do this, first, because we now 
have sufficient metaxological resources to begin to make good on my pledge to show 
how Desmond’s thought augments Taylor’s narrative of secularity. Second, Taylor also 
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recognizes something of the hyperbolic nature of the “Kingdom of God.” Without using 
the language of hyperbole, he reminds us “not to become totally invested in the code, 
even the best code of a peace-loving, egalitarian liberalism. We should find the center of 
our spiritual lives beyond the code, deeper than the code, in networks of living concern, 
which are not to be sacrificed to the code, which must even from time to time to subvert 
it [sic].”859 The Kingdom, for both Desmond and Taylor, encapsulates not only a doctrine 
or a teaching but enshrines and makes possible a way of living agapeically.  
 “At the heart of orthodox Christianity, seen in terms of communion,” for Taylor, 
“is the coming of God through Christ into a personal relation with disciples, and beyond 
them to others, eventually ramifying through the church to humanity as a whole. God 
establishes the new relationship with us by loving us, in a way we cannot unaided love 
each other.”860 The church is called into being by and is placed at the service of agape, 
“the love God has for us, and which we can partake of through his power.”861 The church 
was meant to catalyze a new network of relations based, not in ethnicity or race or 
kinship, but solely on the divine gift of agapeic love. Alas, the ideal hardly ever achieves 
status as the real; for, as Taylor observes, “the church lamentably and spectacularly fails 
to live up to this model; but this is the kind of society it is meant to be.”862     
 Following Ivan Illich, Taylor reads the “Good Samaritan” as a parable tapping 
into the anarchic potential of the agapeic network.863 Moved by the wounded man, the 
Samaritan defies cultural and religious proscriptions to assist him. This action creates 
                                               
859 Taylor, A Secular Age, 743.  
860 Ibid., 282.  
861 Ibid., 20.  
862 Ibid.  
863 For more on the influence of Illich on Taylor, see Eric Gregory and Leah Hunt-Hendrix, “Enfleshment  
and the Time of Ethics,” in Aspiring to Fullness in a Secular Age, 217-239.  
 285 
a new kind of fittingness, belonging together, between Samaritan and wounded 
Jew. They are fitted together in a dissymmetric proportionality which comes from 
God, which is that of agape, and which became possible because God became 
flesh. The enfleshment of God extends outward, through such new links as the 
Samaritan makes with the Jew, into a network, which we call the Church. But this 
is a network, not a categorical grouping; that is, it is a skein of relations which 
link particular, unique, enfleshed people to each other, rather than a grouping of 
people together on the grounds of their sharing some important property.864  
 
Therein rests the anarchic potential: the network of agape is based in and draws its 
strength from a divine source and can unfold irrespective of extant commitments and 
allegiances. Agape is irruptive, breaking in to overthrow old orders as it inaugurates the 
Kingdom here and now, in this place and time. Nor is agape indexed to any metaphor, 
analogy, or symbol: Jesus’s parables possess multiples images not because he lacked 
imagination but because the Kingdom cannot be expressed in images or words. The 
parables are hyperbolic, not meant to inform hearers but to form them as Kingdom 
dwellers, capacitating them to perceive and encouraging them to abide within it.   
 The corruption of the network of agape occurs when “it falls back into something 
more ‘normal’ in worldly terms.”865 We keep the practices but lose their originary spirit: 
The network of agape involves a kind of fidelity to the new relations; and because 
we can all too easily fall away from this (which falling away we call “sin”), we 
are led to shore up these relations; we institutionalize them, introduce rules, divide 
responsibilities. In this way, we keep the hungry fed, the homeless housed, the 
naked clothed; but we are now living caricatures of the network life. We have lost 
some of the communion, the “conspiratio,” which is at the heart of the Eucharist. 
The spirit is strangled.866  
 
Modernity, Taylor and Illich fear, has domesticated the transformative anarchy of agape. 
Eric Gregory and Leah Hunt-Hendrix capture the bureaucratization of agape when they 
write: “When a homeless shelter is built down the road, Christians put away the candle 
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and extra mattress that they had always kept ready for the stranger who might appear, in 
need of a bed for the night. Now, when the Christian opens the door, she gestures in the 
direction of the hostel down the street and washes her hands of the need to engage 
personally with the visitor in need.”867  
 Desmond and Taylor align in believing the ethos of the Kingdom can neither by 
captured by nor fixed into a code of conduct. Yet Desmond’s agapeic indirection offers 
more than an exhortation to “find our spiritual lives beyond the code.”868 In a way, he 
desires for us to probe the surface of Taylor’s map to uncover and unleash the primordial 
force that is at the heart of and animates all being. Desmond beckons us reflect 
intensively on whether, and how, our communities serve as expressions of the agapeic 
generosity of our Creator. Are we animated by the secret sap of agape or do we betray 
this primordial love in our words and deeds? This has ecclesiological significance as even 
the Church, the Body of Christ, must examine its conscience:  
The Church of an agapeic catholicity would be Church of the compassio 
essendi… one would have to say that this is not unrelated to the kenotic poverty 
of the highest that gives for the lowest. We should have to see divine kenosis as 
an agapeic compassio essendi…And would not this be something more intimate 
with the divine kenosis: a poverty of highest fullness that empties itself in porous 
creation and gives itself for the good of the lowest?869  
 
Rightly does Desmond conclude with a question, rather than an assertion. His is an 
invitation to pause and consider mindfully how one stands within the metaxu. Instead of 
giving us a map different from Taylor’s, he supplements the map drawn of our secular 
age. Even if this means trekking out beneath the eclipse of the transcendent, or standing 
at the shores of Dover Beach, or wandering the desert of atheism, metaxological 
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mindfulness trains us to discern, even in the most inhospitable conditions, the secret 
sources of divine life at the heart of being. Desmond captures metaphysically what 
Antony and Evagrius knew existentially and spiritually: “sometimes the desert brings us 
closer to the primal ethos than the sophistications of the city of man.”870  
 It is by drawing our attention toward the inexhaustible depths of the primal ethos 
that Desmond augments Taylor’s map not by extending its borders but by penetrating its 
hidden depths. The agapeic network is not imposed upon the metaxu but exposed as 
abiding at the core of creation itself. Agape is not, so to speak, a lagniappe or “additional 
something” added to creation. It is, rather, the innermost essence of all creation. If Taylor 
furnishes us with a map to guide our pilgrimage into the desert of unbelief, Desmond 
carries with him a metaxological dowsing rod capable of divining the presence of secret 
life-giving streams. He bids us to pause, to dig deep into the sands, and to drink as we 
uncover a vast reservoir beneath the surface. With Desmond as our guide, we come to 
understand how there is no point on the map – ourselves included – not somehow rooted 
in and nourished by these agapeic streams. Taylor’s map gives us the breadth of our 
secular age. Desmond’s dowsing rod uncovers the infinite agapeic depths.   
 Exposing the hidden metaphysical depths of Taylor’s map serves to reconfigure 
our understanding of what it means to participate in the metaxu’s community. All of 
creation, rooted in the agapeic generosity of its Creative origin, is transformed into a 
common home. Taylor’s map, metaxologically conceived, provides us with a sense of 
how the intimate strangeness of being inscribes all of creation into a shared oikos. The 
logos of this oikos is agape, and what Desmond gives us to understand is the 
metaphysical depths of an authentic ecology. In coming to know ourselves as subjects of 
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divine mystery, as persons who are implicated in the ongoing act of creation, our 
response not only to one another but to the whole of the natural world must be one of 
agapeic service. This, perhaps, roots Pope Francis’s understanding of the “integral 
ecology” described in Laudato Si. Pope Francis cites Saint Francis as the 
example par excellence of care for the vulnerable and of an integral ecology lived 
out joyfully and authentically. He is the patron saint of all who study and work in 
the area of ecology, and he is also much loved by non-Christians. He was 
particularly concerned for God’s creation and for the poor and outcast…He shows 
us just how inseparable the bond is between concern for nature, justice for the 
poor, commitment to society, and interior peace.871 
 
The Holy Father’s integral ecology, galvanized at its core by agape, is effectively an 
integrating ecology summoning its participants to work for the good of our shared home. 
What Desmond helps us to see is how, on Taylor’s map, there is no neutral ground on 
which we may feel unconstrained by the call to agapeic service because there is no point 
on the map outside of Divine reach. Every point, above and below the map, bears the 
trace of the Transcendent upon it. To senses attuned by metaxological askēsis, what had 
appeared to be the gloaming of the Transcendent and its disappearance upon the horizon 
comes to be seen, not as the encroachment of night, but as the prelude to a new dawn. By 
this dawn’s light, we perceive how deeply we are interwoven into the agapeic network 
and discover how our “simple daily gestures which break with the logic of violence, 
exploitation and selfishness”872 contribute to the common good of all creation. In leading 
us into the primordial depths of creation, metaxology gives us the courage to sing with 
Saint Francis a canticle to Brother Sun, Sister Moon and celebrate our kinship in our 
common home.  
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 In the hyperbole of the agapeics of community, we find ourselves drawn into the 
ceaseless give-and-take of the metaxu. We are finite yet discern within finitude signs of 
the infinite exterior to ourselves, interior within ourselves, superior to ourselves. This 
porosity reminds us how “our being is in receiving and giving. We are receptive to the 
gift of the other, and we are free to give beyond ourselves to others, and in some 
instances, simply for the good of the other as other.”873 Taylor’s map, viewed having 
traversed a metaxological indirection, becomes a living breathing tableau proclaiming the 
Transcendent present in and disclosed through all beings. We call to mind exemplars of 
lived-out generosity, saints known and unknown. Words attributed to St Ignatius of 
Loyola spring: “Lord, teach me to be generous. Teach me to serve you as you deserve. To 
give and not to count the cost...”. Agapeic giving, a kenotic generosity, a “good measure, 
pressed down and overflowing” (Lk 6:38). Not just words, but incarnate expressions of 
the Agapeic Origin. A sense of agapeic astonishment “throw us over” toward the 
Transcendent whom we encounter not as a faceless or nameless force but as the vitalizing 
force of the compassio essendi which gives us a foretaste of the divine love had for us 
and endows us with courage to love others as we have been loved. Metaxological 
indirection leads us into the depths of Taylor’s map where we hear the call, and are 
empowered to respond, to the challenge to “go and do likewise.”   
 
4.6 Exercising Transcendence: Hurrahing in the Metaxu 
 
 Guided by Gerard Manley Hopkins, I conclude by suggesting how Desmond’s 
metaphysics offers a resource to anyone desiring to encounter the Transcendent in a 
secular age. Simply stated: undertaken as a spiritual exercise, metaxology enables 
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practitioners to re-open the question of the Transcendent and ennobles us by giving us to 
behold how we are inscribed into the metaxu not as isolated monads but as participants in 
a community given to be, and sustained in its being, by an Agapeic Creator. Metaxology 
is not only an exercise in thinking but also, and more vitally, a transformative attunement 
into a way of metaphysical beholding and an awakening to one’s own being beheld.  
  In 1878 Hopkins described his “Hurrahing in Harvest” as “the outcome of half an 
hour of extreme enthusiasm as I walked home alone one day from fishing in the Elwy.”874 
The sonnet captures a rekindling of astonishment that, read with metaxological eyes, 
encapsulates the “poetics of the between” and subtly weaves together each of the four 
indirections we have explored:  
 SUMMER ends now; now, barbarous in beauty, the stooks arise 
    Around; up above, what wind-walks! what lovely behaviour  
    Of silk-sack clouds! Has wilder, willful-wavier 
 Meal-drift moulded ever and melted across skies?  
 
 I walk, I lift up, I lift up heart, eyes, 
    Down all that glory in the heavens to glean our Saviour; 
    And, éyes, heart, what looks, what lips yet gave you a  
 Rapturous love’s greeting of realer, of rounder replies?  
 
 And the azurous hung hills are his world-wielding shoulder 
    Majestic – as a stallion stalwart, very-violet-sweet! – 
  These things, these things were here and but the beholder 
    Wanting; which two when they once meet, 
 The heart rears wings bold and bolder 
    And hurls for him, O half hurls earth for him off under his feet.875  
 
The end of summer in North Wales, a portent of an impending bleak, raw, winter, 
provides Hopkins an unexpected moment of reaping. Around him, “stooks” or sheaves of 
grain have been gathered and stacked; in the sky above, the “wind-walks” as tumbling 
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clouds form and re-form themselves as they drift along. As he walks, it is as though he 
hears nature’s wordless call to prayer; he lifts up his heart and his eyes, taking part now 
in creation’s liturgy. The allusion to Ruth 2:3 is deliberate, for just as Ruth met her future 
husband Boaz while “gleaning” in the field behind the harvesters, Hopkins “gleans” in 
creation hints and intimations of the Savior’s presence in all things. As Kevin Hart writes, 
“what was at first was the gathering of the vestigia dei has suddenly become something 
more whole and more real than could have been anticipated. The gleaning has resulted in 
a rich harvest: Christ greets Hopkins in a manner that could not be ‘realer’ or 
‘rounder.’”876 The advent of Christ reverses our understanding of communication 
because, as Desmond observes, “communication is from what is other to us first, and then 
from ourselves toward that otherness as other. The first initiative does not lie with us, and 
yet something is initiated. As initiating, we are always seconds.”877 This sonnet does not 
conjure Christ into creation but offers a poetic response to an epiphanic disclosure of the 
divine presence indwelling in all things.   
 This brings us to the sonnet’s key line: “these things, these things were here but 
the beholder Wanting.” The doubling of “these things” is a redoubling, a stuttering 
intensification of his sudden awareness of creation’s overdeterminacy. It is not Hopkins 
who imposes order and beauty upon nature but, rather, he is awakened, as if out of a deep 
sleep, and given to behold creation with new eyes. Newly roused, he wipes the rheum of 
postulatory finitism from his eyes and is given to perceive that it is he who has been 
Wanting, that it is he who has been blind to creation’s splendor. His poetic metaphor 
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works, literally and literarily, to “carry us beyond” the terrestrial toward Transcendent as 
the “heart rears wings bolder and bolder” and bears him aloft in rapturous ascent. 
Hopkins awakens to being beheld by his Savior and, in knowing himself as beheld, is 
given to behold things anew. The created order is not an inert substrate awaiting our 
imprint. Instead, creation communicates itself as an unsurpassable moment revealing 
“Rapturous love’s greeting.” 
 “Hurrahing in Harvest” can be read as a poetic concretization of Desmond’s 
indirections. For it is Hopkins who is moved idiotically to raise his entire self – “I lift up, 
I lift up heart, eyes” – toward the “all that glory in the heavens.” What had been, just 
lines before, the “skies” are transformed into the “heavens” as the heart’s perception now 
directs his eyes and allows him to behold the divine presence immanent in the created 
realm. Sensuous aesthetic imagery communicates, furthermore, the surfeit of beauty and 
the rupture of the sublime as it paradoxically captivates the poet and liberates his heart to 
approach the Holy One. The “hurrah” of the harvest comes as he gleans the presence of 
Christ, the creative Logos, mysteriously present not in a distant Empyrion but as the 
sustaining presence glimpsed in “azurous hung hills.” As an erotic indirection, the 
beholder’s “Wanting” is not grudgingly acknowledged but ecstatically celebrated, for this 
“Wanting releases the beholder to follow the heart’s longing toward the one for whom it 
most longs. Finally, we have a profound sense of the agapeics of community: the heart 
takes wing and “hurls for him, O half hurls earth.” Why only “half hurls?” Because 
Christ is present within creation, not hovering in the ether but concretely “under his feet.” 
For those with eyes to see and ears to hear, we are given to behold how all created beings 
are always “together with” in community with the Creative Logos.  
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 The “Hurrahing the Harvest” proves simultaneously enabling and ennobling. It 
enables Hopkins to peer beneath nature’s taken-for-granted surface and to perceive 
within creation signs pointing beyond the immanent order. The scenery of the end-of-
season harvest is transfigured for, in but a moment, he finds himself being drawn into a 
harvest that is never out of season: the harvest of Christ himself who plays, as Hopkins 
notes elsewhere, in “ten thousand places.” Herein, for the Christian, the poem proves 
ennobling. For instead of telling the reader what to think about, the sonnet draws the 
reader into an event of disclosure as the created order reveals its hidden depths, thereby 
allowing Hopkins – and perhaps his accompanying readers – to dwell within creation 
attuned to being called by, and englobed within, the divine presence.  
 What Hopkins captures in poetry is present, in nuce, in Desmond’s metaxological 
poetics. Approached as a form of spiritual exercises, we are drawn into and made able to 
perceive the “happening” of the between. No single instance of this “happening” points 
directly toward God, as though the Holy One were something one could point toward. 
Rather, one is indirected and returned to the primal ethos where one is refreshed at the 
wellspring of astonishment. Metaxology, as an askēsis does not tell the reader what to 
think because it “works” to transform how one perceives. Whereas the modern ethos 
would emphasize the antinomy of autonomy and transcendence, metaxology seeks to 
restore a sense of porosity between them: “I” cannot be apart from the Transcendence 
because my existence, as well as the existence of every other finite being, is inescapably 
a part of the created whole.  
 Undertaken as an exercise, Desmond’s indirections permit us to “exercise 
transcendence” by equipping us to search within the immanent order for signs of the 
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Transcendent. One can, of course, select any one of the indirections and contemplate that 
being is, the intelligibility of nature, the intimate strangeness of being encountered in 
prayer, or the way our communities can be reconfigured according to an agapeic logic. 
Each one, taken singly, can stir us into contemplation. But if we take these indirections as 
a way of life, as a way of beholding, then we can see how each of them intermediate with 
one another. As we get caught up in the interplay of these ways, we can find our way of 
being in the metaxu undergoing a transformation. Like Irish musicians in a seisiún, each 
“way” contributes to and enhances the way we stand in the between, gradually attuning 
us to the rhythmic interplay of voices. Rightly attuned to the “crack” in everything, we 
find ourselves dwelling in, and overcome by, a sense of the “good craic” of creation. 
Desmond’s ways are not dispassionate inquiries but, rather, exercises in attunement 
aimed at getting us to detect the rhythm and to find our place within the symphonic 
composition of creation.  
 What Desmond offers, then, is a nuanced and exciting response to Taylor’s call 
for “new and unprecedented itineraries” to the sacred. As a response, Desmond offers us 
four indirections beginning in the here-and-now which attempt to make sense of our 
experience of being within the metaxu. Rather than abstract logical arguments, 
Desmond’s ways are performative: they invite us to consider things mindfully from a 
metaxological vantage point in order to see if this new way of beholding makes better 
sense of our experience. For those weaned on the thin gruel of univocity, Desmond’s 
recourse to subtle poetics cannot, at least at first, but be maddening. But by undergoing 
these “ways” as exercises, we begin to detect within the finite realm various hints and 
glimmers of the too-muchness or overdeterminacy of being. Desmond’s itineraries do not 
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take us so much into new realms of Taylor’s map as much as they uncover the map’s own 
hidden depths. Instead of directing us elsewhere or off the map, Desmond goads into an 
archaeological exploration of the primordial ethos where we uncover long-clogged 
springs whose water is capable of refreshing our sense of the divine.  
 But, in a way, Desmond’s innovative itineraries are little more than recuperations 
or repristinations of a venerable tradition. For, as we saw, his “ways” are efforts to return 
to the originary ethos of older arguments for God’s existence. He would agree, at least in 
part, when Taylor observes that our goal “is not to return to an earlier formula, inspiring 
as many of these will undoubtedly be….”878 Desmond’s task, however, is not an atavistic 
retrieval aimed at preserving the “older arguments” just as he finds them. We saw this in 
his reformulation of Anselm’s argument. Instead of articulating it as a logical proof, he 
returns Anselm’s way to its origins in prayer and meditation. This “way” is not meant to 
be read over but must be undergone as a practice. The same can be said of Aquinas’s 3rd 
and 5th ways regarded not as artifacts but as still-viable “ways” to approach the divine. 
Each offers an opportunity to “exercise transcendence” as one pauses within the metaxu 
and gives oneself over to a form of philosophical contemplation or, dare it be said, 
philosophical prayer. If metaxology unclogs porosity and reawakens the passio essendi, 
this creates a space for a fruitful rapprochement between theology (fides quarens 
intellectum) and philosophy (intellectus quarens fidem).879 I explore this relationship in 
the next chapter.  
  By leading us through a series of meditations aimed at returning us to the primal 
ethos of being, Desmond intends to rekindle within his readers a sense of astonishment 
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or, with Hopkins, to induce one into “Hurrahing” in the metaxu as we get swept away 
into the poetics of the between. We cannot, of course, compel our own astonishment; yet, 
by approaching metaxology as a form of spiritual exercise, it certainly seems possible to 
“prime the pump,” so to speak, by raising the question of the Transcendent in new ways. 
We can read metaxology not as giving us “the answer” or as possessing “the Truth” but 
as a theater of encounter where the poetics of the texts gives us to behold the metaxu with 
transformed perception. Indeed, each of the ways aide us in loosening our conceptual 
grasp on being, allowing us to relax and begin a process of inhabiting the mystery 
through a process of letting go. Letting go of our concepts, of our striving to master and 
control, need not precipitate an internal crisis. Indeed, the opposite is the case as the 
revitalized passio communicates a sense of being beheld. Before we can behold, we are 
beheld and sustained in existence by a source beyond our control. As beholders, we are 
“Wanting” insofar as desire admits no finite satisfaction: our hearts, as Augustine knew, 
restlessly hunger for the infinite. But we are “Wanting” in still another way, “for now we 
see in a mirror dimly” (1 Cor 13:12) and we await a moment of breakthrough or epiphany 
whereby we might behold the full splendor of the metaxu. Desmond writes: 
We tend to think of beholding as a movement from us to something other to us. 
Beholding something seems to put the perceiver in a position of active superiority 
to the being beheld as other. My beholding seems to confer on me the 
preeminence: the other beheld may be marvelous but my beholding seems to be 
the privileged glory. This kind of beholding, I would say, is too full of itself, and 
hence lacks the fertile emptiness that is filled with openness.880  
 
Desmond’s achievement: in the “Return to Zero,” he leads us back to the “fertile 
emptiness” of the nihil and then, through each of the indirections, allows our posthumous 
mind to consider creation in a new way. The purgative process of agapeic nihilism clears 
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away the debris of self-assertion, demolishes idols erected by the conatus, and stirs 
within us a sense that before we can behold we must first be beheld.  
 The epigraph from John Ruusbroec offers a mystical expression of how 
metaxology “works” as a type spiritual askēsis:  
One must lose oneself in a state devoid of particular form or measure, a state of 
darkness in which all contemplatives blissfully lose their way and are never again 
able to find themselves in a creaturely way. In the abyss of this darkness in which 
the loving spirit has died to itself, God’s revelation and eternal life have their 
origin, for in this darkness an incomprehensible light is born and shines forth.881 
 
Metaxology performs to the extent it is able to disorient one and then, gradually, reorient 
the way one understands oneself in the between. Before it speaks, before it makes claims, 
metaxology is first and foremost a response to having been addressed. It is a call, a 
summons, a vocation leading us, mystagogically, into a refreshed sense of and 
relationship with the Mystery at the heart of all being. Metaxology cannot, consequently, 
be limited solely to describing a way of thought. It is a way of life enlivened by a 
mindfulness nourished at the source of thought itself. Metaxology, furthermore, remains 
hospitable to a porosity between the disciplines of philosophical and theological inquiry. 
Fittingly, metaxology would seem to endow those willing to undertake and be 
transformed through its practice with what Keats called a “Negative Capability” enabling 
one to abide in “uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact 
and reason.”882 My task now is to suggest how metaxology can contribute in an explicit 
way to capacitating the agent in this way through the inculcation of what I want to call 
“epiphanic attunement.” 
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Chapter 5 
 
Epiphanic Attunement 
 
We are the beings of receptive spirituality, who stand in freedom before the free God of a 
possible revelation, which, if it comes, happens in our history through the word. We are 
the ones who, in our history, listen for the word of the free God. Only thus are we what 
we should be. 
-Karl Rahner, Hearer of the Word 
 
 Readers familiar with The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe will recall the scene 
when Aslan offers his life in exchange for Edmund Pevensie’s. Per the law of the “Deep 
Magic,” the Witch had a claim on the life of every traitor in Narnia and Edmund had 
betrayed his siblings. During their negotiations, Aslan challenges the Witch’s knowledge 
of the law, inviting her to tell him of its meaning:  
Tell you what is written on that very Table of Stone which stands beside us? Tell 
you what is written in letters deep as a spear is long on the firestones on the Secret 
Hill? Tell you what is engraved on the scepter of the Emperor-beyond-the-Sea? 
You at least know the Magic which the Emperor put into Narnia at the very 
beginning. You know that every traitor belongs to me as my lawful prey and that 
for every treachery I have a right to kill.883  
 
Mr. Beaver minces no words: “So that’s how you came to imagine yourself a queen – 
because you were the Emperor’s hangman. I see.” The power she exercises over life and 
death is not her own but parasitic; it is seized, not granted. Metaxologically stated, her 
reign bears the mark of a dominative conatus severed from any sense of congress with, or 
responsibility to, an endowing passio essendi.  
As the dark night of Aslan’s sacrificial death cedes to dawn, Lucy and Susan hear 
“a great cracking, deafening noise as if a giant had broken a giant’s plate.” They return to 
the Stone Table only to find it broken in two pieces and Aslan’s body no longer there. In 
this moment of the ancient Table’s breakdown the children, and the reader, are astonished 
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by an unexpected breakthrough: there, “shining in the sunrise, larger than they had seen 
him before, shaking his mane (for it had apparently grown again) stood Aslan himself.” 
Aslan reinterprets the events. For although the Witch 
knew the Deep Magic, there is a magic deeper still which she did not know: Her 
knowledge goes back only to the dawn of time. But if she could have looked a 
little further back, into the stillness and the darkness before Time dawned, she 
would have read there a different incantation. She would have known that when a 
willing victim who had committed no treachery was killed in a traitor’s stead, the 
Table would crack and Death itself would start working backwards.884   
 
Metaxologically expressed: the Witch’s way of self-assertive grasping failed to root itself 
in the depths of the law. Her knowledge of the Law was severed from its originary ethos 
and had become a univocal rule subtending her claim to dominion. Aslan knew, however, 
of its enigmatic origins; he knew the “way” of the Law was not the way of domination 
but a non-disabling vulnerability to an ancient power stronger even than Death. In 
Aslan’s appearance amidst the Table’s rubble, we glimpse what Richard Kearney 
identifies as the “epiphanic paradigm of descent into darkness (kenosis) and ascent into 
light (anabasis).”885 His sacrifice subverts the regnant order and, by breaking it down, 
possibilizes the breakthrough of a new order. In Narnia’s darkest hour, when all hope is 
lost, he is an epiphany, an “irruption of light in opacity,”886 whose manifestation reveals 
the Deep Magic’s power and unleashes a counter-movement of good against evil.  
 In this chapter, I explore how “exercising” metaxology might transform our mode 
of perception by inducing what I call “epiphanic attunement.” The itinerary of our 
exercises follows Kearney’s epiphanic paradigm: we endured the breakdown of the 
“Return” and, our eyes purged by death, our return was guided by the light breaking 
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through the “crack” in everything. Posthumous mind renders us attentive to signs of the 
infinite in the finite, traces of the Transcendent in the immanent. A restored sense of the 
passio essendi allows us to assume a new stance toward reality: we open ourselves in a 
gesture of hospitality and vigilantly listen in silence for the Divine to speak. We are 
beings of perpetual expectancy who abide in an endless season of Advent; we are those 
who, with the whole of our being, listen within history for a revelatory word from the 
Transcendent. Epiphanic attunement describes how we are made able to recognize, and to 
respond, to events of divine disclosure. As a way of life, metaxology transforms the way 
we perceive, and abide within, the metaxu by giving us to behold all things anew.  
 The chapter has four parts. In Part I, I retrieve from Husserl a concept of 
orthoaesthesis (right perception) and transpose this concept into metaxological register. 
This transposition allows me, in Part II, to explore the dynamics of epiphanic attunement 
in two narratives describing a process of “coming to perceive rightly” as a response to 
what Desmond calls “godsends.” In Part III, I suggest how the Road to Emmaus narrative 
offers a palmary example of epiphanic attunement and I gesture toward areas where the 
concept may be developed fruitfully in the future. I conclude by considering the 
relationship between metaphysics and theology and indicate how metaxology exposes the 
“crack” and fundamental porosity between them. Metaxology does not force us to choose 
between them because it shows how both ways of thought are both rooted in, and respond 
to, the mystery of being. By leading us back into this primordial mystery, we will come 
to recognize and appreciate metaxology’s mystagogical impulse. 
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5.1 Orthoaesthesis: From Status Quo to Salutary Breakdown  
 “Edmund Husserl blazed a path toward a phenomenology of the flesh,” Richard 
Kearney remarks, “when he broached the crucial theme of the living body (Leib).”887 
This emphasis on the role of the living body emerges explicitly in Husserl’s Ideas II,888 a 
text written in 1912, rewritten in 1915, and continually revised until he abandoned it in 
1928. Husserl’s assistants Edith Stein and Ludwig Landgrebe published the text 
posthumously, in 1952, after further redaction.889 At its core, Ideas II “concentrates on 
the unity of the self as person and on the self as an embodied, spatially oriented, and 
temporally located subject, thus providing a corrective to the rather disembodied idealist 
standpoint” of his earlier philosophy.890 If Husserl’s earlier work emphasized a 
disembodied transcendental ego, this works serves as a corrective by restoring to the ego 
a body of living flesh.   
 To show why this restoration is important, let me offer a quick point of contrast 
between Descartes and Husserl. In the “Sixth Meditation” Descartes writes that from 
the fact that I know that I exist, and that at the same time I judge that obviously 
nothing else belongs to my nature or essence except that I am a thinking thing, I 
rightly conclude that my essence consists entirely in my being a thinking thing. 
And although perhaps (or rather, as I shall soon say, assuredly) I have a body that 
is very closely joined to me, nevertheless, as I am merely a thinking thing and not 
an extended thing, and because on the other hand I have a distinct idea of a body, 
insofar as it is merely an extended thing and not a thinking thing, it is certain that 
I am really distinct from my body, and can exist without it.891   
 
For Descartes, as students of philosophy know, the body was a hindrance to the 
attainment of clear and distinct ideas. I am essentially “thinking thing” or res cogitans for 
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whom it is vital to bracket out the misleading information conveyed by my senses. In 
Ideas II, Husserl puts together what Descartes had sundered: “The Body is, in the first 
place, the medium of all perception; it is the organ of perception and is necessarily 
involved in all perception.”892 Rather than an impediment to knowledge, Husserl’s body 
(Leib) is the means by which we apprehend and constitute the world we perceive. We do 
not “float” ethereally above the flux because, as embodied subjects, we are immersed 
within it. The body, consequently, is “the bearer of the zero point of orientation, the 
bearer of the here and the now, out of which the pure Ego intuits space and the whole 
world of the senses.”893 Where Descartes sought filter out the contribution of sense data, 
Husserl’s turn to the body effects a medieval retrieval: nihil est in intellectu quod non 
prius in sensu.894 
 For Husserl, the body is the “bearer of the zero point of orientation, the bearer of 
the here and the now, out of which the pure Ego intuits space and the whole world of the 
senses.”895 It is the Nullpunkt where the axes of space and time intersect in one’s flesh. 
Yet it is seldom the case that we experience our bodies as this zero-point. Drew Leder 
describes this phenomenon as the body’s disappearance.896 For Leder, “disappearance” 
does not mean the body vanishes; trading on the “dis-” as a prefix of negation, it is more 
the case that the body simply does not appear to consciousness. Think, for instance, of the 
countless bodily movements and adjustments needed just to get us from our beds to the 
shower each morning. The way we move throughout the day with ease belies the ongoing 
interplay taking place within the body. I walk through the airport, thinking about being on 
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holiday. Yet I can think of skydiving only because I am not thinking about a host of 
sensations and stimuli besetting my body. I move without much, if any, thought of the 
operations of my viscera as my body digests lunch; I am not aware either of the change in 
tile color as I pass through concourses or to the cacophony of voices buzzing around me. 
Now consider: how do your socks feel? Your underwear? Are you now attentive to areas 
of your body you were not previously thinking about? This makes sense because, 
accustomed to wearing clothes, we have learned to “filter out” our sense of their weight 
and texture and we pay them little heed. Or think about how when we become engrossed 
in a good novel, or a ripping dissertation, entire regions of our body “disappear” in what 
Leder calls background disappearance:  
Bodily regions can disappear because they are not the focal origin of our 
sensorimotor engagements but are backgrounded in the corporeal gestalt: that is, 
they are for the moment relegated to a supportive role, involved in irrelevant 
movement, or simply put out of play.897 
   
Immersed in the flow of some activity, some or even all of our bodily regions may 
disappear into the background. A master chef does not think, “Now I lift the knife, now I 
bring it down” nor does the pianist focus on “now this finger, now that.” The body does 
not evanesce into nothingness but “disappears” to allow the subject to focus on a task.   
 In Ideas II, Husserl describes this “background disappearance” with a neologism: 
orthoaesthesis. Etymologically, the word means “right perception” and, as Husserl uses 
it, we can detect two meanings. On one level, orthoaesthesis conveys how the world 
normally appears, the way appearances typically “coalesce into the unity of one 
concordant experience.”898 In an orthoaesthetic system, there is harmony between the 
subject and her surroundings world allowing her to operate in a relatively unobstructed 
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manner. The master chef negotiates the kitchen by chopping, slicing, weighing, tasting, 
etc., without giving much attention to doing it. A habitus cultivated over many years 
allows, under orthoaesthetic conditions, for her to navigate the kitchen space with relative 
ease. Furthermore, on a second level, orthoaesthesis refers also to how one perceives, or 
does not perceive, one’s body. Remaining with the chef, under orthoaesthetic conditions 
she does not think about her alimentary canal, her core temperature, or her gall bladder: 
these operate in the background and, so long as they work in concert, their smooth 
running allows her to focus on teaching new chefs how to julienne carrots.    
 But what happens when there is a breach in the orthoaesthetic system or a sudden 
disruption to the harmony? The chef grabs a hot pan from a hapless rookie and burns her 
hand. Blistered, it “feels” different and differently. How so? She runs a finger across her 
skin and feels swollen flesh where it had been smooth. She picks up her favorite knife 
and it feels somewhat awkward in her wounded hand. Things feel different, but the 
change is not with the exterior world but in my apperception of it. Husserl writes:   
The changed data of the field of touch are indeed still apperceived according to 
appearances but precisely as anomalies, versus the concordant appearances of 
normally functioning sensibility, in which the same things are given in relation to 
the equally concordant and normally appearing parts of the Body and in relation 
to the whole of the Body.899 
 
Muttering under her breath, she continues cooking but must now favor her other hand. 
She works now more deliberately, more cautiously, because the knife is no longer an 
extension of her body but, in her left hand, a hard-to-wield tool. There is a breakdown in 
the formerly smooth operation; what had been recessed and disappeared now obtrudes in 
a way making her task more onerous because it requires a new focus on the body. Any 
change in a sense organ, Husserl observes, effects a change in how “things appear in a 
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corresponding way, and this modified givenness refers back to the normal.900 As we face 
the obstacles presented in moments of breakdown, we become aware of having fallen 
from a “normal” state. Moments of discord reveal taken-for-granted concordance.  
 Husserl’s point, as I take it, is that we seldom recognize an orthoaesthetic or 
normally functioning system until after some type of rupture has occurred. We become 
aware of how clothes “usually” fit only when our pants are too tight or a tag scratches our 
skin. We rue our clumsiness when we cut a finger and have to finish peeling potatoes 
with the other hand. And a breach with more permanent consequences, like losing a limb 
or one’s vision, can necessitate a total reorganization of life: learning to walk with a 
prosthesis, or having to re-design the house, or to develop new strategies for executing 
tasks once easily accomplished. Regardless the severity, the experience of disruption 
recalls a sense of prior harmony, how things “worked together” and flowed normally. 
Viewed orthoaesthetically, the pile of unpeeled potatoes is a pre-dinner chore and the 
steps leading upstairs are a means of getting to the bedroom. For one with a burned hand, 
the pile is an obstacle to mashed potatoes; for one with a broken leg, the stairs once taken 
two at a time seem now an insurmountable feat. In some cases, we pine for things to go 
“back to normal” or to resume their orthoaesthetic flow; in other cases, measures must be 
taken to establish some semblance of a “new normal.”    
 As you may have noticed, the model of orthoaesthetic perception is based on 
pathology, on the breakdown of an organ affecting one’s apprehension of the world. 
Indeed, to denominate something as a “breakdown” requires the ongoing functioning of 
the other organs; a systemic failure of all organs would be death. Again Husserl: 
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Anomalies as such can therefore occur only in this form, namely that the normal 
world remains constitutively preserved, i.e., experienced, by the rest of the 
perceptual organs, the ones which, functioning reciprocally for each other as such 
organs, continue to give us experiences in the normal way.901  
 
What is true for organ systems holds, in a similar way, in instances of inter-subjective 
disagreement. As I interact with others, I may recognize how extensive  
complexes of assertions about things, which I made in earlier periods of time on 
the ground of earlier experiences, experiences which were perfectly concordant 
throughout, are not corroborated by my current companions, and this not because 
these experiences are simply lacking to them (after all, one does not need to have 
seen everything others have seen, and vice versa) but because they thoroughly 
conflict with what the others experience in experiences, we may suppose, that 
necessarily are harmonious and that go on being progressively confirmed.902 
 
Through inter-subjective experiences, the possibility that I have misperceived a given 
state of affairs arises. We encounter resistance to our settled claims about “how things are 
in the world” by rubbing up against others. Indeed, it may turn out that as “I 
communicate to my companions my earlier lived experiences” they will realize “how 
much these [experiences] conflict with their world, constituted inter-subjectively and 
continuously exhibited by means of a harmonious exchange of experiences.”903 Inter-
subjective engagement requires we negotiate our claims within a shared social space 
where conflicts can, and do, arise. I have a cousin who was appalled when he went to 
school having mixed a red Christmas sock with a green St. Patrick’s Day sock. To his 
(then undiagnosed) colorblind eyes, the socks appeared identical; to his fashion-
conscious classmates, his attire appeared, at best, quaintly anomalous. Within the social 
nexus of a classroom, the fashion breakdown was made manifest and he learned to get a 
second opinion on his clothing choices before leaving the house each day.   
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 While I want to preserve the core of Husserl’s understanding, let me transpose the 
concept of orthoaesthesis into a metaxological register. The dynamism of Desmond’s 
metaxu and the ongoing intermediation of beings can, I think, welcome Husserl’s sense 
of the embodied subject emplaced within a nexus of other bodies. Husserl’s sense of 
inter-subjective mediation between beings resonates, to my ear, with Desmond’s sense of 
the fundamental porosity of being. We are not, for either thinker, solitary subjects or 
monads. Not only are we the “porosity of being become mindful,”904 but also, for 
Desmond, we are the porosity of being become flesh. This porosity  
is embodied as an aesthetic field. Aesthetic environment means the milieu of all 
that surrounds us, all that envelops us, and all that seeps into and invades us. We 
are in it, but it is also in us. The aesthetic environment is originally not a neutral 
objective outerness. It is a field saturated with equivocal significance.905  
 
Like Husserl, Desmond understands our lives as lived in congress with other beings. But 
when it comes to Husserl’s sense of “orthoaesthesis,” Desmond has reason to demur. For 
Husserl, it seems we become aware of “perceiving rightly” only in the breach, only after 
we suffer a breakdown of concordance. We experience a descent or, better, a decline 
from the “normal” and need to work to restore previous balance. For Desmond, however, 
the opposite seems to be the case: it is the breakdown of “normal” modes of perception 
that a breakthrough into a new and transformed mode is possible. One risks the katabasis 
or descent of the darkness of the “Return” so that one’s anabasis or ascent may be guided 
by a posthumous mind attentive to the “crack” in everything. This breakdown is not 
pathological but, by rekindling our sense of the Transcendent, deeply theological. By 
inducing a sense of the intimate strangeness of being, a strangeness too easily embedded 
in the sediment of the quotidian, our exercises seek to penetrate the mantle of the taken-
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for-granted. By returning us to the primal ethos, we are given to discern in the metaxu 
signs of the infinite in the finite, glimmers of the transcendent within the immanent.  
 My point: inscribed into a metaxological framework, orthoaesthesis need not refer 
backward or nostalgically to a lost sense of the status quo. On the contrary, I want to 
suggest that “right perception” actually apprehends otherwise concealed depths and 
allows one to behold the “qualitative charge of the ‘to be’ of aesthetic happening.”906 Our 
exercises have aimed, with each hyperbolic indirection, to jostle us from the status quo 
and to reawaken within us the question of the Transcendent. Desmond does not want 
readers to languish in a neutral metaxu, a reconfigured order lacking in value, but to coax 
us onto an itinerary indirecting us toward the primal ethos: 
The value-saturation of the original elemental aesthetic field contradicts the 
abstract notion that we live in a neutral world. There is no neutral world. The 
neutral world is a neutralized world – neutralized of the charge of ontological 
worth already constitutive of the aesthetics of happening. The neutralization does 
not destroy the charge, only diminishes or deforms it.907    
 
Orthoaesthesis, metaxologically framed, does not mean seeing things “neutrally.” Instead 
of describing the status quo, I consider “right perception” as is an achievement wrought 
through metaxological askesis. Just as the breaking of the Stone Table occasioned the in-
breaking of the Deep Magic, so too does breakdown induced by the “Return to Zero” 
capacitate perception of the “crack” in everything. This breakdown of the reconfigured 
ethos allows us to discern by means of the in-breaking light various indirections toward 
the Transcendent. For the metaxologically minded, this breakdown is a salutary 
breakthrough giving us to behold not a different reality but enabling us to perceive reality 
newly attentive to the inextirpable mystery encountered in the depths of being.  
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 Before turning to consider how orthoaesthetic perception attunes us to divine 
manifestations or epiphanies, I want to think along with David Bentley Hart and 
transpose our concept of orthoaesthesis into a more theological key. At the risk of 
saturating my reader with a lengthy passage, let me offer his description of the “gaze of 
love” as enabling us to perceive  
each thing’s fortuity, its mystery, its constancy within a “transfinite” unity, its 
immediate particularity, its radiant inherence within its own “essence,” its 
intelligibility, and its way of holding together in itself the diversity of its 
transcendental aspects as a realized unity amid, and in unity with, multiplicity and 
change. The gaze of love seeks the being of things in the abiding source in which 
they participate; it is a way of seeing that is acquainted with moments of 
enchantment, which awaken it, however briefly, to a recognition of the 
persistence of being’s peaceful and sustaining light…and of this light’s 
“gratuitous necessity”; and these moments, however fleeting or imperfect, compel 
thought to risk a conjecture toward the infinite.908  
 
The “gaze of love” perceives being not as a neutrally inert “thereness” but as a roiling 
and shimmering happening. The gaze beholds the singular in its haecceity but allows 
itself to be directed to its endowing source. The gaze of love is not a voyeuristic 
“peeping” in on the happening but a beholding aware of one’s always already being 
beheld and sustained by the Agapeic Creator. Hart elaborates: 
This gaze of love, that is to say, sees being as an infinite font of manifestation, 
knowing itself in the existence and essence of things, kenotically allowing (and so 
without alienation from its own diffusive goodness) the arrival in itself of what is, 
in itself, nothing: the pure ontic ecstasy of contingent existence.909   
 
Hart’s gaze perceives what our metaxological exercises seek to attain, namely, a sense of 
being’s overdeterminacy, its hyperbolic too-muchness encountered idiotically, 
aesthetically, erotically, and agapeically. We can be hyperbolically indirected toward the 
Transcendent and, through a renewal of our porosity, fall silent in astonishment as we 
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behold the gratuity of creation. Rocked back on our heels, struck by the reawakened 
sense of the passio essendi, our silence is transformed into a vigilant listening. Not only 
our ears, but our whole selves, open outward in ecstatic anticipation of a word we cannot 
command or compel but a word we long to hear with the entirety of our selves. “Only 
thus,” as Rahner observed in the epigraph, “are we what we should be.”  
 As I use it, orthoaesthesis or “right perception” describes a way of beholding that 
is attentive to the “crack” in everything and is attuned to the rhythmic interplay as beings 
intermediate with one another. Rather than prescribing what we perceive, it expresses 
how we are mindfully present within the metaxu. It does not equip us with a theory but 
draws us into an attitude of intellectual contemplation; by undertaking metaxology as an 
askesis we are offered not a theory but an opportunity to be transformed into one of the 
theōroi. So transformed, we realize how not every breakdown, not every interruption, 
proves pathological. In fact, moments of breakdown can be moments of salutary 
breakthrough. Our exercises provide practices in “breaking through” an era’s 
reconfigured ethos to behold the primordial ethos where we can be recharged at the well 
of astonishment. By arousing a sense of the overdeterminacy of being, we are tutored to 
behold all things aright with what Hart rightly calls the “gaze of love.” The created order, 
perceived rightly, not only points beyond itself but becomes the locus of revelatory 
moments, divine epiphanies, or what Desmond has taken to calling “godsends.”  
 
5.2 Orthoaesthesis as Epiphanic Attunement 
 I want now to develop this sense orthoaesthesis in an increasingly theological 
register by showing how it capacitates epiphanic attunement. If, as Hadot writes, 
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“attention (prosoche) is the fundamental Stoic spiritual attitude,”910 I propose epiphanic 
attunement as the fundamental spiritual attitude of the metaxologically-minded subject. 
By means of metaxological askesis, one can join ranks with the theōroi who actively 
contemplate the whole of creation with joyful vigilance. Attentive to the hyperboles of 
being, the whole of creation is beheld as a communicative tableau rife with signs and 
indirections pointing toward the Transcendent. Epiphanic attunement is a way of 
perceiving the whole of creation rightly or orthoaesthetically with the whole of one’s 
being on the lookout for any “chink or crack through which the light appears – a kind of 
gap, or permeability, a porosity to a light that comes from a source beyond.”911 Attentive 
to the “crack” in everything, we incarnate vigilant hospitality to the Divine and await, 
with the whole of our being, a word of address. To be sure, as Rahner observed, this 
listening does not necessarily imply any actual hearing (neither in fact nor for the 
content). Perceiving God’s silence is also an answer that makes the listening 
meaningful. Under God’s silence too we may become what we have to be at any 
rate: personal finite spirit before the personal infinite free God, with whom we 
necessarily have to deal, at least by being aware of God’s silence.912    
 
Though we cannot compel the Transcendent to speak, we can ready ourselves should a 
revelatory word enter into history Creator speak. We open ourselves to the silence and 
pray with the Psalmist: “I wait for the Lord, my soul waits, and in his word I hope; my 
soul waits for the Lord more than those who watch for the morning” (Ps 130:5-6). We 
watch, and pray, and await in anticipatory silence for a word to shatter the silence.  
 In an essay entitled “Godsends,” Desmond offers a fascinating, if not 
unambiguous, reflection on the nature of revelation. This is a signal development, as it 
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marks an engagement with a topic central to theology. Indeed, one might wonder if this is 
not something of a response to Christopher Ben Simpson’s suggestion that, perhaps, 
Desmond would benefit from a more positive account of revealed, confessional 
theology. Indeed, Desmond might need to “come out of the closet” as a 
theologian as well – to be able to give a more robust accounting (and so remedy a 
kind of incompleteness in his present accounting) of the indeed necessary relation 
between, not only philosophy and religion, but philosophy and theology.913  
 
Even if Desmond is not forthcoming about the relationship between metaphysics and 
theology, we may still attempt to discern in this more explicitly theological essay the 
nature of their relationship. Does Desmond need to “build a bridge” between metaphysics 
and theology or might it be the case that his archaeological explorations have succeeded 
in uncovering an oft-neglected yet fundamental porosity between the disciplines?  
 
5.2.1 Godsends and Revelations 
  Desmond begins his reflection on godsends by consulting its definition in the 
Oxford English Dictionary. He is quick to point out the word’s amphiboly. True, a 
“godsend” normally refers to an unexpected boon or fortuitous turn. An anonymous 
benefactor pays the balance on all lay-away items in a store; in dire financial straits, an 
unexpected inheritance arrives in the mail. At the same time, godsends may not always be 
received, at least not initially, with joy. The loss of a job, or the diagnosis of a disease, 
creates an upheaval in one’s life. Looking back upon the event, given some time and 
perspective, one may eventually come to regard it as a salutary disruption. One sees it, in 
a sense, as a “dark grace,” a painful yet beneficial breakdown leading to a positive 
change. My friend lost a six-figure job on Wall Street in 2008. At first stunned, and then 
forlorn, the shock did eventually wear off. He started to see, in the rubble of his career, 
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prospects for him to move in a new direct. He sold his apartment and returned to school 
to earn a degree in education. Now a teacher in a Detroit public school, he regards the 
collapse of his former life as a gift – a secret godsend – allowing him to discern and 
embrace what he recognizes now as his vocation.  
 Thus “godsend” cannot, then, be taken to have a univocal meaning. Indeed, 
Desmond emphasizes its equivocity when he defines a godsend as: 
an event or happening that befalls us, and that may open out the opportunity of a 
benefit or boon, or surprising gift; an even that might well be shadowed by 
something suffered, and suffered not just in the receipts of gifts, but also in the 
visiting on some of pain and disaster or death.914  
 
There is a Shakespearean element at play: what seems fair can be fair or foul and what is 
foul can be fair. If my friend’s lifestyle change is an instance of the latter, one may think 
of how winning the lottery can at times help, and at other times ruin, a family’s life.  
 In the word “godsend” there is, moreover, the “implication of a sending, by the 
divine to us, perhaps, and hence the insinuation of a kind of revelation.”915 A godsend is 
not experienced as a random bit of luck, a mere happenstance, but as a moment of divine 
communication; the godsend appears as having been deliberately sent by the divine. Yet 
neither the godsend’s arrival nor its purpose is always clear. As Desmond observes 
A godsend might be noted but often we do not know what the meaning 
communicated is. Ambiguity and mystery may attend that more painful sense of 
equivocity that comes with the disaster that is a curse to one and a blessing to 
another. In the word “send” also there is the implication of being sent on a 
journey, being called on a mission. The godsend may be a sending that causes us 
to set off on a way in the name of a mysterious cause.916  
 
One needs both to be attentive to the godsend’s arrival and to discern its meaning with 
care. For it is one thing to hear one’s name called in the darkness; it is another, as Samuel 
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learned, to make oneself vulnerable by responding, “Speak, Lord, for your servant is 
listening” (1 Sam 3:9). The godsend can rouse us from somnolence to reveal new 
vocational opportunities or to open up unimaginable pathways. If the godsend is 
communicative, and arrives as a call, how one responds, or does not, cannot but have 
consequences for the whole of one’s life.  
 For Desmond, the godsend might be characterized as an irruptive or shocking 
surprise whose arrival restores a sense of being’s fundamental porosity. Mindful of 
Charles Taylor’s “buffered self” and the “immanent frame,” he describes how 
A godsend comes and we are no longer within the buffered closure in which we 
previously were. A veil is drawn back – the literal meaning of apocalypse (apo-
kalypsis). A chink or crack happens in the closure of the “immanent” frame,” to 
use Charles Taylor’s phrase. We have to ponder the light that comes through the 
chink and wonder how far we might travel in its illumination.917  
 
If the arrival of the godsend catches us off guard, it is a disorientation that reorients us to 
behold things in a new and transformed manner. The godsend bursts open the bounds of 
the ordinary to reveal hitherto concealed depths. Think of Thomas Merton: 
In Louisville, at the corner of Fourth and Walnut, in the center of the shopping 
district, I was suddenly overwhelmed with the realization that I loved all those 
people, that they were mine and I theirs, that we could not be alien to one another 
even though we were total strangers. It was like waking from a dream of 
separateness, of spurious self-isolation in a special world, the world of 
renunciation and supposed holiness. The whole illusion of a separate holy 
existence is a dream.918  
 
Something within Merton gave way, a clog dissolved, and it was revealed to him how all 
of us were intimately, if not strangely, connected to one another. What had been 
understood as parallel tracks of the natural and the supernatural, the sacred and the 
profane, appeared in the godsend’s wake to crisscross and interpenetrate. The godsend 
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did not dispel mystery but served to draw Merton into its depths where he experienced 
the depths of his interconnectedness with, and porosity to, those around him.   
 It is important to insist: the arrival of the godsend, even when welcomed, cannot 
but have an effect upon its recipient. The godsend, as a communication, is a moment of 
epiphany or disclosure. It involves moments of katabasis and anabasis. Its arrival, put 
otherwise, induces a breakdown before yielding to a transformative breakthrough:  
We have to be divested of the shutters before the chink that opens to the light is 
felt – felt as suffering that breaks down the shutters. And perhaps it is not 
surprising that the surprise of the godsend is very often in the dawning of a 
destitution where we can no longer count on anything, and not on ourselves 
either. Beyond all possible determination or self-determination the godsend visits. 
Perhaps we have to become as nothing for it to communicate in the newly 
evacuated space of porosity.919  
 
Within the context of an increasingly secular age, I have emphasized the “Return” as a 
propaedeutic. In pushing nihilism to its limit, in meditating on the implications of 
standing beneath the Angel of Death’s wings, we faced the truth of existence: we come 
from, and return to, nothing. In the wreckage of monuments built to honor the conatus, 
we may yet be astonished to hear a whisper: yet it is. Light bends around the Angel’s 
wing and we perceive the gratuity of being. Gifted with posthumous mind, we behold all 
things with purged senses. In the wake of breakdown instigated through “Return,” one 
comes to see with new eyes, come to perceive orthoaesthetically, how all that is, is a gift.  
 Each of Desmond’s “hyperboles of being” can, he avers, be regarded as at least 
partly “requisite conditions for fleshing out the character of our being porous to a 
godsend.920 By framing each of his indirections as an askēsis, we found four distinct yet 
related ways to perceive anew our fundamental porosity to the Transcendent. My claim is 
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not, of course, that the practice of metaxology renders us porous or that it somehow 
pierces the so-called immanent frame. The exercises are effective to the extent they rouse 
us from the sleep of finitude and sensitize us to the primal porosity of being; the exercises 
attune us to the crack, they do not make it. “There are always cracks in the frame,”921 
Desmond observes, but in our reconfigured ethos we have become blind to this porosity. 
He clears his throat, takes mic from Leonard Cohen, and croons: “there is a crack in 
everything that’s how the light gets in.” Then he adds a line: “but we need eyes trained, 
or attuned, to see this light.”  
 At this point, a reader may begin to share Simpson’s worry over “a possible logic 
of dualism here, where philosophy on its own can perform such that theology is 
redundant, unnecessary, rejected.”922 Desmond, though, can at least partly allay this 
concern. For while it is true that the hyperboles perform by throwing us toward the 
Transcendent, our movement toward the divine is not and cannot be self-initiated. Rather 
what the godsend brings out is that the movement comes to us. The ball of the 
divine play is first thrown to us. There is the gift of receiving. There is something 
of a reversal – it is not we who are intentionally in search of something, but 
something finds us, finds us out, and unexpectedly to us. When it comes, there is 
a surprising consonance of what is sent with secret desire hardly known or 
perhaps denied by us; and it is we who are the beneficiaries.923   
 
Desmond is not positing two disciplines – metaphysics and theology – separated by an 
impermeable barrier. On the contrary, the advent of the godsend reveals not only a 
permeable threshold between them but also recovers, as D. C. Schindler notes, “a certain 
priority of religion over philosophy.”924 Or, to hearken back to our earlier discussion, we 
find here an instructive reaffirmation of the Westphalian 5th Commandment: Be Still and 
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Know: Metaphysics is a Vocation. We are capable of self-transcendence because we have 
been opened by the advent of the Transcendent. The initiative rests always with the 
divine. Our openness is itself a gift, a godsend.  
 Let me tie this together with a joke. When I was a kid, my grandfather told a story 
of a tourist in Ireland who stopped to ask a local for directions to Dublin. The Irishman’s 
reply: “Well, sir, if I were you, I wouldn’t start from here.” The gist: if you really want to 
get someplace, then it is better to start out nearer to where you want to arrive at. I have to 
admit: I never found it funny. But tweak it a bit. A spiritual seeker comes and asks for 
“the” way or even “a” way to God. For the jokester, or the univocal minded philosopher, 
the punchline remains the same. For the metaxologically minded, though, no punchline is 
necessary. For the answer to the question is simple: one can be directed to God from any 
point within the metaxu because all points within the metaxu pulse with the secret life of 
the divine. Creatio ex nihilo is not a formula but a framework for perceiving how all of 
creation is held in being by its Creator; Anselm’s way is not a neutral argument but an 
archaeological expedition into the self’s recesses where one discovers how, even when 
alone, one is never alone. Whether discerned within the exterior world or one’s 
interiority, we can come to perceive how the “crack” in everything reveals how the light 
illuminating the metaxu directs our gaze to its Transcendent source. In this way, for the 
epiphanically attuned, “everything that is is a godsend; and yet nothing that finitely is is 
the source that communicates and reveals itself in the godsend.”925  
 Above, I mentioned an ambiguity in Desmond’s treatment of revelation. On the 
one hand, he is at his most finessed when probing how the “crack” in everything 
communicates a sense of an agapeically creative Origin. Rightly perceived, creation can 
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be seen as the locus of “general revelation” in a way biblical religions gladly affirm: “The 
heavens declare the glory of God, the skies display his craftsmanship” (Ps 19:1). John 
Scotus Eriugena: “the whole world is a theophany.”926 And if I am correct, our 
metaxological exercises not only informed us about metaphysics but have also formed or 
attuned us to perceive these traces within the metaxu. We have been attuned, in other 
words, to behold creation orthoaesthetically with epiphanically attuned senses. To view 
creation as a revelatory godsend is to view creation as an event in which we participate: 
we, too, are implicated in the revelatory happening of the metaxu. Those who have 
undertaken the “Return” and traversed the indirections, have been re-formed to behold all 
of creation with epiphanic eyes. The arrival of the godsend, does not and cannot leave us 
unscathed. In being struck, we bear a wound of knowledge – a trace, a scar, a graced 
reminder of the Transcendent’s ingress into our lives. As Frodo’s scar alerted him to the 
approach of the Ring Wraiths, this wound attunes us to the presence of the divine in all 
things and sensitizes to moments of disclosure occurring in the everyday.  
 What I find lacking, however, is Desmond’s treatment of special revelation. In a 
metaxological philosophy or theology, how are we to make sense of Jesus and the 
prophets? No less than Richard Kearney describes Desmond’s brief consideration of 
these latter figures as “an unusual moment.”927 It is unusual given how his brief treatment 
is richly allusive to and draws upon theological concepts and language: 
What of the special revelation claimed for Jesus Christ? Christ would be the 
absolute godsend – the singular absolute, absolutely intimate with the absolute 
sender, and yet absolute as sent; not a nothing intermediate, though a kenotic 
intermediary absolutely porous to the sending source; there is an absolute 
community of God and godsend (Father and Son) and yet the revealed godsend 
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does not diminish the transcendent mystery of the source, even while revealed in 
absolute immanence…Christ the absolved and absolving godsend?928  
 
Simpson’s eyebrows raise: “Desmond, you speak of intra-divine community and kenosis. 
Is your theological slip showing? Declare yourself or explain why you end, not with a 
Credo, but a question mark!” Simpson’s impatience is shared by Manoussakis who is 
vexed by Desmond’s silence about “Christ, even when writing on God.”929 He continues:  
So the majority of references to Christ in GB [God and the Between] are to a 
Christ that serves merely as an example (see esp. 187, 338, 145) – in a sense not 
different from the Christological exemplarism one meets in Kant’s Religion 
within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. Desmond avoids assigning to Christ’s role 
and place any uniqueness as the in-between par excellence, or if he alludes to 
such an exception (as on pp. 185, 194, and 196) this is done in Christianity’s 
name while carefully avoiding any personal endorsement.930  
 
Kearney is more sanguine, observing of his fellow Corkman, “While hinting at his own 
personal Christian commitment, Desmond retains his position as a philosopher of religion 
rather than a proponent of dogmatic theology in leaving us with Christ as a question.”931 
Finally, Patrick Gardner makes a similarly irenic observation: “Desmond, of course, stops 
short of taking up the mantel of Catholic theology, and we need not force him to abandon 
this sense of methodological integrity.”932  
  Gardner and Kearney let Desmond off too easily and, to my mind, Simpson’s call 
for him to “‘come out of the closet’ as a theologian”933 needs to be entertained. For 
although he is not a confessing theologian, his language resonates with and is at times 
saturated with theological allusions. I ask: what role does Christ play within Desmond’s 
thinking? Is metaxology haunted by Jesus? Is he a secret cousin to Hazel Motes who 
                                               
928 Ibid., 13.  
929 Manoussakis, “The Silences of the Between,” 270.  
930 Ibid, 284.  
931 Kearney, above 
932 Patrick Gardner, “God Beyond and Between,” in William Desmond and Contemporary Theology, 182.  
933 Simpson, 94. Simpson raises the question to Desmond in “Theology, Philosophy, God and the Between”  
published in Louvain Studies 36 (2012): 226-238.  
 320 
saw Jesus move from tree to tree in the back of his mind, a wild ragged figure 
motioning him to turn around and come off into the dark where he was not sure of 
his footing, where he might be walking on the water and not know it and then 
suddenly know it and drown.934  
 
Is Christ clandestinely present within Desmond’s thought, a shadowy figure who emerges 
only to invite us deeper into the woods? Should Desmond exorcise this presence to 
prevent Christ from contaminating the pure pursuit of philosophical reasoning? Does he 
need to build a wall between Athens and Jerusalem?  
 Then again, it may be that we have been seduced into seeing walls and 
impermeable barriers where none exists. What if, in its archaeological endeavors, 
metaxology has actually exposed a fundamental porosity between metaphysics and 
theology? What if philosophy as the “love of wisdom” and theology as a receptive 
listening to the Word of God were both nourished by the same wellspring of mystery? A 
revelatory godsend would not, then, be imposing something alien upon reason but would 
be exposing these mysterious depths. What if, by guiding us toward and resurrecting our 
sense of this mystery, metaxology were actually a sort of mystagogy? If seen as 
mystagogical, our metaxological exercises could work on two levels. Generally, for those 
seeking to return to a sense of the sacred in a secular age, they would work to resurrect a 
sense of astonishment at being’s givenness and lead us to a consideration of how the 
“crack” in everything serves to point toward an Agapeic Creator. For those reading it on a 
theological level, this approach would a potential “Hopkins option” whereby one is given 
to behold from within the metaxu the many and various disclosures of Christ’s presence. 
Metaxology’s poetics work not only to point to reality but to disclose its hidden depths. 
We witness such a revelatory disclosure when Hopkins writes:  
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 I say more: the just man justices; 
  Keeps grace; that keeps all his goings graces; 
 Acts in God’s eye what in God’s eye he is –  
  Christ. For Christ plays in ten thousand places, 
 Lovely in limbs, and lovely in eyes not his 
  To the Father through the features of men’s faces.935 
 
Metaxology, by reawakening our sense of and guiding us deeper the mystery at the heart 
of being, has a mystagogical dimension goading us to rethink the relationship between 
metaphysics and theology. Rather than an antinomy – reason or faith – metaxology’s 
mystagogical element works to reveal how both reason and faith are rooted in and 
nourished at the wellspring of mystery. There exists, at a most basic and primordial level, 
a porosity between them. If Christ appears to be at play within Desmond’s thought, it 
may be because metaxology and theology are sourced in, even if they respond differently 
to, the mysterious presence of the Logos. Let us turn, then, to consider how the rupture of 
the godsend’s arrival may expose and guide us into these abyssal depths where we might 
probe the nature of the threshold separating metaphysics and theology to see if there 
might be a greater porosity between reason and faith than is often realized.  
 
5.2.2 Panting with Secret Life: Epiphanies in O’Connor’s “Revelation” 
 In discussing “godsends,” we must resist the temptation to linger at the level of 
abstract theory. We need to see how a godsend, by precipitating a revelatory event, works 
or performs by “drawing the curtain back” to reveal the secret and mysterious depths of 
being. I share Desmond’s esteem for Flannery O’Connor’s “Revelation” as brilliantly 
illustrating how godsend arrives and can lead to a transformation in perception. The 
godsend’s arrival does not deliver Ruby Turpin to a new reality but enables her to behold 
reality anew. The narrative unfolds according to what Kearney describes as  
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a triangle between author, text, and reader. Or to borrow from Ricoeur’s 
terminology: the prefigurative epiphany of lived experience passes through the 
configurative epiphany of the text before finding its achievement in the 
refigurative epiphany of the reader. Epiphany may thus be construed as a triadic 
movement from life to text and back to life again – a movement amplified and 
enriched by the full arc of hermeneutic transfiguration.936   
 
This triad is vividly and clearly present in “Revelation” and my hope is that by focusing 
on the godsend’s arrival in Ruby’s life, and probing two subsequent epiphanies, we will 
have a better sense of what orthoaesthesis is and how it works to attune us to the 
epiphanies of the everyday. The dynamics uncovered and explored in this story will allow 
us to offer, in the next section, a metaxological reading of John 20. 
 O’Connor’s story is rich and merits lengthy consideration, but I want to focus 
only on the triadic movement from life, to text, back to life. The story opens with Ruby 
Turpin’s entrance into a crowded doctor’s office. It is apparent from the beginning that 
her physical size does not reflect any such spiritual magnanimity. While she exchanges 
pleasantries with a “pleasant” looking woman seated nearby, the reader is drawn into her 
harsh inner monologue. Around her, she observes 
The well-dressed lady had on red and grey suede shoes to match her dress. Mrs. 
Turpin had on her good black patent leather pumps. The ugly girl had on Girl 
Scout shoes and heavy socks. The old woman had on tennis shoes and the white-
trashy mother had on what appeared to be bedroom slippers, black straw with 
gold braid threaded through them – exactly what you expect her to have on.937 
 
The “ugly girl,” named Mary Grace, broodingly reads a textbook entitled Human 
Development. To her chagrin, Ruby senses Mary Grace’s hostility toward her. She stares 
at Ruby, stares through her; to Ruby, “the girl’s eyes seemed lit all of a sudden with a 
peculiar light, an unnatural light like night road signs give.”938 The more Ruby expatiates 
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on her uprightness, outwardly and in an inner monologue, the more hostile Mary Grace 
becomes. In a moment of inward revelry, Ruby proclaims her gratitude to Jesus: 
“When I think who all I could have been besides myself and what all I got, a little 
of everything, and a good disposition besides, I just feel like shouting, ‘Thank 
you, Jesus, for making everything the way it is!’ It could have been different!” 
For one thing, somebody else could have got Claud [her husband]. At the thought 
of this, she was flooded with gratitude and a terrible pang of joy rang through her. 
“Oh thank you, Jesus, Jesus, thank you!” she cried aloud.939  
 
Her ecstasy is fleeting, for at that moment Mary Grace heaves her book and strikes Ruby 
over her left eye. Mary Grace lunges at Ruby and digs her fingers into her neck. One she 
has been pulled away and restrained, a dazed Ruby cannot keep from looking at her. The 
girl’s eyes were now “bluer than before, as if a door had been tightly closed behind them 
was now open to admit light and air.”940 Seduced by her eyes, Ruby realizes the girl 
somehow knows her deeply, personally, and she speaks directly to her: 
“What you got to say to me?” she asked hoarsely and held her breath, waiting as 
for a revelation. The girl raised her head. Her gazed locked with Mrs. Turpin’s. 
“God back to hell where you came from, you old wart hog,” she whispered.941  
 
These words, the reader realizes, have more of an impact upon her than the book. Her life 
has, quite literally, been ruptured by a rather sudden and violent encounter with a text.  
 That afternoon, after she returns home, Ruby tries to rest but “image of a razor-
backed hog with warts on its face and horns coming out behind its ears” visits her 
imagination. There is no mistaking it: Ruby knows deep down that “she had been singled 
out for the message, though there was trash in the room to whom it might justly have 
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been applied…The message had been given to Ruby Turpin, a respectable, hard-working, 
church-going woman.”942 Her anger at this godsend erupts as she rages at God:  
“What do you send me a message like that for?” she said in a low fierce voice, 
barely above a whisper but with the force of a shout in its concentrated fury. 
“How am I a hog and me both? How am I saved and from hell too?”943 
 
Just as the sun is setting, and in a “final surge of fury,” she roars, “Who do you think you 
are?” Her Job-like challenge ricochets and strikes her, putting her into question.  
 What may have appeared, to any onlooker, as a random act of violence is 
recognized by Ruby as a godsend or divine communication. The godsend’s arrival is 
irruptive and destabilizes her sense of certainty and security. Until her encounter with 
Mary Grace, Ruby thought herself endowed of an illusion-free view of the world. The 
wake of the godsend, in the rubble of the breakdown, there is glimpse of breakthrough. 
Struck silent, Ruby beholds her pigs as though their pen were a monstrance: 
like a monumental statue coming to life, she bent her head slowly and gazed, as if 
through the very heart of mystery, down into the pig parlor and on the hogs. They 
had settled all in one corner around the old sow who was grunting softly. A red 
glow suffused them. They appeared to pant with a secret life.944  
 
Bowed in silent adoration, Ruby finds herself implicated in something beyond herself. As 
day cedes to night, she remains transfixed by the hogs, her “gaze bent to them as if she 
were absorbing some abysmal life-giving knowledge.”945  
 Allow me to suggest, by drawing on Desmond, that what we are observing is the 
process by which Ruby is being brought to “perceive rightly” by undergoing a process 
epiphanic attunement. The arrival of the godsend, as Desmond observes, carries with it a 
sense of the “intimate universal.” The godsend, he writes, 
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Opens up the porous space of our being between: this means not only being 
ourselves at all and in the first instance, but in the first instance being with the 
other in a co-natus, a “birth with.” The godsend is the giving of the intimate 
universal, the “birth with” of the intimate universal…We are recipients of 
communication, and receivers of a sending.946  
 
Mary Grace’s book is a projectile, he observes, but in striking its target the “projectile up-
ends all the projects of Mrs. Turpin” and reveals “something prior to and beyond all 
projects.”947 Unbidden and unwanted, the breakdown makes breakthrough possible. The 
pig-pen epiphany does not inform Ruby but forms her to perceive within the hogs her 
share in a secret life. This is a re-birth leading, as Cardinal Newman’s gravestone reads, 
ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem, “out of shadow and phantasy into the truth.”   
 If the first epiphany allowed Ruby to perceive her share in the hogs’ “secret life,” 
the second epiphany overturns her understanding of the status quo’s propriety. Lifting her 
gaze from the pigs to the sky, she sees only 
a purple streak in the sky, cutting through a field of crimson and leading, like an 
extension of the highway, into the descending dusk. There was only She raised 
her hands from the side of the pen in a gesture hieratic and profound. A visionary 
light settled in her eyes. She saw the streak as a vast swinging bridge extending 
upward from the earth through a field of living fire. Upon it a vast horde of souls 
were rumbling toward heaven. There were whole companies of white-trash, clean 
for the first time in their lives, and bands of black niggers in white robes, and 
battalions of freaks and lunatics shouting and clapping and leaping like frogs. And 
bringing up the end of the procession was a tribe of people whom she recognized 
at once as those who, like herself and Claud, had always had a little of everything 
and the God-given wit to use it right…They were marching behind the others with 
great dignity, accountable as they had always been for good order and common 
sense and respectable behavior. They alone were on key. Yet she could see by 
their shocked and altered faces that even their virtues were being burned away.948 
 
Like the prodigal son who “comes to himself” amidst the pigs (Lk 15:17), Ruby comes to 
see her old life in a new light. The order according to which she had lived has been 
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upended and refigured. The chink in Ruby’s world lets new light flood in and the logic of 
the status quo is subverted: the first shall be last and the last shall be first (Mt 20:16).  
 The reader is left to wonder: does Ruby’s life change? Does this experience have 
an ethical edge inducing, as Kearney observes of narrative, “a re-evaluation of one’s 
world.”949 We are not told, although we have a clue. The story ends with Ruby making 
her slow way on the darkening path to the house. In the woods around her the 
invisible cricket choruses had struck up, but what she heard were the voices of the 
souls climbing upward into the starry field and shouting hallelujah.950  
 
Though her vision has faded, she seems attuned to something she did not hear, and could 
not have heard, before. She bears upon her flesh and within her soul the wound of this 
graced encounter. In giving her to behold all things anew, a new way of life has been 
opened before her. To be sure, the swelling above her left eye will eventually dissipate, 
but the expansion of her soul need not shrink back to its original proportions. She has 
been gifted, or perhaps afflicted, by a subversive theo-logic overturning her sense of 
righteousness: her ways are, clearly, not God’s ways. If there is a gossamer strand of 
hope for her conversion, it is in her attunement to the crickets’ melody. If she hears now 
in nature the whoops and cheers of those leading the way to heaven, perhaps she can find 
in this song the rhythm for a new way of life, one granting her admission to the horde of 
those “rumbling toward heaven.” 
 Ruby moves triadically from life to a text and then back to life, although not the 
life she once knew. The breakdown of the status quo, for Ruby and reader alike, exposes 
our primal porosity and gives us to see how the intimate universal binds us to hogs and 
crickets and “battalions of freaks and lunatics.” If we descended with her into darkness 
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(katabasis), our upward ascent (anabasis) is guided by the chink of light opened by the 
godsend. We stand with her, taking our place between the hogs and heaven, and behold 
all things with renewed senses. We perceive a kinship with all of creation and are struck 
by the falsity of our hierarchies based on clean and unclean, redeemed and the damned. If 
Jesus is present in the story, it is not the Jesus who serves as the guarantor of the 
bourgeois status quo. It is, instead, the Misfit’s Jesus who lurks here, the one who has 
“thrown everything off balance.” For those epiphanically attuned, one may exercise the 
“Hopkins option” and catch sight of a liberated Jesus at play in ten thousand places and 
within the horde’s faces. Serenaded by the cricket chorus, Ruby returns home. Haunted 
by nostalgia, does she block out the godsend and resume her former life? Or might her 
ears be forever attuned to hearing the horde in the crickets, and might this nocturnal 
music provide her with a new rhythm by which to live her life? We can only imagine. 
 I hope the reader has not judged this an indulgent detour. The arrival of a godsend 
marks a transitus, the crossing of a threshold as one is led from a life configured 
according to one logic and refigured according to another. This crossing, though, cannot 
remain at the level of theory and must find flesh. And O’Connor is an author committed 
to understanding this transitus. In 1958 she wrote:  
The action of grace changes a character. Grace can’t be experienced in itself. An 
example: when you go to Communion, you receive grace but you experience 
nothing; or if you do experience something, what you experience is not the grace 
but an emotion caused by it. Therefore in a story all you can do with grace is to 
show that it is changing the character.951    
 
Of course, O’Connor never heard of metaxological metaphysics and probably had never 
heard of orthoaesthesis. Nevertheless, I think her story enfleshes the process of epiphanic 
attunement. If our spiritual exercises cultivate a general attentiveness to the “crack” in 
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everything, what “Revelation” offers us is a sense of what takes place when we undergo a 
particular encounter with grace. Ruby’s encounter with Mary Grace refigured did not 
impart new knowledge – at least not immediately – but initiated a process of being re-
formed or attuned. The effect of Grace caused a breakdown and allowed a breakthrough 
into new layers of meaning. “All of my stories,” O’Connor writes in the same letter, “are 
about the action of grace on a character who is not very willing to support it.”952 While 
not without noetic content, grace acts to initiate the slow, and sometimes painful, event of 
conversion as one comes not only to think differently but to behold all things anew.   
 I conclude by making a connection between the godsend and fundamental 
theology. A distinction can be made between the fides quae or the “faith in which” 
someone believes (the content) and the fides qua or the “faith by which” one believes. 
They are not, as Paul Crowley observes, “two distinct tracks or ways of believing, but are 
distinguishable aspects of a single, unified act of faith.”953 In Ruby we witness a 
conversion whose leading-edge cuts at the level of the fides quae. It is not that Ruby 
suddenly comes to belief, but in the rupture of the status quo, her beliefs are transformed 
and refigured. In coming to see things rightly, she falls mute because she no longer 
knows what to think: the content of belief has been changed. What was revealed in the 
godsend may transform her faith (fides qua) but that part of the story remains unknown. 
As she walks home in silence, she must draw out for herself the consequences of what 
she has beheld and decide whether, and how, to incorporate this godsend into her faith.     
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5.2.3 My Lord and My God: Beholding Christ’s Graced Porosity 
 I want to treat John 20, Thomas’s encounter with the Risen Christ, as a scriptural 
instance of the godsend’s irruption. To begin, though, let me start by tweaking 
Wittgenstein’s aphorism: “A painting held us captive. And we could not get outside it, 
for it lay in our imagination and our imagination seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.”954 
The painting to which I refer is Caravaggio’s “The Incredulity of Saint Thomas” (Italian: 
Incredulità di San Tommaso) which depicts Thomas’s encounter with the Risen Christ. 
Thomas, who had not been present for Jesus’ first appearance (John 20:19-22), rejects the 
disciples’ testimony when they tell him, “We have seen the Lord” (20:24). Rather than 
doubtful or skeptical, Thomas is better regarded as resolute in his unbelief (apistos) and 
tells them, “Unless I see the mark of the nails in his hands, and put my finger in the mark 
of the nails and my hand in his side, I will not believe” (20:25). It is Jesus’ second 
appearance to the disciples that Caravaggio paints. Three disciples huddle around Jesus 
with Thomas at the forefront. Jesus serenely pulls back his robe and guides Thomas’s 
right hand toward his pierced breast. Thomas’s finger slides into the wound and his face 
becomes the picture of astonishment: eyes widen and astonishment ripples across his 
brow as, in this haptic happening, faith is born.  
 The trouble, though, is that Caravaggio’s painting seems to have enframed or set 
the imaginative parameters on the way many read and interpret this text. For while Jesus 
does say to Thomas, “Put your finger here and see my hands. Reach out your hand and 
put it in my side. Do not be unbelieving (apistos) but believe” (20:27), there is no 
scriptural evidence for Thomas actually having touched Jesus. As Brian Robinette 
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observes: “Thomas’s response is not to touch in a strictly empirical way – again, we are 
never told that Thomas does what he originally set out to do – but to make a bold 
acknowledgment only possible in faith.”955 Thomas’s responses to Jesus’ invitation is 
memorialized as follows: “My Lord and my God!” On this, Robinette:   
This is among the clearest affirmations of Jesus as “God” in the New Testament, 
and it comes as a response to an unanticipated upsurge of insight into the meaning 
of Jesus as the crucified-and-risen One. The theme of Jesus’ unity with the Father 
is found throughout John’s gospel…but here we have an affirmation from a 
disciple who discerns the reality of God in Jesus’ crucified-and-risen “form.” To 
“see” this form is to “see” the Father.956  
 
If Caravaggio’s painting would have us believe Thomas’ faith comes as a result of 
touching Jesus’ wounds, a close reading of the Gospel’s should give us pause. In his 
remonstration of Thomas, Jesus does not mention touching but only seeing, and seems to 
indicate that sight not essential for belief: “Have you believed because you have seen me? 
Blessed are those who have not seen and yet come to believe” (20:29).  “In other words,” 
Robinette writes, “blessed are those who enter into this structure of faith as a response to 
apostolic testimony: ‘We have seen the Lord.’”957 
 I will return to Robinette in a moment, but I need first to retrieve an insight from 
Hilary of Poitiers. In The Trinity, Hilary observes how, as a Jew, Thomas would have 
daily recited the Sh’ma: “Hear, O Israel, the Lord they God is one” (Dt 6:4). In addition, 
Thomas would often have heard Jesus say: “I and the Father are one” and “All things that 
the Father has are mine” and “I in the Father and the Father in me.”958 So, how is it that 
when Thomas says of Jesus, “My Lord and My God,” he is not “unmindful of the 
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principal commandment?”959 The Sh’ma would be, to the faithful Jew, wholly at odds 
with Jesus’ claims to unity with the Father. Yet, Robert Wilkens notes, “during Christ’s 
lifetime these words apparently made little impact on him. It was only when Thomas 
knew the resurrected Christ that he grasped the meaning of what Jesus had said 
earlier.”960 We have a seeming aporia: how could Thomas affirm both the oneness of God 
and, in meeting the Risen Christ, identify him with as Lord and God?  
 Although Wilkens appears seduced by Caravaggio’s depiction of this scene, he 
nevertheless captures the importance of Hilary’s question: 
During Christ’s lifetime his followers did not grasp fully who he was. Even 
though some of his sayings imply that he had a unique relation to God, and he 
performed miracles and revealed his heavenly glory to his most intimate followers 
at his Transfiguration on the mount, his disciples did not have eyes to see who he 
was. They had sound theological reasons for their opacity. They knew by heart 
the words of the Sh’ma, “Hear O Israel, the Lord your God is one Lord.” Hence 
Hilary asks a question I am sure many other readers of the New Testament have 
asked themselves: How could a faithful Jew who had recited the Sh’ma since 
childhood, whose prayers were addressed to God the king of the universe, address 
Christ as God or Son of God, as the earliest Christians did? Hilary’s answer is that 
the Resurrection of Christ transfigured everything. When Jesus came and stood 
among the disciples and put his finger in his side, Thomas said, “My Lord and my 
God!” When confronted by the risen Christ one does not say, “How interesting,” 
but “My Lord and my God!”961   
 
As Thomas beholds the wounded Christ, he undergoes a transformation of perception. In 
the ruptured flesh of the Risen One, Thomas undergoes a rupturing of his own 
understanding of God. His encounter does not add information to, or stack another 
proposition upon, the content of faith (fides quae). It elicits, rather, the birth of an 
explicitly Christian mode of believing (fides qua). Christ’s wounds are, for Thomas, a 
blessed porosity which transforms his very mode of perception: he sees, not a different 
                                               
959 Ibid., 235-236.  
960 Robert Louis Wilken, The Spirit of Early Christian Thought (New Haven: Yale, 2003), 90.  
961 Ibid., 90-91.  
 332 
reality, but reality differently. And, as Robinette, pointed out above, future generations do 
not need to duplicate Thomas’s experience in order to participate in this faith. The 
apostolic witness – enshrined in their preaching of the Gospel and expressed in the 
ministration of the Church – is sufficient to mediate an encounter with the Risen Christ. 
Paul, in his Letter to the Romans, captures this: “Faith comes from what is heard” 
(10:17). Coming to faith is entering into, or living into, an ongoing dialogue rooted in the 
experience of the apostle. We do not come to faith as a solo endeavor but only as a part of 
a community. In a positivistic era convinced “only what can be counted can count,” 
Sandra Schneiders lays down the gauntlet: as was the case with Mary Magdalene and 
Thomas, our “obsession with the historical-physical must give way to faith in the 
ecclesial-bodily presence of Jesus.”962 We come to belief in the risen Christ not as 
monads, apart from the Church, but only as a part of the ecclesia. In an ideal world, it 
would be a bumper sticker slogan: “No Church, No Jesus. Know Church, Know Jesus.”  
 Although it is not his word, I think Robinette would agree: what we find in 
Thomas’s encounter with the Risen Christ can be described as a grace-initiated process of 
orthoaesthesis. The Risen Christ’s in-breaking into the upper room induces an eventual 
breakdown for Thomas, but in the wounded body of Christ – a porosity glorified by the 
Resurrection – there is an opening to a breakthrough. Robinette:  
the gospel of John imparts a knowledge of the risen One that requires something 
far more demanding than the assimilation of a piece of information within a pre-
established framework of intelligibility. “Jesus is risen” is not merely a 
proposition. It is something to be “lived-into.” It entails a profound shift in 
perception, judgment, and action on the part of those who would be its witnesses. 
It requires a conversion to a new way of “making sense.”963  
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The conversion described is not, of course, a “making sense” that involves imposing new 
schemas upon what is perceived. “Making sense,” then, would seem to involve becoming 
attuned to a logic in excess of our categories. Robinette, drawing on Jean-Luc Marion, 
regards the Resurrection as the “saturated phenomenon par excellence.”964 And, noting 
an overlap between the godsend and the saturated phenomenon, Desmond writes: 
If there is an idea of the godsend, it is one exceeding our concepts, and the 
saturated phenomenon expressly exceed the embrace of (conceptual) 
intentionality. It overflows what conceptual intentionality can contain within 
itself; indeed reverses its more normal direction as aimed at that with which it can 
be in (mutual) correlation. There is a kind of asymmetry communicated from the 
other side, so to say, which is not the other side of intentionality conceived as a 
subject-object relation.965      
 
The godsend, like the saturated phenomenon, is not something we exercise control over. 
It is something to which we respond only after its arrival. It remains always in excess and 
any of our attempts to wrestle it into determinate concepts and categories is doomed to 
failure. The claim “Jesus is risen” is a gobbet of information to be tucked away as trivia. 
Rather than a proposition, it is a claim to have been confronted with a mysterious 
porosity in the very fabric of reality. It is an anarchic claim, disrupting the way we 
normally perceive the world by confronting us with a logic, a theo-logic, of a Creator 
whose creative intent extends into the dark origin of time itself. In the Resurrection, death 
itself is turned backward and a new way of life is made possible for those who, in hearing 
the apostolic testimony, are drawn into the community of faith where we meet, in ten 
thousand faces and places, the ecclesial presence of the Risen Christ.  
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 While Desmond does not treat in depth the special revelation of Christ, I believe 
my preceding “take” on the godsend shows how the concept can accommodate and 
express the dynamism of coming to faith in the Risen Christ. I turn again to Robinette:  
Resurrection belief cannot simply be apprehended. It is given. It manifests itself It 
presents itself as a possibility through apostolic witness It invites. It summons. 
Responding to it will entail some kind of self-dispossession, a leaving behind, but 
also a new welcoming and in-habitation. Faith comes ex auditu, as Gift.966  
 
Rahner seems vindicated: we are beings of a receptive spirituality. Faith is not our 
achievement, the result of conative striving, but is a gift we undergo. For Thomas, this 
receptivity took place in beholding the glorified wounds of the Risen Christ. There he 
beheld a paradoxical occurrence of discontinuous continuity; with the breakdown of old 
patterns of thought and expectation occurs the breakthrough of faith. In Christ’s wounds, 
wounds inflicted in a public execution, Thomas perceives more than the phenomenon of 
the Risen One; peering into those wounds, Thomas perceives the ontological depths of 
creation itself. There is a life, a logic, a Logos, unleashed through Christ’s porous flesh 
and, through Word and Sacrament, future generations may participate in this hidden 
source of life. Thus, we need neither haptic nor optic confirmation to “prove” or ground 
our faith. Faith is to be “lived into” as we respond with our lives to the Word proclaimed 
in and through the life of the Church. To encounter and confess the crucified and Risen 
Christ as the deepest and abiding truth of all creation is not to undergo a change of mind 
but means, fundamentally, to be drawn into the movement and life of discipleship.  
 
5.3 Discerning Patterns of Perception on The Road to Emmaus 
  
 Having explored the general dynamics of orthoaesthesis and its development, I 
want to push it further in order to consider how it might contribute to theological 
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reflection. Thus we now turn to accompany Jesus’ disciples as they travel from Jerusalem 
to Emmaus (Luke 24:13-35). The story begins in the wake of a breakdown as the 
disciples’ hopes in Jesus appear, at least to their eyes, to have been crucified with Jesus at 
Calvary. With grief-laden hearts, Cleopas and his companion are deep in conversation 
when they are joined by a third. The Gospel writer divulges the identity of this stranger, 
although the two companions do not recognize Jesus in their midst because “their eyes 
were kept from recognizing him” (24:16). The stranger breaks into their conversation and 
asks, “What are you discussing with each other while you walk along?” The disciples 
pause. Cleopas: “Are you the only stranger in Jerusalem who does not know the things 
that have taken place there in these days?” When the stranger asks, “What things?” the 
disciples retell the events surrounding Jesus of Nazareth.  
 Jean-Luc Marion offers an incisive take on their response, likening their re-
narration of recent events to a  
a police report: that Jesus of Nazareth, “a prophet mighty in deed and word before 
God and all the people” was condemned to death, then crucified by the 
authorities. Here is the accident, the incident, the “event”, in short the fact 
guaranteed by an intuition offered to all, to the public, and to which an entire city 
(and what a city!) can testify.967 
 
The disciples are, as it were, “facing the facts” and feeling the disappointment of the 
events of the past few days. They “had hoped he that he was the one to redeem Israel” (v. 
20) but now these hopes are dashed. Yet the cold, hard, univocal “facts” of Jesus death 
are now a matter of contest on account of the testimony of some women from their group 
who, upon visiting the tomb, did not find his body but encountered angels. These women, 
moreover, delivered a truly incredible message: Jesus was alive. Other members of the 
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group, of course, had gone to verify the women’s testimony and they, too, discovered an 
empty tomb, “but they did not see him” (v. 24). As Marion points out, it is not the lack of 
evidence preventing them from recognizing Jesus in their midst; it is, rather, the sheer 
excess of evidence which overwhelms them and keeps them from “making sense” of it.  
 On that Easter morning, the disciples found themselves torn between two rival 
and irreconcilable claims: Jesus is dead, Jesus is alive. They, like the rest of Jerusalem, 
are “in the know” about what has transpired. Dead is dead, just as A = A, and Jesus is 
dead. They had observed first-hand the brutal efficiency of Rome’s death apparatus, and 
the publicity of crucifixion left little ambiguity about Jesus’ fate. Yet from the women in 
their group a new and wholly subversive “take” on events: Jesus was dead but is no 
longer. A = not-A. How to make sense of this dissonance? They choose to extricate 
themselves from the equivocal flux of claims and head to safety. They seek to preserve 
not only the safety and integrity of their bodies but also of their psyches: the claims made 
are just too much. They do not yet have a framework capable of reconciling these claims. 
As Marion observes, in this the disciples are very much like us:   
it is thus not the intuition of facts that they lack, but rather the intelligence (the 
concepts), as do we, today: well do they know, as do we, with scientific certainty, 
that Jesus died and that one does not come back from the dead; we can deplore 
this fact, especially in this case, but in the end that’s how it is; we must stay 
reasonable and not lose our heads.968  
 
The disciples are doubly beset: not only have they endured the breakdown of their hopes, 
but the news born by the women threatens their understanding of the world. They mourn 
the loss of Jesus and are loath to give up their understanding of reality. They give 
embodied testimony to Wittgenstein’s claim in the Tractatus: “The world is all that is the 
case” (§1). They are pragmatic realists who, in the wake of their leader’s ignominious 
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death, flee in order to preserve their own lives. Even if they carry grief in their hearts, at 
least they can take comfort in their logic and realism: “The world is determined by the 
facts, and by their being all the facts” (§1.11)969 and they know the facts.  
 The tension and strain placed on their concepts comes to a head, a breaking point, 
with the in-breaking of the stranger. Their recapitulation of the “facts” betray them, for 
although they have seen they clearly have not understood the meaning of these events. 
The stranger offers them not a word of consolation but a rebuke: “Oh, how foolish you 
are, and how slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have declared!” (v.25). Their 
slowness of heart, their clinging to terrestrial logic and their refusal to accept the theo-
logic of the Kingdom, prevents them from seeing rightly. Even as he walks alongside 
them, they remain blind. Why? Marion suggests:   
What concrete sign, what sensible perception, what intuition was lacking? None 
whatsoever, clearly. In fact, they kept themselves from recognizing him. Why 
were they denying the evidence? Not because it was deficient – it wasn’t lacking 
in the slightest – but because it contradicts their entire comprehension (their 
miscomprehension, or at the least, their pre-comprehension) of a phenomenon that 
is nevertheless patently beneath their eyes, and in their ears. They do not 
recognize him because they cannot even imagine that this is really him, Him, who 
has rejoined them, so far do their poor, cobbled-together, honest-to-goodness 
concepts find themselves outstripped by “events” that leave them petrified within 
a matrix of irrefutable prejudices.970  
 
Locked into a very fixed and definite view of the world as organized by the “facts” they 
have seen, all other testimony and evidence is deemed inadmissible. Their imaginations 
are held captive by a of postulatory finitism where life is finite and cannot but be finite. 
Or, as Marion writes, a world in which “the dead man is dead, period. Every other 
possibility finds itself completely excluded, not even considerable.”971  
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 Note the unfolding of this pericope. Jesus does not offer a new piece of 
information or a proposition, nor does he lay out a syllogism or argument. He resumes his 
role as teacher and begins to re-frame the events in order to reveal the meaning of all that 
has transpired: “beginning with Moses and all the prophets, he interpreted to them the 
things about himself in the scriptures” (v. 27). The disciples undergo a moment of divine 
pedagogy or, as Charles Taylor might put it, they are “starting to be educated by God.”972 
Indeed, this a moment of education in its most literal and etymological sense: they are 
being “led out” (educare) of one framework of understanding and drawn into a new way 
of perceiving events. They are being offered, Taylor might note, a “better account” of 
what happened. Rather than an apodictic argument for what they should see, Jesus goes 
to them, ad hominem, and instructs them step-by-step. In the retelling of the story and by 
expanding the narrative horizon, they are capacitated to behold all things anew. Just as 
Aslan had to disclose to the children the meaning of what they had seen but not 
understood, so also does the Risen Jesus tutor his disciples into a new mode of perception 
not by telling them what to see but by expanding the horizon of their understanding and 
teaching them how to perceive in a new manner and according to a new logic or, as it 
turns out, according to the Logos.  
 As the disciples approach a village, the stranger looks as though he wishes to 
continue his journey. But they enjoin him: “Stay with us, because it is almost evening and 
the day is now nearly over” (v. 29). In the climax, having taken his place at the table with 
them, the stranger “took bread, blessed and broke it, and gave it to them. Then their eyes 
were opened, and they recognized him” (v. 30-31). Suddenly, they are given to perceive 
rightly and everything “clicks” into place as they recognize Jesus in their midst. They 
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behold him not because of an effort on their part but because they have been capacitated 
to perceive his presence. In the aftermath of this breakthrough, they become what they 
have received. That is to say, they become godsends, sent back to Jerusalem, as bearers 
of Good News: “The Lord has risen indeed” (v. 35).  
 In the breaking of the bread, the disciples come to see rightly, orthoaesthetically, 
Christ’s presence. They have been attuned to perceive, in the blessing and breaking of the 
bread, an explicitly Christological epiphany. In the breaking of the bread, the disciples 
are not given a numinous sense of the Transcendent. They perceive, in that moment, 
Christ’s presence in their midst. Again, we perceive a triple pattern of breaking: 
1. An in-breaking of Christ’s presence in their midst, the one who guides 
their understanding and perception to behold all things new.  
2. A breakdown of old categories as the stranger tutors them into a new 
mode of perceiving. 
3. A breakthrough into a new mode of life, a new way of being in the world, 
animated by the proclamation: “The Lord has Risen indeed.” 
 
Of course, we know this new mode of seeing is not the result of any grasping on the 
disciples’ part. The narrative shows how they are utterly incapable of understanding what 
has happened by their own lights: they have seen but cannot interpret the evidence 
correctly. But if the disciples coming to see rightly is not the achievement of the conatus 
essendi it is not exactly the fruit of the passio essendi. For while this moment of divine 
pedagogy is something the disciples undergo, this undergoing does more than renew their 
sense of the intimate strangeness of being. As their hearts burn, as they are tutored to 
recognize the Risen One in their midst, they undergo what we might call a passio 
caritatis or a “undergoing of charity” endowing them with the grace to perceive not only 
the “crack” in everything but also, to perceive through the “crack” the presence of the 
Crucified and Risen One.  
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 The passio caritatis is not found in Desmond’s oeuvre, although he does write “of 
a sacred passio essendi: the receiving of our being as patient to the divine 
communication.”973 The sacred passio, he continues, can come in many forms: the 
sudden urge to pray, a sudden moment of artistic inspiration as though visited by the 
Muses, or in liturgies where one is drawn into the sacramental life of the congregation 
where “the agape of the divine dying and rising is commemorated.”974 It seems to me, 
however, that we can develop this “sacred passio” in an even more explicitly theological 
manner whereby the passio caritatis would express how we are mystagogically drawn by 
grace to perceive and abide within an order configured by divine charity. For Christians, 
it is this gift of charity that allows us to partake in God’s own triune life. So, where a 
rekindled sense of the passio essendi awakens us to the mystery at the heart of all of 
creation, the passio caritatis would capacitate a new mode of perception capable of 
discerning the presence of Christ within this mystery. For the Christian, undergoing the 
passio caritatis leads one to behold the world with senses formed by Scripture and 
Tradition. If the passio essendi leads us to the crack where we open ourselves to listen for 
a word to be spoken, it is by undergoing the passio caritatis that we find ourselves 
addressed by, and invited by the Holy Spirit to participate in the life of, the Triune God 
made known in history through Jesus Christ.  
 As a theological expansion of Desmond’s thought, I believe the passio caritatis 
provides a dynamic way of thinking how God’s grace, or charity, is not an “object” or 
gobbet but is a process of being drawn into and reconfigured by God’s life. Rather than 
an alternative to the passio essendi, the passio caritatis would be used to describe how 
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one comes to discern in and through the life of the Church the presence of the Risen 
Christ at play in the whole of Creation. The effect of this undergoing would be to attune 
one to perceive with what James Alison has dubbed “Easter Eyes.”975 Desmond’s own 
take on the Emmaus story inclines me to believe he would not object, at least not too 
strenuously, to this suggestion. For he, too, observes in this pericope a process of 
attunement, a dawning of new awareness, as endowing the disciples with a new mode of 
perception:   
Before one did not see, but now one begins to see; begins to see because a light 
that one cannot command is coming up and going over one. One is being lighted; 
one is not enlightened, one is being enlightened. We are the recipients of 
something that we cannot entirely specify or pin down. It stuns us into silence. 
The seeds of a metanoetics are being sown. A new noesis: a new mindfulness that 
does not know what it knows, and yet it knows that the same things will no longer 
be the same…It is more like a slow conversion, a turning, a kind of periagogē, a 
being turned around.976    
 
Indeed, for Cleopas and his companion, there is a radical turning: having glimpsed the 
Risen Christ, they turn around and go back to Jerusalem with senses made new. Brian 
Robinette observes: “What they had not understood in ‘real time’ became respectively 
intelligible through the Easter experience. Their memory was, as it were, reconstructed: 
‘They said to each other, “Were not our hearts burning within us while he was talking to 
us on the road, while he was opening the scriptures to us?’” Christ, revealed in the 
breaking of bread, sends them back Jerusalem not to resume an old life but to embark 
upon a new one. To undergo the godsend is to discern, in the undergoing, a sending-forth. 
 Now, were I to write another chapter, I would develop the passio caritatis at 
length. In keeping with our theme of spiritual exercises, this could mean exploring how 
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we might approach Jesus’ parables as opening up something akin to a “parabolic 
indirection.” Jesus’ parables, as is well known, often have an element of the hyperbolic 
within them as they struggle to use finite words to express the abundances of God’s love 
and mercy. Yet these parables, as Gerhard Lohfink observes, do more than communicate 
“the overflowing generosity of God.”977 His parables are meant to exercise us, to vex us, 
and stir our imaginations to consider how a reality reconfigured according to the logic of 
God’s Kingdom might appear. The parables do not inform us about the Kingdom but 
form us to participate within it. If we see the whole of the Christian life as an ongoing 
process of undergoing charity in the passio essendi, then we might approach the parables 
as theaters of encounter: we contemplate them with an openness to being addressed 
through them. Contemplation on the texts cannot compel the divine initiative, but it can 
sensitize our imaginations to perceive explicitly Christological patterns in and disclosures 
through the metaxu. In forming our imaginations through their imagery, parabolic 
indirection would help to capacitate Christians to perceive Christ at work in history and 
to discern how we are being called to participate in the work of the Kingdom.  
 If the passio caritatis describes the process through which one lives into and lives 
out one’s relationship with the Triune God, then this “living” will be manifested in and 
through history with other believers. What would it mean for Christians today to be 
implicated in the unfolding of Jesus’ parables? Would they rest content with the status 
quo or would they find, in their friendship with the Risen Christ, an encouragement to 
allow the logic of God’s Kingdom to challenge and subvert our human logic?  The 
parable of the workers in the vineyard (Mt 20:1-15) is more than a nice story about God’s 
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abundant generosity. The story intends to create a fissure within our own order and to 
show how our terrestrial order could be reconfigured. Parables work by transforming our 
imaginations and reforming our perception of the world; they give us a glimpse of the 
“crack” through which God’s Reign is beginning to break into the world, a Reign where  
different rules apply. It is true that people work from morning to night here too. 
God’s world is not a land of the lotus eaters. But here work has dignity, and no 
one need go home in the evening filled with worry and anxiety. No one is alone. 
Above all: it is possible to live without rivalry because there is no something 
greater and more expansive than all ones own desires: work for God’s cause. 
Precisely this common cause desired by everyone creates a solidarity that makes it 
possible to suffer with the suffering of others and to join in others’ joy.978  
 
For those undergoing the passio caritatis, this parable reveals not a fanciful utopia or “no 
place” but a prolepsis of what could be. In quickening or enlivening Christian faith (fides 
qua), the passio caritatis allows us to read and respond to these parables not as 
propositions but as possibilities. They open up parabolic indirections in and through 
which we allow the proclaimed Word of God to assume our flesh in each era.  
 What would it mean to embody and enact in our daily lives the subversive grace 
of God’s Kingdom? What would it be to be re-formed by the passio caritatis in a 
parabolic way? If Hart’s “gaze of love” appears too passive, too aligned with the passio 
essendi, perhaps we might turn to Metz. If parabolic indirections inform us about God’s 
Kingdom and form us to detect its inbreaking presence, then perhaps instead of the “gaze 
of love” we could see ourselves as being offered the dark grace of a “mysticism of open 
eyes, which sees more and not less. It is a mysticism that especially makes visible all 
invisible and inconvenient suffering, and – convenient or not – pays attention to it and 
takes responsibility for it, for the sake of a God who is a friend to human beings.”979 
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Epiphanically attuned by grace, the Christian is by no means delivered from the flux of 
the quotidian. On the contrary, the Christian is returned to the flux not with a mission but 
as a mission. The godsend’s in-breaking is a rupture opening us to perceive how, as 
David Tracy writes, “God reveals God-self in hiddenness: in cross and negativity, above 
all in the suffering of all those others whom the grand narrative of modernity has set aside 
as non-peoples, non-events, non-memories, non-history.”980 It is into fraught and 
dangerous spaces the godsend sends us as bearers of glad tidings – “The Lord has risen 
indeed!” – and empowers us to stand with the suffering and the forgotten in solidarity. 
The Risen Christ glimpsed through the “crack” in everything bids us to bear “Good 
News” to the interstitial places in history and bring them glad tidings of Christ risen.   
 Let me gesture toward another way in which the sense of orthoaesthesis might be 
developed. Students of theology are, no doubt, aware of the reciprocal relationship 
between orthodoxy and orthopraxy. As David Tracy observes, “without orthopraxis, 
orthodoxy is always in danger of becoming the shoddy shell of a once vital religion; 
without true orthodoxy, orthopraxis is always in danger of becoming a diffuse, confused, 
and confusing spirituality.”981 But Jon Sobrino, to my mind rightly, insists on adding at 
least a third category: orthopathy. By this he means, “the correct way of letting ourselves 
be affected by the reality of Christ.”982 Although I cannot go into detail here, I want to 
suggest how orthoaesthesis provides a dialectical partner to orthopathy and, furthermore, 
taking the four “orthos” together may serve as a contribution to theological anthropology.  
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 To stay with the disciples on the Road to Emmaus, recall how they responded to 
Jesus as they walked. Before they cognitively knew or recognized him, they experienced 
an inchoate movement of their affect: “Were not our hearts burning within us while he 
was talking to us?” (v. 31). As they journeyed, as Jesus tutored them to perceive rightly 
the meaning of the Scriptures, the disciples’ affect was transformed. They came to “feel 
rightly” in the company of the Risen One because they were being tutored to perceive 
him in their midst. There is, moreover, a necessary dialectic between them as one 
discerns how one’s affect is being stirred as a consequence of how one is being invited 
into, and is living out, discipleship with Christ. If I may be permitted to tinker with 
Tracy’s observation: without orthoaesthesis, orthopathy is always in danger of becoming 
a solipsistic enclave concerned only with one’s own feeling; without true orthopathy, 
orthoaesthesis is always in danger of becoming a detached and disengaged stance toward 
the world. As they journey toward Emmaus, they undergo a fourfold transformation and 
total reorientation as their day’s journey falls under the direction of the concealed Jesus 
(orthopraxis), their theological horizons are deepened (orthodoxy), their affect is 
enkindled with the fire of faith (orthopathy), and their perception is transformed by the 
inbreaking of the Stranger in their midst (orthoaesthesis).  
 The addition of orthoaesthesis makes possible a fourfold way of dwelling in the 
between. Without gainsaying the need for the dialectic of knowing-doing, I think a more 
robust and adequate anthropology would be attentive to the dimension of perceiving-
feeling. What we know and what we do need to be brought into conversation with how 
we perceive and how we respond. This quaternary would provide a cruciform model 
usable by philosophers and theologians alike. We stand between all four and need to 
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negotiate, for ourselves and within our social nexus, the consequences of a modification 
to any pole. The intermediation between the what dialectic (doxy/praxis) and the how 
dialectic (aesthesis/pathy) converge in and contribute to who one is as a subject. If we 
consider the event of religious conversion, for instance, can see this interplay clearly: 
conversion is irreducible to a change in what one thinks because it involves a revaluation 
of how one perceives and interacts with the world. Mary Magdalene, Thomas, and 
Cleopas did not gain a piece of new information but, in encountering the Risen Christ, 
were drawn into a new mode of perception in which what they learned had to be 
integrated. Christian faith, considered from the standpoint of orthoaesthesis, cannot be 
portrayed only as a way of thinking but as a way of perceiving.     
 
5.4 A “Crack” Between Metaphysics and Theology   
 In this concluding section, I reflect on the relationship between metaxological 
metaphysics and theology. Given Simpson’s observation about the theological tones 
detected in Desmond’s thought, this discussion seems necessary. To be sure, in the years 
since Simpson wrote his book more work on Desmond’s thought has been done and both 
D. C. Schindler983 and Cyril O’Regan984 have reflected on the relationship between 
metaxology and theology. Rather than offering a digest of their work, let me chart a 
course connecting Cork to Quebec to respond to a question posed in my first chapter.  
 Toward the end of Chapter One, we considered Paul Janz’s critique of Taylor’s A 
Secular Age. As Janz observes, one of Taylor’s key commitments in A Secular Age is to a 
universal desire for human flourishing. In the aftermath of Kant and a growing mistrust 
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of metaphysics, it has become commonplace “to appeal to ‘human flourishing’ as a 
nonfoundationalist, yet truly general, normative point of reference for philosophy.”985 
And so, for Janz, it is not especially problematic when Taylor makes the following claim: 
Every person, and every society, lives with or by some conception(s) of what 
human flourishing is: what constitutes a fulfilled life? What makes life really 
worth living? What would we most admire people for? We can’t help asking these 
and related questions in our life. And our struggles to answer them define the 
view or views that we try to live by, or between which we hover.986  
 
This seems, at first, unobjectionable: of course we all want our lives to flourish! Yet Janz 
draws attention to an easily-missed ambiguity in how the word “transcendence” works:   
Beginning from this quite common question, Taylor uses it as a backdrop against 
which to formulate the question of “transcendence” and its relation to 
“immanence.” In other words, the question of transcendence is here defined not 
first with respect to “God” or “the sacred” or “the supernatural” or any other 
specifically religious point of orientation, but rather more broadly and formally, 
simply with respect to a question about “human flourishing.”987  
 
For Janz, Taylor’s appeals to the “transcendent” presume what needs to be argued. Taylor 
needs to offer, in other words, “some sort of critical or rationally demonstrative account, 
however indirect it might have to be, of what the meaningfully authoritative ‘content’ of 
the transcendent might be for human life.”988 Taylor may appeal to theological sources, 
may invoke agape, yet “these claims are not demonstrated, in any critically constructive 
way, to be attributable uniquely to transcendent or theistic sources.”989 
 Perhaps we could phrase Janz’s critique of Taylor in metaxological terms: is 
Taylor guilty of “postulatory theism,” does he presume what needs, in the end, to be 
argued for and proven convincingly? He may draw a compelling map, he may well 
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exhort us to discover new itineraries to the sacred, but why should we bother looking? If 
we want to appease Janz, what we need is not merely a logical appeal to the transcendent 
but an ontological account of its reality.  
 Can Desmond offer a response to Janz’s call for a “rationally demonstrative 
account, however indirect it might have to be”? My answer: yes, Desmond provides us 
with a series of indirections capable of awakening us to, and informing us about, the 
transcendent. Desmond supplements Taylor’s map by giving us a way to dwell mindfully 
upon it and thickens Taylor’s narrative by revealed the ontological depths of the metaxu. 
Metaxology capacitates and encourages its practitioners to assume a contemplative stance 
toward the whole of the created order. Desmond’s indirections do not gesture toward an 
aloof reality “out there” in the Empyrion. His metaxological route leads us, 
mystagogically, into the depths of being where our sense of the mystery abiding at the 
heart of creation can be rekindled. In drawing us toward this mystery,  
the strangeness of the middle returns in an otherness beyond the middle as 
comprehended. The strangeness is not that of a hostile stranger, but rather of an 
intimate from which one has been estranged, which estrangement now begins to 
be slowly overcome. We move back closer into proximity to the “It is good.” Our 
ears, long caked with misunderstanding, hear sporadically only a faint echo of 
song. We have been deaf for too long. This deafness can last centuries, as with 
Western modernity that has systematically closed its hearing to “It is good.”990  
 
Metaxological metaphysics does not offer us a neutral “proof” of the Transcendent. By 
implicating us within the poetics of the between, metaxology capacitates us to behold the 
“crack” in everything and gives us a systematic way to reflect on how all of creation is 
interrelated not only with one another but also, and more importantly, with its endowing 
source. If we take “being religious” at its most basic level (religare: to tie or bind), by 
renewing our sense of the primordial porosity of being we come to realize how we are, all 
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of us, “bound up with” the rest of the created order. To be is to be in relation, to be 
intimately related to all other beings including the Creator who sustains being. To be, in 
effect, is to be radically or fundamentally religious.  
 For Desmond, the relationship between reason and faith, or philosophy and 
theology, does not require us to build a bridge between them. It requires, instead, 
embarking upon an archaeological expedition, a seeking where we may come into contact 
with the logos at the origin (arche) of reason itself. Desmond writes: 
We are enabled to seek the truth before we possess the truth, and this prior 
enabling is not determinate thought, nor determined through ourselves alone, 
hence it cannot be defined in the logic of autonomy. This prior enabling is just 
what allows us to be relatively autonomous at all. We would not be autonomous 
were not autonomy enabled by something prior to and other to autonomy. Self-
determining thinking is released into its own freedom to think for itself by an 
enabling resource that is not self, a source not be captured in terms of this or that 
determinate thought, or by thought’s own determination by and for itself. There is 
more that allows thinking to be itself more than itself.991  
 
Theology and philosophy are, each in its own way, responses to the call of the 
Transcendent, a call not only heard “out there” in the happening of exterior transcendence 
(T1) but also in the very depths of our own being (T2). Each discipline records a response: 
fides quarens intellectum and intellectus quarens fidem. For a faith seeking 
understanding, a metaxologically awakened porosity serves to “remind theology that the 
task of coming to understand is never simply left behind, and truth is not something that 
can be grasped in a closed fist.”992 Caputo kicks up his heels and dances: the “Truth” is 
not something one grasps, or can claim dominion over, but is approached asymptotically 
without hope of possessing it. Rather than a closed fist of possession, theology’s gesture 
is an open-armed gesture of receptivity and welcome to One who cannot be encompassed 
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by our arms. Likewise, a “seeking intelligence” is a response to a call; reason, like faith, 
has a vocation. Whereas the modern theorist would affect a pose of cool and calculated 
indifference, Desmond exhorts us to join ranks with the theōroi who luxuriate in the ludic 
happening of the metaxu. Perhaps, he writes,  
the vocation of reason is to ponder this exceeding. Perhaps it is to grant anew the 
porosity of philosophy and religion, closed in the interim of univocalizing 
modernity, now itself coming to a close. In the interim of new time, the secret 
enigma of being, the mysterious love of the divine, passes beyond that closure.993  
 
Philosophy’s vocation is not to take wing at dusk and survey, from a distance, all that has 
transpired during the day. Philosophy is called, instead, within the metaxu where it can 
respond to its vocation to be a “lover of wisdom” by discerning “what is most import, and 
ultimate: what it means to be, to be true, to be good, to be a human person, what is or is 
not sacred, what God is.”994  
 I wish to dwell for a moment on philosophy as a vocation. For it is nothing out of 
the ordinary to speak of theology as a vocation to reflect on the revealed content of faith. 
But, Desmond avers, a sense of vocation applies to the philosopher:   
Since there is a call, there is a receiving more primal than any self-asserting. The 
receiving so qualifies the self-asserting, that all self-affirmation might undergo a 
metanoia in which our indebtedness to an endowing source beyond ourselves 
move us in the direction of gratitude rather than self-glorification. There is 
reverence for what has been given rather than arrogance for what is claimed as 
one’s own.995  
 
As an activity philosophy is elicited, invited, rather than self-initiated. In this, it shares 
with theology the task of listening and discerning, of opening itself to what is Other to 
self. As practices, philosophy and theology share a common commitment: before 
speaking, or reflecting, they are open – because opened – and receptive. Both have roots 
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extending deep into the primal ethos where the secret sap of Mystery flows into and 
enlivens each. Philosophy, as metaxology, and Christian theology discern, in the “crack” 
separating them, a shared sense of an abiding logos. For the philosopher, the logos sings 
the ancient melody of Creation; for the theologian undergoing the passio caritatis, 
Scripture and Tradition attune her ears to hear in this melody a call to discipleship. She is 
capacitated in this way and given to behold the abiding presence of the Risen One.  
 To assist Taylor and to respond to Janz, we might read Desmond as providing not 
an indirection but a series of indirections enabling us to perceive in the immanent order 
signs of the Transcendent. He gives us a way of being mindful upon Taylor’s map, a 
mode of perception capable of seeing all things in a new light. If Taylor wants new ways 
to encounter the sacred, Desmond allows him to look anew at old ways to see if the old 
routes may yet have life within them. Tutored by Desmond, we do not need two different 
maps, one philosophical and one theological, because we can see how every map of 
creation possess philosophical and theological layers. The “crack” in everything renders 
philosophy and theology, or at least a metaxological philosophy and theology, porous to 
one another. The theological layer is not imposed but exposed and revealed by the 
godsend and our response, in faith, is to live according to the logic of these depths. 
Theology, like philosophy, becomes a way of life.  A metaxological map leads us to the 
“crack” and bids us listen. Attuned by the passio caritatis, we hearken to the woo of the 
divine as the metaxu’s theological layers are revealed and we are drawn deeper into the 
Mystery at the heart of all being where we encounter the Risen One.   
The “crack” between a metaxological metaphysics and theology allows an 
intermediation between the disciplines at their most basic level. But “crack” could, and I 
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think should, be taken not simply as a passage but as a festive happening in its own right. 
Just as the Irish speak of the “crack” or the happening, there is a rhythmic interplay 
between philosophy and theology, reason and faith, into which all can be drawn. What 
metaxology does is to show how we are always already caught up in the happening, in 
the “crack” of being. Again, as Desmond observes, we start in the midst of things and  
we are open to things. We are open because we are already opened. Before we 
come to ourselves as more reflectively thoughtful, we already are in a porosity of 
being, and are ourselves as this porosity of being become mindful of itself. This 
ethos of being I call “the between,” and for me metaphysics is not an abstraction 
from this but a more deeply mindful engagement with it. We are already enabled 
to be within the between.996   
 
If Taylor draws us a reliable map of our secular age, if he has shown us how the desert of 
modern atheism has taken over once lush fields, perhaps Desmond offers us something of 
an oasis. For Desmond gives us, not a new map, but the permit and the tools to begin 
excavating Taylor’s map in order to uncover wellsprings of life-giving water. As a 
response to Janz, Desmond might say: the sources of human fullness do not hover above 
us but reside deep within the earth. We do not need abstract arguments; we need, instead, 
archaeological courage. As Desmond’s understanding of the godsend would seem to 
make clear, the irruption of the godsend does not deliver us over to a different or 
alternative reality. By inducing a breakdown, the inbreaking of the transcendent is a 
breakthrough transforming the way we perceive, and dwell within, the metaxu.  
 Let me conclude by asking: have we helped Desmond out of the theological 
closet? Do not think me cheeky, but I reckon my answer can be no other than a 
metaxological yes-no, allowing the “yes” and the “no” to interpenetrate and qualify one 
another. Yes, Desmond’s recent writing, as seen in “Godsends,” demonstrates an 
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openness to theology, even if only generally. His treatment of the revelatory godsend, his 
language of kenosis, and his understanding of creatio ex nihilo are all elements drawn out 
of a theological idiom. Metaxology, in this way, is certainly hospitable to theological 
language; as he observes, philosophical thinking is at its richest when it is in 
“intermediation with its significant others, such as art and religion.”997 Then again, I must 
a No, as he does not offer any sort of a confessional or explicitly Christian theology. 
Christ may be an exemplar, or the exemplar, but he never advances beyond this point. 
God and the Between is hospitable to Christ, perhaps is even haunted by Christ, but 
Desmond’s feet remain, as Kearney notes, within the philosophy of religion. If 
Desmond’s personal commitments come to the surface, this need not be taken as a sign of 
contamination. It may well show the porosity between philosophy and theology and 
illustrate how the Logos of theology is no stranger to metaxology. 
  On more than one occasion I have muttered, not without irony, the phrase “For 
Christ’s sake!” when reading Desmond. For me to make a theological case for developing 
the passio caritatis, I would need to show how it converges with and departs from what 
Desmond calls the compassio essendi. This is easier said than done. Consider the 
following where, writing mostly of pagan gods, Christ seems suddenly to slip in:  
The gods come to nothing but it is in their coming to nothing that they come to be 
as for the suffering mortal. In coming to nothing they come to be reborn as the 
providers of agapeic festivity. They are offered as sacrifices of laughter. They too 
consent to the passio essendi in laughing with it, and at the folly of the conatus 
essendi. As offers, they become compassio essendi. This reaches its absolute form 
in the God of Christ – absolute porosity, absolving porosity, passing into and 
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through the mortal agony of the human and its passio – absolute passion now 
become a compassio essendi. This absolves the intimate universal.998  
 
Amidst the idols, a reference to the God of Jesus Christ! Is this a God amidst gods or at 
the exclusion of them? Christ as literary exemplar or Savior? One of a kind or unique? Is 
this compassio an achievement or a gift of grace? Does Desmond have a twinkle in his 
eye as he writes this, knowing how muttering “Ah, for Christ’s sake!” might lead to 
further speculation in a theological key? We may ponder, but he offers no ready answer.  
 My answer, a qualified yes-no, places Desmond neither in, nor out, of any closet 
as though theology and philosophy were at root two hermetically sealed-off. In keeping 
with the Chronicles of Narnia, maybe Desmond is more an owner of a wardrobe through 
which one finds secret and unexpected passages between modes of thought. What a 
speaker leaves unsaid does not mean it is unspeakable; if Desmond has not worked out 
the theological implications of his thought fully, there is no reason for others not to take 
up this task. To be sure, I would like more clarity about how he sees his religious 
commitment affecting his metaphysics. If porosity allows for passage between 
disciplines, it would then be helpful to hear something about the rationale behind his 
selection of certain exemplars (Christ) and concepts (kenosis). In fact, I think Desmond 
would find such disclosures most welcome. As Walter Kasper writes, Christology itself: 
inquires not just into this or that existent, but into existence in general. A 
Christian is so to speak compelled to become a metaphysician on account of his 
faith...A pluralistic approach to philosophies and theologies is not only legitimate 
but necessary. But, fundamentally, Christology cannot be inserted into any 
predetermined philosophical system. And there is no question of applying 
predetermined philosophical categories within Christology. On the contrary, faith 
in Jesus Christ is a radical questioning of all closed systems of thought.999   
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Christ, once more, throws everything off balance and punctures hitherto closed systems 
of thought to reveal the depths of being itself. While Desmond does not come out directly 
to posit Christ as the in-between, perhaps it is the case that the very nature and structure 
of metaxology is deeply inflected by this Christological insight. The scope of 
metaxology, and Christology scope, may resonate in their depths at the level of Logos.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
  
 I entitled this chapter “Epiphanic Attunement” because I believe this to be the 
effect metaxology has on those who practice it as a mode of philosophical and theological 
reflection. As a philosophical askesis, it encourages us to see how extraordinary the 
ordinary is. As I have tried to show throughout, metaxology opens up a new mode of 
perception by giving us to behold the “crack” or equivocity of being. This way of seeing 
runs counter to the normal mode of perception operative in our modern ethos. 
Consequently, we have needed to “exercise” ourselves metaxologically to attune our 
vision to detect the “crack.” Like any spiritual exercise, this askesis was not primarily 
directed at changing the way we think but, instead, at forming and transforming the way 
we perceive and abide in the metaxu. Metaxology, undertaken as a form of spiritual 
exercises, aims to cultivate a mode of mindfulness and a concomitant mode of life.  
 But, when Desmond introduces his idea of “godsends,” he seems to move us into 
close proximity with the realm of theology. Having developed a metaxological sense of 
orthoaesthesis, I tried to “test it” by looking at Flannery O’Connor and two Gospel 
narratives. I wanted to demonstrate how not every breakdown was a defeat or a loss. 
Paradoxically, instances of breakdown can be counted as a gain when they facilitate some 
form of transformative breakthrough. The breakdown/breakthrough dialectic undergone 
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in the “Return to Zero” pulses within “Revelation” and the Gospels. To be implicated in 
this dialectic is to undergo a gradual attunement leading to a transformation of the fides 
quae and the fides qua. In the register of Christian theology, epiphanic attunement 
gradually tutors us to recognize not only general disclosures of the Divine but, in 
Scripture and Tradition, the presence of the Risen Christ in the ecclesia. I then introduced 
the idea of the passio caritatis and suggested adding orthoaesthesis to the triad: 
orthodoxy, orthopraxis, orthopathy. Although in need of development, both suggest ways 
in which metaxology can be expanded and put in the service of the life of faith.  
 Finally, I returned to Quebec in order to raise the question about the relationship 
between metaxology and theology. Rather than regarding philosophy and theology as 
impermeable disciplines, Desmond locates at their abyssal depth a shared grounding in 
the primal ethos. Philosophy and theology are vocations, responses, to a call not of our 
own issuance. Instead of constructing bridges, Desmond leads us down into their origin 
in the Mystery of being. Metaxology systematically guides our inquiry and poetically 
implicates us in the happening of the between and rekindles a sense of being “bound to” 
(religare) the whole of creation. If we are astonished to find ourselves in this shared 
home, in listening to the “crack” we may find ourselves drawn into an even deeper layer 
by the passio caritatis who draws us not toward an anonymous presence but into the 
heart of the divine life itself. Though they are distinct, philosophy and theology are 
unified in a sort of enriched poverty: theology knows its content to be a gift and not its 
achievement, and philosophy knows it cannot on its own that for which it hungers. In this 
shared confession of poverty, the antinomy between reason and faith dissolves and they 
are enjoined to help one another discern, and live into, their vocations.  
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  In an era of fragmentation and suspicion of grand claims, Desmond sounds a 
discordant metaphysical note. He arrives not as the grand architect of “The System” but 
as one who has painstakingly worked out a new way of being mindful. He offers us, in 
effect, something of a training program: a long and at times arduous syllabus of exercises 
and practices aimed at transforming how we dwell in the between. Instead of informing 
about how the world is, these exercises capacitate us to behold the world with new eyes. 
Of course, this apprenticeship never ends: the overdeterminacy of being cannot ever be 
exhausted or plumbed by finite beings. Rather than a source of frustration, to perceive the 
metaxu’s inexhaustible depths is the gift and grace of our renewed eyes. The whole of 
being does not only point, but can to those who are epiphanically attuned, sing of its 
Creator. Moreover, if our senses have begun to be tutored by the passio caritatis to hear 
the call of the Risen One who plays in ten thousand places, then our sojourn in Cork has 
not been in vain. Indeed, our time has allowed us to return to the arterial vein of Mystery 
that nourishes philosophy and theology and has allowed us to see how, rather than rivals, 
both are vocations to listen to, and to respond, to the address of the Transcendent One.  
 Let us take our leave of Desmond’s hearth and head over to the local pub where 
we can invite Taylor to join us as we assess our travels. As dusk falls over this stage of 
my project, as the heathery purple light of the gloaming proclaims the end of one day and 
the beginning of nightfall, it is time to take stock of our travels.  
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(In)Conclusion 
If transcendence as other is vertical to time, cutting into it, cutting across it, we are asked 
to be ready for renewal in the interruptions of immanence…The mystery is always there, 
seldom named, never dispelled. In ethical, religious, and philosophical service, beyond all 
determinate cognition, we live from agapeic astonishment, live in metaphysical 
perplexity before this mystery. In a mindfulness beyond determinate knowing, the 
Unequal comes toward us, offering over and over again, the unearned gift of the agape of 
being, singing to our deafness the unbearable music of the ultimate amen.   
 
-William Desmond, Being and the Between 
 
 Charles Taylor and William Desmond place an order at the bar and find a table. 
They are just in time. In the corner, a handful of musicians sit in a circle. An old man in 
the knit sweater taps his bow upon the table and the musicians fall silent. He begins to 
play the first notes of a tune he learned as a boy, a tune he has in turn taught to 
generations of other musicians. The tune’s provenance is unknown, its author long 
forgotten. But the melody lives on in an unspoken and unbroken musical tradition. Flute 
and harp, whistle and pipes, accordion and fiddle: the seisiún begins. An ancient melody 
is born anew in the pub as musical voices interweave and intermingle, each drawing 
strength from the other. One tune leads effortlessly into another. A pause and then a set of 
reels led by a young woman, a fine whistle player. Desmond recognizes the tune, raises 
his glass to Taylor, and drinks deep. Words are neither needed nor adequate. Here where 
the odor of turf hangs in the air, where the music englobes its listeners, where women and 
men reminisce about the past and look eagerly toward the future, where poems are recited 
and songs are sung: this is good craic. No determinate thing in itself, the craic is an 
atmospheric happening, an overdeterminate event of being together. All are implicated in 
the craic for it surrounds and binds all together. Not even the world-weary resist tapping 
a foot in time or holding themselves back from the craic, or “crack,” in everything.  
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 We have come a long way since we first met Charles Taylor in Quebec. The map 
he drew of our secular age helped to orient us as we began our journey. He guided us 
from the restrictive constraints of the moral corral out into the wider ethical field and 
then, in a most daring move, bid us to enter the untracked forest where we might 
encounter the sacred once more. Yet, as Paul Janz trenchantly observed, Taylor leaves a 
key question unanswered: why should we trust Taylor’s map? Tolkien drew detailed 
maps of Middle Earth, but the map is not the territory. Without some sort of “rationally 
demonstrative account, however indirect it might have to be, of what the meaningfully 
authoritative ‘content’ of the transcendent might be for human life,”1000 Taylor seems 
susceptible of the charge of having committed the philosophical error of dogmatism, the 
“rationally unsustainable reification or hypostatization (into a putatively objectively 
authoritative or ontological source) of a ‘transcendent’ point of reference that is, in truth, 
only a linguistic (and negative) notion of the intellect.”1001 Taylor’s map, one might say, 
stands in need of some sort of metaphysical mooring lest his summons for new itineraries 
to the sacred be dismissed as little more than a snipe hunt.  
 We then set off from Quebec and made our way to Cork where we enjoined 
William Desmond to uncover the hidden metaphysical depths of Taylor’s map. We began 
our pilgrimage by canvassing several prominent philosophers of religion – Heidegger, 
Caputo, Kearney, and Westphal – to find out how previous metaphysical undertakings 
had erred. We then compiled a list of “Five Commandments” the would-be 
metaphysician would need to obey. The bulk of Chapter Two then served to introduce 
readers to a considerations of Desmond’s metaxological philosophy. Without any 
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pretense being an all-encompassing “system,” metaxology provides us with concepts and 
categories capable of describing what it means to be in “the between” or metaxu. Riffing 
on Emerson and Leonard Cohen, we saw how metaxology was especially attentive to the 
“crack” in everything. Metaxology capacitates us to perceive the “crack” in all things not 
as a fatal flaw or mortal wound but, rather, as the mark of the porosity of being itself. To 
be at all is to be in relation with the whole of creation. The “crack” in everything 
bespeaks the fragility and gratuity of being itself and points beyond finitude toward the 
endowing source of all existence.  
 In Chapter Three, we used the work of Pierre Hadot to frame Desmond’s 
philosophy as a form of spiritual exercise. Here I tried to show metaxology, approached 
as an askesis or practice, “worked.” The poetics of the between not only inform but also, 
and more importantly, form the way the reader beholds the metaxu. Metaxological 
poetics “work” not only to communicate what it means to be in the between but also to 
implicate the reader the metaxu’s happening. One might see this as being capacitated with 
what Keats called “negative capabilities” – the ability to stand in the darkness, ambiguity, 
mysteries and doubts of existence. We are led into the crushing darkness of the nihil 
where we undergo the breakdown of our determinate categories and conceptual idols. 
This breakdown, though, makes possible a breakthrough into a new way of beholding the 
whole of being. The patterns we followed in Chapter Four was that of katabasis and 
anabasis, of descent and ascent, as we considered how undergoing metaxology can serve 
to transform the way we perceive the created order. Metaxology does not deliver to a 
different reality but gives us to behold reality differently. We are endowed what I called 
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“epiphanic attunement” and made able to perceive the disclosures of the Transcendent in 
and through the immanent order.  
 In Chapter Five, I borrowed a term from Edmund Husserl – orthoaesthesis – and 
gave a metaxological sense of what “right perception” might mean. We moved from 
Ruby Turpin’s pig parlor to the Road to Emmaus and saw how the irruption of the 
godsend works to uncover the concealed depths and to reveal the secret life at the heart of 
being itself. The godsend is, in this way, less an imposition than a graced exposition 
allowing the innermost reality of creation to shine forth. The Holy One is disclosed 
through the Taboric light of the Transfiguration and, as Saint Teresa of Avila once noted, 
“amidst the pots and pans.” Epiphanic attunement becomes an abiding disposition, a 
vigilant patience as one awaits with one’s entire being the advent of Sacred. Epiphanic 
attunement, cultivated through the practice of metaxological askesis, cannot compel God 
to speak but maintains a stance of hospitality for the unexpected arrival of the Divine. 
Where others would see the unwanted and despised, the epiphanically attuned agent 
perceives not an alien Other but a sister and brother. If Gerard Manley Hopkins is right, if 
Christ does indeed play in ten thousand places, then the whole of the Christian life can be 
seen as bristling with joyful anticipation as one strains to perceive the visage of Christ in 
all persons. The epiphanically attuned subject incarnates what Saint Paul exhorts: 
“Rejoice always, pray without ceasing, give thanks in all circumstances” (1 Thes. 5:16-
17). One becomes a living embodiment of prayer; one who, in word and deed, enacts an 
eschatological petition: Maranatha, “Come, O Lord, Come!” 
 What, then, might be said of Desmond’s achievements, both philosophical and 
theological? Should Taylor take Janz’s critique to heart, Desmond arrives as a welcome 
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presence. Rather than extending the borders of Taylor’s map, Desmond’s archaeological 
endeavor penetrates deep into the soil to uncover hidden reservoirs of life-giving water. 
Even in the midst of the desert of modern atheism – to recall Dupré’s metaphor – one can 
dig down and discover wellsprings sufficient to turn the parched desert into an oasis. 
Desmond has, in my estimation, aided Taylor in helping to firm up the metaphysical 
foundations of his map. There is, indeed, a there to be sought. This is no snipe hunt. And 
this there is not just at the borders but is, for those with eyes to see and ears to hear, 
everywhere. The Transcendent abides in the immanent; God is found in all things.  
 In guiding us along a series of indirections, Desmond seems to respond to 
Taylor’s call for new and innovative itineraries leading us toward an encounter with God. 
Some of these ways, as we saw, are repristinations of formerly reliable ways. Rather than 
severing “the ways” from the ethos, Desmond allows the “ways” to reframe and 
transform the way we behold all of reality. He tutors us through these indirections to 
perceive the excessiveness and gratuity of creation. Just as a seisiún is more than the sum 
of the musicians and their instruments, so too there more to creation than the totality of 
beings. The craic or “crack” bespeaks this too-muchness, this overdeterminate 
atmosphere of happening. Music, like the metaxu, points beyond itself to an inexpressible 
surplus incapable of being pinned down or captured by concepts. The “crack” in 
everything is porous to another logic, the logic of a wholly, nay Holy, Other. Metaxology 
gives us to behold how living according to this logic is not a threat, pace Kant, to our 
autonomy. On the contrary, it is this absolving heteronomy that endows us with authentic 
autonomy: we are as we should be precisely because we have been given to be by this 
Origin. At the root of existence, of all existence, is not the wanton exercise of power but 
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the agapeic creativity of the One who sings creation into being. The Christian, in turn, is 
the one who has encountered in the graced porosity of the Risen Christ’s wounds, the 
human face of this Agapeic Creator.  
 As a theologian, I might say with a wink: William Desmond has shown that 
metaphysics does have a prayer. In dubbing Desmond the “Last Metaphysician,” perhaps 
Manoussakis underestimates the staying power of metaphysics. In Desmond, perhaps, 
there as has been a metaphysical awakening. After a long slumber and generations of 
desuetude, a metaxological approach to metaphysical reflection seems to be one viable 
metaphysical option. Should Desmond be regarded as a 21st century prophet of 
metaphysics, his address echoes Mark Twain who, upon hearing rumors of his own death, 
quipped, “The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated.” Without any pretense to 
being the way, metaxological metaphysics records a way. It is not a hegemonic attempt at 
grasping and controlling but is, instead, a vocation to give an account of what it means to 
be at all. It originates not in idle speculation or abstract reasoning but as a response to the 
astonishment of having been addressed by the advent of the Transcendent. One hazards to 
speak as a metaphysician because one recognizes oneself as having been bidden to do so.   
 As a discourse, metaxology serves the philosophical and theological life.   
 In this way, metaxology has a prayer insofar as it leads its practitioners to assume a 
stance of vigilant listening. Attentive to the “crack” in everything, one patiently listens. 
One opens oneself to the silence and waits in longing. Of this act Rahner once wrote: 
Perceiving God’s silence is also an answer that makes the listening meaningful. 
Under God’s silence too we may be become what we have to be at any rate: 
personal finite spirit before the personal infinite free God, with whom we 
necessarily have to deal, at least by being aware of God’s silence.1002  
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The caducity of discourse is the happy fault, the felix culpa of human reason: when our 
words are exhausted and our concepts shattered, then in the rubble one may hear in the 
silence the woo of the Holy One. A metaxological itinerary, guiding us through the 
“Return to Zero” traverses a mystagogical path whereby our senses are purged as we 
undergo the dark night of nihilism. The purgation of darkness unclogs our primal porosity 
and we cry with Samuel: Speak, Lord, your servant is listening! And, as night cedes to 
dawn, as our eyes peer through the dust and debris of our fallen idols, the dawn from on 
high breaks upon us. The dawn does not dispel or banish the Mystery into which we have 
been drawn but deepens it. We blink with orthoaesthetically attuned eyes and perceive 
how the logos of being is agape. The Logos is not a disengaged canon floating high in the 
sky like Plato’s sun; it is, rather, incarnate and present in history. Thus Balthasar:  
It is too good to be true: the mystery of being, revealed as absolute love, 
condescending to wash his creatures’ feet, and even their souls, taking upon 
himself all the confusion of guilt, all the God-directed hatred, all the accusations 
showered upon him with cudgels, all the disbelief that arrogantly covers up what 
he had revealed, all the mocking hostility that once and for all nailed down his 
inconceivable movement of self-abasement—in order to pardon his creature, 
before himself and the world.1003    
 
For those with eyes to see, Christ “the power of God and the wisdom of God” (1 Cor 
1:24) is encountered the core and essence of being itself. The scandal of Jesus’ 
particularity is, for many, an utterly idiotic and impossible to believe claim. But for those 
given the dark grace to experience how “God’s foolishness is wiser than human wisdom, 
and God’s weakness is stronger than human strength” (1 Cor 1:25), the idiocy of 
Christianity’s claim records the breakthrough being itself, agape itself, as it works to 
reconfigure our ethos according to the logic of God’s Kingdom. The Christian, 
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consequently, finds oneself caught up in the pierced-yet-glorified grasp of the Agapeic 
One and invited to say nothing more and nothing less than Amen with one’s being. The 
credibility of Christianity depends upon this assent, upon one’s willingness to become an 
idiot for Christ as one is moved by love to “Go and do likewise” (Lk 10:37).  
 Would that I could now write, “In conclusion” and bring this project to a close. 
Such resolution may sate an appetite for closure but would, I fear, betray the spirit of the 
project. There can be no cut-and-dry resolution, no Answer, no final sentence after which 
one might “drop the mic” and exit the stage. There is only, as I hinted above, an 
(in)conclusion. When the last order of the night is placed, when the musicians play the 
evening’s last set and as the barkeep washes glasses, there is but a temporary cessation of 
activity. Revelers will go their separate ways and the musicians will pack their 
instruments, but the craic is neither expunged nor exhausted. It lives on in memory and 
coaxes us, over and over again, into the future. Heraclitus: you can never step into the 
same river twice. The seisiún: you can never play the same tune twice because the living 
tradition refuses to be fixed and insists on growing and evolving. Metaxology: speak of 
the between as much as you like, sing of it and commend it to verse, but there will always 
be too much to be said and sung. Metaxology bids us to stay faithful to the flux, to remain 
awake and alert to the dynamism of the metaxu, and to allow ourselves to be drawn into 
and transformed by the intermediation of being. On the proscenium of the metaxu, there 
are no objective spectators: we are, all of us, a part of the ongoing performance.  
 To read Taylor’s map with metaxological eyes is to perceive, even in the most 
unlikely places, openings to the Transcendent and new ways of reflecting on how the 
Holy One is disclosed in time and space. I have endeavored, throughout this essay, to 
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show how metaxology can enter into fruitful and illuminating dialogue with poetic, 
musical, literary, and theological sources. I have indicated, furthermore, certain places 
where these insights might be further developed. How might metaxology be illuminated 
by, and reciprocally illuminate, the work of Ian McGilchrist’s The Master and His 
Emissary or social psychologists such as Kenneth Gergen and Jonathan Haidt? How 
might Desmond be brought into conversation with theologians such as René Girard, 
Sarah Coakley, and Karl Rahner? I have suggested how one might develop something 
like the passio caritatis or offer a fourth dimension (orthoaesthesis) to the triad of 
orthodoxy, orthopathy, and orthopraxis. If we are sensitive to the dynamism of 
metaxology, what would it look like to re-read, say, the Council of Chalcedon (451 CE)? 
Might we find in Chalcedon an anticipation of metaxology’s unwillingness to “freeze the 
flux” and it tries to express the paradoxical fullness of Christ’s humanity and divinity? 
Could our understanding of the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist be enriched by a 
metaxological re-framing? Might metaxology assist us in re-thinking the relationship not 
only between theology and philosophy but also between theology and science?  
  To my mind, William Desmond’s theological achievement is found in 
metaxology’s ability to provide not just a way of thinking but, when undertaken as a form 
of spiritual exercise, a way of living. Metaxology, studied in this way, concerns less what 
one perceives than how one does so. It makes possible what Paul Crowley has called a 
“mystagogy of believing” drawing one into the depths of the Mystery at the heart of all 
creation.1004 In an odyssey akin to Bonaventure’s The Journey of the Mind to God, one is 
guided stepwise to perceive God’s presence in all things. Led by grace along this 
itinerary the wayfarer undergoes, like Francis, a transitus from slavery to freedom, from 
                                               
1004 Crowley, “Mystagogy and Mission: The Challenge of Nonbelief and the Task of Theology,” 24. 
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death to new life. We are plunged into the purgative darkness of divine Mystery and 
given to behold, in time, the form of the Crucified One in whom we are called to 
sabbatical rest. By practicing metaxology as an askesis, by exercising transcendence as 
we journey through the metaxu, we may begin to find ourselves rocked back on our heels: 
what had seemed the unstoppable eclipse of transcendence, when beheld with 
metaxologically attuned eyes, appears now to be a new dawn. As the darkling plane is 
gradually illuminated by the new morning’s light, one is astonished to experience oneself 
englobed by and caught up in the presence of the Holy One who sings to us in our 
deafness and renews our porosity to the Transcendent.  
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